University of South-Eastern Norway
School of Business
–
Master's Thesis
Study programme: HI-MAS5000
Autumn 2022/Spring 2023

Edward Troth

A study of the wartime experiences of twenty naval veterans

The Reality of the war at sea for the men of the Royal Norwegian navy during the second world war.



University of South-Eastern Norway
School of Business
Institute of Economy, History & Social sciences
PO Box 235
NO-3603 Kongsberg, Norway

http://www.usn.no

This thesis is worth 60 study points

Summary

This thesis takes a series of interviews conducted by the Horten naval museum in Norway and seeks to answer the question as to what the men interviewed viewed as the most significant, yet unexpected aspects of their wartime experiences in the service of the Royal Norwegian navy during the second world war. It is to use their testimony through a series of oral histories, in conjunction with other source material to create a complete picture of their wartime service, bringing to light new information about their own, personal experiences, along with those of the Royal Norwegian navy as a whole.

Throughout this study one will see how seemingly un-related events, incidents, and seemingly unimportant aspects of the war at sea came to deeply affect the individuals who fought in an often-forgotten theatre of the second world war. One will come to learn how war affects the individual, and in turn, how it is perceived by the human perspective. Not only this, but to ask the question as to its significance for those who were affected by it the most. Most importantly however, this study shall convey three important things. Firstly, to paint a picture as to the type of men who served in the Royal Norwegian Navy during the second world war and how they compare and contrast, both as individuals and as a group. Secondly, to show the importance that seemingly benign aspects such as camaraderie and morale can have at sea along with unorthodox ways in which they manifested themselves. And finally, to unearth an ugly, yet important truth regarding their eventual return home post-war. Both detailing the reasons why, along with how the individual came to be affected.

Contents

Foreword

This thesis was created in collaboration with the Royal Norwegian naval museum in Horten, Norway. We would like to thank them for making available the source material for this study and for providing inspiration for this thesis. This thesis has been written under the guidance of Jan Thomas Kobberrød, during the period August 2022 – May 2023.

This thesis assumes some knowledge of the wider context that is the Second world war, along with basic knowledge regarding naval terminology. In its entirety, this thesis is dedicated to the men who served in the Royal Norwegian navy during the second world war.

Special thanks to Even Hagerup Gulliksen.

1 Introduction

The Royal Norwegian navy was the Kingdom of Norway's premier arm of the second world war. It was a branch of the Norwegian military that would serve from the first day of the Kingdom of Norway's war effort until the last, paying a higher price than any other branch of service. The experiences of those who came to serve in its ranks have however, been largely forgotten in the public image. Arguably, never receiving proper recognition for their sacrifices and efforts in exile and at home. It is these experiences that are of most interest to this study. The experiences of the ordinary men who served in the branches of the Norwegian navy. How they saw these events in the 1940s, and how they came to shape their perceptions on the second world war.

Until now, there has been little-to-no work done on such matters. There may have been written pieces and works regarding pitched battles or engagements, but to shed light on how the ordinary individual came to view their own actions in the context of the largest war ever seen, has been up until this point, an absent undertaking. How the individual sailor or naval airman viewed the war from their own, human perspective, and what mattered the most. Both then, and later in life. As of yet, these are questions that have not been answered. Questions that this study shall shed light upon. How the war came to affect the individual sailor and shape his perceptions on his service, is a rather daunting one. By using their testimony however, this study shall examine their wartime service through the lens that it deserves. Namely, through the eyes of the men who bore witness themselves.

The catalyst for such an undertaking, falls in large part at the feet of the Norwegian National naval museum, otherwise referred to as *Marinemuseet*, in Horten, Norway. It was under the purview of this institution that a series of interviews with twenty different Royal Norwegian Naval veterans, were conducted. Here their experiences would be documented through first-hand interviews of their recollections of their Naval service during the Second World War. From lauded operations such as the Normandy landings or the sinking of the *Scharnhorst*, to controversies such as the sinking of Norwegian civilian shipping, their experiences and recollections regarding their service during the second world war were meticulously recorded. Topics such as camaraderie, the importance of morale, the Normandy landings, the myriad of arctic convoys, and their eventual return home were all present in these interviews.

1.1 Outline view

Whilst the interviews come with many instances of recollections and observations made regarding wartime battles and engagements, and would make for interesting reading, they are not to form the main focus of this study. Rather, it is the aim of this study to focus instead on the contents of the interviews to examine and discuss the aspects of wartime service in the Royal Norwegian navy, that came to hold the most significance for the men who served in its ranks. More specifically, two aspects that came to affect the interviewees as much, if not more-so than any battle at sea. In their eyes, holding as much significance as to any medals won, or enemy ships sunk. These being, the significance of camaraderie and morale on board ship, coupled with an examination of their return home post-war.

This is not to say that individual battles and actions, such as sinking of HNoMS *Eskdale*[1] or the myriad of artic convoys are not important, they are. Rather, they are not to form the main focus of this study. Instead, they are to be used to either highlight, augment, or provide the setting for many of the elements that are to be written about. For example, much of the testimony regarding the effects and significance of morale aboard ship were to take place amid some of the most brutal, and terrifying engagements of the war. Yet, as one will go on to see, the testimony of those interviewees present highlights the significance that was the immediate first-hand perspective of the man interviewed. In the majority of cases, this was to be the Benzedrine tablet in his hand, or the jovial banter of his comrade. Not the tactical manoeuvring or logistical concern left to the officers on the bridge.

It should also be stated that the battles and engagements that the Royal Norwegian navy came to participate in have already been covered in a far from insignificant manner. In addition to this, conventional warfare does not occur as an isolated instance, however large or small the action. Rather it is an intertwined phenomenon. As originally put forward by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, Warfare consists of multiple levels, of which the individual only holds competency over the levels in which they have been sufficiently trained for.[2] Such doctrinal theorems have of course been

[1] HNoMS or HNorMS, is the naval abbreviation for *His/Her Norwegian Majesty's Ship*. Later changed in 1946 to *KNM*, itself an abbreviation for *Kongelig Norsk Marine*.

[2] Clausewitz, & Rapoport 1968: Clausewitz held the view that the art of war consisted of two inter-operating levels: strategy and tactics (pages 172-172), and that in war, the individual can only be expected to hold competency at the level for which they have been sufficiently trained (pages 167-168).

expanded upon since the era of Napoleonic warfare, and tweaked to reflect national differences and goals, along with an ever-changing battlefield. This is especially the case concerning the era of the second world war, where differing nations offered their own interpretations of Clausewitz's original theorems. In today's world, most of the West seems to follow the lead of the United States military, who see warfare as primarily consisting of three different levels. To this effect, the joint chiefs of staff of the United States armed forces hold the view that, "While the various forms and methods of warfare are ultimately expressed in concrete military action, the three levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—link tactical actions to achievement of national objectives."[3]

The observations and interpretations of the interviewed veterans should therefore, not be viewed in isolation, rather, as a part of a larger context as their experiences are deeply intertwined with and effected by the other levels of warfare. Therefore, any observations made by those interviewed regarding battles, and specific actions at sea remain largely unreliable. This being as the very nature of warfare itself dictates that any individual sailor interviewed can only competently account for their immediate surroundings at the time, as Clausewitz first predicted. Consequentially, if this study were indeed to focus upon the battles and engagements of the Navy, then all interpretations and observations made by the interviewees on their state of mind and perceptions during their naval service, would only cover the perception available to them at the time. Rarely, if ever, consisting of all three levels of warfare. In most cases, this would only cover the tactical level. If this were the case, then their testimony would prove to be unreliable at best, leaving out the other two levels of warfare not visible to them at the time.

Instead of using the interviewed testimony of these naval veterans to explain the various pitched battles and engagements in which they would fight, there presents itself another opportunity entirely. One for which the men of this study hold a far higher degree of competency. Rather, the interviews of the twenty naval veterans shed light on far more obscure, yet arguable just as significant elements and events regarding the story of their wartime service at sea. Experiences regarding morale and camaraderie aboard ship, along with their return home, have been a largely neglected aspect of the history of the

[3] Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2017: I-7

Royal Norwegian navy. This is especially the case when regarding their return home, as their experiences are just as varied and nuanced as their wartime service. Furthermore, the aspects of morale and camaraderie on board ship, coupled with the return home of the veterans interviewed are significant for several reasons. Not only do they form the bulk of the material of this study, but they invoke such a degree of detail, and personal significance for the interviewees, that one is given the impression that it was these three memories of their wartime service that had the most impact on the naval veterans being interviewed. An impact that is present both individually, with their own quirks and variations, but also of the group of veterans as a whole.

Although present, it is not ideas of grand strategy, liberating their occupied homeland, or even the glory of victory, that came to form most of the content of these interviews. Rather, their contents are far more nuanced, and reflect the thoughts and observations of the individual. Ideas and concepts such as victory, defeat, heroism, or even pride, that might seem more important from an external perspective, are wholeheartedly over-shadowed by recollections and perspectives that to the average person today, might seem in-significant. The main chapters regarding their experiences upon their return home, coupled with their recollections and observations regarding the effects, are two examples of this. Elements such as these, along with their manifestations were both far more important to the individuals interviewed. Thus, they were far more prevalent in their testimony. In turn, the more human experiences such as these, formed a key part in both the wartime, and post-war lives of these men.

1.2 Background for this study

As aforementioned, the branches of naval service were to bear the brunt of Norwegian combatant losses in the second world war. In turn, paying a cost in both men and materiel that the other branches of service were largely spared from. However, perhaps more importantly, whilst there has been a fair amount of both personal, and popular accounts regarding those who served in the merchant marine, and quite rightly so, little work has been done regarding the experiences of those who served in the Norwegian armed navy. More specifically, there has been little to no work categorising and examining the experiences of Naval servicemen of all ranks. From the enlisted deckhand to the highly educated staff officer, the experiences of Norwegian naval personnel during the second world war have largely been left to the personal level, with no singular work examining and describing their experiences in their entirety. It is thus

the purpose of this study to undertake this task. To comb through previously unheard, private testimony, and to use it as the valuable source material it has arguably proven to be. Hopefully, shedding new light on a central part of Norwegian history.

Furthermore, whilst several books were written about the various actions and engagements that the Norwegian navy in exile took part in, the experiences of the men who served and suffered in these engagements has not been written about in any significant manner. For example, whilst much can be said, and has indeed been written about the strategic implications and tactical variables about the Norwegian Navy's contribution to campaigns such as the battle for the Atlantic, the escorting of the arctic convoys to the Soviet Union, or even sinking of the Scharnhorst, little has been done in way of using first-hand accounts of naval servicemen to shed new light on such campaigns. As example, Erik Anker Steen's chronologies and annals on the Norwegian navy, written in the immediate post-war period, show the reader a great deal of information on the broader perspectives of the war. In this case, the perspectives of a staff officer at the operational and strategic levels. They do not however give much thought to the experiences of those serving at the individual level.

It is therefore all too often that one ignores the human consequence of war when examining conflicts of the past. This can prove to be a particular negation when the topic is that of the second world war. As is common knowledge, the Second world war was, and still is, the largest conventional war ever fought, and in a war of numbers, divisions, armies, and fleets, it is far too easy to forget the human level. It is far too easy to forget the fact that those who served were not mere statistics, but real individual people. It is therefore the individual that bears the brunt in any war, and the experiences of which, unless documented, die with them on their passing.

In summary, it is the aim of this study to not only document, but contextualise, use the two forms of material, i.e., the testimony of the individual veterans' observations and experiences in addition to source material pertaining to the wider strategic implications of the war, to provide a more complete, and new understanding of not only the role of the Norwegian navy during the second world war, but to also shed light on the experiences of the men who served.

1.3 The source material of this study

1.3.1 An examination of the written source material

The source material for this study is in large part consistent of two independent elements. Firstly, the core of this study is to make use of oral histories. More specifically, a series of interviews conducted between the Horten Naval Museum and twenty former naval personnel on their experiences during the second world war. Secondly, this study makes use of a considerable number of literary sources from both official, and unofficial histories.

1.3.1.1 The issue of politicised source material & personal interests

The first point of contention regarding the source material of this study is that of the written literature used in conjunction with, the series of interviews. In general, when one chooses to make use of literature regarding the second world war there are certain disclaimers and considerations that must be considered. The first of these considerations is that, whilst true of most, if not all forms of literature, writings about the second world war that were published during the early post-war period, are subject to a rather unique degree of politicisation. This is especially true of the early cold-war period of the 1950s and 60s where each nation tried to emphasise its own contribution to the war effort or even in some cases, amplify apologist sentiment. In essence, if the author was present in the decision or policy making apparatus of a state, within the time frame in question, the higher the likelihood there is of said source material being politicised or factually unreliable.

This is especially true when regarding source material that was written by, or about the conduct of individuals that came to affect either governmental or military policy and strategems. Prime examples of this being the U.S. military employing the likes of Franz Halder and Fritz Bayerlein, amongst others, to write official histories of the conflict, whilst in American captivity. Because of this, common perception on the war, both in the Anglosphere and most of the “West”, was skewed towards the viewpoints of a small cabal of now unemployed, German officers, with all its anti-Soviet, and apologist rhetoric. Whilst just a singular example, this was not an isolated occurrence.

The effects of this are still being felt today as writings such as these, along with famous memoirs by Albert Speer, Heinz Guderian, and Erich von Manstein, to name a few, helped warp public perception in a new era of hostility towards the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, in this era of scholarship and literature, both western and German faults, crimes, and shortcomings were overseen in favour of a new narrative. Consequentially, this massively downplayed Soviet and American tactical and operational successes in the war, whilst simultaneously overplaying German tactical ability, in turn portraying the Wehrmacht and German armed forces as a clean fighting force. This itself is something wholly untrue. It would of course later come to light that Franz Halder, Erich Manstein, Heinz Guderian, and Albert Speer, had been implicated in several war crimes that, had they been known at the time, would likely have seen them hang at Nuremberg. And whilst not unique to German officers, it was their writings that would unfortunately, become some of the most influential works regarding the second world war, and came to shape western perceptions as a direct result. It should of course be stated that this is perhaps one of the more extreme examples of how post-war literature came to be politicised. Yet the consequences of this politicisation should not be ignored. Furthermore, they should be laid bare to show how scholarship can be coloured by politicised narratives of the cold-war period.

One might be construed into thinking as to why such an observation is relevant to this study, an understandable thought. Upon further elaboration however, one realises that in relation to this study, the effects of this are two-fold. Firstly, the case of military officers, especially German ones, serves as an example to be wary of, albeit an extreme one. More specifically, it serves as an evidential warning as to how military officers can colour historical perceptions based on their own personal convictions. All, whilst maintaining an image of impartiality in the role of historical authorship. Secondly, by diminishing the effort of the Soviet Union in popular western thought, the efforts of those who supplied the Soviet armed forces and escorted those supplied were simply not prioritised as topics for writing material, be they scholarly or otherwise. Consequently, for many who served on the arctic convoys, as many in this study would come to do, their service wasn’t recognised as it arguably should have.

Arguably, an even more important reason for preferentially using more modern source material, however, coincides with the end of the cold war itself. Regarding this specific study, it was not until the opening of Soviet archives during the 1990s, and the de-classifying of military documents in the west at the end of the cold war, that historians were able to finally understand the significance of the arctic convoys, amongst other aspects of the war at sea. Contrary to orthodox scholarship and literature of the cold war

era, it had in fact turned out that the Soviet government had drastically understated the importance of the lend-lease that it had received during the war. In consequence, the importance played by the artic convoys in keeping the Soviets in the war had been unfairly diminished. For the men of this study who stood watch, protecting merchantmen and their ships from enemy attack, in the harshest of seas, and all those who served at sea on the merchant vessels bringing aviation fuel, tanks, grain and other war materiel to the Soviet Union, their contribution was largely not recognised until the late 1990s. It is still arguably, yet to be fully realised today.

The third key point to consider here, is that when considering a written source for this study, the fact that the author may have served in the navy should not be seen as a guarantee of authenticity or accuracy. Whilst they may provide a unique insight or observation, their writings should receive the same scrutiny as any other. Arguably, it should be scrutinised more so due to the issues of personal conflict, as already mentioned. In this study, there are two sets of works that fall into this category. These being the works of Eirik Anker Steen, and Fritz Otto-Busch's account of the sinking of the Scharnhorst. The latter being co-written by the war-time journalist Leif Bøhn, and another naval veteran, battery-chief on board HNoMS *Stord*, by the name of Nils Owren.

Thus, when choosing which sources and literature to use in this study, careful attention had to be paid in regard to politicisation. In addition to this, more modern scholarship and literature has consciously been prioritised wherever possible. Itself a decision that largely owes itself to the availability of de-classified archives and new information in recent years. However, in this topic, there are certain works of the immediate post-war years that cannot be ignored. The most notable of these being the assorted works of Erik Anker Steen titled, "Norges Sjøkrig", or "Norway's war at sea", when translated into English. Work on this series of books began during the latter stages of the war whilst Steen was still employed at the Royal Norwegian admiralty. With the first in the series being published in 1954.

Steen's works are not to be confused with the similar works, written by the author, and fellow naval officer Rolf Scheen. It must be stated however that whilst these were considered, the decision was made for this study to focus of Steen's works. This being as they are, in this opinion, more thorough when regarding the years spent in exile. A

fact further compounded when noting that Steen also makes use of Scheen's two books regarding the first year of the war, building upon Scheen's literature with his Steen's own observations. Steen's works also lack the politicisation commonly found in other works of the time, with a notable absence of personal opinions as to the conduct of the war. Instead focusing on hard data in the form of official reports, supply information, strategic directives and the like. And whilst Busch's writings on the sinking of the Scharnhorst provide include more of a narrative element, it is still an objective historical piece. Neither overplaying the Norwegian contribution to the operation, nor downplaying that of the British. All whilst lacking the politicisation and personal glorification inherent to contemporary Officers and authors.

The primary reason for highlighting these works, rather than those of more modern authors, is therefore two-fold. Firstly, for many high-profile veterans that came to write post-war scholarship or personal memoirs, their works are often tainted by politicisation of the cold-war era. Secondly, the issue of personal gain was a factor in the writings of many former military officers, arguably owing itself to the politicisation of cold war era histories. As already mentioned, many German officers would write official histories and personal memoirs to salvage their public image and wash their hands of crimes committed in the name of their respective leaders.

This was not a phenomenon isolated to Generals of the axis-powers either. It was present in the memoirs and publishing's of allied leaders too. Household names such as Bernard Montgomery, Arthur Harris, Mark Clark amongst others. As a result, any written material produced and published by wartime officers should arguable speaking be viewed with a certain degree of scepticism. Undergoing the same amount of scrutiny as any other source. This study therefore makes use of both modern articles and published books wherever possible. Be they medical journals documenting the use of amphetamines at sea, to modern scholarship with access to declassified statistical data regarding the battle of the Atlantic, they are for the most part, preferable to works written in the 50s and 60s.

1.3.2 The importance of newer source material

The reasons for the preferential use of more modern source material are thus two-fold: Firstly, the absence of personal involvement on the part of the author. This coupled with the second factor, namely that being the availability of recently de-classified documents

and sources in recent years. This second point stemming in large part from the wave of declassification of military and governmental archives after the end of the cold war. It is for these two reasons in particular, that most of the external literature regarding the main chapters of this study, be they medical journals and articles regarding substance use and abuse in the navy, or military journals regarding the significance in that Operation Downfall on the delayed return of Norwegian naval veterans post-war, is of a recent vintage. As a result of this, articles and literary works with access to declassified source material that would simply not have been available in the immediate post-war period, owing to issues regarding personal conflict, or political sensitivity. For example, the information regarding substance use (see chapter 4) would have been far too politically sensitive to have been released in the immediate post-war period, even if it had been de-classified.

The theoretical framework for using modern source material, is one that literary works such as these can supplement the oral sources in question and help provide a certain amount of context from a more detached perspective. A detached perspective from where the author is completely removed from any-and-all personal confliction with the events in question. That is not to say that modern scholarship and literature regarding the second world war is immune from politicisation, far from it. Politicisation here often takes the form of historical reconstructions through the eyes of modern political or national thought however such elements are far less subtle. In turn, being easily dealt with. Either through disclaimer, or through the use of a different source entirely.

Summarily it is because of the personal involvement of many cold-war era authors with the events in which they discuss that in many cases, coupled with the high degree of politicisation of their writings that more modern scholarship can prove to be preferable when regarding the second world war. Whilst more modern scholarship and literature, may at first seem although further detached in time from the events which they describe, one is assured at the very least that there is no issue of personal confliction. Also, their access to new information, largely in part due to the opening of state archives on both sides of the former iron curtain, makes for a more accurate representation. In turn making modern literature a preferable resource for this study.

1.3.3 The interviews themselves

The core source material of this study consists of a series of personal interviews conducted by the National Naval Museum in Horten during the early 2000s. These individuals, twenty in number, were all interviewed in a 1-to-1 capacity over the course of several hours with the specific time varying, depending on the contents of the individual's testimony. Most often however, they were conducted over two to three different sessions, usually lasting for roughly 45 minutes at a time. In this regard, the interviews consisted of a session where the interviewee talked about their pre-war background and occupation, followed by their perceptions and memories regarding the German invasion of 1940. At which time, they, for the most part, explained how they made the journey to Britain to join the Royal Norwegian navy. With subsequent sessions pertaining to their wartime service, and subsequent return home post-war.

1.3.3.1 Original transcripts vs audio files

Physically speaking, the interviews took on two forms that were available for academic study. The first of these being a series of bulleted transcripts made by the original team of interviewers at the museum, with the second being a series of recordings taken of the interviews themselves. Wherever possible, the testimony of the naval veterans in this study has been manually transcribed from the digital recordings of the interviews. This being that the original transcripts only divulge on the testimony deemed most important at the time, to the original team of interviewers. Here the transcripts serve mostly as an indication for timestamps in the recordings. With full transcriptions only present at certain timestamps, not throughout the entire interviews.

Because of the nature of the transcripts, roughly half of the interviewed statements cited have been manually transcribed through listening to audio files of the interviews. This is rather important, as some of the cited testimony may at first glance, seem grammatically incorrect. Since a portion of the interviewed statements have been manually transcribed during the course of this study, they have been cited word for word, pause for pause. I.e., they have been transcribed in such a way as to convey the rhythmic language used by the interviewee, with all its advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, one can better infer as to how the interviewee acted during the interview. On the other hand however, this means that grammatical errors, or repetitions have been transcribed in the same manner in which they were orally stated by the interviewee. In order to balance

this out, any and all grammatical errors and /or repetitions made by the original transcripts have also been cited as they appear.

As a result of the minor discrepancies between the original transcripts provided and the audio files manually transcribed, they have both been cited with different prefixes to denote their origin. In the footnotes in the subsequent parts of this study, all testimony cited from the original transcripts will come with the prefix of M III /IV, followed by the prefix K, to be followed by a number. M III/IV standing for the batch in which the interviewee's statement was originally taken. Here, "M III" would stand for the third batch of interviews and so forth. The K prefix along with its subsequent number, is itself an abbreviation for the individual interview taken. Here, the prefix K09 would stand for the 9th interview taken in the transcribed folders provided by the marinemuseum. Whilst somewhat unorthodox, this method of labelling is what was originally present in the interview transcripts provided. Thus, they shall be labelled in their original form. Any other interview cited is therefore to be seen as being manually transcribed from the audio files provided, with their differences being labelled in the footnotes accordingly.

It should also be mentioned that due to the somewhat lacklustre nature of record keeping at the naval museum however, not all the digital recordings were made available. The manifestation of this is that the physical recordings of certain individuals could not be sourced, as was the case regarding the testimony provided by subjects Sverre Sjuls & Hakon Lunde. Fortunately though, the original transcripts taken by the interviewing team were sufficient to make use of their interviewed testimony. However, as previously mentioned, the original transcripts provide more of an overview regarding to the topics and timestamps of the interviewing process, and the use of transcripts or audio files is clearly labelled within the footnotes.

1.3.3.2 Why twenty?

In all the naval museum in Horten had conducted a series of 60 interviews that, over time, were made available to this study. However, to answer this study, twenty were plucked in order to make use of their testimony. For this, there are several reasons. The first of these being that, of the twenty interviewees chosen, almost all of them were naval ratings, enlisted men, or non-commissioned officers during their service. In other words, they were what one might regard as regular sailors or naval aviators.

Furthermore, in the cases where interviewees were by war's end commissioned as a King's officer in the navy, they did so during the course of the war. They were not career officers at the time of their enlistment. This meant that they, all saw action and /or service in the same manner as the enlisted men.

In addition to this, another reason for focusing on the twenty interviews in question is that these twenty had, for the vast majority at least, served throughout the whole war. This meant that this group could shed light on experience and actions from any period of the war. Yet perhaps the most prevalent reason for focusing on this group of twenty, was the fact that they encompassed the entirety of naval service. More specifically, this group of twenty encompassed every branch of the Royal Norwegian navy, from the naval air service to the submarine arm, from the surface fleet to the coastal artillery. With this, their interviewed testimony can provide a picture as to the service life of the entire Royal Norwegian navy during the second world war, along with the men who served in its ranks. This means that there is no group or portion of these twenty that greatly outnumbers the other, with their interviewed testimony holding an equal degree of value and significance. Therefore, the testimony of men who served in the submarine arm might for example be unique, yet due to the roughly equal spread of the service branch of the group, their testimony does not outweigh, say that of those who served in the MTB branch of the navy. In other words, these twenty individuals represent the experiences of those serving in the Royal Norwegian navy as a whole, in addition to themselves.

They were all officers or ratings of the Royal Norwegian navy, having served during the second world war. Whilst there were more than twenty conducted, the interviews of this specific group of twenty were used for several key reasons. The first, and most important of these reasons is that the interviews of this group of twenty were all made available with extensive transcripts, and audio recordings. The exceptions of course being the interviews with Sjuls and Lunde, who's audio files could not be sourced. In their case however, their original transcripts were rather extensive.

The final note of contention should thus be that of the time in which these interviews were originally recorded. The interviews were taken in the early 2000s by the Horten naval museum as a part of an original effort to record the oral histories of those who served in the Royal Norwegian navy, before they passed. Whilst an exact date for their

recordings has not been made available by the marinemuseum, one can deduce that they were recorded in the period 2000 – 2010. This being in large part due to the digitalised nature of the interviews. More specifically, the fact that they were originally recorded onto CDs that were later digitised for the purposes of this study. At any rate, the exact date on which these interviews were conducted is not what is most important. Rather, their contents and the significance of the testimony within the interviews.

1.3.4 Oral histories, their inherent challenges, and benefits

Oral histories are a unique form of historical source material, that can be used, and abused, wither willingly or unwillingly. This point brings one onto the first point of contention previously outlined. That being, the necessitation for a discuss regarding the usage of oral histories. In particular, a discussion pertaining to the benefits and drawbacks of using oral histories as a central source. If one is to use the interviews in question as intended, that is, as a form of oral history to examine experiences of Norwegian naval servicemen during the second world war, there are certain variables to consider that warrant further elaboration. Notably, in such a topic as this, where there is little to be found in the way of written, personal accounts from enlisted men who served in the navy, during the period spent in exile.

In large part stemming from the expectation that diaries could be used by the enemy upon capture to give away vital information, most allied servicemen were discouraged from keeping detailed, personally written accounts. This is especially true when regarding those who served at sea. Consequentially, one is left will little alternative than to use oral histories taken long after the second world war. In this case, the series of interviews taken by the Horten naval museum in the 2000s.

This is not to say that oral histories are the only source material to be used, in some contexts we cannot write about a topic without interviewing people, while it will otherwise complement and work together with other historical material.[4] This study is one such context. Here, the experience and testimony of the individuals in question take centre-stage, providing the main credence to this research. This in turn leaves one with the task of balancing the use of oral histories in conjunction with written source

[4] Grove & Heiret 2018: 125 (translation)

material. As a result of this, one should be mindful of the limitations inherent to oral histories, negating them wherever possible.

At face value, oral histories tend to take the form of a narrative source but can in fact also be construed as a remnant source, in the form of the person being interviewed.[5] Meaning that it is up to the discretion of the historian as to what usage the oral history in question should provide. In this case, if one is to use the interviews to reflect on what aspects of service in the exiled navy held the most significance, then source criticality, by using these oral histories in conjunction with written source material is of paramount importance. But why is this the case? Why do oral histories require contextualisation through the use of external source material?

Whilst oral histories can prove to be invaluable in some cases, they do hold certain limitations. Limitations that can prove rather troublesome if not handled with due diligence. Regarding this, there are two main limitations that present themselves, which one should be mindful of, at all times. Firstly, the human mind is not a linear item. People can misremember the past, especially regarding events that happened decades prior.[6] Secondly, the process of recollection is far from a linear process. In oral histories, it is common for those being interviewed to recollect the past in so called, "chunks", with seemingly detached memories being used to construct a narrative that oneself wants to conjure.[7] It is therefore of the upmost importance that oral histories are not used as the sole-source but used in conjunction with more reliable forms of source material. Furthermore, it is of vital importance that the interviewer remains in complete control of the conversation. Making sure that the interviewee testifies to recollections and observations for which they are qualified to address. By doing this, the information provided in the form of recollections of the individual, in this case information regarding the day-to-day experiences of former naval personnel, can be used to inform, and supplement previously written source material. Thereby, providing new insights to an important topic.

The importance of using oral histories in conjunction with external material, rather than in isolation, is notable when accounting for the nature of the interviews themselves.

[5] Grove & Heiret 2018: 126 (translation: The term Narrative source being a translation for "Beretning", with remnant source being a translation for "Levning")
[6] Grove & Heiret 2018: 127 (translation)
[7] Grove & Heiret 2018: 127 (translation)

That being that the interviews in question were conducted post-war, many years after the events in question. Yet, these interviews are still to be used as a remnant source. This being as the primary focus of this study is not to discuss the Royal Norwegian navy as a whole. Rather, it is to examine what these twenty naval veterans either wittingly or unwittingly, viewed as the most significant aspects of their service in the exiled Royal Norwegian navy. Therefore, whilst oral histories would usually be considered as a narrative source, i.e., a source constructed after the events in question have taken place. In this case, the interviews conducted by the Horten naval museum are to be used as a remnant source, where the interviews themselves are to be viewed as a primary source.

The very nature of oral histories means that whilst the focus of this study shall be that of the recollections of the day-to-day lives of these naval veterans, it will not discount any observations made as to perceptive observations or changes made post-war. It will however be necessary to disclaim any, and all examples of such instances as they appear. Clearly differentiating the two. Furthermore, as has already been stated, such a task falls primarily on the interviewer. Although in this case, it would be prudent to use the narrative elements of the interviews as a narrative source regarding questions such as their observations post-war, or modern reflections not available to the interviewees during the war. The hope being, that this would allow for a clear demarcation between the remnant elements of the interviews, namely the memories and recollections of past events to be used in a remnant source capacity, as intended.

Oral histories are not the be all and end all of historical source material, far from it. Yet, their usage should not be discounted due to their limitations. As aforementioned, this study is to document the personal accounts of naval veterans, using them to examine and discuss the aspects of their wartime service that held the most significance. Consequentially, these oral histories in question can provide a plethora of information, if they are handled in a manner befitting their historical value. The interviews of this study contain a plethora of information that, has until now, remained previously unknown. Hopefully, providing a new perspective of the war in exile.

In summary, the nature of this study warrants certain disclaimers and discussions, made necessary by the fact that a large portion of the source material in question comes in the form of oral histories. Yet, whilst oral histories bring with them a certain set of

challenges, they also come with a unique set of opportunities. Opportunities that can allow for shedding light on the experiences and observations made by the ordinary service personnel of the Royal Norwegian navy during the second world war. For the majority of those involved, the interviews in question were the first occasion on which many had categorised their wartime experiences at all, let alone in any official capacity. In conducting this research, the historian in general, and this individual study is posed with a historical and ethical dilemma as to how these interviews should be utilised. How best to deal with this dilemma is of course a subjective matter though. In this case they are to be used as a remnant source, with prerequisite contextualisation and scrutiny made available by external, written source material.

1.4 Subsequent chapters and their constitution

The final point of note should therefore be a brief overview as to the make-up of this study. The next chapter, chapter 2, will give context to the story of the Royal Norwegian navy during the war. Providing both a short history as to its organisation and order of battle, along with the background for the world in which the men of this study were to serve. In essence, showing how the Royal Norwegian navy went from an outdated, pre-war force, to a modern navy in the United Nations coalition. Following this, Chapter 3 shall serve to provide an overview as to the individuals of this study. Quantifying their character into two main ideal types to explain both their motivations and actions. The idea being to quantify the character and backgrounds of these men in order to give an indication as to the type of men who served in the Royal Norwegian navy during the second world war.

Chapters 4 and 5 shall form the main focus of this study. Chapter 4 shall seek to explain the importance of morale and camaraderie at sea, whilst at the same time, discussing its overall significance. This can be done in in a general sense, but more importantly, it can also be done by answering the question as to why it was such an important aspect of the wartime service of the men interviewed. Along with this, chapter 4 shall examine the importance played by certain substances in the Royal Norwegian navy, and their effects on the morale of its sailors. Furthermore, chapter 4 shall serve to uncover the largely unknown matter of controlled substances and their usage by naval forces in the conflict. More specifically, how substances such as amphetamines, alcohol, tobacco and other stimulants, made their way into the hands of the men of this study. Uncovering just how widespread they were.

Chapter 5 concerns the topic of the return home of these men. I.e., their return home after the completion of their service after the cessation of hostilities in 1945. Here one shall come to learn as to both the date of their return and how this came to vary greatly depending on certain circumstances. In addition to examining their perceived treatment upon returning home, and how this differed amongst the interviewees. To of course be followed by concluding remarks in chapter 6.

2 The Royal Norwegian Navy during the Second World war

The men of this study would all serve in the Royal Norwegian navy in some form or another. Yet to properly contextualise their service, it would be prudent to first give an overview of the Norwegian Navy in the Second world war, as doing so will help to contextualise the individual accounts of those who served. This can be done in many ways, although perhaps the most prudent of them would be to provide a brief chronological overview as to both the make-up, and actions of the Royal Norwegian Navy during the Second world war. The idea being, that this would provide an understanding for both the circumstances which led to their experiences, but to also place these men in the larger tactical, and strategic context of Operations and campaigns of the conflict.

Another important reason for such a task is that the Royal Norwegian navy should not be viewed as a singular branch of service with a singular purpose. Rather, the organisation that was the Royal Norwegian navy should be viewed as a living, breathing organism, rather than a homogenous force. This is a point that one will hear repeated several times throughout this study, but for good reason. The Royal Norwegian navy was a combative arm that went through a series of evolutions, in both size and purpose throughout the second world war. A factor that would come to greatly effect and shape the testimony of those who were to serve in its ranks. One could therefore choose to examine and categorise the observations and experiences that the ratings[8], officers, and other ranks in the interviews of this study made in isolation. Yet, the very constitution of the navy in which they served, necessitates a degree of contextualisation.

2.1 Mired beginnings:

At the outbreak of hostilities in April 1940, the Norwegian Navy was in a way the most modern, and capable arm of the Norwegian armed forces. Consisting of three different branches, the Coastal artillery, the naval air service, and finally the fleet itself, naval service should not be seen only as service on the high seas, rather an all-encompassing service in the modern era of combined arms warfare. This brings one onto the first important point of contextualisation. That being the fact that many of those interviewed, almost half to be precise did not serve at sea, but rather, came to serve either in various

[8] An enlisted sailor below the rank of Warrant officer

staff roles such as intelligence officers and NCOs[9], or in the branch of the naval air service. So diverse was this service that, by wars end, almost half of the seven and a half thousand men and women in naval service were not to serve at sea, rather as auxiliaries and in staffing roles of varying degrees[10]. As one can plainly see, the Royal Norwegian navy was not a homogenous element, rather a service that had evolved from a simple defensive fleet into a combined arms branch of the Norwegian armed forces.

Upon Britain and France's declarations of war on the German Reich as of the 3rd of September 1939, the Norwegian navy, both the fleet and coastal artillery were partially mobilised under the pretext of a reduced neutrality watch.[11] Whilst at first this may seem like a prudent decision, upon further examination, one may note that this was not a full mobilisation, as had been the case in the first world war, with large gaps and shortages to contend with. Secondly, the army had not been mobilised, as had indeed been the case in the first world war where army units had been used to supplement and protect coastal defences.[12] Furthermore, the shortages and gaps pertaining to the partial mobilisation, namely that as to why a full mobilisation of the three branches was not possible, as had been the case in the first world war, lays in large part at the lack of trained officers and naval crews in both the fleet and coastal artillery. As a consequence, the organisational command forces of the navy, i.e, staff officers, quartermasters and the like, did not allow for any expansion.[13] Meaning that even if the admiralty or even the Nygaardsvold government wished to increase preparedness beyond a partial mobilisation, there was no room for expansion, meaning that by the time of the German invasion, Norwegian coastal and naval defences were drastically understaffed and underequipped.

It is in this state that the Norwegian navy began the war. As Hitler's panzers were rolling into Poland, and the U-boats of the Kriegsmarine were wreaking havoc in the Atlantic, the Royal Norwegian navy was years, perhaps decades obsolete, with most vessels being of pre-first world war vintage coastal defence ships and submarines. The situation being so bad that large numbers of civilian and auxiliary trawlers were pressed into service, to patrol Norway's vast coastline. For a more precise figure, one can again

[9] Non-commissioned officer
[10] Helle 1997: 25
[11] Steen 1954: 13
[12] Steen 1954: 13
[13] Steen 1954: 14

turn to Einar Steen and his work on the Norwegian General staff. Steen himself puts the number of ships, before the German invasion on the 9th of April as; 49 so called "guard boats", these being mostly smaller pleasure and working civilian craft that were pressed into service, along with 62 armed vessels. 43 of which, being commissioned in the years 1874-1918.[14] As already mentioned, one can infer from these numbers that the Norwegian navy was, for the most part, largely obsolete by contemporary standards.

Regarding the naval air service, the situation was more of the same with the navy possessing 14 torpedo attack aircraft along with 21 reconnaissance aircraft.[15] Apart from a small number of Heinkel 115 floatplanes, which had ironically been purchased from Nazi Germany before the outbreak of war, the Naval air service was an outdated force. Erik Anker Steen summarised this at the time by saying that "The aircraft that the Navy's air force had at its disposal were not only few, but also of obsolete types. Among other things, they did not meet the requirements for speed and combat power to take up combat with more temporal aircraft." (My translation)[16]

Not all vessels and aircraft were obsolete, however. Following the end of the first world war, there was a concerted, albeit small effort made as to modernising the fleet. During this period, 19 vessels of all types of a modern, at the worst case, obsolescent were constructed.[17] The most notable of these were 4 modern destroyers of the *Sleipner* class, along with 6 modern submarines. It was to be these vessels that were to form the foundation for a new navy, once the Norwegian campaign of 1940 came to an end, and those that could, continued the war in exile. Furthermore, it is on these vessels that several of the interviewees would find themselves in the first years of the war. Most notably on KNM *Sleipner,* after she had been put to use by the Royal navy, patrolling the East coast of England and Scotland during the Battle of Britain.

Once again, Steen's numbers, pertaining from his time as a staff officer in the Norwegian Navy during the war provide invaluable data as to the order of battle during the war. And whilst the Norwegian navy was outdated, insufficient, and doctrinally obsolete at the time of the German invasion, after 1940, said navy would evolve into a modern, and formidable fighting force. As Steen's numbers show however, is that for

[14] Steen 1954: 18
[15] Steen 1954: 16
[16] Steen 1954: 25
[17] Steen 1954: 18

all the pitched battles and duties the navy would later carry out from exile, its starting point was one of mired beginnings.

2.2 The consequences and significance of the Norwegian campaign

The Norwegian campaign, lasting between April and June of 1940, was for the Norwegian armed forces, and especially the navy, a complete disaster of unmitigated proportions. More importantly, it was a campaign for which the Norwegian armed forces were ill equipped to fight. A new wave of scholarship has tried to examine the reasons for failure in the Norwegian campaign, along with detailing the losses inflicted on the allied fleets and armies, along with debating their significance for the outcome and direction of the war. Geirr Haarr, a Norwegian historian who has chronicled the Norwegian campaign in more recent years summarises the Norwegian campaign as such being, "the first campaign of WWII where multiple forces under national command attempted to fight together for the same objective, having landed at isolated sites. Also, it was the first time ever that the three services were required to co-operate – where failure from one could, and several times did, spell disaster for all."[18]

It was this task of integrating the three branches of the armed forces that the Norwegian military, and her allies for that matter would fail so miserably. A makeshift German naval force, consisting mostly of lighter vessels, along with pressed merchant ships, was able to strike a crippling blow on the Norwegian fleet and her land and sea-based allies. The unpreparedness of the Norwegian fleet, especially in the face of superior German air power meant that any concerted effort was to be defeated in earnest. Contrary to pre-war planning or blind optimism, "the overall strategic battle for Norway had been won and lost at sea"[19]. For primarily seafaring nations such as Britain and Norway, the fact that the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe had given them such a bloody nose proved a tough pill to swallow. Yet, the disastrous nature of the Norwegian campaign of 1940, brought with it the impetus to re-think how to fight a modern war at sea, in a new era of combined arms warfare.

Consequentially, what the Norwegian campaign left the surviving Norwegian, and British armed forces with however was the knowledge that, "the Norwegian campaign

[18] Haarr 2010: 367
[19] Haarr 2010: 368

time and time again demonstrated that virtually every operational and strategic doctrine for warfare at sea had to be learned afresh."[20] Most importantly, it learned that in order to conduct successful naval operations at sea, or in support of the ground forces, there had to be sufficient communication and mutual co-operation between both naval, and air branches of service. All within in the framework of clearly defined goals and tasks set forth in the three levels of warfare. Furthermore, any future action would, at the very least, require air parity, however more ideally, air supremacy. All subsequent actions conducted by the Royal Norwegian, and Royal navies from 1940 onwards would therefore take place with the guarantee that adequate air cover would be provided.

It is perhaps a blessing in disguise that the Norwegian campaign was such an abject failure that it forced the Norwegian and British navies to rethink the role that air power was to have at sea. From the battle of the North cape to the Normandy landings, all subsequent actions and operations that the Norwegian navy were to participate in, from their bases in exile were to either be conducted in the knowledge that there was at the very least a semblance of control in the skies above, often in co-operation with either the Norwegian, or British Fleet air arms, providing reconnaissance data, and air support as needed.

The individual and collective losses of the Norwegian campaign are of the upmost importance to this study. This being as by categorising the losses suffered by the Norwegian navy during the period between April – June 1940, is one provided with a definitive impression of the disaster that faced the Norwegian admiralty and its sailors in the summer of 1940. More importantly however, by examining the losses suffered by the Norwegian navy, one is presented with the human and materiel cost that faced the subjects of this study. For example, it was after cessation the Norwegian campaign, that the majority of those interviewed were to join the Naval arm. Knowing full well the losses already suffered by both the fleet, and the air arm.

It should be noted that the tallying of losses was already being conducted by the admiralty, as the first vessels and men followed the king and his government into exile. Eirik Anker Steen, for example. For this study however, it has proven to be prudent thus far to use both contemporary, and more modern sources. Regarding this, there are several sources that one can turn to. When examining the losses suffered by the Navy in

[20] Haarr 2010: 368

the Norwegian campaign however, there is a slight issue as to specific numbers pertaining to both vessels and personnel lost. This discrepancy owes itself in large part to the chaotic nature of the campaign. More specifically, due to the amount of irregular naval forces, in addition to the speedy invasion by German forces of the major centres of government and local officiation. In light of this, modern estimates, such as those by Milner & Lindgjerdet place the Navy's losses in both material and manpower at 27 vessels, 13 skiffs, and roughly 646 killed.[21] With Harry Plevy placing the total number of Norwegian casualties at 1,335.[22] Whilst such a figure may seem small, at least in comparison with other campaigns, or even the casualties suffered by the Germans, one can plainly see that almost half of all Norwegian casualties suffered during the campaign of 1940 were suffered by naval personnel. It is therefore not entirely unreasonable to infer that it was the Norwegian navy that bore the brunt of the ill-fated Norwegian campaign.

Whilst the human cost was no doubt emotionally and physically costly, it can be argued however that such a dramatic loss of materiel was to be a blessing in disguise. This being as the loss of most of the fleet would provide both the British and Norwegian navies with the forced decision of re-equipping the Norwegian fleet with more modern vessels. Summarily, "compared with the later campaigns and battles in Europe, Russia, the middle and Far East, casualties in Norway were surprisingly low, but difficult to compare."[23] The effects of these losses were however far more profound in the years following the Norwegian campaign of 1940. Arguably, reshaping the Norwegian navy better than any possible victory.

The consequences of the debacle that was the Norwegian campaign of 1940 are unique because they almost serve in complete isolation. The Norwegian navy, was a small and largely outdated force, as has already been mentioned, but the casualty figures although small, constitute a significant portion of the standing force. In addition to these implications, the consequences of which would drag the Norwegian fleet kicking and screaming into the twentieth century. The losses suffered in Norwegian campaign and the subsequent escape into exile would provide the Norwegian navy with a unique opportunity that many of its contemporaries were not afforded. It was given a second

[21] Milner & Lindgjerdet 2016: 237
[22] Plevy 2017: 327
[23] Plevy 2017: 327

chance. This was a chance it was to grasp with both arms. Both forcing and enabling the Norwegian navy to rebuild and re-equip both its combative arms for the new, total war it was reluctantly a part of.

2.2.1 Service in exile

From its bases in exile, the Norwegian navy would go on to serve in all theatres of the E.T.O (European theatre of operations), from the Arctic to the Mediterranean Sea. For this to be possible however, the navy would need to grow in size, along with modernising it's available fleet. By the end of the Norwegian campaign in the summer of 1940, roughly four-hundred officers, quartermasters, and enlisted men from the navy managed to flee to Britain. These men would form the core of the new exiled navy.[24] The loss of ships however was profound, with only 13 vessels being able to make the crossing in good order. As a result of the obsolescence of the fleet, only one of these ships was to provide any use to the British Royal navy. That being the relatively modern destroyer *Sleipner.* Therefore, it should be mentioned that almost all the vessels operated by the Royal Norwegian navy in exile were either purchased from or gifted by the British Royal navy or US navy.

Whilst not the main focus of this study, it is also necessary to briefly mention some of the more notable engagements that the Norwegian Navy was to fight in, as many of those who were interviewed were present. From 1941 onwards, the Norwegian fleet would become a significant actor in the war at sea for the allies. Proving its mettle on many an occasion. Furthermore, the Royal Norwegian navy was not merely a seagoing fleet, but a combined arms service of both air and sea power, with Catalina, Mosquito, and other aircraft being used in both a reconnaissance and offensive capacity. This in conjunction with the ever-growing fleet at sea. This meant that from 1943 onwards, after the Norwegian acquisition of modern aircraft, destroyers, and patrol ships, the Royal navy had access to an allied, multi-branch naval power. A power that was of course dwarfed in size by the Royal Navy but a proven force that could be used to supplement and augment British forces at the tactical level.

So it was that from this point onwards that the Norwegian Navy was to no longer be used in reserve, in second line duties, but rather at the forefront, alongside her British, American, and Soviet allies. The most obvious example of such a cooperation at the

[24] Busch 1958: 153

forefront of the war at sea can of course be seen when examining the role played by Norwegian naval vessels and personnel in the Battle of the Atlantic. Most notably in the efforts of Norwegian crews when providing escort to the so called “arctic convoys”, as part of either British or American task groups that were headed for Murmansk with aid to the Soviet Union upon its entry into the war after June of 1941.

It is in this role that the Norwegian Navy would spend the rest of the war. As an offensive arm, that came to act with tactical independence, whilst in support, and in some cases, under the command of her British allies. Although not without challenges, this relationship would prove to be most fruitful, with the Norwegian navy providing both vessels and personnel for some of the war’s most important engagements and operations.

2.2.1.1 The conditions of warfare in arctic seas

It was in the arctic that a large proportion of Norwegian men, aircraft, and vessels were to serve. Be it with the task of protecting shipping convoys, hunting for German warships that had taken refuge in Norwegian fjords, or simply patrolling the Northern seas, the war in the arctic was of a unique nature with men and ships having to fight the elements as much as their enemy. The case of the Norwegian destroyer *Stord* should be remembered however, not because it sank the *Scharnhorst*, or because it escorted millions of tonnes of war material to Murmansk, but because it did all these things in the harshest of conditions imaginable, serving with distinction in the process. In essence, “The service Stord undertook was perhaps the hardest during the entire war in Europe. The Murmansk convoys were a strain of the very worst. Not a moment of peace and security could the crews feel. Danger threatened from all sides. The Arctic Ocean is one of the stormiest waters on our planet. The darkness, the cold, the thick snow, the seas that froze to ice on the deck and above everything standing together, combined to sap the spirit of life out of the men.”[25]

As previously mentioned in the outline view, the aim of this study is not to divulge at length regarding the battles and engagements undertaken by the Royal Norwegian navy during the second world war. However, by briefly examining *Stord’s* service record regarding to her participation in the sinking of the *Scharnhorst*, one can begin to understand the reality that the war at sea meant for those who came to serve. Especially

[25] Busch 1958: 154 (translation)

regarding the conditions which many were exposed to. Furthermore, whilst not unique to *Stord* herself, her service, goes to show the extreme nature of warfare in arctic seas.

Operating, under the command of a large taskforce under the flag of the British battleship *Duke of York*, it was the Norwegian destroyer *Stord* that was to be amongst the Allied destroyers that were to land the killing blow on the long hunted German battlecruiser Scharnhorst, in the icy, December seas on the high arctic. Firing a total eight torpedoes at the German battlecruiser from a range of no more than 1,800 yards.[26] Whilst this does pose as a simple example, it was the norm, rather than the exception, that Norwegian vessels and seamen were to serve with gallantry under the harshest of circumstances. It was in the harshest of conditions, low visibility, driving snow, all whilst charging, and in turn sinking a dangerous opponent, with little regard for their own safety over others, that most of these individuals were to serve. Coincidentally it was here that two of those interviewed, namely Bjørn hagen, and Sverre Sjuls, were to find themselves on that fateful day. In this melee of ice and fire at sea. Battling the conditions as much their human enemy.

It was in these conditions, that the men of this study were to be subject to, day in, day out. Conditions of freezing cold, pitch black nights, icy decks, waves that could send a man overboard never to be seen again (as in fact happened on *Stord* when chasing down the *Scharnhorst*), and frigid waters that meant a man's survival time in the water was rated in minutes rather than hours or days as was for those "fortunate" enough to serve in the more hospitable waters of the Mediterranean or the pacific. All this whilst dutifully performing the task of hunting and being hunted by an unrelenting enemy, often for days on end. For the men of this study this was life. It was their day-to-day existence so long as there was a war to be fought. Some for months, some for years. But the cold hard reality was that for all of them, they were miles away from home, unsure as to their fate. Whilst some of those in this study were to serve in more hospitable climates, or in more "comfortable" roles, the Norwegian navy almost exclusively operated in the E.T.O, with most of its service coming in Arctic waters of the North Atlantic along with both the North and Norwegian, Seas. As a result of this, its crews and vessels were subject to some of the harshest conditions of the war.

[26] Busch 1958: 117 (translation)

It is as a result of this service that the importance of not forgetting their experiences cannot be overstated, no matter how much this study may state the fact. In total almost 1 in 7 of every naval seaman, staff officer, watchman, deckhand, naval aviator, and any other naval rating and rank, never returned home. Battling the conditions, as much as the enemy. A fact made rather sobering considering that the US Navy, which had to contend with both the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Kriegsmarine in both the Pacific and Atlantic oceans respectively, only saw a loss rate roughly equal to 1.85% its servicemen.[27] This of course being a number that pales in comparison to the proportional losses of 1 in 7, or 14% suffered by the Norwegian fleet.

It should be stated however that the US fleet was obviously far larger in both tonnage and manpower, with its manpower totalling some 3,380,817 men in 1945[28], meaning that the proportional casualty rate was always going to be higher for the Norwegian navy. Yet, the disparity is almost ten-fold, with the average Norwegian naval sailor or aviator far more likely to be killed in action than his American counterpart. A 14% loss rate for the US navy would have been catastrophic, a figure that would have stood at 473,314 sailors killed in action, had they suffered the same proportional losses as the Norwegian fleet. For the American public, the proportional losses suffered by the Royal Norwegian Navy during the war, would have likely been unacceptable. Yet for the Norwegian government in exile, it was simply a reality of war.

Whilst this might at first seem like just another titbit relating to the second world war, the reason for divulging such statistical information is important, if not somewhat hypothetical in nature. This being as the relatively small number of men to serve in the Royal Norwegian navy, can at times seem rather miniscule when compared to other nations or fleets. The US navy being a perfect example of this. The proportional data shows however, that service in the Norwegian fleet was statistically far more dangerous for the individual sailor when compared to that of her coalition partners, and that both the service of the Norwegian fleet and the men who served in its ranks should not be scoffed at, as a result.

[27] National WW2 Museum, New Orleans: *US military casualties in WW2* [Table]
(According to the national WW2 Museum in New Orleans, US navy deaths amounted to the figure of 62,614 out of a total strength of 3,380,817, a figure that roughly equates to 1.85% compared to the 14% figure suffered by the Royal Norwegian navy)
[28] National WW2 Museum, New Orleans: *US military personnel (1939-1945)* [Table]

By war's end, the Royal Norwegian Navy had grown from a second-rate force, armed with the most rudimentary of weapons, operating a fleet of outdated, and outclassed vessels, to a modern, and capable fighting force. From an initial strength of five hundred who originally went into exile in 1940[29]. It would become an integral part of the Western allies' contribution to the war at sea, taking part in some of the most important battles and engagements of the war, arguably punching well above its weight in the process. Yet for its contribution it would pay a disproportionately heavy price. In all, the Royal Norwegian navy would operate "a total of 12 destroyers, six Flower-class corvettes and one Castle-class corvette, 30 MTBs, 9 motor launchers, 4 submarines, 4 submarine chasers, 38 minesweepers, 12 patrol vessels and 2 depot ships."[30] In terms of personnel, the number of personnel in uniform would grow to "7,366 women and men, 2,238 of whom served on board navy vessels, and a further 1,459 manned gunboats on board merchant vessels."[31]

[29] Helle 1997: 25
[30] Milner & Lindgjerdet 2016: 237
[31] Milner & Lindgjerdet 2016: 237

3 The subjects of this study - An overview

As is typical with any form of oral history, one should ask certain questions to quantify the results as they arise. Especially in this case, where the aim is to create a new understanding, and to use the testimony provided by the interviewees, to paint a complete picture of their wartime service. Questions such as, what was their background? Where and how did they serve? Along with, the factors that motivated them to escape to allied controlled territory to join the navy and fight the war from exile, should not be ignored. Rather, the answers to these questions should be quantified so that the human element of these oral histories is understood for what it is. Namely, a window into an otherwise unforgotten past. By categorising the background of these men, and the story that is their service life, will one be able to quantify their stories. Furthermore, by quantifying their type of character, using the methods of the sociologist Max Weber, can one deduce certain common denominators or “ideal types”, as to the nature of these men in question.

3.1 The individuals of this study

Of all twenty interviewees, every man served within the various branches of the Royal Norwegian navy during the second world war. Of these men, a majority coming to serve in the surface fleet of the navy, although a significant minority would serve in other branches of the navy. The testimony of these men would form the core elements of this study, providing the bulk of the testimony used. This is not to say however, that they were the only men whose testimony came to be used in this study, far from it. Throughout the interviews there presented themselves several individuals who served in other branches of the Norwegian navy. For example, whilst the majority would serve in the fleet itself, there were several men who served, either as pilots or aircrew in in the Fleet air arm. Flying either Catalina seaplanes based out of Iceland and Scotland, or Mosquito fighter-bombers who spent more of their time conducting raiding sorties against enemy shipping or coastal installations.

To highlight just how varied the seemingly singular service of the Royal Norwegian navy could be, the fleet itself was far from a homogenous element. Service in the fleet could mean serving on anything between an MTB (motor torpedo boat), to a light cruiser, or even a submarine. Although, it should be noted that all those serving on submarines were volunteers. Therefore, if a man is addressed as serving in the fleet, it is

not assured that he came to serve on a conventional surface vessel. Again, one should do well to remember that although the majority, naval service did not mean that a man necessarily served with the main surface fleet. In the case of the interviewees, the vast majority served on board one of the Royal Norwegian navy's surface vessels at some point during the war, either preceding, or following their transfer to either a submarine, or aircraft detachment. The only individual to not serve on board a ship, or an aircraft was an individual by the name of Ivar Lie, who served as a part of the coastal artillery, itself a constituent part of the navy.

3.1.1 Personal backgrounds & commonalities

Regarding their personal backgrounds, the twenty interviewees were split into roughly two camps. The first of these consisting of men who, prior to the German invasion of Norway on the 9th of April 1940, had experience at sea. With the second group consisting of those that had not. Regarding any prior experience at sea, there were three ways mentioned, in which these men had gained previous experience. These were notably, a pre-war career in the merchant marine, something that itself often came as a pre-requisite to a professional career in the armed fleet. The second option being a term of service in the peacetime navy. With the final option being a term of employment on-board a civilian merchant vessel. Of these, the majority came to serve as a constituent part of the merchant marine in the years leading up to the conflict.

For some, this was a purely economic endeavour. For others however, such employment was undertaken as a pre-requisite for service in the re-arming Royal Norwegian navy. An example of this would be that of Rolf Henningsen, who's time in the merchant marine will be used to highlight the importance of substances at sea. Many of these men would, fortunately, or unfortunately, depending on how one views to interpret the situation, find themselves at the outbreak of war. Some as far flung as Rolf Hennignsen, who experienced the German invasion of Poland whilst sailing through the Panama Canal, finding himself on seemingly the opposite side of the world at the outbreak of war. Hennignsen would later return home to Ålesund, subsequently departing for the open seas once more on the 5th of April 1940, a mere 4 days before the German invasion. Henningsen's experience was not alone either. There were also men such as Bjarne Eia who at the outbreak of war, was employed as a deckhand in Argentina.

This was not to say that a prior career at sea was all roses, however. Ragnar Dybdahl would also find himself at sea on the 3rd of September. Although in Dybedahl's case, he would see a brief period of internment in Algiers on the presumption of being a German spy. Eventually being repatriated back to Norway before the invasion, where he would remain until he himself would sail to England on board a small pleasure craft. In any case, it was due to such employment at sea that these men who had been employed within the merchant marine, either at the outbreak of the war on the 3rd of September 1939, or the German invasion of Norway in April the following year, were amongst the first to enter allied service in exile. For these men, their prior experience at sea made for a seemingly swift transition to armed, naval service.

Those in the first camp who had previously served in the Royal Norwegian navy either before the outbreak of hostilities or at the time of the German invasion were the fewest in number, although far from a significant amount. These men consisted of Bjørn Hagen, Sverre Sjuls, and Lars Yggeseth, who all served at sea either aboard minesweepers or destroyers at the time of the German invasion. More importantly however, these men were the first of the interviewees to see action at sea, with Hagen and Sjuls both taking part in the battles around the Norwegian coastline in 1940. Most unique to the experiences of these three was the fact that Hagen, Sjuls, and Yggeseth were the only three to be interviewed who sailed to Britain under the colours of the Royal Norwegian navy. Moreover, these men did not make the journey under their own volition. Rather, sailing to Britain under orders from their military command, as a constituent part of the Royal Norwegian navy. It is worth mentioning however that, they did indeed state that they wished to continue the fight in exile. With Sjuls even stating that upon the crew being offered the opportunity to remain in Norway, only two men decided to remain.[32]

For those with little-to-no prior experience at sea, their personal backgrounds were rather more varied. From young men such as Finn Ferner, who was enrolled at Harvard college in the U.S. where he would remain until enlisting in the Naval air service in 1942, to others such as Gustav Steimler and Inge Steensland, who were still in middle school at the time. What was common amongst the men pertaining to this second category, however, was the fact that they were young, and itching for a fight. What

[32] M III K9, Sjuls interview transcript: 12:07

these men lacked in previous experience, they would make up for in motivation and a lust for revenge. Furthermore, these men were, for the most part still within the borders of the Kingdom of Norway by the time the government, the royal family, and the military had fled to Britain. Meaning that, it was these men who had to make the perilous journey to allied territory under their own authority. Something that shall be examined in the next subchapter, namely that of quantifying these men into ideal types, in large part, by examining the way that they made the journey to allied territory.

3.2 Ideal types

Whilst important to not only contextualise, but also to understand how to interpret the interviewed testimony of those who served, their specific branch of service is arguably not as important as the type of character that these men were constituted of. Although one could use their statements and recollections to describe and examine the history of the Royal Norwegian Navy as a whole, the sum of twenty individuals hardly constitutes the thousands that were to serve in the Royal Norwegian navy. Ideally, their experiences pertaining to their naval service should not be used as an over-arching paintbrush for the entire navy. Rather, it would be far more prudent to take the testimony of the twenty individuals in question, as a basis for examining the personal properties and the mindset of the individuals in question. To do this, one can make use of Max Weber's so-called "ideal types".

Whilst far from perfect, Weber's ideal types provide the possibility of quantifying the testimony of these twenty individuals to infer a certain degree as to the experiences of the wider Norwegian navy. In essence, although one cannot definitively state that the experiences of these men encompass that of all who were to serve in the Royal Norwegian navy. Using Weber's ideal types to quantify the experiences and character of these twenty individuals, brings with it the possibility of categorising and quantifying their experiences, within a larger framework. Whilst at the same time, giving the option of applying further testimony as it arises in the future. More specifically, while these ideal types primarily pertain to these twenty individuals, they are not limited to them.

So why quantify these individuals through using Weber's ideal types? Firstly, if the aim of this study is indeed the take the experiences of these twenty individuals and use their statements to reconstruct their past experiences into a new understanding as to their experiences, then to omit any information regarding these individuals themselves would

leave no context as to their testimony. There are several areas in which one could choose to focus on these individuals in order to make this possible. However, the most prudent course of action, in this instance, would be to examine their individual character. The idea being that one can gauge their personal character through their testimony regarding motivations for serving in the navy, along with their personal backgrounds. In turn, using it to quantify the men whose testimony is central to this study. In addition to providing some indication as to both the mindset, and motivations for leaving German occupied Norway, for the exiled Navy. Also, the very nature of the content of their interviews, arguably necessitates such action. This being as, throughout the interviews, there constitutes several common denominators regarding the individuals interviewed.

This of course, brings with it a certain caveat that is inherent to the theories of "ideal types". Ideally speaking, "the ideal type can help the social scientist to successfully approach a new topic; to advance the analysis through a comparison of the ideal type to reality and, by doing so, discover something new. But all of this is only possible if the ideal type has been constructed in a correct way."[33]. Therefore, in order for their usage to not be warped in any shape-or-form, one must be rather precise in how one chooses to construct the ideal types to be used. One can thus quantify and compare both their personal backgrounds, along with their motivations into Weber's ideal types. Before proceeding, it should be noted that these are not absolute, however, they do give an indication as to the type of character and /or mindset that befell these men.

3.2.1 Two ideal types

In an overarching sense, the men of this study can largely be categorised into two ideal types. The first of these, that being those who had previously served at sea, either in the Royal Norwegian Navy, or the merchant marine, has been somewhat mentioned already. Here one will find that the majority of the older members of this study, i.e., those who held prior experience at sea along with those who were serving in naval uniform at the outbreak of war. The second ideal type however is rather more unique. One can refer to this second ideal type of individual as one where they held little-to-no prior experience at sea yet made the journey to Britain or her dependencies specifically so that they could serve in the exiled Royal Norwegian navy.

[33] Swedberg 2018: 184

Throughout the interviews, especially the parts regarding the motivations and backgrounds of these men, there arises certain common denominators that denote the character of those who fall into this ideal type. In fact, judging by their testimony, one can be fairly asserted in stating that this was the case for all apart from the small number of men who mostly belong to the ideal type who, were already serving in the Norwegian armed forces in exile or at sea in the merchant marine by the time Norway had been fully occupied.

For the large part, the men belonging to this ideal type were young, single, either still students, or unemployed. However, all of them, to each and every man, were both highly motivated to the idea of serving in the exiled fleet, with the hopes of being given the opportunity for revenge against their newfound, German enemies. Therefore, to better explain this ideal type of individual, one can look at certain traits that come to make up this ideal type. Doing this, can go some way to explain the make-up of the character of those belonging to it.

3.2.1.1 The lust for revenge

It is perhaps therefore, that examining their motivations for revenge would likely be a good starting point. For many, this can go some distance as to explain their reasons for making the perilous journey to allied controlled territory in order to sign up for service with the exiled fleet. This is not to say revenge in a psychotic sense. Rather, the desire to simply strike back at the German invaders. Due to the rather swift and chaotic nature of the Norwegian campaign, the majority of those interviewed testified that they were never given the chance to fight the Germans. Let alone, fight them on an equal footing.

Apart from the Ivar Lie, who was present at the defence of Oscarsborg fortress on the 9th of April, or those who were already in naval uniform at the outbreak of war, the vast majority of those interviewed were never given a chance to fight the invaders. With many in fact only learning of the invasion as German soldiers were marching through their local town centres. Only those already in uniform were able to fight in 1940, and only men such as Sverre Sjuls and Bjørn Hagen, who had been present during the battles in and around Romdalsfjorden and Narvik respectively, saw anything resembling success.

Regarding the frustrations of the 1940 campaign, and to how this affected the mindset and motivations of the men, Hakon Lunde was the most concise in his testimony.

Regarding his disappointment as to what he felt was the shame of a tepid capitulation, he stated, “jeg var såpass politisk engasjert allerede den gang uten å være medlem av noe parti, at jeg ble ganske, jeg skal ikke legge sjul på at jeg ble ganske forbannet over på som hadde skjedd.”[34] Later going on to add that, “det var en stor skam, marinen var den gang mobilisert med 8000 mann, hæren hadde 25.000 mann inne og allikevel så greyer altså denne eskadren med 8000 soldater å ta hele landet i løpet av en natt”[35]. What Lunde is specifically referring to is the slow, and delayed mobilisation of Norwegian forces that, in his mind at least, could have led to a different outcome, had it been conducted differently.

Whilst it is hard to differentiate how much his post-war perceptions had filtered through his mind into the memories of 1940, is hard to say. In any case, Lunde’s testimony highlights that still, after 50 years, that many of those who came to serve in the various branches of the Royal Norwegian navy were deprived of the opportunity to fight the invasion in a conventional manner. It should thus come as little surprise to know that in the time between the occupation and their eventual travel to British territory, five of the men interviewed gave examples as to how they aided various resistance groups from the home-front. Although, this itself consisted mostly of passive resistance, such as printing leaflets or providing intelligence to allied operatives in Sweden. In addition to this, many were of the belief that service in the exiled fleet would provide them with the most direct of paths to fight back at the enemy.

Of the interviewees, Lunde was the only man to openly address his frustrations pertaining to the 1940 campaign. Although the fact that many of the interviewees made the perilous journey to Britain or her dependencies only a short time after the German conquest, (most within a year) is rather telling. Arguably evidence to the fact that many shared in his consensus, with most certainly wanting revenge and the chance to fight the enemy. Something which many believed they had been deprived of in 1940. Consequentially, for many young Norwegian men at the time who wanted to fight the Germans on a level playing field, the next logical step was to make the perilous journey to Britain in order to join the exiled Royal Norwegian navy.

[34] M IV K02, Lunde interview transcript: 16:04
[35] M IV K02, Lunde interview transcript: 16:04

3.2.1.2 Highly motivated character

The nature in which they made the journey goes some way as to highlight the second main trait of this ideal type. Namely, that of being highly motivated towards a cause. A trait such as this might seem to be ambiguous at first, however all of the men interviewed carried with them the commonality of being devoted to the upmost to their individual goals. Perhaps the prime example of this can be seen when examining the way in which many of these men were to make the perilous journey into exile. The manner in which many of these men were to make the journey into exile, and later serve in the navy is evidence of its presence, provides testament as to their devotional character. Common ideals such as the aforementioned, lust for revenge, patriotism, a life at sea, or even the simple promise of adventure, may have provided motivation for these individuals. And although their individual motivations differed, depending on the circumstance, their devotion is common throughout the interviews.

For instance, several of the men, seven to be precise, fled German occupied Norway by either banding together with friends or colleagues, to make the journey in commandeered fishing vessels, and various types of pleasure-craft. In some cases, even making the journey alone. In one of the more colourful cases present, a man by the name of Egil D. Johansen even attempted to cross the North Sea in a kayak before being forced to turn back due to overpassing German aircraft, only to later commandeer a fishing vessel, which made the daring voyage to Scotland.[36] In any case, it should be remembered that had these men been caught, and their intentions to fight from exile been proven, they faced execution by the National Samling regime. Interestingly enough, there is also the case pertaining to that of Gustav Steimler, who made two unsuccessful attempts at crossing the North-sea after purchasing a small boat for the princely sum of five-thousand kroner in 1941. Upon which he was twice arrested by the Gestapo but released due to a lack of evidence.

Steimler would go on to successfully make the crossing in January 1942, however as with Johansen's testimony, it shows that having failed to make the journey to Britain on their first attempts, these men were not deterred. Despite the prospect of execution had they been caught, or interrogation by the much-feared Gestapo, as in Steimler's case, these men remained devoted to the idea of continuing the fight from exile. In addition to

[36] M III K18, Johansen interview transcript: 09:40

this, the vessels in which these men would cross weren't ocean going ferries, or even sturdy shipping vessels. Rather, they made the journey in much smaller, and more flimsy trawlers and /or pleasure craft, making the journey across the North Sea a perilous one indeed. A fact made even more dangerous considering these men were very young at the time, with few holding prior experience at sea. Especially since all those who had prior experience at sea, amongst the interviewees at the very least, were by this time already serving under British colours.

3.2.1.3 Young men with little to lose

Perhaps the most profound and striking of traits that presents itself throughout the testimony of those men who made the journey to serve Norwegian navy in exile, is that they were extremely young with little to lose. For the most part, these "Men", who were by all right still boys, made the journey to exile because there was simply little for them at home. For the majority, they weren't married, and saw little to no prospects of a fulfilling career or education so long as Norway remained occupied.

On the lower end of the scale, some of those who can be categorised into this ideal type were barely of 16 years old, barely having finished middle-school. Specifically, there are two such men present in the interviews. Men such as Gustav Steimler and Inge Steensland, both 16 years old at the time of travel, made the perilous journey to Scotland in newly purchased or commandeered fishing trawlers, having held no prior experience at sea. Gustav Steimler in particular, hadn't even finished his middle-schooling by the time Norway had capitulated[37]. Steensland himself had only enrolled in his tertiary education at the Gymnas in the autumn of 1940. To this effect he would state that, "skolene ble jo stengt, vi fikk standpunktkarakterer og slapp eksamener til middelskolen så begynte jeg på gymnaset om høsten, og utover høsten, vinteren da så var vi noen da som planla at vi skulle dra ut til England, enten via Sverige eller over Nordsjøen for å melde oss frivillig og bli med i krigen da."[38]

Whilst the prospect of a small cabal of 16-year-old boys making the journey across the North Sea to fight in the largest conflict ever seen is jarring, there is something more significant with Steensland's testimony. Steensland's testimony shows how common such a lust for revenge was among young men at the time. Showing how the chaos of

[37] M IV K08, Steimler interview transcript: 04:24
[38] M IV K07, Steensland interview transcript: 03:50

1940 spurred many young individuals and groups to take their own initiative and make the decision to continue the fight from exile. With it, providing the motivation to make the perilous journey to Britain. Whilst the motivation would, in large part stem from the prospect of a fair fight against the Germans, all the men interviewed showed signs of being highly motivated. The way in which this manifested itself can be seen in several ways. Be it the way these men made the journey to Britain, as seen in this sub-chapter, or the manner in which these men conducted themselves whilst at sea. The latter point will present itself in chapter 4, going some way to explain the manner in which these men kept going in the direst of circumstances. Thus, whilst impossible to claim with absolute certainty, one can infer that such an ideal type of being highly motivated, is applicable to the wider Norwegian navy as a whole. More specifically, if the testimony provided by the interviewees is anything to go by, then one can make the plausible assumption that the trait of these men being highly motivated in their service came to encompass the vast majority of those who served. Not only this, but also manifesting itself in their daily actions.

Steensland's testimony in particular, goes to highlight the point that the men belonging to this ideal type were for the large part very young with little to no obligations preventing their travel. Whether their perceptions reflected the truth of their circumstances is also not important. Rather, what is is important is that they viewed their surroundings and circumstances as a dead-end. Where they believed that there was nothing for them at home. In essence, owing to their newfound lust for adventure, revenge, or simply a career, these men saw the exiled fleet as a logical step in their lives.

3.2.1.4 Men drawn to danger

The final trait of the men who belonged to the ideal type of specifically making to journey to Britain to serve in the exiled fleet is somewhat intertwined with those already mentioned. It can however be found time and time again when examining the wartime service of many of the men interviewed. In the simplest of terms, these men were evidently drawn to the danger of serving in the exiled fleet. Whilst this trait can be defined as either an individual, or group being enticed by the prospect of a particularly dangerous wartime career, it is nonetheless applicable to all those belonging to this ideal type.

The reason for its inclusion as a key trait of this ideal type, is that a far from insignificant number of those interviewed came to serve in volunteer-only branches of the navy. Branches of the navy such as the much fabled “Shetland bus”, that famously ferried SOE trained agents and supplies across the North Sea, in co-operation with the Norwegian resistance. With the most notable of example likely being the botched raid on Bardufoss airfield, in which Jan Baalsrud made his daring escape to Sweden in 1943. To further highlight the perilous nature of this service, these crossings were in large part made in unarmed, and battered fishing trawlers that chose rather to hide in plain sight. In this case, KS *Brattholm*, the trawler that carried out the mission, had its cover blown. This would, as many are aware, result in a brief firefight, to be followed by the capture, torture, and brutal execution of the surviving crew. Except for Baalsrud of course.

By 1944, the Shetland bus would eventually replace their old fishing trawlers with much faster, and better armed sub-chasers in the final year of the war, for the majority of the war, the odds were highlight stacked against them. This is important as dangers such as the prospect of torture and execution upon capture, along with little chance of escape in the event of being discovered, were known to those who served on the Shetland bus at the time. Furthermore, the sinking of the *Brattholm,* coupled with the high-profile escape of Baalsrud, meant that there was no doubt as to the realities of captivity at the hands of the German security services. Finn Ferner, the first man to be interviewed, would attest to this. He would coincidentally have his own brush with death only a few days before the infamous sinking of the *Brattholm*.

Whilst serving on board the *Bergholm*, another trawler, Ferner would see himself, along with his crew, including the famed Leif Larsen, sunk. Whilst returning from a successful rendezvous on the Norwegian coast, *Bergholm* was spotted by a German patrol aircraft, and later sunk by a subsequent attack by German aircraft. Although in this case, they were fortunate enough to evade capture, albeit only after deceiving a would-be collaborator. Ferner would testify that his captain had told this collaborator that the survivors of the *Bergholm* planned to row their remaining lifeboat to Molde. This deception would prove itself to be rather wise as, it would later come to light that this individual had conveyed the message to the German authorities. Authorities who were waiting for Ferner and his fellow crewmembers in Molde. Luckily for Ferner though, his captain had suspected the civilian of being a German informant, and thus decided to make way to Ålesund instead.

Again, whilst an action-packed account, the most interesting element is that the crew of the Bergholm were aware of the fate that awaited them had they been captured. Ferner would attest to this in his interview. Stating that, "nei, vi hadde blitt tatt og skutt for *Brattholm* som gikk ned noen dager etter oss"[39] Yet, these men still carried on as before. Furthermore, if Ferner's wartime record is anything to go by, one can safely say that there were men like Ferner who actively sought out such danger.

The story was the same for men who volunteered for service with the MTB (motor-torpedo-boat) arm, such as Karl Gustav Petterson, served on lightly armed, and armoured vessels on the icy seas of the arctic, and subarctic oceans mirrors the testimony and experience of Ferner. Service in either the Shetland bus or the MTB service entailed the fact that capture by the enemy, brought with it the prospect of torture and execution following Adolf Hitler's so called "commando decree" in October of 1942. This order specifically outlined that, "All enemies encountered by German troops on so-called Commando expeditions in Europe or Africa whether ostensibly uniformed soldiers or sabotage agents with or without weapons are to be annihilated both in battle and in flight to the last man."[40] And that, "they will be handed over immediately over to the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst)."[41]

Yet, despite all of this, these men still volunteered, and served in these branches. With every individual being fully aware of the consequences of capture. Whilst the execution of the crew of the *Brattholm* or MTB 345, themselves a direct result of Hitler's commando decree, might have to as a shock to many, they did not deter those willing to gamble against the odds. To the ordinary perspective, service in a branch where the prospect of capture by the enemy meant an almost-certain death, might seem too dangerous, or even downright foolhardy. Yet men like, Finn Ferner, and Karl Gustav Petterson, were in fact drawn to danger such as this.

The idea of these men being drawn to danger is not isolated to those serving above the waves either. Men who volunteered for service in the submarine arm, such as Tom Brynhildsen and Lars Yggeseth, faced almost, certain death if spotted by a German

[39] M III K02, Ferner interview transcript: 23:24
[40] Typescript translation of the 'Fuhrer Befehl', Hitler's 'Commando Order', 18 October 1942 [Image number: 231691]
[41] Typescript translation of the 'Fuhrer Befehl', Hitler's 'Commando Order', 18 October 1942 [Image number: 231691]

destroyer. Here, the simple the simple nature of submarine warfare meant that there was nowhere to run if attacked. If a submarine was indeed badly damaged whilst the vessel was submerged, there would be little chance for the crew to escape. There would be no chance of rescue, only an agonizing death under the waves. As the sinking of the Russian submarine, *Kursk*, showed the world in the year 2000, the prospect of rescuing a submerged crew running low on oxygen is difficult enough in the present era, a feat nigh-on impossible in the 1940s. Brynhildsen would himself state that his motivation for volunteering for the submarine arm were due to the fact that he preferred the prospect of being the hunter, compared to that of the hunted. Stating that, "Jeg ville ha litt hevn på det der balladen jeg hadde vært med på, så jeg fant ut at det måtte være bedre å jakte dem enn å bli jaktet på så lenge som jeg hadde holdt på."[42] With this statement it is important to know that Bryhildsen was among the lucky few to survive the journey on what was to be known as the "Kvarstad convoy" in 1942.

Dubbed, "Operation Performance" by the admiralty in 1942, this was a sordidly dangerous affair where a convoy of ten Norwegian merchant vessels attempted to run the gauntlet of the German controlled seas of the Kattegat and Skagerrak with the hope of reaching Britain. Unfortunately, "of the ten ships that made the run from Gothenburg, 6 went to the bottom, two returned to Sweden and two made it to England"[43] It was on one of the two lucky vessels, *Newton* & *Lind*, which Brynhildsen was to make the journey to England. Judging by his aforementioned testimony regarding his motivations for joining, one can therefore infer that Brynhildsen's traumatic experience on board the Kvarstad convoy left such a lasting impression that he vowed to serve on the bleeding edge as a part of the submarine arm. Bringing with it, the chance of being the hunter rather than the hunted.

In summary, the interviews are littered with testimony showing that men willingly volunteered for branches of the navy that entailed a higher degree of danger than regular naval service. Men who volunteered knowing full well that they were increasing their chances of meeting a gruesome fate at sea, or at the hands of the German security services. Despite all of this, the prospect of torture, the grim reality of there being little-to-no chance of rescue from a sinking submarine or being executed under the dubious pretext of being an enemy saboteur, did not deter them. Rather, many of those who

[42] M III K14, Brynhildsen interview audio recording,: 24:44
[43] Andresen & Johansen 1948: 82 (translation)

served in the Royal Norwegian navy actively sought out the most dangerous of paths to forge for themselves and their comrades. A large portion of these men could have chosen to serve on a destroyer, cruiser, or even behind a desk. Yet they chose to serve on the cold face, from the bleeding edge of the war at sea, all in the face of overwhelming odds.

3.2.2 The key difference between the two ideal types

Whilst the ideal type of men who made the journey into exile to serve in the navy is the larger of the two, one should not discount the motivations and character of the other group. For the large part, the ideal type of men who were already in uniform at the time of the German invasion were motivated to fight. Yet had they not already been in uniform in 1940, it is hard to say whether they would have still made the journey into exile as was commonplace in the second group. The men belonging to the group of those with prior experience at sea, whether this be in the armed navy or merchant fleet, were for the most part older with careers and families waiting for them at home. Families who waited years for their return whose lives were put on hold by the war.

One should do well to remember that for the men belonging to this group, the decision to travel to Britain and /or her dependencies to continue the fight was in many cases not theirs to make. As can be seen with the testimony of Sverre Sjuls, where the crew of his destroyer were abruptly informed of the captain and admiralty's decision to travel to Britain to continue the fight, it was often a decision taken by a superior officer, or captain of a merchant ship that was to determine the fate of these men. Not their own. In addition to this, for the men who belonged to this ideal type, who constituted sailors of the merchant marine, the story was much the same. Men such as Rolf Henningsen found themselves exiled, not due to personal decisions or motivations, but because they simply happened to be serving at sea by the time of the invasion of Norway in 1940, making any return home virtually impossible. This is not to say that traits and elements of character such as a lust for revenge, or adventure, were not present in the ideal type of men who were older, and who were already in some form of naval service in 1940. Rather, that it did not constitute the main reasons for their service in the exiled Royal Norwegian navy, as it did with the ideal type of men who made the journey into exile under their own steam. Contrast this with the experiences of young men like Steensland and Steimler, who made the journey into exile under their own volition and the difference becomes clearer still.

Thus, if one were to summarise such a difference in the simplest of terms, contrasting the two groups in their most prevalent of differences, it would be thus: The ideal type of men who made the journey to Britain under their own steam to serve in the exiled fleet did so due to motivations such as a lust for revenge and adventure, with little-to-no obligations and ties to the community, and nothing to lose. Whereas those belonging to the ideal type of men who found themselves serving in the navy due to circumstances beyond their control, through prior service in either the armed navy, or merchant fleet, did so in spite of all these reasons, with everything to lose.

3.3 Concluding remarks

The men pertaining to this study did not serve under one unitary role during the war. Rather, they served in varying branches under the over-arching umbrella of the Royal Norwegian navy, each with a service life as unique as the next. These men shared with each other both similarities and differences that would come to define their character. Common denominators such as their pre-war backgrounds and occupations came to shape how they would come to serve in the constituent parts of the Royal Norwegian navy. Furthermore, the way in which many made the journey into exile allows one to quantify their testimony and their character into certain ideal types. Ideal types that can contextualise both the subsequent chapters of this study, but also the individuals themselves. In turn allowing one to infer the type of sailor or airman that served in the Royal Norwegian navy.

In addition to this, examining their actions and motivations during the war makes it possible to infer three ideal types regarding the men interviewed. In large part falling into the three ideal types of men being motivated by a lust for revenge, being highly motivated, and tertiarily being drawn to danger. It is within these three ideal types that one can not only quantify the constitution of the twenty men interviewed, but to also explain their wartime actions and testimony in the subsequent chapters of this study. Providing not only an answer to the question of what their wartime service entailed, as shall be elaborated in the subsequent chapters. More importantly however, it provides an answer as to why these men, in many cases, actively sought out the danger of service in the Royal Norwegian navy.

4 Camaraderie & morale on board

The aspect of camaraderie and morale was arguably the most important aspect of wartime service for the veterans interviewed. Camaraderie and morale can, in many cases, prove to be unique aspects regarding wartime service for any veterans. Let alone, a specific group, as is the case here. Being present in virtually every action and recollection of those actions discussed by the interviewees, it came to leave the biggest imprint on the memories of those interviewed. With all mentioning the importance and positive effects of their wartime camaraderie, in due part resulting from their high morale. At times, intersecting seemingly titanic clashes of arms, with a more human, and individual element that reminded these veterans of their humanity.

Whilst nothing ground-breaking, the variables on the battlefield such as camaraderie and /or morale have been present in wartime for thousands of years. In this case, the sheer amount of description pertaining to the experiences of the men interviewed that fall into these categories, coupled with the colourful and awe-inspiring events which fostered them, mean that in this case, they are unique. In fact, based upon the testimony of those interviewed, it is possible to make a case in stating that the aspects of camaraderie and morale were the single-most important variable in the day-to-day service lives of the men interviewed. For them at least, holding greater significance than any other aspect of their service.

4.1 Defining morale

In any walk of life, morale is an important factor. Both, for the individual, and for the collective. In wartime however, this is something that can be amplified to the point of becoming the difference between victory and defeat for the collective, and life-or-death for the individual. Whilst not a new phenomenon, the advent of industrial warfare, and the casualties to match, meant that arguably, morale was, and still is to this day, one of the most important variables on the battlefield. An observation best summarised by Napoleon, with himself stating that, "in war morale forces are to three to one."[44] In other words, that the aspect of morale is three times as powerful a variable on the battlefield than any other factor. For the men serving in the Royal Norwegian navy, this was arguably more important considering the nature of their battlefield, and the theatre of war in which they would fight. It was not one of rolling fields, flat deserts, or tropical

[44] Pope 1941: 195

islands. Rather, it was a battlefield that brought with it inhospitable conditions, on some of the world's harshest seas and oceans. In such an environment as this, the aspect of morale and camaraderie can literally mean the difference between life and death. A ship's crew can receive the best training that the admiralty has to offer, yet without morale their effectiveness as a fighting force can be rendered mute.

This importance was of course not lost on the allied navies at the time with extensive studies and journals written by both military officers and civilian academics writing extensive opinion pieces along with doctrinal suggestions pertaining to the aspect of morale in wartime. Especially regarding its significance for those serving at sea. Upon the entry of the United States into the war in December of 1941, *The Journal of Educational Sociology* published a series of studies and pieces pertaining to the issue of morale in the armed forces. These journals are freely available to view today, and they provide the reader with an insight as to how elements such as morale and camaraderie were viewed at the time. More specifically, the effect morale could have on the war at sea. Stating that, "morale is a state produced by a clearly such commanding power and authority that it evokes all the capacities of a man or a group, fusing them into an in emotional and ideational unity that increases, sustains, and organizes all effort."[45] If this is truly the case, as believed by academia in 1941, one is left with one simple question. Namely that being the question as to how did such an effort, or even fusion as academically stated, play out for the men who found themselves on the cold face of the war at sea?

4.2 Examples in the interviews

Regarding the men interviewed, their experiences pertaining to morale fall under what one might refer to as, morale on board ship. However, there are instances present in which there is vivid description pertaining to their camaraderie in relation to other circumstances. For example, when during training, on leave, or even in lifeboats adrift at sea leaving a lasting impact. As a result, a strong case can be made for saying that it was the most prevalent of their experiences, with most interviewees being able to best recollect either instances, events, or memories that were to do with aspects of camaraderie and/ or morale. Not only is such a vividness striking, but it also becomes even more significant when one realises the fact that these observations were made

[45] Pope 1941: 203

throughout different settings, dates, and events. Themselves encompassing the entirety of the men's wartime service.

As previously alluded to, to say that the aspect of morale is of tremendous value in wartime, is nothing new. However, its effects can vary greatly, especially depending on the setting and circumstance. This is especially true when regarding naval warfare, where one can go from serving on an enormous battlecruiser with thousands of personnel, to a submarine, destroyer or motor launch. These types of vessels, come with their own, unique set of circumstances, often with only a few hundred crew at most. In many cases, with less than one hundred crewmen. It is therefore by examining the way that morale was increased and fostered on board such smaller vessels, coincidentally the very type of vessels that the Royal Norwegian navy in exile was to primarily operate, that effects on a crew can be best seen and understood. In turn, providing one with an explanation as to how morale effected the everyday lives of Norwegian naval servicemen.

Having established what morale is, and why it is important in wartime, especially at sea, is it possible to finally address and examine how this morale and camaraderie manifested itself for the men interviewed. It is the interviews, where the manifestation of this can be best examined. Perhaps one of the more striking instances of this manifestation can be found in the testimony of those present during the sinking of the Norwegian destroyer HNoMS Eskdale in early 1943. On the night of the 13th - 14th of April 1943. On the 13th/14th, depending on the source used, Eskdale was sunk by German torpedo-boats whilst escorting five trawlers, constituting Channel Convoy PW232. For context, this itself was a routine operation on what was known as the "Portsmouth – Milford Haven" route, in the English Channel.

The full picture of the attack, and subsequent loss of Eskdale can be attained through the combined use of the testimony of those present, namely 2 men by the names of, Hakon Lunde, himself present on sister ship HNoMS "Glaisdale", and Sverre Sjuls, who was unfortunate enough to find himself aboard "Eskdale" at the time of her untimely sinking. This is useful to the study as publicly available databases on Royal Navy, and Norwegian warships can be somewhat lacking in detail. Furthermore, it is within the interviews of these two men that one can begin to see the manifestation of,

and effect that a ships morale could have on the individual sailor, along the all-important effect on survival.

Regarding the sinking, Hakon Lunde stated that, "vi kunne ta opp samtalen til tyskerne på en, inntil en viss radius. Og, så vi hørte de ga ordre om å skyte mot destroyer da, spørsmålet var hvilken, var det "Eskdale" eller var det oss, men vi fikk jo fort vite hvem det var og det var "Eskdale". Den fikk i alt fire torpedoer, og og det var jo hardt, og da ble kaptein Horve så sint at han prøvde å få tak i, forfølge disse e-båtene over til franskekysten".[46] As one can infer from Lunde's statement, "Eskdale's sinking was a dramatic event. Something that would leave a lasting impact of Lunde for the rest his life. Himself later going on to say that "for å si det, for hvem som helst som opplever en torpedo, en torpedering på avstand så er jo det kraftig kost, og det gjorde et visst inntrykk på meg, det må jeg si."[47]

For Sverre Sjuls however, the other man present, and one of Eskdale's machine operators, it was not the sinking per say that would leave the largest impression. Rather, the manner in which the crew would carry itself upon being sunk. In large part due to their high state of morale. Here he stated that upon being sunk in the frigid waters of the channel, at which time he was able to scramble himself with many of his comrades into a lifeboat, were his nerves braced by his skipper's quick thinking. In his own words, "skipperen der, han fant frem ei flaske whiskey eller to, så gikk de rundt og så fikk vi en dram hver som da gjorde veldig godt"[48] As one can plainly see, Sjuls' testimony shows that the issue of morale was not an order issued by superior officers, or something instilled during their training. Rather, "something that demands the initiative and response of the people in every type of activity and grouping"[49], as coined by *The Journal of Educational Sociology* in 1941, a mere two years before the events which Sjuls was to describe.

This is not to say however that the high morale, and spontaneous initiative on either the part of those interviewed, or by others, was able to completely offset the psychological and physiological strain placed on those at sea. Rather, it could allow the men to cope with the strain. As mentioned by Lunde, the sinking of Eskdale left a lasting impression on him, and

[46] M IV K03, Lunde interview transcript: 07:52
[47] M IV K03, Lunde interview transcript: 07:52
[48] M III K09, Sjuls interview transcript: 25:58
[49] Pope 1941: 203

clearly took its toll, both mentally and physically. Whilst Lunde would later in life go on to have a distinguished naval career, in addition to a respectable career in politics, his testimony shows that the vivid regard in which he was to remember Eskdale's sinking should leave anyone in the present under no illusion as to the lasting effects that these men were to suffer. Something that can be seen when regarding Sjuls' observations and recollections regarding the events that lead his captain to promptly dish out his personal supply of whiskey. Here he stated that "Jeg stod personlig og så en flåte med en fire fem mann hvor det kom en torpedo faktisk i hoppende og traff denne flatten med tre fire mann, bare blåste det vekk, og vi ble jo beskutt imens vi kom om bord i den båten og der ble jo flere beskutt og jeg tror et par mann ble drept også med skudd i magen."[50] It was at this point, that his skipper then produced the whiskey, raising the spirits of those in Sjuls' lifeboat.

In typical military style, public information regarding Eskdale's sinking simply states that on the 14th of April Eskdale came, "Under attack 12 miles ENE of the Lizard by E-Boats of 3rd German Flotilla. Hit by two torpedoes fired by German S90 and disabled. Sank in position 50.03N, 05.46 W after hit by further torpedo from S112."[51] This statement being a typical example. Itself being sourced from the work of Lt Cdr Geoffrey B Mason RN (Rtd), subsequently being made available to the public through online databases. Whilst these databases are often comprised of official dispatch notes and reports, along with being put together by Naval officers, they can leave out many important aspects. Especially those pertaining to the individual experiences of those present. This proves to be an important point as when the testimony of those present is examined, new information comes to light. Especially that regarding the aspect of morale and camaraderie at sea. Information that would otherwise be completely forgotten, had it not been for the interviewing of those present. It is here that the true value of oral histories shows itself. Being able to shed light on an otherwise unknown human perception. In this case Lunde & Sjuls' testimony truly shine, allowing any prospective reader to view the Eskdale's sinking through the lens of human eyes. In turn, allowing oneself to view these events as if one was themselves present.

The value in Sjuls' statements is that they give an indication as to the frame of mind that an individual can find themselves in, when faced with the most terrifying and arduous of circumstances. Furthermore, whilst the effects of morale, along with their significance are

[50] M III K09, Sjuls interview transcript 25:58
[51] Mason 2004

not an exact science, Sjuls' experiences show the true value of morale at sea. At sea, a high degree of camaraderie and morale might not prevent mental and physical fatigue indefinitely. Rather, as evident in Sjuls' testimony, it can serve to lift the spirits of the men as to help a crew complete their mission. In turn, helping them offput feelings of sorrow, remorse, or even all emotions entirely until a time in which it was safe for them to do so. Sjuls would go on to summarise this himself, stating that, it wasn't until after returning to port, in essence when out of danger that he was able to fully take in the magnitude of events. In Sjuls' own words, "Du tenkte vel ikke, du var bare glad at det, det var ikke deg denne gangen. Men det var jo sørgelig når vi bisatte dem da med all den høytidelighet det medførte med skudd og all ære tilbrakt dem som da lå i kistene sine. Men neste øyeblikk så var vel det mer eller mindre borte. Nye mannskaper kom om bord, nye båter."[52] As one can plainly see, the sinking left as distinct an impression on Sjuls, as on Lunde, leaving both with traumatizing and lasting memories. However, the realities of war, coupled with the instinct for personal survival left both with little alternative other than to simply repress any worries until much later in their lives.

4.2.1 The use of stimulants and substances

At first glance, Sjuls' testimony provides valuable insight regarding the effect that spontaneous thinking can have on both the collective, and individual morale of a ship's crew. In addition to this however, his testimony also raises another interesting point. Itself stemming from the seemingly rousing effect that his captain's whiskey had on the survivors of Eskdale's sinking. Namely, the role that certain items and consumables had on the day-to-day morale and camaraderie of those interviewed. What one might refer to as stimulating substances, to be a little more precise. The interviews of this study are quite simply littered with instances where luxuries and substances such as tobacco, alcohol, and assorted foodstuffs, being used either aboard ship, in lifeboats, or whilst on shore leave. With the drug Benzedrine being used, in the most colourful of cases. Perhaps Benzedrine is therefore a good place to start, being as it is likely the most jarring of stimulants mentioned. Itself being strictly controlled in today's world.

As the world went to war in 1939, the use of stimulants, such as pharmaceutical drugs and tobacco, along with the importance that food and alcohol could have on the morale of fighting men, was far from an alien concept. Tobacco and alcohol had of course been used

[52] M III K09, Sjuls interview transcript: 27:23

throughout the Napoleonic wars and the more recent first world war in vast quantities. So integral was this relationship between the armed forces and its tobacco and alcohol that British troops fighting on the Western front in the first world war being provided with a daily ration including both Rum and cigarettes. With German troops being supplied with copious amounts of beer for personal consumption. This was something that had largely remained unchanged with the outbreak of the second world war.

By the 1930s however, advancements in pharmaceutical technologies had facilitated a new era of relationship between the military, and the pharmaceutical industry. With it, the possibility of using pharmaceutical drugs to ward of fatigue. Something that had plagued the fighting nations of the first world war. A fact not lost on military doctors of the day. So high was this concern, which was in all likeliness not completely unwarranted, that, "in 1940, military medical personnel anticipated a crisis from the mental illness known in the previous war as "shell shock."[53] Amphetamines, an invention of the interwar years, seemingly provided the military with a "wonder-drug", allowing their soldiers, sailors, and airmen to ward off fatigue. Hopefully preventing shellshock. Whether these drugs had the desired effect is doubtful, and still being debated today. What cannot be denied however, is the fact that, "Amphetamine was a new product of the pharmaceutical laboratory that, like the sulfa drugs and penicillin, quickly found its way to the battlefield."[54] Specifically, finding its way into the hands of those serving in the Royal Norwegian navy.

The use of Benzedrine by those interviewed first appears when Sverre Sjuls speaks about his experiences escorting arctic convoys to Murmansk in 1943, whilst serving aboard HNoMS Stord. Regarding his exposure to the drug, he had this to say, "vi fikk jo midler når det gikk for lenge, til å holde oss våkne. Vi hadde sånn nødproviant, det var jo ikke sånn anledning til å lage mat, så det var nødproviant, og der lå det noen Benzedrin tabletter som vi tok, og da ble øyene pupillene store og våke, og da gikk du, men man holdt seg våkne."[55] As can be seen in Sjuls' testimony, Benzedrine was provided in its intended role, i.e., as a stimulant to ward off signs of fatigue, giving the bewildered seaman a much-needed lift.

Judging by Sjuls' testimony, the drug seemed to have the desired effect, allowing the crew to stay alert for extended periods of time in the harshest of conditions. It should also be noted

[53] Rasmussen 2011: 209
[54] Rasmussen 2011: 205-206
[55] M III K09, Sjuls interview transcript: 29:04

that Sjuls' observations give Creedence to the critics of amphetamine use at the time, along with modern day scholars who largely acknowledge that, "The grounds on which amphetamine was actually adopted by both British and American militaries had less to do with the science of fatigue than with the drug's mood-altering effects, as judged by military men—increased confidence and aggression, and elevated morale."[56] It is therefore possible to say that it was the belief that they were being given a "wonder-drug" that had the largest effect. Arguably providing Sjuls and his comrades with a perceived stimulation. Improving morale, and alertness.

It was British use of the drug that facilitated it falling into the hands of Norwegian seamen. In this case, Sverre Sjuls. British naval use, thus along with its subordinate navies such as the Norwegian Royal Navy in exile, was by far, the largest of the fighting navies to issue amphetamines during the conflict. "Admiralty figures indicate that some 28 million tablets were ordered for the Merchant Navy and RN between August 1942 and June 1943."[57] Coincidentally being the very period in which Sjuls was to describe his own use of the drug. Furthermore, so large was the amount of amphetamines issued in the naval units under British command that, "the substance was used throughout the Service and across a range of operational settings, including convoy work and surface engagements, and by submariners, naval aviators, and special forces personnel."[58] With Sverre Sjuls being one of thousands to serve on convoy work, coincidentally, finding himself to be a guinea pig in one of history's greatest clinical-trials ever put into practice.

Whether this effect was real or perceived is not important. What is important however is the fact that Sjuls, and his comrades believed that taking Benzedrine had a net-positive effect. Whilst the stimulating effects cannot be doubted, amphetamines are, as known today, not the wonder-drug they were touted as being in the late 1930s, something already known by many in the pharmaceutical and medical industries at the time. With U.S army psychiatrists concluding at the end of the war that, "officially sanctioned amphetamine use had caused serious abuse of the drug among soldiers during the war"[59] However, the perceived uptick in both morale and fighting spirit in those subject to its effects should not be discounted. Especially in regard to the accounts and testimony

[56] Rasmussen 2011: 206
[57] Pugh 2017: 499
[58] Pugh 2017: 499
[59] Rasmussen 2011: 232

provided by Sjuls. Sjuls' testimony in particular being an excellent individual example inherent to the effects of amphetamine use, with the drug providing him with the belief in that he was adequately equipped and capable of completing his given tasks and duties. In his mind, giving him the strength required whilst patrolling the arctic seas.

4.2.1.1 Alcohol & tobacco

The use of amphetamines such as Benzedrine might serve as a more extreme example by today's standards, however it was as one might imagine, far from the only substance used by naval personnel. More mainstream stimulants such as tobacco and alcohol were used far more frequently by the men interviewed. This itself should come as no surprise. Both the British and Royal Norwegian navies have had long and historical relationships with both alcohol and tobacco, especially tobacco when aboard ship. Often-times, one of the most important of a seaman's personal effects were his tobacco and pipe. Used many on an occasion to brace their nerves or simply stave off the boredom of long patrols. For the men interviewed this was no exception, with many stating with vivid detail the importance of their personal supplies of alcohol and tobacco, be it either in port, or when at sea.

Tobacco, as previously mentioned held what some might describe as, an unnatural importance amongst the personal effects of a sailor. However, in times of crisis, it could be argued as being more valuable than gold. Something that Rolf Henningsen would describe first-hand. Henningsen, an Åsgårdstrand native, would by war's end, come to serve as a naval officer with experiences on board both British and Norwegian ships in both the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and arctic theatres. Even going on to serve as a naval attaché in Washington D.C. post-war. However, to serve in the Royal Norwegian Navy in any capacity, there were two main requirements. Namely, a respectable middle-school exam, and 18 months experience at sea. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that upon graduating middle-school, Henningsen promptly signed up with the Norwegian merchant marine. A path that many of those interviewed came to mirror.

It was during his service with the Merchant marine that Henningsen would experience the significance of tobacco for himself. On the 7th of October 1940, M/S Touraine, the merchant vessel on which Henningsen served, was torpedoed by a German U-boat in the Irish sea. Fortunately for Henningsen, Touraine was only hit by a single torpedo, giving him adequate time to make his way into one of the lifeboats. Unfortunately, the

seas that day were rather stormy, making for a miserable experience, further compounding the trauma of being sunk. Regarding the incident, Henningsen recollected that, whilst in the lifeboat, tobacco gave the men a much-needed lift, bracing their nerves. Specifically stating that, "Ja. Jeg husker at Anstermann var den eneste som hadde tobakk, han hadde jo pipe, og den pipen hans gikk på rundgang til alle sammen, både de som ikke røkte og de som røkte."[60]

Hennignsen's statement, just like that of Sjuls' provides a window into the mindset of these sailors at the time of a ships sinking. With their reaction being a very human one. In turn, showing that for these men, most of whom were under the age of 21, that any respite from their new reality was a welcome one. Any semblance of civility, or peaceful interlude could seemingly work wonders for the morale of both the individual, and a group. Owing to similar circumstances, Hennignsen's experience in the lifeboat mirrors that of Sjuls own experience upon the sinking of "Eskdale". With these statements however, one is left with the distinct impression that no matter the substance or item, the use of tobacco, alcohol, amphetamines, or food, were all used for similar purposes. With each substance coming with its own perceived, and real effects on both the morale and psyche of a ship's crew.

Lars Yggeseth, a submariner, would also testify to the importance that tobacco and alcohol held in the daily lives of the crew of his submarine. Stating that upon receiving hazard pay whence the crew returned to port after a successful mission they would set upon devouring the local pubs and base canteens for cheap beer, in his own words stating, "Nei det var ned på puben det å få et glass øl så lenge han hadde penger, og så kantina, vi hadde kantine inne på basen og der betalte vi 6 pence for en pint med øl."[61] Whilst an amusing story, it goes to show that whilst drinking on board ship may not have been permitted, drinking copious amounts of alcohol was an important pastime for the men, even when not in danger. Seemingly giving them something to look forward to. With them being able to either drink in celebration of recent victories, or otherwise drown their sorrows, helping them to mourn fallen comrades. Something Sverre Sjuls would certainly attest to after Eskdale's sinking. However, the main reason for including Yggeseth's testimony is that he provided valuable insight into the unique difficulties facing the crew of a submarine at sea. With special emphasis placed on the

[60] M III K7, Hennignsen interview audio recording: 07:08
[61] M III K17, Yggeseth interview transcript 12:08

deterioration of food rations as time went on, in addition to the unique restrictions placed on the crew.

4.2.2 Morale under the waves

Warfare aboard a submarine takes on a completely different nature when compared with that above the waves. Here a crew must live by a completely different set of rules and restrictions, with silence being the golden rule of conduct on board. In layman's terms, the slightest noise could give away the submarine's position to enemy hydrophone, or radar operators, spelling a terrifying and quick end. Here, as one can imagine, the crew's behaviour and wellbeing were significantly constrained, with the obvious restrictions placed on smoking whilst underwater. In his own words, Yggeseth would state, regarding the restrictions placed on the crew that, "likedan så var det strengt forbudt å snakke mer enn høyst nødvendig, vi skulle ikke bruke surstoff og røyking var selvsagt totalt forbudt så det var ikke annet enn hver gang vi dukket opp og startet dieselene da fikk dem lov til å røyke."[62] Restrictions such as these likely explain for the ravenous nature in which shore-leave was enjoyed. Drinking and partying heavily when on land, as the very nature of the war under the waves left little room for the enjoyment of personal luxuries. Furthermore, the lack of the opportunity to smoke, an activity so relished by the majority of those interviewed, coupled with the deteriorating rations as their deployment wore on, meant that the aspect of morale was arguable even more important on board a submarine, when compared to that for other vessels.

Whilst at first glance this might give the impression that morale on board submarines was the worst on board any type of vessel, this could not be farther from the truth. Yes, there were more restrictions placed on the everyday lives of the crew, and yes; living conditions deteriorated more-so on submarines over the course of a deployment, in comparison with surface vessels, but that is not to say that morale was poor. To the contrary, the very nature of live on board a submarine, led to an increased level of morale, with what some might call unbridled camaraderie. On board a submarine, there is no personal space, only the collective space of the crew. Furthermore, the very nature of warfare under the waves, the mentality of "hunter vs the hunted", or the ability to remain undetected for large periods of time gave off the sense of untouchability amongst submariners. A sense of belief that was ever increased and reinforced after a

[62] M III K16, Yggeseth interview transcript: 24:17

successful mission into Atlantic or Arctic waters. Something that Tom Brynhildsen, another submariner, would attest to. Stating that, “Det skulle ikke tro det at du var glad når du hadde tatt livet av så, så mange, men, heldigvis du kuttet ut den tanken, og jublet for den innsatsen du hadde gjort selv. Og det var vel sikkert for alle sammen. Så stemningen var god. Fikk en, senket jo tysk ubåt for eksempel, det regnes jo for å være veldig stor, stor jobb, og det var jubel når vi fikk senket den da, men men. Det høres så rart ut, men det er jo sånn. Du blir sånn selv når det er andre som jakter på deg her.”[63]

The decreased standard of living was not limited to the ordinary ratings either, but a burden shared by everyone on board, from the captain to the humble torpedo-loader. Even the more negative aspects of life on board a submarine fostered their own sense of camaraderie with its unique twists and elements. Whilst the prospect of a gruesome death on the vastness of arctic waters was present for all those who would serve in the Royal Norwegian navy, the prospect of a sudden death under the icy waves whilst trapped inside what was essentially a metal tube, made service on board submarines all-the-more terrifying. For this reason, it was understandably a volunteer-only branch of the navy. This of course providing the additional the benefit inherent to a volunteer-only force. Namely, the fact that each-and-every man was motivated to the upmost, not only for himself, but the men who he would live, and in some cases die with.

The result of this, was a lasting sense of camaraderie that many in this study would never forget, struggling to replicate it in their later civilian lives, after the war. Finn Clausen, most notable for operating the Shetland Bus network, even being present during the infamous sinking of the trawler “Bornholm”, along with the subsequent escape from German search parties, reinforces such a sentiment. Stating that, “det var det store var at man fikk jo venner for livet, så det det er jo det største beholdning etter krigen kan du si.”[64] And that only during reunions, was this sense of camaraderie replicated.

4.3 Concluding remarks

In summary, crews used all means at their disposal to increase and improve morale aboard ship. From drinking each other under the table in port, to taking Benzedrine tablets whilst on patrol, naval servicemen sought all respite available to them.

[63] M III K15, Brynhildsen interview audio recording: 19:50
[64] M III K02, Clausen interview transcript: 12:20

Furthermore, the matter of Camaraderie and morale on board ship was not constructed from hierarchical orders. Rather, it was a way in which these men carried themselves in the face of immeasurable danger. Often-times, this very danger contributing to a heightened sense of camaraderie in the face of death. Whether it was it through personal initiative, respect for their commanding officers or each other, or simply the belief in their moral superiority over the enemy, is not what is most important. What is most important is the fact that for the men interviewed, it was in their best interests to maintain a high state of morale. In many cases, because it could mean the difference between life and death.

It is through the lens of those who served on these vessels that one is able to see how aspects such as rations, luxuries, the sense of danger, and the necessity to work together came to foster an unparalleled sense of morale and camaraderie. Its significance, as seen through the testimony of those who served is thus undeniable. With the aspect of high morale and literally meaning the difference between life and death for many who came to serve. Whether being fostered through the consumption of personal luxuries, food, or even stimulative drugs, the result remains the same. Keeping the men alive and mentally fit so that they may complete their mission and their duties until such a time as it is safe to decompress.

Whilst the importance of morale was known by the officers and men at the time, the way in which it was fostered was up to each individual ship's crew, and its own circumstances. The use of stimulants especially, allowed crews to not necessarily, be more alert, but however give them the impression of being more alert. Providing them with the belief that they had been sufficiently bolstered to remain vigilant when on long convoys in the pitch-black, and icy nights inherent to the arctic. Letting neither themselves, nor more crucially, their comrades down. A belief certainly shared by many in this study. Perhaps therefore, one can conclude such a chapter with the words of Bjørn Hagen. "For under en krig så må du stole på den mannen som står ved siden av deg og han må også stole på at du gjør din jobb for hvis en av dem svikter så går kanskje begge to vest. Og slik og sånn er det hele veien under en krig du er nødt til og så stole på hverandre, og på det viset så blir det et eget kameratforhold med dem som

har vært sammen om bord i en båt, og det har ikke forandret seg selv om det er 50 år siden dette herre her. Det varer like godt."[65]

[65] M III K 12, Hagen interview transcript: 11:00

5 The experiences of Norwegian naval personnel on their return home

Originally, the aim of this study was to examine the key elements of the service of a specific group of twenty Norwegian, naval servicemen. The thought being, to bring to light the realities of their daily lives at sea. This, along with the wartime struggles of those who served in the naval service during the second world war. With the method of doing this, being to examine their interviewed testimony, to reconstruct a complete picture of their experiences. In turn, conveying the areas, instances, and elements that hold the most significance. There is however one key element of their service that occurred, in large part, after the cessation of hostilities in the European theatre. This being their return home post-war. After years spent in exile, battling the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe, in dangerous waters, the men of this study were eventually to return home. To friends, family, or in some cases, no-one. It is these differences of circumstance that shall be examined. How were these naval veterans treated upon their return home? Furthermore, how did these veterans, in their own words to boot, experience the transition between wartime service, and their return to a peaceful society?

In the contemporary era, especially in popular media, one is inundated with images of soldiers being met with either jubilation or contempt, depending on the conflict. Especially in a country such as Norway, which came to be occupied for a little over five years, the common perception is often coloured with the sudden liberation of May 1945. Be it the return of the King to his rightful throne, the Oslo crowds showering the motorcade with flowers whilst simultaneously waving small Norwegian flags. The image is one of triumphant jubilation, and the hope of a brighter, more peaceful future. The common perception of the end of the war in Europe is full of such images. The fabled image of Charles De Gaulle walking down the Champs Elysée in Paris, upon the city's liberation in 1944, or even the large ticker-tape parades in London or New York show the ideal. But they are but that, an ideal. Although genuine, they were carefully choreographed events that could be broadcast the world over. The reality for those who served however, was far more nuanced.

For those interviewed, their testimony regarding their return home might not have been bullet-ridden, or as dangerous as many other aspects of their wartime service, but it is

arguably just as significant, along with being just as varied as the accounts of their service. Therefore, to limit the research of this study to within the 8th of May 1945 the day that the Kingdom of Norway was officially liberated, would be premature. If one is to end the scope of this study, and thus omit the perceptions of the men upon their return home, then one would be left with an incomplete picture. An examination of their return home is therefore necessary to complete this picture.

5.1 A delayed return

Firstly, it should be said that whilst Norway's war in Europe may have ended on the 8th of May 1945, the service of its sailors did not. Norway, being part of the United Nations coalition was bound by international solidarity, along with a fair amount of pressure from her British and American allies, to declare war on Japan upon defeating Nazi Germany. A fact forgotten in today's world is that whilst seen as a largely diplomatic, and symbolic gesture, the Kingdom of Norway did in fact declare war on Japan on the 9th of July 1945. Meaning that for many, their return home was unlikely at best, until the surrender of the Japanese Empire. As a result of this, the vast majority of those interviewed, were not able to return until August of 1945, at the earliest. Apart from a select few staff officers, Hakon Lunde being amongst them, the men of this study never experienced the massive parades, street parties, or patriotic fervour that those fortunate enough to return in May 1945 were able to. Rather, circumstances far beyond their control meant that their return was often delayed, for weeks or months after the liberation of their homeland. What, therefore, were these circumstances that led to their return home being delayed, in so many cases?

5.1.1 The role of rank, occupation & branch of service

The time at which a seaman, or airman of the Norwegian navy was able to return home was not a personal decision, but a decision made, in large part, by sheer circumstance. Whilst such a statement may, at first, seem ambiguous, there are a few key factors that show evidence for this. The first of these being the rank and occupation of the interviewee in question. For example, Hakon Lunde came to serve as a staff officer in the final months of the war with one of the many perks of this role being that he was able to return to Norway on the 11th of May 1945. For the enlisted men, or officer cadets interviewed, they had to serve for months, or even years beyond the liberation before being able to return home.

This delayed return was perhaps most prevalent when regarding the testimony of those who served aboard minesweepers. The experiences of men like Bjarne Thorsen, who by war's end was serving on minesweepers based in Scotland. For men like him, there were no parades or instant return home as many had hoped. Instead of a swift return home, men like Bjarne Thorsen were instead tasked with the rather dangerous, yet important task of clearing both allied and German mines from Norwegian waters. In his own words he would state that upon receiving news that the war was over that, "Det var jo en lettelse, men du har ikke den store gleden sånn som det norske folk som var kvitt tyskerne. Du var jo fremdeles i tjeneste, fremdeles så hadde du ett og halvt år igjen i tjeneste, og det var det jo det samme"[66] As one can see, the circumstances which resulted in his continuation of service, long after the cessation of hostilities was one of occupation. Thorsen was understandably frustrated by this. Yet, he conceded that it was a job that needed doing and that assisting the help of former German minelayers softened the blow somewhat. Thorsen didn't mince his words when regarding the fact that he missed out on the riotous celebrations, in large part due to his remote Shetland posting when he stated that, "Så du kan ikke si at freden sank inne med oss for det gjorde den faen ikke! Det var jævelig."[67]

Whilst Lunde and Thorsen's testimony may serve as opposite experiences, they show somewhat the degree to which the manner of service and rank respectively, came to affect the time in which a sailor was able to return home. Again, holding a higher rank, could bring with it the occupation of a relatively cushy job at the admiralty, as in Lunde's case. With one of the perks coming in the form of being able to return home as early as May 1945. What Bjarne Thorsen's testimony shows is that whilst the rank of a naval serviceman was an important factor, it was the designated role of the individual in the navy that was the largest factor in the date of his return. Whether out of sheer necessity, as in Thorsen's case, or even the geographical and logistical limitations, the fact remains the same. That the time at which a serviceman returned home was not his own decision to make, rather one made by the powers at be. Whilst it should also be briefly mentioned that those who came to serve in the fleet air arm, either flying Catalina seaplanes of mosquito fighter-bombers, were also able to return in May, this should be viewed as the exception. Not the norm.

[66] M III K04, Thorsen interview transcript: 33:30
[67] M III K04, Thorsen interview transcript: 33:30

Regarding the matter of logistical and geographical limitations, there is the historical case of Norwegian naval personnel being embedded as liaison personnel with their coalition allies. This was commonplace with those who attended naval academies whilst in exile. Here, officer cadets, educated at British institutions, were embedded with the Royal Canadian and British navies as midshipmen. This was especially the case for men such as Bjarne Eia, who were still enrolled in the exiled Norwegian naval academy by the war's end and had to complete their military training and education before being able to return home. Another forgotten aspect of those who came to serve on British, American, or Canadian warships was the simple fact that whilst the war in Europe may have come to an end, the war in the Far-East was still raging on. Thus, for those who served on-board allied warships, their delayed return home neatly coincided with Japan's surrender in late August of 1945. Evidently being based upon the simple, yet common assumption that the Canadian and U.S, and British Royal navies would likely be deployed to the Far-East, for the coming invasion of the Japanese home islands. A fate which many in the British and coalition navies had already assigned themselves to.

As one can see, there were several reasons as to why these sailors and naval aviators were not able to return home until many months after Norway had been liberated. Thorsen's statement shows this first-hand. For the majority interviewed, their military service did not end in May 1945, but continued at the same pace as before. The cogs of military machinery and bureaucracy did not suddenly grind to a halt upon the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. Rather, as is typical of any large-scale operation, took time to demobilise the millions of men that were in uniform. Furthermore, Thorsen's service aboard minelayers highlights the role played by Norwegian military personnel inherent to the peaceful transfer of power upon the surrender of the German garrison in occupied Norway.

5.1.2 Operation Doomsday

By May 1945, the role of the Norwegian armed forces, especially the navy had suddenly, although expectedly, gone from being an aggressive, fighting force, to one that was meant to keep the peace. Ensuring the peaceful vacation of German men and materiel from Norwegian territory, in what was to be called, "Operation Doomsday". An entirely post-war operation, its aims were to, "re-establish national and local government, maintain law and order, rebuild infrastructure destroyed by the Germans (particularly in the north of the country), ensure the delivery of services and

amenities, assess and relieve public health issues including malnutrition, administer returning refugees and to process and repatriate the 350,000 surrendered German service personnel and thousands of foreign forced labourers."[68] Whilst the majority of these duties would be tasked to British paratroopers, and Norwegian army & police personnel, named the Royal Norwegian navy was to play a small, yet significant part in this transfer of power. Coincidentally, it was for this reason that Hakon Lunde was able to return earlier than any other man interviewed, on the 11th of May. This being as, due to his rank and position as a staff officer, had received orders to accompany the British first airborne division, colloquially named "the red devils", to Gardermoen airfield.

For the Norwegian navy, and the other men interviewed, Operation Doomsday came with two primary objectives. The first of these being the mundane task of clearing mines from Norwegian waters, as was the case in Bjarne Thorsen's case. With the second objective taking the form of overseeing the surrender of the German U-boat, and service fleet harboured in Norwegian ports. Whilst mostly forgotten today, it should be remembered that by May 1945, the U-boats operating from Kriegsmarine bases in Norway were the most advanced in the world. Therefore, the type XXI & XXIII electric U-boats especially as newly introduced by the Kriegsmarine, could not be permitted to be scuttled by their now defeated crews. For the Norwegian submarine arm especially, this meant that those with the rank, or pre-requisite knowledge were summarily sent to Norwegian ports to oversee the transfer of German U-boats into allied captivity. All whilst the rest of the Norwegian crews were simply left to stew in their Scottish bases until being de-mobilised. Yggeseth would attest to this, stating that, "Nå var vi hvert fall, var de uheldige for å si det sånn da. Det ble en god del av guttene ble tatt, viktige personer hvert fall, ble sendt da, en del over til Norge for å overta de tyske ubåtene. Og resten av oss, ble værende igjen, så vi kom ikke til Norge, før august."[69]

Operation Doomsday would therefore prevent many Norwegian sailors and naval personnel from returning home before later in the summer, as many were required to stay on to ensure the peaceful co-operation of the German garrison in Norway. This was a process that even at the time was expected to take some time. Unknown to the men of this study, whose lives were further put on hold by Doomsday, was the fact that, whilst 350 000 German soldiers, sailors and airmen would in fact surrender, allied planning

[68] Greenbriar 2017: 73
[69] M III K17, Lars Yggeseth interview audio recording: 21:04

had estimated that the number was far lower, at roughly 250 000 men.[70] This, of course came in addition to the thousands of forced labourers that required repatriation to their home countries. It is therefore not entirely unreasonable to suggest that such an unforeseen increase in the number of men, along with their weaponry, led to the delayed return home of many naval personnel.

Had Thorsen or Yggeseth been informed of their obligatory participation of Operation Doomsday at the time, it would likely have likely provided little solace to them either way. After all, these were men who after years of war, simply wished to return home. Consequentially, whilst their return home may have been at the forefront of the mind of each-and-every individual sailor and airman of the Royal Norwegian Navy, for those making the big decisions in Whitehall or Oslo, the reality was rather different. For those calling the shots, simple realities and constraints of the day meant the repatriation of servicemen had to take a proverbial backseat to other, more important matters. To this effect, the average enlisted man would likely respond by saying that his return was the most important thing in the world, yet the decision was not theirs to make.

At first, the fact that most men in the Royal Norwegian navy were not able to return home until August 1945, might have seemed strange. Especially considering the fact that this was over 3 months after the war in Europe came to an end. However, this delayed return home after years spent in exile, was no isolated phenomenon. It was a common occurrence for the majority of those interviewed, being the case for each-and-every non-commissioned sailor interviewed. In some cases, this was simply down to sheer bad luck. In the majority of cases however, it was down to circumstance. Circumstances far beyond the control and authority of most individuals meant that their return was to be delayed. Whether it be due to umbrella of Operation Doomsday, the ongoing war with Japan, or the lethargic nature of military and government bureaucracy, the result remains the same. Most men in the Navy were not to return to jubilant celebrations on the 8th of May, or even the 17th. Rather, they waited anxiously for months, or in some rare cases, years, for their long-awaited return home.

[70] Mann 2012: 199

5.2 Personal experiences upon returning home

So, what of their return? Having established that the majority weren't able to return until many months after the liberation one can begin to examine their perceptions on their long-awaited return home. Here their experiences would be as varied, nuanced, and as colourful as their wartime service, arguably being just as important. By examining how they perceived their return home, and their experiences and thoughts upon returning to civilian life, after years at war, can one do their wartime service justice. Arguably, completing their as-of-yet, untold story.

Before proceeding any further, there is a slight caveat that should be addressed. That being the liberation of Finnmark at the end of 1944. For the last year of the war, there was one portion of the Norwegian mainland that was somewhat free, having been liberated by a mostly Soviet Force, that had pushed the German arctic armies all the way from the approaches of Murmansk to the mountains just to the North-east of Tromsø. Consequentially, several interviewees were able to briefly serve alongside the Soviets in the waters and fjords of Finnmark. All such visits were brief however, either owing to the destroyed infrastructure in the area, coupled with the fact that missions such as MTB patrols, or submarine actions were far more useful in these more southern waters of the North Sea. As a result, many of those interviewed would reflect upon the joy of returning to a partially free Finnmark. Although, the fact that so much had been destroyed, either by the retreating German's or advancing Soviets, left a sour taste.

5.2.1 Disappointment, or expected realities?

As previously alluded to, the date on which a naval serviceman was able to return home after the war should be considered a lottery more than anything else. With many hoping to return home as soon as the German surrender was announced on the 7th of May 1945. This hope quickly being dashed by higher-command, or simple political and military reality. For some however, they were fortunate enough to return as early as May 1945. Men in the fleet air arm, such as Finn Ferner and Egil D. Johansen, were the outliers here. Being able to return in time for the riotous celebrations on the 17th of May. The first national day to be publicly celebrated in 5 years.

This is not to say however, that the men of the fleet air arm were unitary in the joyous nature of their return home. Lauritz Humlen, a navigator in the fleet air arm would himself sate to the contrary that despite his perceived glamorous service, he in fact

returned to Norway already in the spring of 1945 with neither money in his pocket, nor his own clothes. In fact, stating that he, "følte seg utenfor"[71] Even so, all three of these men were fortunate as they were able to return home quickly after the war in Europe came to an end. A fact made more interesting considering that, throughout the interviews, there emerges a pattern of the men receiving a better reception the earlier they came home.

As one can imagine, the popular consensus amongst the civilian population in Norway was one of delight, relief, or even gratitude. This was something Egil D. Johansen himself would attest to, stating that, "Jeg ble ikke noe sånn ordentlig glede før 17. mai da fikk jeg anledning til å komme hjem med Finn Ferner, og det var jo storveies. Da kom jeg hjem og da ble det glede. Da fikk vi, foreldrene visste jo ingenting før jeg plutselig stod i døren der sammen med en kamerat canadier, og det ble utrolig glede så det var det, komme helskinnet hjem igjen."[72] Whilst a heart-warming account, it would unfortunately prove to be the exception. Other men, less fortunate men had to wait for months to return home. Furthermore, this is not to say that all those who served in the fleet air arm were as fortunate. Whilst the reasons for this have been discussed at length, the effect on the reception the men received has not.

By the late summer and early autumn, such popular attitudes of triumph and jubilation had for the most part subsided. Even with the capitulation of Japan, bringing with it, world peace, events in the far-east were a world away to the average Norwegian. Those who retuned in the months following VE-day, their return was a rather more sordid affair. They were not greeted by large ticker-tape parades, huge crowds waving flags and showering them with flowers. For the majority of these men, what greeted them was not jubilation, and collective joy, but silence, and apathy. For men such as Lars Yggeseth, who were not able to return home until August, his return was one of disappointment. After years spent in exile, crammed into a submarine, facing what many would consider to be immeasurable odds, he had hoped for a return befitting of his service. Years later, in the interviews, Yggeseth would recall how missing out on the celebrations of the 8th of May left a sour taste. Regarding his absence he simply stated that, "Så vi fikk ikke være med på noe av stasen som var her nede hjemme den 8. mai,

[71] M IV K12, Humlen interview transcript: 13:30
[72] M III K09, Johansen interview transcript: 33:35

den gikk vi glipp av."[73] Judging by his previous testimony regarding his perceptions on Operation Doomsday and the fact that he was not chosen to return to Norway during May to assist in securing the surrender of the Kriegsmarine U-boat fleet in Norway, his perceptions on his delayed return were something that although disappointing, was at the very least understandable. Whilst the delay may have been understandable, albeit disappointing for many, the effect this had on their eventual return was not. Regarding his return home in August 1945, Yggeseth perhaps summed this best by bluntly stating that, "Det var ikke noe mottagelse. Det var noen motorbåter som var ute og møtte oss, ellers så gikk vi stille og rolig."[74] This unfortunately was a common occurrence. With a number of those who had returned throughout the late summer, and autumn reflecting negatively upon their return.

This is not to say however that the delayed return guaranteed a negative reception, however. Again, the delayed return would leave a sour taste for many others, with men such as Ragnar Dybdahl later viewing it as one of the worst memories of their wartime experiences. He stated that "Den verste tida etter krigen vart slutt var at vi ikke fikk reist hjem igjen, det sytes jeg var verst. Ble værende i kirkenes i flere måneder, før jeg fikk reist hjem igjen til Ålesund. Det var verst av alt sammen"[75] Although in Dybdahl's case, his eventual return home would prove to be a far more pleasant affair, living up to the long-awaited ideal of flag waving crowds. For both men however, one can plainly see that the delayed return left a lasting image in their minds. The fact that decades later, they were to regard their delayed return with such bluntness and reflective disappointment should be telling. Also, whilst Yggeseth's testimony is perhaps the most negative of reflections amongst the interviews, and arguably not a reflection upon the collective group, his testimony shows that the common perception of returning veterans, conjured by the image of ticker-tape parades in times-square or Piccadilly circus should not be seen as a universal experience. Rather, a constructed ideal that simply wasn't the case for many who came to serve during the war.

Reality, however, was to slap them with disappointment and anguish. Whilst such disappointment after years of expectations and hope was commonplace in the thoughts of many who came to be interviewed, Tom Brynhildsen was more measured than most,

[73] M III K17, Yggeseth, interview audio recording: 22:15
[74] M III K17 Yggeseth interview audio recording: 22:26
[75] M III K06, Dybdahl interview audio recording 25:09

in his comments. Especially considering the degree to which he was able to reflect on this disappointment decades later. Here he would state that, “vi hadde blitt fortalt og de hadde skrevet om i de forskjellige hefter og blader da, om at sånn og sånt skulle det bli, og sånt skulle de få det, men det var ikke alle som var fornøyde, og det var sikkert grunner til det og. Vi, vi var vel ikke så glade for alt som, sånn som det var hjemme når vi kom da.”[76] Brynhildsen would elaborate further, summarising his personal disappointment. Especially considering the importance that he believed the Royal Norwegian navy had played in the defeat of Nazi Germany. Stating that, “Når vi regnet med at, nå har vi gjort en svær jobb, så nå må de respektere det vi har gjort, det ble det sikkert også gjort, men, det var jo fort også skuffe en sånn mann.”[77]As can be seen, Brynildsen’s comments go to show that after years’ service in exile, many simply expected a better welcome. Especially when one accounts for the harsh nature of the war in the Atlantic, and arctic seas. Reality, however, was a bitter pill to swallow, both in 1945, and decades later during the interviews.

5.2.2 How popular perceptions shaped their return

Veterans being treated at odds with their own expectations, or even the treatment or reception that their service warrants are no isolated phenomenon of course. Perhaps the Vietnam war and the mistreatment of American veterans is the most profound example of this, yet there is something more peculiar regarding the return of this specific group. One should remember, that in 1945, these men were not returning from some foreign entanglement, or even a war of conquest. Rather, the liberation of their homeland against a foreign oppressor. By all reckoning, they should have been universally welcomed home as heroes. Unlike the treatment of Vietnam veterans, or those returning from the middle east in the present era, their apathetic return cannot be chalked down to a public that never wanted them to fight in the first place. This is simply because, although the vast majority never partook in armed conflict against their occupiers, one can safely assert that most Norwegians were glad to be liberated in May 1945. Therefore, to explain such an apathetic return, there had to have been a different explanation. One that was unique to the world of 1945, especially to the once occupied nations of Europe.

[76] M III K15, Brynhildsen interview audio recording: 23:26
[77] M III K15, Brynhildsen interview audio recroding 23:26

The true value in Brynhildsen's comments, just like those of Dybedahl and Yggeseth, highlight the nuanced nature of the reception that awaited these men. Furthermore, the nuanced nature inherent to all three pieces of testimony hints at the reasons for this disappointment. Whilst many local communities were not to forget the sacrifice made by their exiled men, and welcomed them accordingly, as in Brynhildsen's case, national perceptions and attitudes had largely changed by the late summer of 1945. Furthermore, such a negative piece of testimony such as Yggeseth's, shows how drastic this change in the national consensus had been. Especially considering that this was only between the months of May to August of 1945. Gone was the collective sense of relief and triumph, so prevalent in the newsreels of May & June 1945. In its stead, the simple reality that people had civilian lives to return to, and a future to rebuild. Subsequently, post-war realities meant that not long after its end, the war was something that many simply wished to leave behind, with it, the inherent trauma and sorrow. Thus, the disappointment of their return should not be as surprising as first thought. Rather, an understandable reaction from a war-weary populace.

This lack of interest from a war-weary public was likely made more severe considering the majority of those who served in the Norwegian Navy, had served on what some might call a "forgotten" theatre of war, i.e., escorting arctic convoys, or patrolling on foreign, icy seas. Furthermore, several naval units and vessels, such as Royal Norwegian submarines or MTBs (motor torpedo boats), had seen what some might refer to as a controversial service whilst in exile. Perhaps the most prominent example of this being the much discussed and still controversial sinking of the Hurtigruten ferry DS *Irma* on the 13th of February 1944. This itself is a controversy still being discussed in the national Norwegian press as recently as 2016 in fact.[78] Whilst it should be noted that Norwegian domestic shipping had been targeted, and indeed sunk by Norwegian and British aircraft and naval vessels, throughout the conflict, such an overt sinking on a civilian ferry led many to view certain branches of the Norwegian navy in poor regard.

Many would defend these raiding operations that seemingly tied down considerable amounts of German attention and resources. Yet, the loss of innocent Norwegian lives in the process entailed a certain degree of bad press. In the eyes of many, the sinking of Norwegian civilian traffic, tarnished the reputation of the Royal Norwegian navy. This

[78] Klo 2016

was of course not helped by the fact that the Nasjonal Samling newspaper, *Fritt folk*, was quick to jump on the apparent barbarism of the Norwegian government in exile at any given opportunity.[79] Although actions such as these were heavily politicised at the time, it is not beyond the realm of possibility to say that they were partly to blame for the negative reception of many who served in the submarine and MTB arm of the Norwegian navy upon their return home.

5.2.3 The human cost

Whilst many were disappointed at their lacklustre reception, or the time taken to receive permission to return home, the men of the Norwegian navy were in all glad to return home. Whilst lacking public recognition, most of the men interviewed were fortunate enough to return to grateful families, whom they had not seen for many years. As one can imagine, returning scenes such as these seemed to make the years spent on hostile seas worth the toll that they had taken on their minds, and bodies. There were even cases of men who had been presumed dead for years, only to suddenly reappear after the war's end. Perhaps the most colourful case being that of Bjørn Hagen, who had been reported as killed in action during the battles around Narvik in 1940, only to return home in 1945 to a flabbergasted family, all whilst carrying his own death certificate. To this, being greeted by the humorous remark, "jøss, du ser jammen godt til å ha ligget på havets bunn i fem år."[80]

Men like Bjørn Hagen were of course, the lucky ones. For every so called "happy ending", there was what one might call a bad ending, filled with sorrow, loss, and grief. For those who had survived their service at sea, their return home came with it the soldierly responsibility of giving their condolence to the relatives of fallen comrades. Providing some closure to the fact that their loved-one had given the greatest of sacrifice in the name of their liberation. Mothers had to be informed that their sons had been lost in some barren stretch of the Atlantic, with no grave to mourn over, no memorial to visit. Only the memory of a once-loved son, brother, or husband. For men such as Gustav Steimler, who had served on the arctic convoys to Murmansk, with the prospect of an icy, lonesome, and slow death at the hands of marauding U-boats, it was the bearing of such news as this, that had the longest-lasting effect.

[79] Klo 2016
[80] M III K12, Hagen interview transcript: 18:47

Steimler's testimony on the matter is, without a shadow of a doubt, the most emotional of the lot. It highlights the human cost of war better than any other interview, and shows that for every man who returned home, there was a story of loss, of sorrow, and of regret. Whilst all the other pieces of testimony have been condensed, or used to summarise a point, Steimler's recollections are so moving that they convey the thinking and feeling of so many naval veterans. His self-given responsibility is so jarring that, to paraphrase it, or simply include snippets, would not do his words justice.

They are the following:

"Og der hadde jeg også kanskje min sterkeste opplevelse når jeg omsider kom hjem, for det første fant jeg alle mine i live, så jeg var heldig. Men en av de jeg rømte til England med, som var litt yngre enn meg og som også var om bord i «Montbretsia». Han ble drept om bord der og han og jeg hadde en avtale som gikk ut på at hvis en av oss kommer hjem så skulle den andre gå og fortelle de pårørende hva som hadde skjedd. Og det ble altså min oppgave da og jeg glemmer aldri på, aldri når jeg ringte på døren til hans foreldre og de så meg og skjønte med en gang hvorfor jeg stod der. De hadde jo ventet og håpet ikke sant at han skulle komme hjem, men jeg kunne da fortelle hvordan han hadde blitt drept den november natt."[81]

Steimler's testimony highlights the true cost of war. The fact that behind every cannon, or even every unit marker on a map, there is a human individual. For the men of the Royal Norwegian navy, the nature of their service meant that there was no prospect of a military burial in some quaint English churchyard, or even a dignified burial at sea. There was to be no grand memorial so prevalent in the fields of Flanders today. Rather the individual cost of war on both the mind and the soul, coupled with the memory of fallen comrades in a forgotten battleground on the waves. It should perhaps come as no shock that many simply, after this point, wished to return to some semblance of a civilian life. A consensus summarised best by Ragnar Dybdahl when he stated that, "Det var en kjempeopplevelse gitt. Det var radig annerledes. Det var så mange år, det gikk så mange år, va glad det va slutt, var lei av den blåe kragen"[82]

[81] M IV K10, Steimler interview transcript: 09:20
[82] M III K06, Dybdahl interview audio recording: 21:54

Some were more fortunate than others. Men such as Tom Brynhildsen were fortunate enough to resume their civilian lives just as they had been left in 1940, whereas many would struggle adjusting to the unfamiliarity of peace. Brynhildsen would reflect on the effect this had on his psyche, stating that: “Dagen etter jeg kom hjem så var jeg på jobb, og jeg hadde nok å gjøre, altfor mye å gjøre, og sånn fortsatt jeg. Så på den måten så tenkte en vel mindre på det som en hadde vært igjennom. Stadig var fylt opp med jobb. Stadig var det nok å gjøre, det har mye å si. Så de karene som reiste hjem og ikke hadde noe å gjøre, de klaget mere.”[83] For many others however, the trauma, angst, and sorrow of their wartime service would only subside at reunions later in life. Never forgetting the importance, and personal impact that the war at sea had taken upon them.

5.3 Concluding remarks

The unconditional surrender of the Third Reich on the 8th of May 1945, and the end of the war in Europe didn't mean an end to active service for the sailors and airmen of the Royal Norwegian Navy. As new realities and responsibilities, such as operation doomsday, and the ongoing war against the Japanese Empire, clashing with hopes and wishes of those serving. With their long-awaited return was in large part pushed back until the late summer and early autumn of 1945. Whilst a man’s rank and occupation affected the date of return to a varying degree, the majority were delayed for several months. Unfortunately, this delayed return carried with it the consequence of a disappointing, if at all present reception, with national perceptions and attitudes having changed. With the earlier the return generally coalescing with a better reception from the general public.

With peace, there came new realities and responsibilities for those who had served at sea, on the forgotten theatres of the second world war. Itself levying the human cost of the war, especially that of the brutality and harshness inherent to the war on the arctic seas. With it came the responsibility and grief of death, the task of informing a comrade’s next of kin, and the relief of a safe return for those who were lucky enough to have survived. The task of adjusting from an atmosphere of constant fear, and danger, to that of a civilian life and career was now the new battleground for the veterans of the Royal Norwegian navy. With it, the struggle to part with the mental and physical strain of war. Their return home was not a sugar-coated ideal so common in today’s

[83] M III K15, Brynhildsen interview audio recording: 26:27

perceptions. Rather, it was as varied, grief-ridden, and important to the men of the Royal Norwegian navy as their most pitched of battles and should not be forgotten.

6 Conclusion

The twenty men of this study all served in the Royal Norwegian navy with distinction. They did so as a constituent part of the Kingdom of Norway's most significant contribution to the allied war effort during the second world war. Some did so out of personal motivation, and some out of necessity. Some had already pursued a career at sea, whereas there were others who had not. Yet, they all gave their youth to a service at sea, to an ever evolving and growing Norwegian navy. With many knowing full well the risks and sacrifices such service entailed. Throughout all this though, it was not the pitched-battles or engagements that came to hold the most significance. Rather, the individual, and human experiences that came to define their wartime service. Experiences that until now, have remained largely untold.

Experiences such as their perceptions regarding morale and camaraderie at sea were prevalent throughout their interviews with the Horten naval museum, shedding light on the more tacit, yet human experience of war. To these men, the aspect of morale and camaraderie held an important status in their daily lives at sea, affecting both their physical and mental health. Often, through the use of stimulants, luxuries and drugs. Again, this was no isolated phenomenon, and was itself present in the majority of the interviews. From smoking tobacco filled pipes when adrift in harsh seas to bolster their spirits, to drinking each other under the table in port to forget the stresses of deployment, the result is the same. The men of the Royal Norwegian navy had a daily, and personal relationship with stimulants and substances. Not to mention their participation in one of the largest state-sanctioned drug trials in history. Testifying first-hand as to the widespread use of amphetamines amongst those serving at sea.

Their eventual return home, along with the varied and contrasting nature in which these men experienced said return, goes to show how the individual can be greatly affected by factors that are seemingly totally detached from their own circumstances. After years of service in some of the harshest seas the men of the Royal Norwegian navy had little-to-no input regarding their long-awaited return home. Rather, new post-war realities and responsibilities meant that the majority of those who were to serve in the fleet had to wait for months on end before being able to return home. Furthermore, these men experienced contempt, adulation, sorrow, and hatred, along with everything in-between, upon their eventual return. And although none could have held the highest of

expectations, many returned home feeling disappointed or betrayed, having not even been acknowledged for all they had done.

For many of the men who served in the Royal Norwegian navy during her years spent in exile, they did not ask for rewards, or even the adulation that they likely deserved. Rather, recognition for all they had come to sacrifice. Whilst a lucky few returned home to waiting crowds, the majority did not. For these men, their wartime service in the Norwegian navy brought with it the reality that, by the time of their return, the majority had decided to move on with their lives and leave the trauma of war behind them. Trauma which brought with it the reality of processing what they had experienced, something that many would struggle for the rest of their lives. So how best to process their wartime service? What should one take away from the main points of this study?

For the detached perspective, war is a distant phenomenon. One that is viewed through numbers, maps, or cold hard statistics. The reality, however, is rather more human, where the individual is placed both at the forefront of action and left to deal with the cost. This is how one should view the service of these twenty, and of all those who came to serve in the Royal Norwegian navy. Not of squadron markers on a map, or even abstract numbers such as the 14% casualty rate that the men of the navy were to suffer. Rather that for every action, there was an individual with their own two eyes, who came to experience the war in their own unique way, with their own story to tell. Shedding light on the reality of service that a wartime career in the Royal Norwegian navy entailed.

One may recollect that from the beginning of this study, the rather open question as to how best tell the story that was the wartime experience of those who served in the Royal Norwegian navy during the second world war, has been presented. The result of this study should thus be, to view it in the same context and in the same manner as the men themselves. To an admiral, post-war politician, or reader in the present-day, aspects of morale, or their return home may seem insignificant. Yet, they came to shape the entire perception that these twenty interviews held on their wartime service. In turn shaping how these men would later process and quantify their heroism and trauma. Just perhaps, it should therefore be how one in the present day should also do so.

7 References & bibliography

Sources sourced from Marinemuseet, Horten

Interview transcripts:

Interview transcript: *M III K02 – K03.* Interview: Finn Clausen. Marinemuseet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript*: M III K04 – K05.* Interview: Bjarne W. Thorsen. Marinemuseet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript: *M III K06.* Interview: Ragnar Dybdahl. Marinemuseet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript: *M III K07 – K08.* Interview: Rolf Henningsen. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript: *M III K09 – K10.* Interview: Sverre Sjuls. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript: *M III K11 – K12.* Interview: Bjørn Hagen. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript: *M III K13 – K15.* Interview: Tom brynhildsen. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript: *M III K16 – K17.* Interview: Lars Yggeseth. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript: *M III K18 – K19.* Interview: Egil D. Johansen. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript: *M III K20 – K22.* Interview: Bjarne Eia. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript: *M III K23 – M IV K01.* Interview: Jacob Børresen. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript: *M IV K02 – K04.* Interview: Hakon Lunde. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript: *M IV K05 – K06.* Interview: Finn Ferner. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript: *M IV K07.* Interview: Inge Steensland. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript: *M IV K08 – K10.* Interview: Gustav Steimler. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript: *M IV K11 – K13.* Interview: Lauritz humlen. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript: *M IV K14 – K15.* Interview: Harald Hartman. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview transcript: *M IV K16 – K18.* Interview: Johannes Thorsen. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d.)

Interview transcript: *M IV K19 – K20.* Interview: Karl Gustav Petterson. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d.)

Interview transcript: *M IV K21 – K23.* Interview: Ivar Lie. Marinemueet, Horten. (n.d)

Interview audio recordings:

Interview audio recording: *M III K14.* Interview: Tom Brynhildsen. Marinemuseet, Horten. (n.d.)

Interview audio recording: *M III K15*. Interview: Tom brynhildsen. Marinemuseet, Horten. (n.d.)

Interview audio recording: *M III K07.* Interview: Rolf Henningsen. Marinemuseet, Horten. (n.d.)

Interview audio recording: *M III K17.* Interview: Lars Yggeseth. Marinemuseet, Horten. (n.d.)

Interview audio recording: *M III K06*. Ragnar Dybdahl: Marinemuseet, Horten. (n.d.)

Bibliography

Andresen, A. P., & Johansen, H. S. (1948). *Kvarstadbåtene : Göteborgkonvoien*: et kapitel av den norske handelsmarines historie under krigen (p. 163 , pl.). Grundt Tanum.

Busch, F.-O. (1958). *Dramaet om Scharnhorst*. Achehoug. https://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-nb_digibok_2012020208195

Clausewitz, C. von, & Rapoport, A. (1968). *Carl von Clausewitz on war*. Penguin.

Greenacre, J. (2017). "Flexible Enough to Adapt": British Airborne Forces' Experience during Post Conflict Operations 1944- 1946. *British Journal for Military History*, *4*(1). https://bjmh.gold.ac.uk/article/view/775/897

Haarr, G. H. (2010). *The Battle for Norway, April-June 1940*. Seaforth.

Helle, B. (1997). *Marinen i krig*. Sjøforsvarsstaben. https://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-nb_digibok_2009030300032

Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2017). *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. JP 1. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff. https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp1.pdf

Klo, A. (2016, December 18). *Britiske og russiske styrker drepte flest nordmenn langs kysten*. NRK. https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/xl/britiske-og-russiske-styrker-drepte-flest-nordmenn-langs-kysten-1.13254432

Mann, C. (2012). *British policy and strategy towards Norway, 1941-45*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Grove, K., Heiret, J. (2018). Å arbeida med munnlege kjelder. Melve, L., & Ryymin, T. (Eds.). *Historikerens arbeidsmåter*. (p. 123 – p. 147). Universitetsforlaget.

Mason, G. B. Lt Cdr. (2004). *Service histories of Royal navy warships in World War 2: HNorMS Eskdale (L 36) – Type III, Hunt-class Escort Destroyer.* Naval-History.net https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-10DE-HMS_Eskdale.htm

Milner, M. & Lindgjerdet, F. (2016). *Slaaget om Atlanterhavet 1939-1945: Og de Norske krigsseilerne.* Ares Forlag AS.

Plevy, H. (2017). *Norway 1940: Chronicle of a Chaotic Campaign*. Fonthill.

Pope, A. U. (1941). The Importance of Morale. *The Journal of Educational Sociology*, *15*(4), 195–205. https://doi.org/10.2307/2262466

Pugh, J. (2017). "Not … Like a Rum-Ration": Amphetamine Sulphate, the Royal Navy, and the Evolution of Policy and Medical Research during the Second World War. *War in History*, *24*(4), 498–519. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26393388

Rasmussen, Nicolas. (2011). Medical Science and the Military: The Allies' Use of Amphetamine during World War II. The Journal of interdisciplinary history. 42. 205-33. 10.1162/JINH_a_00212.

Steen, E. A. (1959). *Norges sjøkrig 1940-1945*. Gyldendal. https://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-nb_digibok_2012011908103

Steen, E. A. (1963). *Norges sjøkrig 1940-1945*. Gyldendal. https://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-nb_digibok_2014082107054

Steen, E. A. (1954). *Norges sjøkrig 1940-1945*. Gyldendal. https://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-nb_digibok_2012010508096

Swedberg, R. (2018). How to use Max Weber's ideal type in sociological analysis. Journal of Classical Sociology, 18(3), 181–196. https://doi-org.ezproxy1.usn.no/10.1177/1468795X17743643

Typescript translation of the 'Fuhrer Befehl', Hitler's 'Commando Order', 18 October 1942 [Image number: 231691] Retrieved from: https://collection.nam.ac.uk/detail.php?acc=1992-03-218-111

Tables & charts

US military casualties in WW2 [Table]. The National WWII Museum, New Orleans, LA, United States. Retrieved 24th of April 2023: https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-starters-us-military-numbers

US military personnel (1939-1945) [Table]. The National WWII Museum, New Orleans, LA, United States. Retrieved 24th of April 2023: https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-starters-us-military-numbers