


Christian Tolstrup Jensen

Exploiting the spectacular

A study of Danish and Norwegian event stakeholders' interest in international sport events 2010-2020





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into their worlds and their enthusiasm. There are so many people in the world doing so many jobs that I depend on and yet know so little about. Now I know a little more.

The scouts' house, Oterholt, May 2020

Abstract

This thesis presents an analysis of the main motivations behind international sport events in Denmark and Norway between 2010 and 2020. The analysis is based on a collective case study of interviews, press coverage and documents related to six international sport events during this period. The motivations are regarded as forms of justification from the events' main stakeholders with two main recipients. The internal recipient is an event's stakeholders themselves, who have to convince themselves that the event is worth the trouble and then work to convince the external recipients. On a global level, this is the event owner in the case of the particular event and the global event field in general in order to be able to attract events in the future. At the same time, the stakeholders justify the event in the eyes of their peers on a local level. This includes the general public because of the necessity of public support for the event.

The thesis demonstrates that the main stakeholders behind the events were the host municipality and the NGB representing the relevant sport. They stood out because of their combination of high organisational and social commitments. They were necessary for the organisation of the events and also had an expressed interest in making the events relevant to their peers, which in praxis meant making the events legitimate in the eyes of the general public.

The stakeholders' justification depends on two forms of motivation for any of the event in question. The events are objects of speculation as the stakeholders want to use the event to obtain something, often money or other forms of resources. The events are also spectacular occasions; a successful spectacular event is an end in itself for its participants, be it by letting loose for a moment or in some other way experiencing a personal development.

Spectacular events and their lasting positive impression is particularly important on the personal level for the stakeholder representatives and for legitimising these events in the media. However, also in general, the thesis shows how this argument is an extremely important motivation for events in addition to speculative outcomes such as economic

outputs, infrastructure, or other arguments, on which research on sport event typically has focused.

By including the global perspective, the thesis finally also shows how various local stakeholders had a strategic perspective in their hosting where hosting one event should not only yield a spectacular and speculative outcome on its own but also improve the stakeholders' standing in the global event field and ease their access to future events. The current interest and persistence in event hosting in Denmark and Norway is not just the result of positive outcomes from individual events but the dynamics of a local, lasting event field.

Keywords: events, Denmark, Norway, motivation, justification, 2010-2020, Nordic, arguments, sport, major, mega, stakeholders

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Abbreviations

ASOIF	Association of Summer Olympic International Federations
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CBS	Copenhagen Business School
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
DAF	Dansk Atletik Forbund
DGI	Danske Gymnastik- og Idrætsforeninger
DHA	Discourse-Historical Approach
DHF	Dansk Håndbold Forbund
DIF	Danmarks Idrætsforbund
DIU	Danmarks Ishockey Union
DIY	Do It Yourself
DK	Denmark
DKK	Danish Kroner
DR	Danmarks Radio
ECU	European Currency Unit
EOC	European Olympic Committee
EU	the European Union
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FIS	Fédération Internationale de Ski

IAAF	International Association of Athletics Federations ¹
ICF	International Canoe Federation
IIHF	International Ice Hockey Federation
IHF	the International Handball Federation
(I)NGO	(International) Non-governmental Organisation
IOC	the International Olympic Committee
ISO	the International Organization for Standardization
MDS	Most Different System Design
MSS	Most Similar System Design
N	Norway
NBA	National Basketball Association
NCF	Norges Cykleforbund
NFL	National Football League
NGB	National Governing Body
NIF	Norges Idrettsforbund
NKK	Norwegian Kroner
SEAD	Sport Event Alliance Denmark
SEDK	Sport Event Denmark
SFF	Særforbundenes Fellesorganisasjon

¹ November 2019 renamed World Athletics.

UCI Union Cycliste Internationale

WADA the World Anti-Doping Agency

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1 Introduction

Considering the hosting of international sport events in Denmark and Norway since the 1970s (see Figure 1), the most recent decade from 2010-2020 has witnessed new records for international sport events in Denmark. Norway likewise has seen a new, high level of hosting if not (yet) comparable to the highly active 1980s and 1990s, probably as a consequence of hosting the Winter Olympics in 1994. Recent political initiatives like the adoption of local and national “event strategies” in sport organisations and public administrations alike underline the interest further and give it a formal trait. There is an outspoken will in Denmark and Norway to host events. Why?




Figure 1: Number of world and European championships hosted or to be hosted in Denmark and Norway from 1970-2020 (as of 2018).

Source: See Appendix 2.

You, like every lay-person, friend, family member and colleague I have asked this question, probably have an answer ready. You are most likely able to list all the typical reasons organisations in Denmark and Norway give for seeking to host international sport events. They typically highlight how events make people feel proud, encourage development, brand the host, attract tourists, bring economic benefits, etc.

Why, then, should an entire thesis be written on this topic? Firstly, as I will show in the next section, these widespread reasons are contested by the event research with little

effect on the interest. Could it be that the stakeholders have interests beyond these reasons and therefore feel less hit? In just a few lines, the reasons for the hosting of events, which appeared so natural and given, begin to blur. A study by the event researchers Robert A. Baade and Victor Matheson from 2016 does not give a definitive answer, but it provides a place to begin the study of the much more complex but therefore all the more intriguing phenomenon of bidding for international sport events. After concluding that the biggest of all sport events, the Olympic Games, “tend to offer only a low chance of providing host cities with positive net benefits”, Baade and Matheson suggest three alternative explanations for why states and cities continue to seek to host events. Firstly, some parties might benefit from the event; secondly, economic concerns might only play a minor role in the decision making for some hosts; and thirdly, the host would usually be prone to overestimating the outcomes prior to the event and therefore also to be disappointed in its aftermath (Baade & Matheson, 2016, pp. 213–214).

To explain the interest in events, listing the reasons is insufficient. One must also consider the stakeholders, i.e. the organisations with an interest in events² and especially those capable of influencing if not controlling the bid (who are “Denmark” and “Norway”?). One must look at what these stakeholders want from the event beyond concrete outcomes like a financial surplus. The suggestion that the host is likely to overestimate the outcome underlines that the bidding process also can take on a dynamic of its own. Finally, as such events are public it is also relevant to consider how the stakeholders ensure a general recognition of the event. Eventually, answering the question “why events?” turns out to be a bit more complicated than listing the usual reasons. To accommodate this complexity, the thesis asks:

Who are the Danish and Norwegian stakeholders in international sport events and why do they currently host, or seek to host, them?

² A more elaborate description of the thesis’ stakeholder approach follows in section 2.4.

This question is answered by fulfilling three objectives.

The *first* objective is to describe the network of the event stakeholders, their event aims and analyse how the stakeholders use and potentially influence the general event discourse.

The *second* objective is to analyse the relevance of backward and forward linkage for the stakeholders' sustained interest in events. In other words, how do the stakeholders relate a particular event to previous and future events and how does this influence any sustained interest?

The *third* objective is to analyse how these stakeholders transform the general interest in events into a general recognition of a specific sport event. This enables a closer look at the dynamics of the bidding process mentioned above.

Fulfilling these objectives and answering the research question amount to a study of a contemporary, social phenomenon: the interest in and perceived role of international events in Denmark and Norway. As an historian, I see the basis of the study as disciplinary research, which – ideally – seeks to “describe, explain and predict ‘key phenomena’” in society (Pernecky, 2016, p. 4). Nonetheless, I want my research to have an impact and in the project, I draw on sport and event management research, i.e. “professional researches” with – ideally – a focus on improving “the conditions of society” (Pernecky, 2016, p. 4). However, in this project this professional approach follows the disciplinary approach.

1.1 Contribution to the research

This section introduces the state of the art in the research fields relevant for the thesis. It is argued that, as it fulfils the objectives, although not as its main aim this thesis contributes to the existing research field in at least three ways. Firstly, it does so through its focus in time and space (before the event and in two countries, Denmark and Norway). Thereby it contrasts the current focus in research on the lasting (“structural”) outcomes caused by events (legacies), often in big countries (Preuss, 2019, p. 106). Secondly, its

method (collective case study, introduced in chapter 4) gives a more comprehensive understanding of events than the usual single event studies. Thirdly, the focus on smaller international sport events challenges the over-concentration in research on mega events and opens a discussion of the distinctive qualities of a sport event.

1.1.1 State of the art: Research on sport events

Essentially, this is a study of events and their stakeholders with a desire to understand why they seek to host events. This means I am interested in the arguments they use prior to the event and the structures which influence the formation of these arguments, viz. the interest in events. Based on this goal, the following keywords were used for the first literature search: international, major, mega, sport events, justification, legitimisation, arguments, persuade, convince, bidding, decision, hosting. In addition, I conducted inquiries with similar key words in Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and German. The search involved three library catalogues/research databases. The first was Google Scholar, which provided a broad sweep of the research with the possibility to follow up on the use of the relevant papers and books (cf. the “Cited by” function). Although the broad sweep yielded many results, they were increasingly irrelevant. I did not look through all the results, stopping when the pages only contained irrelevant results. The other two databases belonged to the Library of the University of Copenhagen and the Norwegian University Libraries and were used for covering national research.³

Overall, there is extremely limited literature genuinely concerned with the stakeholders’ motivations for bidding for sport events (cf. the next section). What I mean by “genuinely” is that this literature has a broad approach to motivation which goes beyond the immediate outcomes and impacts of the events, i.e. their legacies.

Because of the limited results, a second search was conducted with broader search terms. This time I only searched for studies on international/major/mega sport events in general

³ Via www.rex.kb.dk and www.oria.no respectively. This also included international databases and publishers such as SPORTDiscus, SAGE, Jstor, Emerald, Taylor and Francis, Elsevier, and Springer.

within international research (research in English/German). Here, research into sport event legacies crystallised as the wider research field within event research with relevance for my project concerning at least one form of motivation. To explore the literature and the development of this field further, I consulted the references in recent literature reviews on sport legacy research (Holt & Ruta, 2015b; Koenigstorfer et al., 2019; Malfas et al., 2004; Parent & Chappelet, 2017; Scheu & Preuss, 2017; A. Thomson et al., 2019). A search on similar key words in Danish/Norwegian/Swedish provided some results but did not reveal an area of research particular to the Scandinavian context. Broadening the search terms to events in general finally made it possible to attach the project to a developed Nordic field of research: events as a theme within cultural policy studies.

The following sections first present the state of the art regarding “genuine” research on motivations for bidding for events. They then focus on the more developed fields of legacy research and events as part of the cultural policy development in Denmark and Norway.

1.1.1.1 Research on bidding and motives

Although few, the studies of bidding processes for international sport events highlight the diversity of arguments present in such processes. In their study on the arguments for the London Olympics in 2012, Richard Giulianotti and Tommy Langseth for instance show how arguments referring to a market logic or fame were more prominent than arguments based on civic values like solidarity. They also link the arguments to specific sender groups, but they do not go beyond the event in question (Giulianotti & Langseth, 2016). Interestingly, particularly with regard to the present project, similar studies have been conducted involving the bidding process for one of the project’s cases, Oslo’s bid for the Winter Olympics in 2022, if also focusing only on the arguments used in the media as part of the bidding process (Seippel et al., 2016; Tangen, 2016b; cf. A. Kim et al., 2015).

Although different arguments might not necessarily be barriers when planning for an event (Tjønnedal, 2018), other studies underline the importance of considering the stakeholders’ influence (Koenigstorfer et al., 2019, p. 12) as the formation of the arguments is

a process marked by local conditions and “windows of opportunity” (Lesjø, 2018, p. 62; cf. Salisbury, 2017; Emery, 2002b; Hautbois et al., 2012; Kassens-Noor & Lauermann, 2017, 2018; Westerbeek et al., 2002). The existence of “alibi bids” by “utilitarian bidders”, i.e. bids without serious prospects of winning, is a good example of the particularities in a bidding process that one would rarely grasp immediately. In these cases, countries or cities do not bid to win but hope that by entering the competition they signal openness, e.g. for investments (Chappelet, 2005, p. 21; cf. Bason, 2019; Torres, 2012).⁴

In summary, bidding for events is a “haphazard” experience (Emery, 2002a, p. 105; cf. Getz, 2004), which often ends in failure for endogenous or exogenous reasons like in-fighting or outbidding (Kassens-Noor & Lauermann, 2018, p. 3375). So far, however, this has only been proven in case studies of particular events. Broader studies like the present is well suited to develop on the current state of the field.

1.1.1.2 Legacy research

As the following sections will show, most sport event research focuses on what sociologist Harry H. Hiller termed the “forward linkage”, the outcomes, which the events “cause” and often is described as an event’s legacies (1998, p. 49). A recent review for instance concludes that “the idea of realising sport and non-sport legacies from hosting large-scale sport events has become central to the rhetoric and practice” of event stakeholders (A. Thomson et al., 2019, p. 295; cf. Holt & Ruta, 2015b; Tomlinson, 2010; Grix et al., 2017; Hiller, 2000). An older review of impacts of the Olympics even concluded that “economic benefits are the prime motive for all the interests involved in the hosting of the Games” (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006, p. 9; Malfas et al., 2004, p. 218).

Hiller also proposed backward linkage as a way of analysing events. However, as demonstrated by the limited research on the bidding process and confirmed by some review articles (A. Thomson et al., 2019, p. 303; Emery, 2017) event research has taken that idea

⁴ Rose and Spiegel (2011) for instance meant to highlight an economic benefit from this bid, however later studies have criticised the findings and limited their results to Western countries which are already relatively well-off (Coates, 2012, p. 426; Rose & Spiegel, 2011; Zimbalist, 2015, p. 61).

less into consideration. Studies on countries' preparations for hosting the Olympics that typically include hosting several increasingly larger events prior to hosting the actual mega event are an exception, but such research is not relevant for the present project due to the focus on hosting events for a very specific reason (e.g. Santos, 2014; Williams, 2015). In general, the focus on events and their legacies means that the fundamental purpose is to leave something to future generations and there is little consideration for what the past means for the event (Hiller, 1998, pp. 49–50). John MacAloon (2008)'s point that the French-speaking employees at the International Olympic Committee (IOC) differentiate between “heritage” (how the past influences the current event) and “legacies” (how the event should leave something for future generations), is a good example of this difference in perspective.

Backward linkage would also include a consideration of how sport event hosting policies influence bids. This will be an important theme in the thesis, which connects it to an emerging field of sport event policy research. So far the concept of sport event policies has been discussed alongside analysis of policy documents, but there is limited knowledge about these policies' practical implications of (Chappelet & Lee, 2016; Clausen & Bayle, 2017; Leopkey et al., 2010; Leopkey & Ellis, 2019; McCloy, 2009; Pinson, 2016; Schnitzer, Schlemmer, et al., 2017; Stopper et al., 2011a, 2011b). The present study's in-depth study of two countries, one with and one without an explicit strategy, and with access to information on the practice will provide interesting perspectives and qualify the discussion on the relevance of these strategies.

1.1.1.2.1 History of legacies

My insistence on considering the event's backward linkage rests on the presumption that events are motivated by more than their legacies. However, given their position in the research and among stakeholders, a thorough overview of the typical legacies and the controversies is necessary for a future analysis of their influence on the event discourse.

To begin with, the connection between outcomes and events was an area of attention for event stakeholders long before research began to consider it. Legacies *avant la lettre*,

simply understood as the positive outcomes from an event, has been traced back to some of the earliest editions of the modern Olympics (Gold & Gold, 2017, Chapter 2; Scheu & Preuss, 2017). The use of “legacy” as a word for these outcomes originated at the 1956 Olympics in Melbourne and it took off from the 1980s, when the IOC began to use the term to describe the positive aspects of hosting the Olympic Games (Cashman, 2003, p. 34). Around the same time, the extent of research also increased; even if the papers talked about “outcomes” or “impacts” rather than legacies, research in events has a long history of ex-post approaches with a focus on the economic outcomes/impacts (Marris, 1987; J. R. B. Ritchie, 1984; cf. the overview in Spilling, 1998).

In the 2000s, the research specifically on sport events legacies grew with the increased interest in such events (Grix et al., 2019b, pp. 23–24). This new legacy research promoted a nuanced view on legacies as both negative and positive outcomes. This contrasted the particularly positive approach of the stakeholders and also developed the idea that a legacy could amount to more than the economic impact (Leopkey & Parent, 2012; A. Thomson et al., 2019, p. 309). The organisers to some degree took these ideas on. For instance, at a conference on Olympic legacies in 2002, the IOC included contributions from researchers mentioning negative legacies (Guala & Bondonio, 2008, p. 1; cf. Leopkey & Parent, 2012). However, it did not change the IOC’s general conceptualisation of “legacy” as something purely positive among practitioners (IOC, 2013, p. 6).⁵ The IOC also suggested that the idea of the legacy should be reserved for outcomes beyond the “impact”, i.e. the direct stimulus on the city from the event, “which may be considerable but is too short-term to be considered legacy” (Holt & Ruta, 2015a, p. 2). This idea of legacy as something lasting is also a factor in the research. In 2019, the prominent legacy researcher Holger Preuss defined legacies as “any outcomes that affect people and/or space caused by structural changes that stem from the Olympic Games” (2019, p. 106). Legacies have to

⁵ Several papers presented and published afterwards on “legacy” from an IOC-seminar on legacies in 2002 (see e.g. studies by Cashman, Chappelet, Dansero and Hiller in Moragas et al., (2003)) included the idea of negative legacies. The conference as such however did not define legacy other than as a “concept” “directly related to the understanding of the mission of Olympism in society” (Moragas et al., 2003, p. 491).

be changes based on structural changes, which suggest that they must have a lasting character.

Legacy	Number of papers in the review
Public life, politics and culture	99
Sport – mass participation	6
Economy	60
Legacy at a generalised level	41
Built environment – non-sporting	39
Environment (emergent ‘type’)	28
Sport – physical infrastructure	25
Health	16
Sport – information and education	12
Sport – elite performance	9
Sport – symbols, memory, history	8
Sport – financial/administrative support	0

Table 1: Number of papers on legacies sorted according to categories in recent literature review on legacy research.

Source: A. Thomson et al., 2019, p. 303.

The current research not only diverges from most organisers’ conception of legacies by including negative and unwanted legacies (Boykoff, 2017b), but it is also often unable to confirm the prospected positive legacies (Silvestre, 2008, p. 2). It thus has a double neg-

ative impact as it highlights negative impacts and turns the positive into “fairy tales” (Britain, Bocarro, & Byers, 2017, p. 261; McCartney et al., 2010, p. 6). This contrast between the amount of critical research and the continued stakeholder interest in Denmark and Norway (as elsewhere) is a further indication of a low explanatory value of legacies when analysing the current interest in events, or indeed suggests that stakeholders do not take note of the research. In either case, it substantiates the relevance of the project’s pre-event and beyond-the-legacy perspectives.

1.1.1.2.2 Legacies as motivation

In the following, I provide an overview of the five most typical legacy categories, which one also could see as the five best researched arguments for events. The three most prominent (and debated) categories are tangible legacies within infrastructure and environment, sport, and economic outcomes (Gratton et al., 2006, p. 57).⁶ The two other categories are the intangible legacies and are sorted into two categories: feel-good and political legacies. In the latter research, there is a particular focus on the potential for international branding of the host (Holt & Ruta, 2015a, p. 4; Storm et al., 2017, p. 293).

The stakeholders have also begun to differentiate between various categories of legacies. However, these actions have been criticised as the categories are often hard to disentangle and might obscure the role of the various initiatives (Leopkey & Parent, 2012, p. 935). A diffuse categorisation could indicate that there are little or no determinants, but so far there have been few studies on this (A. Kim et al., 2015; Matheson, 2010, p. 18).

In the following overview of legacy research, one should also remember that the interest from the research is not equally spread across the categories (cf. Table 1). In addition, most of the references throughout the overview are to research on events bigger and

⁶ There are elaborated lists of prominent of legacies and my list is an adaptation based on lists in collections of recognised publications on legacies (Holt & Ruta, 2015a; Horne, 2007, p. 86; A. Kim et al., 2015, pp. 76, 85; Leopkey & Parent, 2012; Malfas et al., 2004; J. R. B. Ritchie, 1984). One of the few studies which has considered the motivations for a smaller event by Anne Tjørndal (2018) shows a similarity in the expected legacies, which supports the sorting’s relevance for smaller events too.

more costly than any event ever hosted in Denmark or Norway. I will of course include a perspective based on research on smaller events wherever possible to show that there are similar discussions on many of the legacies from smaller events. However, I also ask the reader not to make too strict a distinction between large and small events. Despite the difference in costs, many of the stakeholders in my cases applied a relativistic view to the definition of events, thus making their events mega events regardless of the definitions in research (cf. the discussion on mega and other major international sport events below).

1.1.1.2.2.1 Economic legacies

The economic legacy has been and is both the most concrete and contested form of legacy (Koenigstorfer et al., 2019, p. 8; J. R. B. Ritchie, 1984, p. 4; Zimbalist, 2015): concrete because both organisers and researchers regularly evaluate (ex-post) the short-term economic impact of an event based on numbers and formulas;⁷ and contested because these evaluations tend to come to different results as there is no agreed standard on how to evaluate events' economic impact.⁸ Whereas the evaluations from the organisers tend to show positive results (Crompton, 2006), the researchers are often ambiguous or outright negative (Zimbalist, 2015). Some researchers have even criticised a organiser's methods for being possibly "flawed in a way that biases the economic impact upwards" (Baade & Matheson, 2016, p. 208; Kasimati, 2003).

Recently, some studies have suggested applying a long-term perspective when making economic evaluations. This would then include several legacies such as health and infrastructure (Gratton & Ramchandani, 2017, p. 117; cf. the plead for a 'holistic' view in Shipway & Kirkup, 2012). This inclusion could improve the event's figures and fits well with

⁷ One could argue the short-term impact does not qualify as a legacy since it has no structural impact, however it is commonly included as a legacy category nevertheless.

⁸ Nooij and Berg (2018) presents a recent discussion on the various methods of ex-post analyses (Nooij & Berg, 2018, pp. 70–71).

the management by objectives prevalent in contemporary public management (cf. section 5.2); however, a long-term perspective risks obscuring the causal relations between the event and its outcomes.

Finally, the amount of money involved, even for smaller events, could have negative consequences for the organisers because of the risk of corruption (D. Black, 2014; Zimbalist, 2015). Along these lines and because of the generally better fit between locally available resources and the resources demanded by the event, some research suggests that hosting (several) small events is more beneficial compared to large events (Agha & Taks, 2015, pp. 213–214). There are however also studies showing the same negligible economic outcomes for smaller events based on local sport teams as for the big events (Coates, 2012, pp. 409–416; Storm et al., 2017; Värja, 2016).

1.1.1.2.2 Infrastructural and environmental legacies

Infrastructural legacies from sport events amount either to common public goods like public transportation or, more narrowly, to improved/additional sport facilities. The shape of environmental legacies varies significantly from infrastructural changes to showcasing innovations or cleaning polluted waters (Boykoff, 2017a; Gold & Gold, 2017, p. 72; Hayes & Karamichas, 2012b, p. 10). This is a form of legacy primarily related to mega events such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup (Allmers & Maennig, 2009; Scharfenort, 2012; Tomlinson et al., 2011; Zimbalist, 2015). Although this is partly due to the general costs of these events, the owners of the biggest events, the international football federation, FIFA, and the IOC, also encourage the hosts to be sustainable and environmentally friendly (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012a, p. 254).⁹ This could partly be because of the criticism from research which questions the sustainability of such events because of the risk of “white elephants”, i.e. stadiums or other structures which have a

⁹ Both IOC and FIFA have introduced initiatives promoting environmental issues in line with “universal values and liberal social programmes” (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012b, pp. 6–7, 9–10).

gross overcapacity and are consequently unusable after the event (Alm et al., 2016, pp. 578–579).

Smaller events experience the same debate, but research suggests that the risk of a negative infrastructural legacy from major and even smaller sport events is lower as the need for building new infrastructure is usually small or non-existing (Taks, 2013, p. 124). However, the absence of new infrastructure as incentive could also make their costs harder to justify (Girginov, 2018, p. 122).

1.1.1.2.2.3 Sport legacies

The absence of new sport infrastructure could make it less relevant for some sport federations to bid for an event, but sport legacies could also exist as increased attention or other resources. As with the other legacies, the research is “inconclusive” with regard to events delivering on these wishes (Barrick et al., 2017, p. 1861; cf. De Bosscher et al., 2015, pp. 16–19; Hanstad & Skille, 2010; Robinson, 2015, pp. 294–295; Anna-Maria Strittmatter, 2017).¹⁰ As an example, a recent study on one of this project’s cases, the UCI World Road Cycling Championship 2017 in Bergen, did not find any “big effect on the inhabitants’ bike or training habits” from the event (Solberg et al., 2018, p. 23).

Part of the reason for the uncertain outcome at least from mega events could be that they put elite athletes at the centre on a commercial basis with a huge distance to the sport-for-all participants (Horne, 2012, pp. 42–43). Smaller events on the other hand are more likely to be a bottom-up initiative with local activation, e.g. through volunteers and a local sense of ownership (Solberg et al., 2017, p. 69). This can be beneficial for the sport legacies since they can concentrate on one sport in a suitable milieu. However, even then an outcome like increased sport participation is not a given and requires a conscious effort from the sport organisations (Misener et al., 2015).

¹⁰ A positive example is the Olympics in Atlanta 1996, where the new constructions were designed to meet the end-user demand and then merely adapted to the demands for the IOC (French & Disher, 1997, p. 390; Stevens & Howard, 1996, p. 35).

1.1.1.2.2.4 Feel-good legacies

Feel-good legacies cover the intangible benefits connected to “an increase in local pride and community spirit” (Malfas et al., 2004, p. 214). They are often measured as “life satisfaction” and some studies show that hosting an international sport event can have a (short-lived) positive effect (Kavetsos & Szymanski, 2010, p. 168; Zimbalist, 2015, pp. 47–48), for instance, encouraging social gatherings either in the stadium or – more often – at home or in a pub (Solberg & Ulvnes, 2016, p. 13). The associated positive feelings do not even have to be attached to a specific place. The event can also spur a cosmopolitan feeling among the citizens of being a part of “something bigger” (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012b, p. 7; Whitson & Horne, 2006, p. 83). While this is generally considered positive, “the global processes might overwhelm the local rather than neatly integrating the two” and there is a potential for negative feedback (D. L. Andrews & Ritzer, 2007, p. 137).

All in all, a feel-good legacy is not certain (Storm & Jakobsen, 2019). Nevertheless, especially when dismissing the economic outcomes, economists resort to such intangible legacies as alternative explanations for why cities desire to host events (Kavetsos & Szymanski, 2010, p. 160; Nooij & Berg, 2013, p. 17; Solberg, 2017, pp. 51, 56).

1.1.1.2.2.5 Political legacies

Almost any form of legacy connects to one or more policies and all stakeholders could be said to be political as their decisions concern the distribution of resources in society. By political legacies I therefore specifically mean the states’ and increasingly cities’ use of events for building international relations. The hosting of mega events by emerging markets and countries, most notably the BRICS,¹¹ is currently the most distinct expression of this use of events.¹² In these cases, events are often tools for (re)-branding the country (e.g. Bonde, 2014, pp. 685–686; Grix et al., 2015, p. 471; Houlihan & Zheng, 2015, p. 330;

¹¹ Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

¹² The use of mega events as a way of declaring one’s country to be “developed” is not new. It first appeared around the 1968 Summer Olympics in Mexico (Darnell & Millington, 2015).

Majumdar, 2012, p. 126; Tomlinson et al., 2011). Increasingly, cities engage themselves in a global competition too in the hope of increasing “customer satisfaction” (Ham, 2001, pp. 1–2; cf. Cerny, 2000, pp. 127–128). These customers are not only spectators at the event but also attractive, i.e. innovative, well-educated citizens or global companies, which seek to be associated with the brand of the country or make use of the favourable conditions for business offered by the host.

Hosting events for improving international relations could be especially effective compared to other PR initiatives, for instance when combining political and infrastructural legacies. Such events can both boost the brand and make the new infrastructure tangible symbols for this development, as demonstrated by the Bird’s Nest stadium built for the 2008 Beijing Olympics (Gratton & Preuss, 2008, pp. 1925–1926; Roche, 2000, pp. 141, 147). Events are therefore often related with exercising soft power, which however presupposes that the state or city already has an established, credible and authentic brand (Grix et al., 2019b, p. 29; Nye, 2004). Analysing events as soft power requires a consideration of a wider context. I will return to the role of context in chapter 3.

Political legacies can also have a national dimension. Showing off the capabilities of a nation can make the inhabitants proud and provide a feel-good legacy while also having a political impact, for instance by raising the citizens’ consciousness of a global competition or increasing their approval of a market lead “economic and social restructuring” (C. M. Hall, 2006, p. 63; cf. D. R. Black, 2017, p. 222). In authoritarian states specifically, an event might provide opportunities for “neopatrimonial traditions of policy making” (Gronskaya & Makarychev, 2014, p. 43; cf. D. Black, 2008, p. 471; Hayes & Karamichas, 2012a, p. 254). Even well-established, democratic powers can use events to imbue the population with “a nothing to prove philosophy of strengthening global status” (Emery, 2017, p. 29) by allowing for a focus on less tangible benefits compared to emerging economic powers (Bason, 2019, sec. 5.4.4).

For these legacies, mega events have an advantage compared to small events. A host of a major event can often only use the event to leverage an existing policy, whereas a mega event alone can do much to (re)brand a city or a state (Taks, 2016, p. 87). However, there

is a general critique of these political outcomes from international NGOs like Human Rights Watch or Greenpeace,¹³ national NGOs, local grassroot committees, and the press.¹⁴ An often-heard criticism is alleged violations of human rights as a consequence of the event-supported transformation of the host country or city (Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2015, pp. 714–715; C. M. Hall, 2006, pp. 61–62; Horne, 2018, p. 14; Zimbalist, 2015, p. 82). These protests also take place in states with traditions for good governance (Blake, 2005, p. 18; Horne, 2018, p. 18; Könecke et al., 2016; Lenskyj, 2015). Recent studies have emphasised the capabilities of such voices with reference to the failed bids for events due to local protests. It might be time to nuance the otherwise dominant role attributed to the global organisations in favour of a strong local voice (Boykoff, 2011; Kassens-Noor & Lauermann, 2018; Könecke et al., 2016). Along the same line, research suggests that politicians allow an increased involvement of the NGOs to extenuate any loss of legitimacy (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012b, pp. 15–23).

1.1.1.3 Summing up on legacies

Considering just the legacies might not give the full picture of why bidders show an interest in events. Nevertheless, the presentation of the most common legacies has made some important contributions to the project. Firstly, some typical arguments for events have been introduced, and, secondly, there is evidence that some are less relevant for smaller events, a view which can be discussed during the project. Finally, it has substantiated my claim that legacies might be less relevant arguments because of the research's inability to confirm some stakeholders' often used reasons for hosting events. While there is a need for a broader view, this has yet to take place. In 2014, sport management scholar Laurence Chalip took stock on the legacy research, writing:

¹³ Amnesty International and other NGOs collaborate on the site <http://www.sportandhumanrights.org/> (last accessed 29/01/2018) and the Institute for Human Rights and Business has released a series of reports on human rights in connection with sport mega events: <https://www.ihrb.org/library/publications/mega-sporting-events> (last accessed 29/01/2018).

¹⁴ In Brazil negative press coverage by far outweighed the positive coverage in the year prior to the FIFA World Cup in 2014 before the ratio then equalised as the event took off (Swart et al., 2017, p. 240).

given the array of concerns about the economic, social, and environmental consequences of events, one might wonder why cities, regions, and countries work so hard to attract and use events in their marketing. It may be that some events do yield sufficient positive outcomes to be worth the effort and expense. (2014, p. 3)

Chalip's remark indicates something which prevents research on legacies from explaining the interest in events. It suggests that research just has to keep looking and eventually the researchers will find and describe a profitable event, like a botanist looking for a rare plant. So far, event botanists have largely searched in vain without the interest in hosting ceasing. The result is that research remains within a legacy framework which focuses on measuring the outcomes (Page & Connell, 2012, p. 9; A. Thomson et al., 2019, fig. 3).

Change might be on its way as evidenced by a 2018 study in which the authors pleaded for an honest distinction by the host between the promoted, perceived and actual goals (Dowse & Fletcher, 2018, p. 8). Perhaps stakeholders promote cultural aims while in reality they perceive the event as an economic potential, which then rarely materialises after the event. This project can hopefully bring more clarity into the process by taking a step backwards compared to the typical legacy research. Thus, the project also draws on another recent development in the event research whereby events are linked to existing initiatives – the idea of events as leverage.

1.1.1.4 Leverage: An emerging pre-event perspective in research?

The idea of using events leverage was proposed in 2004 as a way of improving the economic impact of an event and a move away from the legacy research (Chalip, 2004). The model later expanded and leverage was defined as the “planning for the maximisation of both short- and long-term event outcomes” (O'Brien & Chalip, 2007, p. 297; cf. review in Bason, 2019; Taks et al., 2013; Ziakas, 2015).

Leverage is meant to disband the idea that the event itself is the sole driving factor behind its legacies. Instead, stakeholders should use the event as leverage for existing strategies (Chalip, 2014, pp. 6–8, 2017, p. 29; Girginov, 2018, p. 71). Otherwise the event's leverage

becomes “event-led”, an afterthought or additional justification indistinguishable from the legacies (A. Smith, 2014, p. 21). Leverage could be attained for instance by “exploiting” the event as one of several means for a planned general bettering of social conditions in a city (Misener, 2015, p. 136; cf. Barrick et al., 2017, p. 1867). At the same time, using an event for leverage does not mean one has to disband the idea of legacies as such. A legacy might very well be part of the event’s leveraging strategy (Ziakas, 2015, p. 696); therefore, the outcomes of leverage are also generally overlapping with the various legacies introduced above (cf. the categorisation in Bason, 2019).

However, unlike “legacy”, leverage has not become part of the practitioners’ vocabulary (Andersson et al., 2017, p. 240) despite there being something intuitive about the ideas since some organisers have unwittingly used an event for leverage (e.g. Derom & VanWynsberghe, 2015; Kellett et al., 2008; Matheson, 2010; Taks et al., 2013, 2014). For instance, the Commonwealth Games in 2002 in Manchester functioned as leverage by being “a uniting theme, rather than a speculative stimulus” for running initiatives (A. Smith & Fox, 2007, p. 1139). Success depends on planning and preconditions rather than the event itself; for example, the studies on the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow and New Delhi were not all positive (N. Gray & Porter, 2015, pp. 396–397; Majumdar, 2012, pp. 128–129).

The leverage concept provides an alternative approach to event justification based on legacies, which is based on initiatives predating the event and therefore corresponding with this thesis’ focus on the time prior to the event. In addition, leverage research often focuses on events similar to those in this project, i.e. smaller events in areas outside the typical (mega) sport event hosts such as big Western powers and the BRICS (Blake, 2005; Giulianotti et al., 2015; Gratton et al., 2015; Orttung & Zhemukhov, 2017; Tomlinson et al., 2011; Zimbalist, 2017). This has led to research into cities hosting several events and thereby building so-called “event portfolios” to showcase their merits (Chalip, 2004, pp.

244–245; Ziakas, 2015, p. 695).¹⁵ Although leverage has encouraged interest in how past events relate to future events (cf. backward and forward linkage), research especially on event portfolios has however focused mostly on the management perspectives and not adopted the overarching view for understanding the interest in events taken by this thesis (Ziakas, 2019).

Consequently, this project extends the research field by including several international sport events and one bigger event – the Winter Olympics – in one analysis. This combination of events of different sizes within the same context makes it possible to compare the stakeholders’ use of them for legacies and/or leverage. Increasing our understanding of smaller events in particular also improves the relevance of event research in general as the combined outcome of smaller events by far exceeds the impact of their larger counterparts (D. Black, 2014, p. 14).

1.1.1.4.1 Mega, major or just sport events?

However, what is a “smaller” event? More studies like the present on smaller events will also help distinguish between major and mega events. Today, there is for instance widespread agreement that the (Summer¹⁶) Olympics and the FIFA World Cup for men are the only mega events. However, this is more based on tradition than clear criteria and provides little information as to what actually constitutes a mega event (Harris et al., 2017, p. 325; Horne, 2012, p. 33).¹⁷

¹⁵ This is a “balanced” view on the use of a portfolio; an alternative would be to use the portfolio like a stock portfolio, i.e. to compare the performance of multiple events, eventually “selling them off” or investing additional resources (Andersson et al., 2017, p. 228).

¹⁶ The Winter Olympics occupy a special place. They are much smaller than the Summer Olympics or The Commonwealth Games. However, they are able to draw on the legacy and Olympic ideology, meaning they can punch above their weight without being on a par with the typical mega events (D. Black, 2014, n. 3).

¹⁷ This idea is not hegemonic, as it is not uncommon that a paper characterises the FIFA World Cup or the Summer Olympics as a “major”, i.e. using the word in a more general sense (Brittain, Bocarro, Byers, et al., 2017; Holt & Ruta, 2015a). One should not confuse these definitions and sizes with the classifications by Bent Flyvbjerg, Professor in the planning of mega projects. Within his field, large infrastructural projects in

One of the most cited definitions of mega events by Maurice Roche stipulates that “[m]ega-events’ are largescale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance” (Roche, 2000, p. 1; e.g. used in Bason, 2019, p. 16; Grix et al., 2019b; Gruneau & Horne, 2016, p. 2; Hayes & Karamichas, 2012b, p. 2; Yu et al., 2018, p. 301). This gives some criteria but does not describe “mega” or what is meant by “international significance”.

There have been different attempts to remove this vagueness. The most prominent attempts focus on a typology based on the (mega) sport events’ quantitative impact, e.g. their impact on tourism, costs, media attention or the economy (Gammon, 2012; Gratton et al., 2000, p. 26; Müller, 2015b, p. 629). According to such definitions, most of the cases in this project do not qualify as mega events. Sorting events according to qualitatively criteria is another solution, e.g. according to their aims, the stakeholders involved, their rate of reoccurrence, etc. Such typologies sort events in categories which range from community events to mega events. The scales therefore still have some quantitative implication; events with similar qualities tend to have similar sizes. Applying such scales on this project’s cases (cf. section 1.2) would mean working with mega events as it is often only the top level, “mega events”, which combines an international target group with a one-off event (Chappelet & Parent, 2017, p. 5; Gratton et al., 2000, p. 26; C. M. Hall, 1989, p. 265)

The definitions and terminology seem arbitrary. To overcome this one could say that if the stakeholders do not “observe a difference then there *is* no difference” (Deemter, 2010, p. 97, emphasis in original). This would mean “the extent to which an event is defined as ‘mega’ is dependent upon to whom and to what it is directed” (Gammon, 2012, p. 106; cf. Getz, 2012b, p. 45). This was a typical perception in my cases. While some informants, often those from specialised event organisations, did reserve the term “mega events” for events such as the Summer Olympics, many took an explicitly relative

general (of which the Olympics is only one of many examples (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006, p. 10; Jennings & Lodge, 2010; Müller, 2011)) and tera projects are emerging, which are a thousand times bigger than mega events (Flyvbjerg, 2016, p. 5).

approach and produced a scale of events adjusted to Danish and Norwegian conditions, for instance making the Ice Hockey World Championship in 2018 a mega event (cf. Solberg, 2017, p. 46). To be open to this relative approach, I will generally talk about my cases as simply international sport events. Here there is also an attempt simply to see any event as nothing but an event; a suggestion made by Olav R. Spilling, researcher in innovation and business development, in 1998 which has rarely been considered (Spilling, 1998, p. 102; cf. Marris, 1987; Gammon, 2012). I will elaborate on what I mean by an event later and expand on Roche's qualitative aspects of events as "dramatic" instances with "popular appeal". In this project, an international sport event is therefore a dramatic, popular, international and temporary sport occurrence.

1.1.1.5 Conclusion: International sport event research

Most sport event research focuses on the events' forward linkage, i.e. the legacies, they are supposed to leave behind. This mostly happens in studies of single cases (Gratton & Ramchandani, 2017; Mykletun, 2009; Preuss, 2019; Zimbalist, 2017)¹⁸ or by only comparing several similar (mega) events in different countries (Gratton & Preuss, 2008; Malfas et al., 2004; Müller, 2015a; Zimbalist, 2015). This is also the conclusion in reviews of the research in the closely related research involving big cultural events (Bocarro et al., 2017; Wilson et al., 2017). The field has also only recently taken up Hiller's "parallel linkage" with the concept of leverage (the use of events to reinforce running initiatives).¹⁹

This project therefore focuses on the backward linkage, the bidding phase and further back to previous event experiences. As hosts increasingly make use of event strategies or policies, how one event potentially links back to earlier events is particularly relevant. This is an approach which has remained largely untouched with the exception of some highly specialised studies on particular countries preparing for Olympic games and cases of

¹⁸ In a review of legacy studies of the Winter Olympics for example, 19 out of 31 papers were based on a single edition of the Winter Olympics (Gaudette et al., 2017, pp. 297–298)

¹⁹ The contemporary field does not consider Hiller's paper and terminology paradigmatic or seminal, but it is very well suited to providing an initial overview of the different perspectives available for the field.

event portfolios (Ziakas, 2010). It is however likely that present and future events are affected by events of the past, especially given their conscious efforts (cf. the strategies mentioned in the introduction) (Hiller, 1998; G. Richards & Palmer, 2010, p. 454).

Fulfilling the main aim of the thesis, achieving the objectives and answering the research question could therefore advance sport event research and perhaps contribute to broader discussions on events in general. The pre-event perspective is also overlooked in the general event literature (Rojek, 2013, pp. 21–22), for which legacies have also been a major research subject (Gammon, 2012; Getz, 2012b, p. 23). Eventually, the project's desire to go beyond the legacies disbands the research's instrumental view of events and the thesis will therefore also contribute to the field with an inquiry into what research on events per se can add to our understanding regarding the interest in events (cf. MacKenzie & Porter, 2016, p. 25).

1.1.2 Research on events in a Danish and Norwegian context

The general interest in events from research has also led to some studies and publications on the organisation and outcomes of recent single sport events in Norway (Hanstad, 2012; Hanstad & Lesjø, 2017; Lesjø, 2018; Sarpebakken, 2017; Seippel et al., 2016) and the Lillehammer Olympics in 1994 (e.g. Klausen, 1996, 1995; Spilling, 1998; Teigland, 1999).²⁰ One study includes some discussions around the role of the FIS Nordic World Ski Championship in Oslo in 2011 for future editions of the Winter Olympics (Gripsrud, 2012), but otherwise events in series have not been covered. The only general study on events is a master's thesis which discusses some of the first initiatives around events from Innovation Norway²¹ in 2011; however, it was completed at a time where the implications remained to be seen (Jonstad & Umancová, 2012, p. 44; cf. Innovasjon Norge, 2011). This is similar to the situation in Denmark, where Storm and Brandt (2008) is the major if also

²⁰ Some of these publications came as a result of a larger research project on big sport events in Norway financed by the Norwegian Ministry for Culture and NIF running 2010-2016 with a particular focus on volunteers at events and the Youth Olympic Festival in Lillehammer 2016 (Hanstad et al., 2016, pp. 89–90).

²¹ A Norwegian public institute for business support and development.

dated study of sport events in Denmark as it came at a time where many of the organisations whose outcomes I follow up on in this project had just been established. The field of cultural policy development research on the other hand provides some recent findings on events in general.

The latest boost for the Nordic cultural policy research on events, like the legacy research, began around the year 2000. At that time, researchers in the Nordic countries as elsewhere began to investigate the event stakeholders' move towards a focus on the economic impacts of events and culture in general (Duelund, 2008, pp. 7–8, 16; cf. T. Bille et al., 2016; Gyimóthy et al., 2012; Mair & Whitford, 2013). At the same time, they also registered an increase in the number of festivals in Denmark, Norway and in general (Bowdin, 2012, Chapter 1; Getz, 2012b, p. 28; Stavrum, 2014, p. 371).

Broadly speaking, this event research has several parallels with the research in sport legacies. They are often case studies of individual events and they have a post-event perspective (cf. Mykletun et al., 2012). The studies on the most recent editions of the European Capital of Culture in Denmark and Norway – Aarhus (2017) and Stavanger (2007) – are good examples. They discuss the outcomes of the events and their organisation, reach, ability to include various areas of society, and their international representation. However, they do not attempt to look at the event from a pre-event perspective or from the perspective of several events (Bergsgard et al., 2010; Bergsgard & Vassenden, 2011; Fitjar et al., 2013; Herrschel & Newman, 2017, sec. 5.3; Jancovich & Hansen, 2018; Rommetvedt, 2013). The (international) calls for more studies involving the political processes and policies around events constitute another parallel to the gap in legacy research regarding the political framework within which legacies function (Mair & Whitford, 2013, p. 16; Wilson et al., 2017). There are also some differences since, in contrast to the critical approach in general sport event research, the research on festivals can be “festival optimistic” – except when researching the events' economic outcome (Stavrum, 2014, p. 374; cf. T. Bille, 2017, pp. 17–18; Harding, 2017).

Although the thesis' primary concern is to answer the aforementioned three objectives, these sections have substantiated the three particular areas to which the study could be of relevance. Firstly, fulfilling the objectives is also likely to contribute to the picture of how the interest in an event comes about beyond the prospects of legacies in very large countries based on "mega events". This could provide new insights into how the motivation develops during the bidding process inter alia by analysing the role of event policies and small countries, in this case Denmark and Norway, areas hitherto rarely considered within sport event research. Secondly, the focus on several smaller sport events is useful for a discussion of what constitutes a "mega event", cf. the suggestion that an event is better understood when defined qualitatively rather than quantitatively. Thirdly, this could also contribute to a discussion on what an event is and be of relevance for research on cultural policy development and cultural events.

As a final, less focal contribution, I would hope the study could lead to an increased focus on the history of sport events in Denmark and Norway. So far, this research is limited to research on the Norwegian Winter Olympics in 1952 and 1994, and more recently to the FIS Nordic World Ski Championships in 1997 and 2011 (Hanstad, 2012; Heyerdahl, 2014; Klausen, 1996). I have not been able to find any studies regarding Denmark's sport event history and it does not play any significant role in the existing general histories of Danish sport (Korsgaard, 1997; Trangbæk et al., 1995a, 1995b). As Appendix 2 shows, this is not because Denmark only started to host events after 2010. There were few events between 1960 and 1990, but before that Norway and Denmark were extremely active – if also within a more limited range of events than today. Between 1894 and 1950, Norway hosted 15 world or European championships in ice-skating and Denmark hosted 12 road and track cycling championships. Maurice Roche's seminal works on the historical relation between international sport events and cultural event and global and national communities have highlighted the link between the event history, the general history and the contemporary society (2000, 2017). This link is currently unexplored in a Danish and Norwegian context and from that perspective, this study is only the first at the beginning of a third phase of Danish-Norwegian event history. The first was the steady growth from 1900 until approximately 1960. This was followed by a low tide from 1960 until 1990 and

we are now at the beginning of another flood, which began with the hosting of the Lillehammer Olympics and the adoption of a strategic approach to hosting international sport events in Denmark during the 2000s.

1.2 The events

The foundation for the thesis is data from six recent international sport events in Denmark and Norway. However, because of the increased interest and the presumption that this interest is lasting across several events, cf. the thesis' second objective, I have approached the events as a collective, as cases of events all carried out under the same event discourse. This approach is elaborated in the methodology chapter, with this section limited to a short introduction to each of the events.

1.2.1 2014, IAAF World Half Marathon Championship, Copenhagen

The IAAF Half Marathon World Championship 2014 took place in the city centre of the Danish capital Copenhagen on March 29, 2014. It was the outcome of a cooperation between the municipalities of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg, the Danish Athletics Federation (DAF), Sport Event Denmark (SEDK),²² and Wonderful Copenhagen (the official regional tourism organisation).

The event had two parts: the championship and a run open for all on the same route as the elite runners. The amateurs' race began immediately after the elite runners. In the elite run, 223 runners (128 men and 95 women) from 58 countries took part. They competed in four disciplines: men and women individual, and men and women team. 30,000 amateurs from 72 nations participated in the open-for-all run (sold out). 1,500 volunteers assisted in the staging of the event and the Danish police estimated that 200,000 spectators followed the run.

²² An organisation founded by the Danish state for supporting the attracting and staging of international sport events in Denmark (cf. section 6.4.3).

The International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) awarded the event to Copenhagen in September 2011 in competition with a bid from Cheboksary, Russia. Its budget was approximately 20 million DKK/2.7 million €.

1.2.2 Serial host: the Danish Handball Federation

The Danish Handball Federation (DHF) hosted several international sport events in the project's period. To reflect this, I have singled out its two most prestigious events for analysis, namely the IHF World Women's Handball Championship in 2015 and the IHF World Men's Handball Championship in 2019.

The women's edition took place from December 5-20, 2015 in Herning (the main venue), Frederikshavn, Næstved, and Kolding. 24 teams participated. The DHF, the host municipalities, the county²³ Central Denmark Region, and SEDK supported the event. 1,200 volunteers, primarily from local handball associations, helped stage the event. The championships attracted 150,000 spectators and 850 journalists covered it. The International Handball Federation (IHF) awarded the event to Denmark in January 2011. Denmark had at that point no competitors after South Korea had withdrawn its bid. The championship had a budget of approximately 35 million DKK/4.7 million €.

The men's edition took place from 10-27 January 2019 in Denmark (Herning and Copenhagen) and Germany (Berlin, Munich, Cologne and Hamburg). As for the women, the local municipalities, the county Central Denmark Region, and SEDK supported the event. The IHF awarded the championship to the German-Danish collaboration in October 2013 after the two countries had initially made individual bids. The other bidders were FYR Macedonia (now North Macedonia), Norway, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden. 24 teams participated in the tournament, which attracted more than 900,000 spectators (across the two

²³ In the thesis, I use "county" as a collective term for the public authorities on a regional level in-between the national government and the local municipality, i.e. the Danish "regioner" and the Norwegian "fylker".

host countries). The Danish budget was 76.4 million DKK/10.25 million € (with an expected profit of approximately 32 million DKK/4.3 million €). The number of volunteers was approximately 1,000 (in Denmark).

1.2.3 2017, UCI Road World Championships, Bergen (Bergen2017)

Together with a few neighbouring municipalities, the Norwegian city Bergen hosted the UCI Road World Championship from September 16-24, 2017. The event owner, Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI), awarded the event to the city in September 2014, preferring its bid to those from Austria, Australia, and Colombia. Bergen had initially bid for the 2016 edition, but when UCI awarded this edition to Qatar in August 2012, Bergen resettled for 2017. The Bergen Municipality and the Norwegian Cycling Federation (NCF) were the two most influential stakeholders. In addition, some neighbouring municipalities (Askøy, Fjell and Øy-garden) and the county (Rogaland) provided personnel and financial support for the event. The Norwegian state contributed financially to specific parts of the event, such as the infrastructure. The original budget prior to winning the event was approximately 156 million NOK/15.9 million €.

The event included twelve competitions and required 2,200 volunteers. The championship had an estimated 700,000 spectators and approximately 1,150 participants from 80 nations.

1.2.4 2018, IIHF Ice Hockey World Championship, Herning, Copenhagen

The A-Ice hockey World Championship for men took place in Herning and Copenhagen from May 4-20, 2018. The International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) awarded the cities the championship in May 2014, defeating a bid from Latvia. Aside from the host municipalities, their counties (the Central and Capital Regions) and SEDK supported the event. The world championship attracted 526,297 spectators to see the 16 nations compete and had a budget of 105 million DKK/14.1 million €. Approximately 550 volunteers helped during the event.

1.2.5 2022, Oslo2022: The Winter Olympics, Oslo (failed 2014)

The Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (NIF) began working on an application for the 2022 Winter Olympics in September 2011, after the IOC had surprisingly awarded the 2018 Winter Games to PyeongChang, South Korea and not (as expected) to Munich, Germany. In the eyes of top officials within Norwegian sport organisations, an Asian edition of the Games in 2018 made it realistic to get the Games to Europe (and Norway) in 2022. In May 2012, NIF allied officially with the Municipality of Oslo and together they worked on the bid until October 2014, when the Norwegian conservative party Høyre, then the leading party in a government coalition, refused to provide a state guarantee. This was a requirement by the event owner, the IOC, and consequently NIF and Oslo retracted the bid. At the end of the process, the main supporting stakeholders were the Oslo Municipality and NIF in addition to the Oppland County and the municipalities of Lillehammer, Bærum, Hamar, Lørenskog, Øyer, and Ringeby.

In the application for the state guarantee from June 2013, the organisers planned with a budget of approximately 33.7 billion NOK (circa 4.4 billion €). In September 2014, the applicant committee presented a new budget reduced by approximately 8.8 billion NOK (circa 1.1 billion €). As the Games never happened, the following numbers are all estimates from the applicant committee. It estimated a need for approximately 20,250 volunteers to help with the regular Olympics and the Paralympics, a total of 3,050 participants, and approximately three million spectators. In Beijing, to which the IOC awarded the Winter Games for 2022 in July 2015, the organisers plan (as of December 2018) to stage 109 competitions. Beijing won the Games in competition with Almaty, Kazakhstan.

*

The second chapter gives an overview of the global sport and its events. It describes the globalisation of sport events, especially since the 1960s, and presents the dynamics and formal rules of the global sport event market, particularly regarding their bidding processes. It concludes with a theoretical view regarding the attractiveness of an event today

based on a further discussion on legacies as motivation for events and a new discussion of the events' gripping character as an additional motivation. Together with chapter 5, this chapter introduces the local and global context for sport events. They are admittedly extensive and push the start of the analysis far into the thesis, but this is necessary as international sport events are dependent on:

a sustained engagement between national and local authorities, supporters and critics, with global networks of capital accumulation and circulation, culture and communications, international governmental relations, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and international flows of migration and tourism. (*Gruneau & Horne, 2016, p. 3*)

The third and fourth chapters present the theoretical and methodological frameworks for the study. The former presents the epistemological background based on a critical realist approach and the general theory that the reason for hosting events is the outcome of the interaction between a local, national and global level. For the analysis of the interaction, the third chapter describes my use of the field theory by Pierre Bourdieu, the pragmatic sociology of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, and the sensemaking model developed by Karl E. Weick. The subsequent chapter makes a case for the thesis' empirical and methodological foundations, specifically the use of case study research and discursive analysis.

The fifth chapter is a presentation of the local side to the global development as described above.

In chapter 6, I analyse the sectors of the event stakeholders in Denmark and Norway regarding their general perception of events. I also consider their relation to the global event stakeholders.

In chapter 7, I expand the general, local conceptualisation of an event by looking at the most common arguments across events. In particular, I focus on the role of the event as

a public celebration. The relevance of the generic arguments for events as being economically beneficial, sources of pride, and beneficial for the sport. Based on the analysis of the arguments, the chapter concludes with an analysis of what makes the sport event stand out from other events. Chapters 6 and 7 correspond to the first and the second objective regarding the event stakeholders and the event discourse and the relevance of backward and forward linkage with regard to their sustained interest in events.

Chapter 8 changes the focus of the analysis from the generic to the specific and analyses how the stakeholders justify an actual, specific event. This corresponds to my third objective regarding the conversion of the general interest into a particular interest.

Finally, chapter 9 concludes the thesis with a summary and critical²⁴ discussion of the thesis' findings and a discussion of the limits of the project.

²⁴ Note that "critical" in this thesis predominantly refers to the tradition of critical research, to raise an awareness and possibly a discussion of certain sides of contemporary society. It does however also draw on "critical" as a term within historical methodology, cf. source criticism in the chapter on methodology (Hammersley, 2011, pp. 75–76).

2 Global sport events: interconnected and attractive

The first objective of the thesis is to describe the network of stakeholders behind the events and analyse the general event discourse. The first part of this chapter introduces the global side of the stakeholders' network by demonstrating how international sport events are attached to global networks, which base their operations on the world being an entity as opposed to several detached markets or regions. The idea of globalisation is not uncontested, and sceptics argue that so-called global companies often have national managements, that most trade takes place within certain regions, and that, although interconnected, the world is not of one mind (Hamelink, 2015). Globalisation not only increases competition, it also introduces new power relations and experiences of domination (Bourdieu, 2001, pp. 105–106); nonetheless, I find this concept useful as a framework for describing the development of international sport and its events over the last 50 years and thereby the global dynamics within which the Danish and Norwegian event stakeholders operate. The introduction to the stakeholder network focuses on three areas. The first is a general overview of the globalisation of sport in order to introduce two additional factors necessary for understanding the relevance of international sport events today: the market, in this case predominantly the media market, and the state, i.e. the host states and cities.²⁵ The second focuses on the media, highlights the importance of the media for ensuring that sport events reach a global audience and increase their earnings. The third covers the local and national public levels and places the previous discussion on legacies in a broader context by showing how these stakeholders might utilise sport events to engage in global competitions for attention, investments, and further events.

²⁵ The composition varies according to context. Whereas this tripartite organisation (national sport/international sport federations, the public and the market) generally suits Western democracies, it was different in the case of the Sochi Olympics, where the Russian national government single-handedly pulled the strings (Müller, 2011, p. 2101).

The second part of the chapter provides a backdrop for the analysis of the network's event discourse by discussing events' relevance in the post-modern world related to firstly the previous legacy dimension and secondly to the events as gripping.

2.1 Globalisation of sport and its events

Like globalisation, sport is an elusive term. The possibility of an all-encompassing definition of sport is regarded as limited (Behringer, 2012, pp. 13–16; Bøje & Eichberg, 1994, p. 29). Described very broadly, sport “is a form of collective action, involving a host of different people, connected in particular networks, and creating particular forms of sport products and performances” (J. A. Maguire, 2011, p. 860). It may seem erroneous to define sport as “sport”, but that is Maguire's point: “sport” always depends on what the participants define as sport and one must look to the outcome and context to substantiate the term (see Tangen, 1997).




Figure 2: The supply of international sport events 1910-2005 .

Source: Dejonghe, 2007, p. 27.

The sport performance investigated in this section is sometimes characterised as “modern sport”.²⁶ The typical example (and one of its most successful outcomes) is football. Both football and modern sport in general appeared in England in the 19th century when schools combined physical activity with regulated competition (Perkin, 1992, pp. 211–212).²⁷ In addition to the competitions, modern sport also included quantitative, standardised measurements of activities across competitions and a refined aesthetics (Slagstad, 2008, pp. 166–168).

To keep track of these records and regulate sport, first national and later international federations were founded and in 1894 Pierre de Coubertin founded the IOC, which would become one of the most influential international sport organisations. Soon, assisted by new technological inventions such as the telegraph, which made it possible to spread news about results, records and rules at an unheard speed, the international federations were able to organise international championships. From its humble beginning, the supply of sport events has since increased enormously (see Figure 2) in accordance with an increased global interest in staging them (Page & Connell, 2012, p. 5). Some of these events are organised by commercial entities, where the cycling event Tour de France is just one prominent example. However, I still take tournaments based on the national teams or athletes to be more widespread forms of events for which cities, states and national federations compete to host than events owned by private companies.

As well as the number of events, their size has also often increased in terms of money, participants, spectators, etc. However, size is just one parameter, which event stakeholders use to assess the relevance of events for society (Roche, 2000, pp. 16–20, 34; cf. Lolland, 2006). Another key parameter is the event brand. For the modern Olympics, for instance, the aim is not just to be a sport competition but to promote peace and bring

²⁶ I will return to a discussion of any local particularities around sport in Denmark and Norway such as the difference between “idræt/idrett” and modern sport in section 5.3.

²⁷ This definition of sport as “physical contests” (Guttmann, 1978/2012, fig. 2) of course leaves motorsport (not to mention eSport) in an uncertain position. Perhaps the networks and outcomes of today’s sport are about to change.

people together as a form of global “invented tradition” (Girginov, 2018, p. 7; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2007, p. 301). Promising various gains or legacies for those supporting such events is a third parameter (Leopkey & Parent, 2012, p. 932; Rojek, 2013, p. 57). Here and for the other parameters, the IOC has led the way and other event owners have followed suit (Halbwirth & Toohey, 2015, pp. 248–249, 254; James, 2013, p. 336; cf. IOC, 2013; Emery, 2017, p. 27).

To maximise the outcomes of the event’s size, brand and legacies, the event should become global (Giulianotti & Robertson, 2007b; Naha, 2017, p. 1347). In the late 19th century, the telegraph had been an important tool in this globalisation. 100 years later, sport once again found itself with its events in the centre of a breakthrough in communication technology with huge implications for the relationships between the sport events, businesses and the media (Smart, 2007, p. 115).

2.2 Media & commercialisation

The sport and the media have almost always had a close relationship based on a common interest in promoting the sport. Newspapers at the beginning of the 20th century not only reported on events but conducted so-called “active journalism” and organised sport events themselves (e.g. the Tour de France) (Dahlén, 2008, p. 82). This both promoted the sport and attracted readers to the media source in question.

The relationship changed immensely from the 1960s and onwards due to the rapid commercialisation of sport events. Commercialisation describes the development of a demand for an economic output from investors, which then again presupposes a turnover of commodities (Gammelsæter, 2011, pp. 278–279). In this case, it was sport’s events or at least the right to broadcast from them which became the commodity that sport federations began to sell to the media. Previously, sport’s main commodity had been its elite athletes. Federations ‘sold’ their athletes to sponsors, whose products would then be endorsed. As sport events were broadcast to a global audience, the sponsoring remained significant, but the audience expanded. Sport events had therefore changed from tournaments of specific sports to “recurring spectacular commercial media festivals” (Smart,

2007, p. 130). This meant that the broadcasts reached both sport-interested people and people interested in the sport event as an event. Consequently, the range of companies interested in sponsoring these events expanded from merely sport firms to virtually every company; furthermore the companies no longer just sponsored athletes but began to sponsor entire events. In contrast to any former media outlet, the television came to provide a direct financial contribution to sports and their events (without owning them, as is the case of the Tour de France). As the level of interest increased, the price of the rights to broadcast increased hugely with the Olympic Games as the most extreme case. In 1960, the rights to broadcast the Summer Olympics cost 1,200,000 \$ (approximately 9,308,000 € in 2019). In contrast, the rights to broadcast the Olympic Games from 2021 to 2032, i.e. six Games, cost 7.95 billion \$ (approximately 7.11 billion €) (IOC, 2017b; Lolland, 2002, p. 118).

Beginning in the 1960s, media/television-broadcasters, the sport organisations and the businesses would develop a dynamic of their own. Businesses wanted to advertise, the broadcasters had space in their sport broadcasts, and the sport organisations could use the profits to increase their athletes' chances of winning. A more professional, appealing sport could then attract more broadcasters, more sponsors, and make the spiral continue (Roche, 2000, p. 153; Smart, 2007, p. 126; Storm & Brandt, 2008, pp. 46–48). In the 1970s and 80s, the IOC institutionalised the commercialisation of its events further. The IOC for instance developed a new long-term sponsorship scheme, The Olympic Partner programme. It set new standards for uniting entertainment, media coverage, sport competitions and the exposure of (sport) goods that eventually spread to other events (James, 2013, pp. 335–336; Roche, 2000, p. 162; Tangen, 1997, p. 334).

Today, many international sport federations earn a considerable amount of money from selling broadcasting rights to and from the sponsorship of their events (Clausen & Bayle, 2017, p. 40). This means that the interests of the event owner and its sponsors usually have the upper hand in any conflict with the local organisers and sponsors (Mega-Sporting Events Platform for Human Rights, 2017, pp. 1–16). International federations do not

expect this to change in the foreseeable future. Indeed, in 2019 the Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF) foresaw an increased competition for sport events from other events and therefore “IFs [International Federations] will need to develop a more proactive, creative, commercially driven and collaborative mind set [around events]” (ASOIF, 2019, p. 5).

The potentially increased power of the sponsor is also relevant in this project because of the general shift from sponsoring for visibility, e.g. by putting up posters, to the formation of “co-marketing” alliances between sponsors and organisers (J. Andrews, 2012; A. Morgan et al., 2017, p. 106). This expands the basis of the relation between event owner and the sponsor from just money to a common interest in how the event should be staged. Eventually, this could also include how the sponsor and other stakeholders should brand or show their motivation for the event (Djaballah et al., 2015, p. 72). The same is true for the media; it too has become a necessary and thus potentially influential stakeholder for many international sport events as it no longer merely reports from events but has transformed them into media-born events (Meyer, 2002, p. 61). This is the 21st century’s form of the active sport journalism present in the early 20th century. While the media do not initiate events, they live off them as they continuously frame distinct sport events as expressions of recurring stories of success and defeats (cf. Pedersen, 2011, pp. 156–158).

2.3 The bidder: A new role for the city – and the state

These sections on the globalisation of sport and media show how their relation around events has made the events increasingly commercial and professional. This final section shows how the host community is part of this professionalisation in two ways (cf. G. Richards & Palmer, 2010, pp. 35–37 on the professionalisation of events in cities generally).

Firstly, nation states contribute to more professional, i.e. more attractive, sport performances at events by funding elite sport. The state sport programmes in the Eastern bloc, which began at approximately the same time as media started to broadcast the sport events on a global scale, are the first prominent examples of this. Since then, publicly funded organisations specifically for supporting elite sport have become an everyday

practice in countries such as Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, and various places in Asia and the Middle East (Loland, 2002, pp. 114–116; J. A. Maguire, 2005, p. 345; G. Richards & Palmer, 2010, p. 156).

The second connection between the host nations/cities and the professionalisation of events is the event owners' constant need for hosts, which forces them to ensure events are relevant for the hosts. As mentioned in the section on the history of legacies, this concept has been an important tool for promoting events as relevant, e.g. as used by IOC to increase the attractiveness of the Olympic Games since the 1980s. Judging from the increased numbers of bidders for the Olympics that followed, the reforms proved successful (from one for the 1984 Games to 11 for the 2004 Games (Bason, 2019, fig. 1.1).

In the 2010s, i.e. the period considered in this project, however, the Olympics and global sport in general experienced a crisis, among other things due to the costs of certain events, which led to accusations of corruption and bad governance (Geeraert, 2015, Chapter 2). The IOC reacted in 2014 when it adopted the Agenda 2020 reform plan to stimulate new interest in hosting the Olympics inter alia by addressing the accusations of gigantism and unsustainability (IOC, 2014). Although it is too early to draw any conclusions about the success of the reform programme (Kassens-Noor & Lauermann, 2018, p. 3382), it is possible that the crisis weakened the event owners' position vis-à-vis the bidder in this period. A case from the Youth Winter Olympics in Lillehammer 2016 could be an indication of this. When NIF planned the bid, they realised that they risked not getting sufficient public support to pay for the participants' village. Lillehammer was the only bid for the Games and when the organisers asked the IOC to step in, it did so in order to ensure that the Games would take place (Lesjø, 2017, p. 29).

The local and national hosts also began to adopt event strategies, another potential strengthening of the local bidders vis-à-vis their global counterparts. A strategy is:

[a] series of decisions and activities by prospective host cities/re-gions/countries which utilise public funding and other resources un-

der formal and informal institutional frameworks to regulate their involvement for supporting the successful bidding and hosting for sport events, via employing management and marketing tools that coordinate and promote actions of related stakeholders, such as governments at different levels, sport organisations, commercial sponsors, volunteer groups, local communities and event owners. (*Chappelet & Lee, 2016, p. 3*)

In 2011, nine out of 24 European countries had event strategies (seven of which had been adopted after 2000) and an additional eight countries either had strategies in the process of development or guidelines (Stopper et al., 2011b, p. 10).²⁸ There are no studies on the use of event strategies on a city level, but as cities are typically the official hosts and bidders for an event they are essential for the execution of any national event policy. In Denmark and Norway, several cities have developed strategies (cf. chapter 6). With these strategies in place, the bidding and hosting of events becomes a lasting node in a network between the public administrations and the national governing bodies (NGBs),²⁹ who hold the formal rights to bid for an event (Chappelet & Lee, 2016, pp. 11–12; Stopper et al., 2011b, p. 20).

These strategies also link the event interest with the development of a new relation between national governments and cities caused by globalisation; indeed, several cities like London and New York City consider themselves global and “more oriented to other global cities than to national hinterlands” (Jessop, 2015, p. 131), with the result that the governance of the country changes. The state is no longer the central piece in the international competition. The roles of cities and states instead coalesce around a perception of the city as a centre for global competition supported by the state e.g. when hosting events (Sassen, 2007, pp. 170–171; cf. Brenner, 1998; P. J. Taylor, 2000; R. Florida, 2008,

²⁸ Non-European countries with strategies include Canada, South Korea and Qatar (Bayle, 2017, p. 112).

²⁹ The governing body is the overarching association for the local clubs on an either national or regional level for a specific sport.

pt. 1). These descriptions are subject to the same reservation made with regard to my extensive use of research on mega events despite most of my events not being typical mega events. My events' host cities are not among those typically considered global cities and the Nordic nation states are still strong; nevertheless, they do show signs of this regional thinking instead of one based on nation states as central entities in the global competition (Hirsch, 1996, pp. 103–104; McCann & Acs, 2009, sec. 4; cf. Pedersen, 2010). States promote intercity regions like the Øresund Region between Malmö (Sweden) and Copenhagen (Denmark) and they use “Nordic” as a regional brand (Herrschel & Newman, 2017, pp. 88–89; Nordic Council of Ministers, 2015).

2.3.1 The global event's local linkages

When an event takes place somewhere, two paths intersect. The story of the global event is one of them. All global events have a history of their own. The Winter Olympics took place in Albertville in 1992 before moving on to Lillehammer in 1994 and Nagano in 1998. Lillehammer had never hosted the Winter Olympics before, but it, like every host, had and still has its own, local event history. It hosted Pool B of the 1993 World Junior Ice Hockey Championship; in 1994, it hosted the Winter Olympics; and in 1995, among other things the city hosted the FIL World Luge Championships. Although each event is different, they are all chapters in a local history of events.

When the global and the local paths cross, the global event enters a local space or “sociotope”,³⁰ a term which the Swedish geographer Alexander Ståhle originally used to describe how some spaces are marked by their “commonly perceived direct use values (...) by a specific culture or group” (2006, p. 60). For events, the place does not exist physically but the previous sections suggest that it might exist as a network between local event stakeholders, which takes form as the stakeholders consider the past, present and future relationships between them, their event history and the current event. Because an event is always localised, this local edition of an event becomes a “space of place” with a history.

³⁰ Derived from the term biotope, a place with a specific population composition based on certain environmental factors (Chepkemoi, 2017).

The global, medialised side of the event on the other hand is a “space of flows”, focused on gratification and only containing a sense of the present (Stähle, 2006, p. 64; cf. Castells, 2013, p. 50).

The local perspective varies according to the local history. Perhaps the city simply aims for bigger events. An array of events could also be used to pursue various sport agendas (e.g. anti-doping), support more general non-sport objectives such as a strategy of public diplomacy, show conformity, align with certain powers, or simply secure an optimal economic outcome (Houlihan & Zheng, 2015, pp. 332–335). In any case, this makes each event one of several and the worth of several coordinated events is significantly higher compared to each individual event (Agha & Taks, 2015; Gibson et al., 2012, p. 169; MacKellar, 2013, pp. 131–132). Like any other portfolio, those based on events will decay if not refreshed as competitors and event owners move on. To acquire a portfolio requires events and events require resources, which in turn brings the local within reach of the global. The event portfolio is a local product, but it is the event owners who decide what capital is relevant. This is not necessarily money (although that has been the case before³¹) and can also include technical qualifications or any other form of resource considered relevant by the event owners. This is seldom clear because the bidding processes are complex and non-transparent procedures with a lack of clear criteria.³² The only clear thing is that the owner always has the final say (cf. how globalisation does not necessarily dissolve hierarchies) (Cornelissen, 2016, pp. 140–141).³³

³¹ Some processes, at least on the international level, have been marked by corruption or simply the awarding of events because of one candidate’s ability to outbid its rivals financially (Masters, 2015; Ryan, 2016).

³² A study of good governance among international sport federations showed that in none of the 35 federations did “the selection of host candidates [take] place according to a transparent and objectively reproducible process” (Geeraert, 2015, p. 31).

³³ The event owner has after all rather leased out the event than sold it, and so the event should remain attractive for future bidders (or ‘tenants’) (Geeraert, 2017, p. 27; Hiller, 2003, p. 108).

2.4 Conclusion: The event stakeholder network

A global sport event is a meeting place for a range of different sectors and organisations, who either contribute or at least show an interest in gaining from the event. The previous sections on the globalisation of sport events have emphasised the event owners, media and hosts as the events' central stakeholders, highlighting the increasing professionalism as a trait which will be integrated in my later analyses. For now, as an overview of this introduction to the global event and as a basis for fulfilling the thesis' first objective, I conclude this introduction to the global sport event with a model for these stakeholders' relations beginning with a description of what I mean by "stakeholder".

Traditionally "stakeholders" are entities, which are vital for the event in question, have something at stake (money, reputation, etc.), and would often be divided into primary and secondary stakeholders depending who should benefit from an event's values first (Freeman, 2008, pp. 41–42, 2010, fig. 1.2; Friedman et al., 2004, p. 174).³⁴ This is related to the stakeholder theory's normative aim, namely to analyse "how business works at its best, and how it could work". This means considering the "stockholders" as well as the stakeholders. The theory should "show how a business could be managed to take full account of its effects on and responsibilities towards stakeholders" (Freeman, 2010, p. 9).

Regarding sport events, previous studies based on a stakeholder approach have revealed a complexity in their stakeholder composition; which in my view renders the stakeholder approach described above insufficient (Parent, 2008; e.g. Parent & Chappelet, 2017). A host municipality for instance has a clear stake in the form of subsidies it provides, whereas the press has little at stake but a huge interest. Other event research has noticed this need for nuances too (Ferrand & Skirstad, 2015, pp. 67–68), and consequently my stakeholder model integrates all the organisations into one network, sorted according to

³⁴ Private individuals are not per definition excluded from being stakeholders. It is possible that a private person has something at stake in an event, although at least in this project this is rarely the case.

their social and organisational commitment and including stakeholders with both high and low levels of commitment (see Figure 3). Organisational commitment describes the stakeholder's involvement in the risk management and ensuring of a sound running of the event's planning and organisation, while social commitment goes beyond an obligation to uphold sound event organisation. A stakeholder with a high social commitment is concerned with the event's impact on the stakeholder's community, e.g. the citizens or the members of an NGB.

Stakeholders with a high commitment on both scales are "engaged stakeholders" and will be the focus of this thesis. According to the research behind the model, the group typically includes public authorities at the local, regional and national levels, local and national sport organisations, and local sponsors. These highly engaged members often initiate the bid in the first place by forming so-called "booster coalitions". Here, they also agree (at least publicly) on a common goal and drive the process forward (D. Black, 2014, p. 16; Hiller, 2000, p. 450). Such coalitions have access to an existing bureaucracy and other resources, which makes them rather effective and professional – a necessity in the current event market (cf. above and Hayes & Karamichas, 2012c, p. 22). They access these resources through its members, and a contribution of resources might be a requirement for membership. These coalitions are efficient but not transparent, at least not until they include the public authorities, who are answerable to the public (Hiller, 2000, p. 440; cf. Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, pt. 1).³⁵ In theory, the inclusion of members representing and answerable to the public would help coalitions reach the ultimate position for an engaged stakeholder, namely to make an argument which equals "the general interest" (Horne, 2012, p. 38). However, as they are made up of various stakeholders, members often seek a broad appeal by promising several different outcomes instead (Wenner &

³⁵ E.g. the IOC has only recently (October 2017) loosened their demand for a financial guarantee from the applicant's government before considering an application, which hitherto had made public involvement a requirement regardless of the size of the public sector and its general relation to the sport (Livingstone, 2017).

Billings, 2017, p. 23). These promises might be made to peers of the engaged stakeholders or the three additional stakeholder types with which the model operates, namely the “allied”, “militant” and “passive” stakeholders.

Allied stakeholders have only a high organisational commitment. Typical examples would be media rights holders and event owners. Their primary source of influence is organisational power based on contracts and ownership. Obviously, they also have a general social commitment, but I do not see that the management of these interests depend as directly on the social outcomes of a specific event as it would be the case for the NGB or the host city. The international sport federation/owner has responsibility for managing the interests of its peers (the national member organisations), but I presume it handles these interests during several events. For the event owner, in contrast to the local host, an event is not an out-of-the-ordinary experience and their peers will not follow its progress closely to ensure a specific outcome for them.

Militant stakeholders have a high social commitment, which often shows itself in their strong opinions about how the event ought to be organised, for example out of concerns for the local environment or a general opposition to capitalism (cf. the grassroots and city-based NOlympics movements protesting against specific editions of the Olympics, particularly on a local level but also against the Olympics more generally (Robertson, 2019)). However, they have no direct say in the organisation of the event.




Figure 3: An ideal typical sorting of sport event stakeholders according to their social and organisational commitment to the event.

Figure based on Ferrand & Skirstad (2015) and Girard & Sobczak (2012).

Finally, although the passive stakeholders make per default no forms of commitment to the event, other stakeholder groups might mobilise them. Here, it is relevant to determine whether the media is making the public active by spurring enthusiasm or decreasing

it by applying a negative perspective (Hiller, 1998, p. 49; Schnitzer, Scheiber, et al., 2017, pp. 887, 898). Protests against the Olympics also show how agents from civil society can work successfully against an event as for instance in the case of the protests against the Munich bid for the Winter Games in 2022. These protests managed to seriously challenge the usual event logic that sport events per default are good experiences for a city (Könecke et al., 2016, pp. 22–23). Combined with the IOC's demands for public support, this could indicate a future role for the public as an active stakeholder (IOC, 2017a, pp. 9–11). So far, public engagement has predominantly expressed itself as a preventative force and it remains to be seen if the public can also engage in a positive way and achieve a high organisational commitment. Parts of the public could for instance be involved through local sport organisations (Enjolras, 2003, pp. 7–8; Storm & Brandt, 2008, p. 135).

Stakeholders in international sport events are locally and globally active on their own, but they come together around the event. This section has provided an overview of the global trends and a model for the event stakeholders which I will return to in my empirical chapters following the overview of the local trends in chapter 5. Regarding the analysis, it is relevant to include two final remarks about the stakeholder theory. Firstly, the empirical chapters will also discuss the importance of the individuals which the stakeholder theory does not consider. Secondly, while the stakeholder theory emphasises the relevance of taking a stakeholder approach, it is more of a “framework” than a theory (Freeman, 2010, pp. 63–64). For the analysis of the stakeholders' interactions I have other theories which are presented in chapter 3.³⁶ Prior to that, the next section elaborates on the object of interest for all the stakeholders: the event.

³⁶ Some of these theories in their setup resemble various approaches previously described within stakeholder analysis (Bryson, 2004). However, I found it advantageous to use the theories described in chapter 3 as my only theoretical foundation as they provided both this approach and starting points for discussing the interpretation of these relations.

2.5 Global (sport) events in the post-modern world

International sport events are nodes in a global network of national and international sport associations, businesses, and public authorities. Importantly, the use of new technology in the network has meant that the stakeholders are now able to exploit the events' spectacular elements and use them as an even better mechanism for pursuing instrumental, speculative outcomes. To ensure these outcomes, events have to attract the largest audience possible. It is the audience who, inspired by the events, should feel an adherence to the state, move to the host city, buy the sponsors' products, start practicing sport, etc. One of the important breakthroughs has been the ability for stakeholders to make a sport event interesting for those who are not interested in the event for the sake of the sport. This broadening is reflected in my first objective, to consider the "general event discourse" and not just the sport event discourse. The shift to a more general discourse also requires a consideration of some broader trends in society. The following sections define the event as such and introduce what I presume to be fundamental elements in the global (sport) event discourse, namely its spectacular and speculative dimensions, based on existing event research and theories about the post-modern society.

2.5.1 What is an event?

To begin with, events could simply be seen as something which happens. However, some events are more significant than others (Shipley & Zacks, 2008, Chapter 3). In an introduction to an "evental approach to the study of events", Iain MacKenzie and Robert Porter (2016) qualify this by making a distinction between events as "things" and events as "events". To see an event simply as *something* that happens, i.e. an action or occurrence within a limited time and space, is to see the event as a thing. An event as an "event" is a "phenomenon that contain within them so to speak, a novelty-bearing quality" (MacKenzie & Porter, 2016, p. 25; cf. Žižek, 2014). Whereas things are states, events are the changes between states. MacKenzie and Porter explicitly contrast this idea with the event management's view of the events in question as "things in the service of competitive advantage" for the stakeholder (2016, p. 25).

Research on event management however has had an eye for the events as events too, borrowing from a “classical discourse” of “myth, ritual and symbolism; ceremony and celebration; spectacle [and] communitas” (Getz, 2012a, p. 37). The findings of sociologist Émile Durkheim function as a prominent example. Durkheim’s classic studies of the aboriginals’ religious practice in Australia from the beginning of the 20th century was just as much as study of a society as of religion, which makes it useful for current event research when explaining the relevance of events today. Durkheim showed that it is through society that the individual becomes something more than itself. He also describes how this happens through rituals (events in event research). They bring a rhythm to society through which the individuals confirm their relations (Durkheim, 1912/1995). Anthropologist Victor Turner’s works are another important source of inspiration. He too drew on Durkheim when considering the close connection between events and rituals as “‘collective representations’, symbols having a common intellectual and emotional meaning for all the members of the group” (Turner, 1982, p. 54). Turner also developed a distinction between the liminal and limonoid ritual. The first is “centrally integrated into the total social process, forming with all its other aspects a complete whole”. The limonoid ritual is the opposite and tends:

to be more idiosyncratic, quirky, to be generated by specific names in individuals and in particular groups – “schools,” circles, and coteries – they have to compete with one another for general recognition and are thought of at first as ludic offerings placed for sale on the free market. (Turner, 1982, p. 54)

Donald Getz exemplifies this concept when developing the idea of the current events as a move from reoccurring, structuring liminal events to playful, commodified limonoid events (2012b).

Regarding sport events, some research on sports fans interprets the fans’ relation to a sport or team as a “secular religion” and in that way the sport event too can be a way for the audience to transgress into a collective similar to Turner’s rituals (Giulianotti, 2015b, pp. 6–7; 136–144). However, as described by Durkheim, a religion has two levels. The

first is the immediate sense of community provoked in the moment of effervescence. It seems evident that spectators can experience this at a match, where the fans, like the participants in rituals, often engage in carnival-like activities such as moving in sync, costuming, singing, and experiencing a “moral community” (Durkheim, 1912/1995, p. 42; cf. Ehrenreich, 2007, sec. 11.2). According to Durkheim, the second level of religion is the sense of belonging to something bigger (cf. the totem as a prism and the imagination of an “ideal” world through the ritual (Durkheim, 1912/1995, p. 424)).

2.5.1.1 *Contemporary events*

MacKenzie and Porter defined events as bearers of novelties. For Durkheim, rituals helped members of a society making sense of the world. Durkheim’s rituals were based on long-running traditions which were nevertheless staged, and MacKenzie and Porter’s idea of an event suggests they can be used to provoke a change. In contemporary definitions of cultural events, this makes the events something willed and with a targeted impact, similar to the limonoid rituals described by Turner.³⁷ Indeed, in a study of staged events Britta Timm Knudsen and Dorte Refslund Christensen suggest that:

[f]or [staged] events to become ‘events’ they have to encompass this dual ideal: they have to evoke events in their users – enhancing their feeling of aliveness – and they have to open time for their users and ideally for mankind in general. Events can point to and open a ‘not yet’ world beyond actual worlds. (B. T. Knudsen & Christensen, 2014, p. 123; cf. Derrida, 2007)

In another Danish study on the role of events from 2008, the political scientist Jens Nielsen defined an event as:

³⁷ Some research questions whether this happens at sport events (Rojek, 2013, p. 139). With reference to Turner, it questions whether this community is as deeply felt in comparison to the experience of true liminal ritual, arguing that a sport match is ‘just’ a limonoid commodity (cf. above and Andreasen, 2009).

a single or periodically reoccurring occasion [begivenhed], which is planned and staged individually with the attendance or participation of a target group in mind, with the purpose – by the use of symbolic expressions and actions and through effervescence – of giving this target group a specific experience of new insights, confirmation and transformation. (2008, p. 33)

With reference to Durkheim, Nielsen saw events as totems, i.e. what designated the clan in Durkheim's study or, in Nielsen's wording, are "the prisms through which the life of the clan and surroundings are understood" (Nielsen, 2008, p. 42; cf. Durkheim, 1912/1995, p. 100). Both Nielsen and Knudsen and Christensen believed that events should evoke "events" in the sense of MacKenzie and Porter. However, their study objects, suggesting that this could happen with events which are products of the culture industry's "event making" (B. T. Knudsen & Christensen, 2014, pp. 123–125).

These definitions of staged events make the interdependence between the event as an instrument and as an event clear in the case of the contemporary staged event. This interdependence lead to my suggestion that the current event discourse has two fundamental elements (cf. the thesis' first objective relating to the general event discourse): firstly, events are spectacular as they allow individual to experience a new community or sense through participating in the event comparable to the ritual described above; secondly, they are speculative when designed to give the stakeholders access to new or increased amounts of resources. The following section elaborates on these two spectacular and speculative elements to show how some general trends in society could make events especially interesting now as a basis for further analysis in the empirical chapters.

2.5.2 The sport event as spectacle

Based on an outline of the spectacular potential in events and an overview of some of the classic elements of post-modern society, this section discusses how a spectacular event discourse could be a relevant source of motivation to investigate in the analysis, possibly as an alternative to the legacy argument .

The inspiration for this inquiry comes from Nielsen (2008), who in a study of Danish events suggests that the spectacular element of events has become particularly relevant in post-modern society. The post-modern society, according to Anthony Giddens, is a society where the ideas of the primacy of the West, reliable knowledge, and a constant and steady progression all are questioned (Giddens, 1990/2015, p. 52). Consequently, individuals lose their sense of a steady ground and this leads to a desire for building communality. This idea of the human being today as missing a clear purpose is a common theme across various theories of the modern and post-modern world. The Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has described the post-modern society as “liquid”; traditions are dissolved and the world is open and undecided, which gives each individual the freedom to decide what to do with their life (Bauman, 2000). This fluidity means that there are no solid foundations. People are always on the move, either as tourists or vagabonds. The former move because they constantly optimise their way of living in a world of change and upheaval, and the latter constitute the rest. They do not have the energy to move but circumstances force them to do so nonetheless (Bauman, 1998/2016, Chapter 4). The lack of foundation prevents one from staying. One cannot make a final choice and “thus we feel often an overwhelming urge to find – to compose such a reason [: for being somewhere particular]” (Bauman, 1998/2016, p. 77; cf. Beck, 1986/2016, pt. 2). Being on the move could split societies and isolate their individuals, as exemplified in Robert Putnam's studies on the decline of social capital in the USA (Putnam, 1995).

These post-modern traits, Nielsen sees as a reason for the current public attraction to events. Unlike Durkheim, events are not as rituals constitutive of one common religion across society, but they nevertheless imbue a feeling of meaning into the participants bereft of a purpose. “[E]vents as effervescent rites in the profane everyday life might strengthen them [: the spectators] and invite to reflection on this new purpose [of life]” (Nielsen, 2008, pp. 133–134).

Modern sport at its beginning was not an obvious supplier of such community creating, spectacular events. The transformative aspect of modern sport first targeted the athlete participants. In the 19th century, it was the athlete who would become a correlation of

modernity's instrumentality and expressivism³⁸ (Guttman, 1978/2012, fig. 2). The sport and the new modes of production in factories aligned and disciplined the body and in art, the expressivism sought the self-fulfilment, strengthening and vitalisation of the individual.

However, as sport events began to attract spectators, sports expanded into a new wider "social space" (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 154) and created a community of spectators based on the athlete. In the global space of the sport event,

the sport is a ritual celebrating the contingent – a ritual of enjoyment of the unforeseeable in the body and nature of the human. The spectators for their part can let themselves intoxicate by the incalculable mysteries of the coincidences. (Slagstad, 2008, p. 639)

In 1978, the American sport researcher Guttman described the development of sport as a move away from rituals towards formal record keeping (Guttman, 1978/2012). Modern sport was an expression of a development from ritual *to* record. However, the sport event could break away from this idea and create something which is both ritual *and* record (Slagstad, 2008, pt. 6, chap. 1). Although little explored, it is possible to see how a spectacular event discourse focusing on the event's impact on the individual experiencing the event as an event could spur an interest in events. It would however only be truly significant if it is possible to determine whether the community encompasses more than those present at the arena. This is where the media comes into play.

2.5.2.1 *The spectacular media event*

The partnership with the media was crucial for the expansion of the sport event beyond the stadium. As mentioned, it has increased the number of spectators enormously from those present at the arena to people watching on the television, listening on the radio or

³⁸ This term was coined by the philosopher Charles Taylor to describe the view of German romanticism that every human pursued their own expression, in contrast with the instrumental view of the human of the Enlightenment (Slagstad, 2008, p. 438).

following the event via the internet. Media has in some ways taken over from the stadium, meaning that the contemporary sport event is primarily a medialised occurrence (MacAloon, 1984, p. 270).

If one takes, as the French situationist Guy Debord does, the perception of society via the media as given then this expansion beyond the arena has happened without any loss of impact. The event portrayed in the media is just as real as the event experienced by the audience in the arena (Debord, 1988/1991, 1967/2002). However, this does not mean that the two events are alike. The media is not a neutral mediator when it puts the content of the event into a frame whose “sole message is: ‘What appears is good; what is good appears’” (Debord, 1967/2002, sec. 1.12; cf. Compton, 2015). Through images, emotional appeal and other elements of the production, the media creates social relations between spectators not present in the arena and consequently they can experience the events as spectacular by becoming part of new or reconfirmed medialised community (Debord, 1967/2002, sec. 1.4). For instance, in a study on the National Basketball League (NBA) in the USA, sociologist David L. Andrews demonstrates how broadcasting reengineered “the NBA into a manufacturer of personality dramas and cults” and eventually also commodities “from which the consumer is encouraged to derive a positive and consistent sensory experience” (D. L. Andrews, 2006, pp. 99–100; cf. Kellner, 2001 and D. L. Andrews, 2007 on the dimensions of the spectacular.).

The suggestion that the medialised event might be similar in its function to any other event instead of some ersatz makes it relevant to consider how the spectacular event influences the event discourse and the interest in events. However, as sport events become spectacular through the media, they might start to “mainly function as spectacles” and become “a mass commodity” rather than examples of physical contests (Bourdieu, 2000a, pp. 123–124). Firstly, this raises the question of the particular relevance of sport in the events, to which I will return later. Secondly, it highlights the link between the spectacular event’s appeal to the individual and the speculative element of the event often held by its stakeholders.

2.5.3 Speculative events

The section on legacies and the global role of the media and the host states/cities has already introduced some of the most important speculative reasons for stakeholders to engage in events. In these cases, the events are “things”, described by MacKenzie and Porter (2006) as instruments for achieving an advantage or solving a problem. More specifically, legacies make events investments. They yield some sort of outcome – often but not always in the form of money. However, these legacies and the notion of cities as being involved in global competitions have not presented any explanation for why, of all the possible solutions, events have become the preferred approach. After all, cities and events have a long relation. Why this focus now?

The full analysis of this in the case of Denmark and Norway follows in the empirical chapters, but first it is relevant to point out potential factors in the formation of the speculative side of the event discourse. The most important of these is the move of many cities away from the industrial focus on production capacity to economies based on creativity and culture (R. Florida, 2008; R. L. Florida, 2002/2014). Attracting and staging events has become one (popular) way of enhancing the existing creativity, refurbishing the image of the city and attracting a qualified workforce (G. Richards & Palmer, 2010, p. 18). For some cities, events are simply means for external ends; in other cases, the very staging of events become investments and ways of creating arenas of consumption from which the cities hope to earn money. This has led to cases of “festivalisation”, an idea closely related to that of the “experience economy”, which suggests that all acts of consumption should entail some form of experience for the consumer (Pine & Gilmore, 1999/2011).³⁹ While the individual’s attraction to events can be partly explained by the individual’s quest for meaning, the searching individual is also a consumer. This relationship is exemplified by the origins of Nielsen’s study. It focuses on the intrinsic values of events, how an event functions, and eventually appeals to the members of the public; however, this study only

³⁹ Experience as in the German “‘Erlebnisse’, a state one lives through, not ‘Erfahrungen’, occurrences, which happens to one” (Bauman, 1998/2016, p. 94).

came about as part of a larger project on the experience economy in Denmark and the “possibilities for an increased economic value generation [værdiskabelse]” (Nielsen, 2008, p. 6).

The speculative outcomes might be doubly effective in raising the interest in events as they both motivate the event and potentially limit the possibilities of criticism. The speculative element strengthens the case for the proponents by adding logos to the rhetoric pathos of the spectacular event. This for instance exempts public authorities from seeking special approval when supporting sport events because of a “dominant consensus” around their obvious goodness, which one also finds around sport in general (Pentifallo & Van Wynsberghe, 2014, p. 74; C. M. Hall, 2006, p. 67). Such “managing for results” in a setting of post-politics, i.e. using events to pursue legacies without spurring any political discussions, has been evident in both non-democratic states such as China and Russia as well as Canada (D. R. Black, 2017, p. 225; Makarychev & Alexandra Yatsyk, 2016, p. 3).

Some research even suggests that an event is actually only feasible when combining legacies with a broadly appealing spectacle (Bull & Lovell, 2007, p. 246). In the following section, I will extend on this by suggesting that it is possible for the speculative and spectacular elements to coalesce already during the planning for the event.

2.5.3.1 The spectacular in the speculative planning phase

Speculative outcomes are motivational in themselves since they are resources which the stakeholders can use later to pursue aims of their own. However, it is possible to add another motivational factor to these outcomes if one chooses to see the legacies as spectacular, transforming elements of an event.

If the stakeholders for instance determine certain legacies in the planning phase and begin to make plans for how to use them, the event planning becomes a period of change for the stakeholders similar to the way in which the actual event is a period of transformation for the spectators. For example, research shows how stakeholders perceive the planning phase as a space for innovation, disruption and creative destruction (Gruneau & Horne, 2016). Depending on the size of the project, various possibilities for action rise

during this “state of exception” prior to the event (Boykoff, 2013). Perhaps, the planning phase is even the most creative, transformative and spectacular part of the process for the stakeholders. As soon as the event begins, certain rules apply for finding the winners and staging the competitions.

In the planning phase, the stakeholders can dream, reach for the sublime, and try to make the most of it for themselves. This is a creative and motivating process. In a study on mega projects in general, the sociologist Bent Flyvbjerg shows how it is common for stakeholders to reach for technologically, politically, economically or aesthetically sublime projects.⁴⁰ For events, later research has added a fifth sublime, namely the “interest group sublime”, an example of which is sport organisations pushing for a bigger stadium (Tangen, 2016a). This drive to achieve the sublime motivates the stakeholders and combines my spectacular and speculative dimensions in the planning phase. However, it often also leads to increased costs (Flyvbjerg, 2016, pp. 6–7). The sublimes are essentially a form of the principal-agent problem, which usually describes a situation in which an agent (e.g. a contractor) has an interest in keeping the principal (e.g. the owner of the building) uninformed of problems until the investment from the principal is too high to give up (cf. Geeraert, 2017, pp. 25–26; Solberg, 2017, pp. 52–53). Engineers, architects and bankers are all typical agents, whereas politicians would typically be principals. However, Flyvbjerg makes the politician an agent by distinguishing between the politician as the owner and the politician as an individual with personal aspirations, e.g. to ‘offer’ the city a great Games, much like the oligarchs in ancient Greece and Rome (Veyne, 1992, pp. 10–11). While it might seem counterintuitive that the principal and the agent could be the same person, the organisation might not be aware that it embodies both and forget to be the responsible principal. Flyvbjerg for instance provides evidence that stakeholders sometimes overlook risks because of an “optimism bias”, meaning they have too much faith in the earnings from the investment and a disregard of the risks of cost overruns

⁴⁰ Mega projects overall comprise not only mega sport events but also other large infrastructural projects such as subways or dams (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012a, p. 249), but some research connects the two fields by analysing mega sport events (i.e. the Olympics) as mega projects (e.g. Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006, p. 10; Jennings & Lodge, 2010; Müller, 2011).

(Flyvbjerg, 2014). An awareness of this potential problem could therefore also limit the relevance of the spectacular elements in the planning phase and as motivation for the event.

2.6 International sport events in the 2010s

International sport events in the 2010s are the outcome of a development which began in the 1960s when global media coverage gave sport events an “unprecedented global audience” (Horne, 2007, p. 83). This led to a close interdependency between the sport, media and commercial enterprises and also transformed events into “valuable promotional opportunities for cities and regions” (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006, p. 8).

The chapter has demonstrated how these promotional opportunities depended on making sport events broadly appealing. This broad appeal is possible because, in tandem with the media, contemporary sport’s competitions can create a sense of community among the spectators, both those interested in the sport as well as those generally interested in a spectacular show. At the same time, legacies have become an important discourse not least for the host cities and states. This speculative side of the events entails a change of perspective from the event itself to the event as a means for achieving various ends.

Based on this, the chapter concludes that it is fundamental that the thesis’ analysis of the current discourse on events and their stakeholders takes into consideration the global influence on the event stakeholders, a specific event’s spectacular character, and the speculative prospect based on the event’s legacies. However, the chapter has also shown that the planning for legacies could transform the event planning into an event in itself and has highlighted the importance of not making overtly sharp distinctions between the spectacular and speculative dimensions of an event. It concludes with a brief discussion of the potential limits to events’ attractiveness.

2.6.1 Are there limits to the attractiveness?

As much as international sport events are marked by globalisation, an international event always results in a meeting of the global and the local. Ideally, this takes the form of “glocalisation”, i.e. “diminishing contrasts and increasing varieties”,⁴¹ in an exchange between global and local “public standardised values” or cultures (Douglas, 1966/2002, pp. 39–40; cf. Rowe, 2011, p. 81). In this way, “global sport” does not mean that only one sport or event is dominant, but rather the globalisation of “modern sport” or event as a format, i.e. regulated, measured competitive physical activities. Football for instance exists in several local versions such as American football, Australian football, rugby, etc. These different forms of football can then again contain local variations, e.g. regarding accepted levels of aggression within the globally valid formal rule structure (Giulianotti & Robertson, 2007b, 2007a, p. 7; J. A. Maguire, 1999, p. 213).

However, the local (elite’s) attempt to use the event to stand out might be difficult because of two factors. Firstly, international sport federations are keen to keep events under their control. For many international federations, their events are both prestigious objects and major sources of income (Clausen & Bayle, 2017, p. 41). Thus far, globalisation has helped because it has increased the “formalised supranational policy arrangements” (Bergsgard, et al., 2007, pp. 43–44). Thereby, still larger groups at the lower levels fuse into or become subject to global entities, which leads to “greater concentrations of power” at the top levels such as the IOC, FIFA, etc. (J. A. Maguire, 2005, p. 32). Sport events have become the “twenty-first century SportsWorld”,⁴² a system controlling sport through “grobalisation” (a portmanteau of growth and globalisation). In contrast to the seamless glocalisation, grobalisation emphasises “the imperialistic ambitions of nations,

⁴¹ Thus defined by J. A. Maguire with a reference to Norbert Elias’ conclusion that civilisation diminishes contrast while also allowing for a greater variety within accepted civilised conduct (J. A. Maguire, 1999, p. 45).

⁴² A reference to the dystopian description by Robert Lipsyte of American sports in the 1970s as a system for controlling the common people through distraction from the economic and political suppression (Nauright & Pope, 2017, pp. 1817–1818). Mega sport events are increasingly functioning as institutions due to their lasting relations trumping the current host city (Gruneau & Horne, 2016, p. 2).

corporations, organizations, and other entities and their desire – indeed, their need – to impose themselves on various geographic areas” (Ritzer, 2003, p. 194). Although this does not reject the possibility of an “interpenetrative relationship between the global and the local” (D. L. Andrews & Ritzer, 2007, p. 138), the authors are sceptical about the agency of the local. Acting glocally from a globalist perspective is nothing but adhering to global trends, yet the localisation of events limits the globalisation of the event (D. L. Andrews & Ritzer, 2007, pp. 141–142). For instance, in the opening ceremonies hosts are often able to make the event at least appear indigenously conceived, controlled, and comparatively rich in its content (Ritzer, 2003, p. 195).

Secondly, all rituals including sport events are processes of both inclusion and exclusion. A ritual for a boy coming-of-age serves just as much to exclude the boy from the group of women as to include him in the group of men (Bourdieu, 1982, pp. 58–59). In the case of the event, the city hosts the event so that as many citizens as possibly feel included, in particular those who would usually feel excluded by sport. Simultaneously, at a global level the city hopes to be considered part of the global community by hosting. This is a desire for inclusion with a touch of exclusion. What is the point of being part of a community if no one recognises your capabilities? The city therefore also tries to appear exclusive, e.g. through the stadium; first its hosts spectacularly uniting events before then functioning as an architectural legacy, which makes the city exclusive (MacAloon, 1984, p. 243; Roche, 2000, p. 45).

This chapter has shown that this has provoked protests from anti-globalisation leftist movements against an “international capitalist class” and globalisation as a (hegemonic) ideology (Veltmeyer, 2008, p. 192). In some cases, elements of the public have challenged the engaged stakeholders out of local fears e.g. for the environment or the local economy combined with general anti-globalisation sentiments (Boykoff, 2011, pp. 47–48; Könecke et al., 2016, p. 21). So far, the protests have exclusively targeted mega events. On the side of the owner, recent reforms in the IOC such as the Agenda 2020 are yet to show an effect. In Denmark and Norway, the general interest does not seem to have decreased or

led to protests except perhaps in the case of the biggest possible event, the Winter Olympics.

Are events processes of glocalisation, globalisation, or something else? Principally, sport events are arenas where the global and local contexts adopt and adapt to each other's impulses if not outright rejecting them as "matter out of place" (Douglas, 1966/2002, p. 36). The stakeholders act on and react to each other before potentially reaching a (temporary) equilibrium. Generally, it seems that global organisations have the last say and only recently have there been hints of local opposition. However, this chapter has also focused on the global side of the context for this interaction. The following chapters on theory and methodology provide the outline for my analysis of such networks before I come to chapter 5 on the Danish and Norwegian context.

3 Metatheoretical and theoretical foundations

I concluded the previous chapter by noting that event stakeholders operate in a network. Depending on one's aims, it is possible to concentrate on various parts of this network. As mentioned previously, this thesis focuses on the engaged stakeholders' motivation for involving themselves in the network. Why do they seek to host events or – put somewhat differently – how do they justify this interest both before themselves and others in the network?⁴³

This short introduction already provides a basic outline of how this justification happens. The engaged stakeholders are the senders of the justifications, which have two recipients: the engaged stakeholders themselves and the external recipients. I presume that there are two external recipients, the most obvious of which is the event owner. However, as highlighted in the previous chapter, it is possible to imagine a local agency. The second external recipient is the local peers of the engaged stakeholders, e.g. for the local and national politicians this would be their voters. To this comes the stakeholder's internal justification as a precondition for any external initiative. Whereas the content of external justifications depends on the recipients, the internal justification could relate to the perception of events on both a macro and a micro-level. The internal justification could for instance be that the event will be an asset in a perceived global competition for resources in general, for events in particular or – on the micro level – stem from an individual seeking personal fame. For both an internal and an external justification, the point of the previous chapter stands that the sender and the recipients are embedded in a

⁴³ Cf. philosopher John Rawls' description of justification from his work on how one could structure a fair society from *A Theory of Justice* (1999). Here, Rawls sees a justification as an "argument addressed to those who disagree with us, or to ourselves when we are of two minds. It presumes a clash of views between persons or within one person, and seeks to convince others, or ourselves, of the reasonableness of the principles upon which our claims and judgments are founded. Being designed to reconcile by reason, justification proceeds from what all parties to the discussion hold in common. Ideally, to justify a conception of justice to someone is to give him a proof of its principles from premises that we both accept, these principles having in turn consequences that match our considered judgments. Thus mere proof is not justification" (1971/1999, p. 508).

wider context. A theoretical premise for any analysis of the justifications is therefore a framework of theories considering the sender of the argument, the stakeholders, and the structures and context around them.

This chapter presents this framework across four sections. The first is about the relation between the stakeholder and structure on a metatheoretical level. The subsequent three sections cover the global via the local, ending at the individual level. The first two cover the theoretical inspiration for my analysis of the external arguments, while the final section follows up with the theory for analysing the internal justification. The primary aim is to give an overview of the thesis' theoretical framework. This is obviously relevant for the analysis, but applying theoretical concepts used in a wide range of analyses of modern society also eases the discussion on the findings' generalisability.

3.1 The relationship between stakeholder and structure

The project's metatheoretical frame for analysing the structural context of the event's arguments is based on the critical realist approach as put forward in the early works by Roy Bhaskar with later developments (Bhaskar, 1989/2005, 1975/2008; cf. Pearce, 2007; Potter, 2007).

At its outset, the critical realist approach was an alternative to both the positivist demand for causal laws and the constructivist idea of leaving the interpretation of the world to the individual. In both cases, Bhaskar found that the epistemology and the ontology would conflate into one as "statements about being can be reduced to or analysed in terms of statements about knowledge; i.e. that ontological questions can always be transposed into epistemological terms" (Bhaskar, 1975/2008, p. 26 cf. Fletcher, 2017).

Critical realism's alternative is an ontology, where the world is split into intransitive and transitive dimensions: the world per se and the world as far as we have knowledge of it. The epistemological consequence of this is that knowledge is a social product and "the world a world of agents incompletely described" (Bhaskar, 1975/2008, p. 104). It is here that critical realism differentiates itself from the post-structural idea of knowledge as freely constructed (Gorski, 2013, p. 660).

The relation between the transitive and the intransitive dimensions follows via three domains: the real, the actual and the empirical. The domain of the real equals the structural level of society; these structures could be the existence of a bureaucracy, physical objects or simply reasons/discourses. Then follows the domain of the actual, i.e. the events as occurrences. These are the outcomes of the structures in the domain of the real mixed with “wider discourses (...) and uneven possibilities of the context” (Sayer, 2000, p. 25). After all, “statements of laws are tendency statements. Tendencies may be possessed unexercised, exercised unrealised, and realized unperceived (or undetected) by men; they may also be transformed” (Bhaskar, 1975/2008, p. 7). Although structures are not determinants, they constrain the agent if the agent cannot change them within “*a given time period*” and instead learn to live by them (Jessop, 2015, p. 95, emphasis in original). What for instance within the time perspective of a single event appears to be a structural constraint need not be so from the perspective of several events. Finally, the empirical level involves the perceptions or experiences of these events in the domain of the actual. If the stakeholders in some way see a relation between their smaller events and the mega events, my task is to explain why this is the case and examine the consequences.

Realists therefore seek to identify both necessity and possibility or potential in the world – what things must go together, and what could happen, given the nature of the objects. (Sayer, 2000, p. 11)

The format of sport events requires participation with global stakeholders and structures which influence the local stakeholders, even if this participation is not consciously recognised. Merely observing an outcome and the immediate actions behind it will not necessarily explain the phenomenon. Even when some cases happen without structural changes they still interact with the structures, if only by ensuring they persevere (cf. the increasing awareness of the influence of structures like gender or different forms of government on the role of legacies from mega events in Bocarro et al., 2017). In other cases

the event has an impact on the structure, although how radical it is varies from case to case (Collier, 1994, p. 10, cf. Bhaskar, 1989/2005, Chapter 2).




Figure 4: The three domains of a critical realist inquiry.

Bhaskar originally proposed four steps to analyse a social phenomenon. Later research refined the approach and *inter alia* added a description of the phenomenon as a first step. This then follows “Resolution”, the first step in Bhaskar’s original model, and entails an analysis of each individual event’s components. One should then combine these components into a coherent theory, i.e. conducting a so-called “theoretical Redescription”. This means that the researcher performs a form of abduction and interprets the phenomenon in a dialectic between relevant theory and data (Fletcher, 2017). This is followed by a retroductive step, which extends the abductive interpretation by searching for its “basic conditions” (cf. the domain of the real (Danermark et al., 2001, p. 80)). This step focuses on “the antecedent events or states of affairs that could have produced them [the current events]” through the “[e]limination of alternative possible causes” (the fourth original step) (Bhaskar, 1989/2005, p. 142, 1975/2008, p. 115).

The model is based on so-called “epistemic relativism” (Bhaskar, 1989/2005, pp. 62–63). It is relative because it is not the world *per se* which changes (ontological realism), only the theories about it. Consequently, it is impossible to test theories with experiments because the world is an open system. It is possible to test a hypothesis “[e]ven though not necessarily quantitatively, and (...) exclusively in terms of its explanatory power” (Bhaskar, 1989/2005, p. 53). Findings on the relations between the levels are not stable causal links;

while there are structures, these are only latent tendencies (Collier, 1994, p. 6).⁴⁴ In my cases, the tendencies resulted in bids for sport events, but it is also important to consider the alternatives. Which mechanisms lead to certain sport events enjoying prominence while other events do not?

At the same time, such openness for alternatives and an emphasis on the uncertainty has implications for my methodology. It could for instance limit the prospects of generalising from the thesis' results. The role of the researcher is another issue. The critical realist approach stresses that knowledge production is "an ongoing social activity in a continuing process of transformation" (Bhaskar, 1975/2008, p. 6) and a "double hermeneutical circle" for the researcher, testing and adjusting the hypothesis by considering the study objects and the scientific community (Sayer, 2000, p. 17). The agents might have their version and I have mine, but we do not make these at random. These versions build on certain structures and processes preceding the current action of justification. Obviously, I have to consider the background of the informants, but I also have to consider my personal dispositions when conducting the analysis. The framework's encouragement to go beyond the domain of the empirical and look for the explanation of the phenomenon among the "real" mechanisms provides some distance. I will however still have to be consciousness of the space in society I share with the objects of my study (M. J. Smith, 1998, fig. 7.11). I will return to both of these issues in the next chapter.

Altogether, this is not a recipe for a full-blown analysis but a description of the view on the relationship between structure and stakeholders in the thesis. Critical realism "is not itself a theory of society", nor does it presume any particular methods (Gorski, 2013, p. 660; cf. Danermark et al., 2001, p. 73). The actual analysis requires specific theories and methods, which are outlined in the next section.

⁴⁴ "To say that a thing has a power to do something is (...) to say that it possesses a structure or is of such a kind that it would do it, if the appropriate conditions obtained" (Bhaskar, 1975/2008, p. 78). There is no such thing as "general power" (Jessop, 2015, p. 92).

3.2 Theory

This part has three sections. Each introduces my theoretical framework for analysing the global, local and internal justifications, respectively.

The first section explores the relationship between a presumed global event field, i.e. the globally recognised norms for events, and the local stakeholders. Based on the traits of this relation, which I outlined in chapter 2, I postulate that the relations are relatively stable and regulated. To support my analysis of these relations, I draw on the field theory by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.

The local engaged stakeholders however cannot ignore their peers. They must find a compromise between the demands of the global structure and the demands of themselves and their peers. Gaining their consent – if not active support – includes the fulfilment of certain expectations. To make this possible, I imagine the local dynamics as less rigid than the global event field. Inspired by the pragmatic sociology developed by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, this analysis of the national/local justifications is based on the assumption that the engaged stakeholders can be pragmatic, in contrast to (or at least more easily than) what is the case on the global level.

Thirdly, “[d]oing justice to the reality of history is not a matter of noting the way in which the past provides a background to the present; it is a matter of treating what people do in the present as a struggle to create a future out of the past” (J. A. Maguire, 2005, pp. 8–9). The question for the analysis of the internal justification is therefore how the individual makes sense of the idea of hosting an event situated in a specific time and space (J. Maguire, 1995, pp. 5, 22). As developed by Karl E. Weick based on studies of organisations (1995), the theoretical background is sensemaking.

3.2.1 The permanent global event agent

As a city hosts several events, I imagine that the engaged stakeholders come to maintain a stable relation with the global event owners (cf. the forming of an event sociotope and the strong position of the event owner described in the previous chapter). Each local

event they host is representative of a long line of events – when one event is over, the next is ready to take its place. “The Event is dead, long live the Event!”

These stakeholders have both a stake in a specific event and a collective stake in the city or nation’s reputation as members of a global event network. Global and local stakeholders have a shared interest in and adherence to a structure around events; they are therefore members of a field as these interests are “irreducible to the stakes and interests specific to other fields” (Bourdieu, 2000d, p. 72).

Full membership/recognition is a gradual process which happens as local and national stakeholders adapt to the “doxa” of the event field, “a set of fundamental beliefs which does not even need to be asserted in the form of an explicit, self-conscious dogma” (Bourdieu, 2000b, p. 15). Bourdieu in his analysis of the art field shows that this field is based on the doxa “art for the art’s sake” (2000a, p. 96). Imagining that this is also true for the event field, that its doxa is ‘events for the event’s sake’, gives a common belief for the members of the field. The doxa however does not prescribe exactly what an event is. Just like the art field, the agreement that art should be pursued for the sake of the art does not nullify the discussion in the field of what should be considered art (Bourdieu, 1996, pp. 223–227). On the basis of the doxa, the members of the field therefore debate the norms or “nomos” in the field (Bourdieu, 2000b, p. 96). Just like in science, where the paradigms might change without the idea of science going away (Bourdieu, 2000c, pp. 62–63). Members of a field might resist the norms or impose new ones yet still remain in the field as long as “they concur in their belief (doxa) in the game and its stakes” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 98). In my cases, adaptation or resistance are likely to manifest if a group of local stakeholders takes the initiative for an event policy (cf. Dubois, 2015). An event policy could be to give the global rules priority over local customs, for instance support institutions priming the local conditions for the global demands (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2004, pp. 4–5). It could also be an attempt to change the global norms if the local stakeholders are likely to propose new requirements which otherwise would not

have been part of the globally conceived event. Neither of these ideas questions the belief in the event as such; rather, they only suggest how the 'right' or proper event should be.

The task for the field theory is to explain such cases of either succumbing to or changing the interaction between the global and the local. Critical realism takes the first step by placing the stakeholder or agent in the centre, affected but not determined by the underlying structures (Bhaskar, 1975/2008, pp. 99–102). However, it does not suggest how these changes might happen and simply draws the logical conclusion that “men must reproduce (or more or less transform) the structures [if society should continue]” (Bhaskar, 1975/2008, p. 187). Only the field theory provides a framework for analysing this reproduction or transformation. Its outset is based on the agents' resources and prepositions upon entering the field, but these resources do not determine the trajectory of the agent once in the field (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 170; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 96–97; cf. Potter, 2000). Instead, the practice of an agent is the outcome of their confluence in the structure and the agent's strategy (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 25). An agent would for instance only have a family (or be a member of the event field) if the agent maintains the relations and draws on them (family members or events) to “satisfy vital and symbolic interests” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 38, cf. Smith (1998, p. 303) for a similar view of the family in critical realism). Rather than structures, the family and events are the results of the strategy of the agent while also influencing the agent.

Some would disagree with this reading of Bourdieu's theory and consider the theory to be too reliant on the structure and dismissive of adaptations to “contextual shifts” (Alexander, 1995; cf. Vike, 2011, p. 379).⁴⁵ Nevertheless, I maintain that the agent is “a mediating construct, not a determinate one” and through “slippages” change is possible (if

⁴⁵ Bourdieu was criticised for being too “deterministic” in his view on sport in his suggestion that sport is “an object of struggles among the fractions of the dominant class and also among the social classes” (1978/2000, p. 122). It is also only in his 1988 work that he introduces habitus in sport and highlights the structured *and structuring* power it has in his field theory (Bourdieu, 1988, pp. 157–158; Pringle, 2015, pp. 171–172).

often slow) (Harker, 1984, p. 121 cf. Bhaskar, 1975/2008, p. 106-107). Bourdieu emphasised how times of radical social change were likely to lead to changes in the established norms (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 169, 1993, p. 113, 2000d, p. 73). It would be logical to couple this idea of radical change with the aforementioned findings on sport mega events that such events can provoke states of exception (Boykoff, 2013; Glynn, 2008; Gruneau & Horne, 2015, pt. II). However, for most organisations in the event field, events are the order of the day; if every new event meant radical changes, their businesses would hardly be sustainable. The disruptions described in this event research are only characteristic for the event experience among people outside the field. Events transforming the field are probably rare.

3.2.1.1 Capitals and changes in the field

A more likely source of changes inside the field is when a stakeholder accumulates enough valid resources to impose a new worldview or nomos in a field. The field theory conceptualises these resources as four capitals: social, economic, cultural, and symbolic. Like the origin of the metaphor – economic capital – these capitals are mutually interchangeable, although such changes cannot always happen immediately (Bourdieu, 1977, Chapter 4, 2008). Quick transactions are only possible in the case of economic capital as it simply equals the accumulation of economic wealth. This process is more difficult with the others as they amount to the “accumulated history” of the agent (Bourdieu, 2008, p. 280).

Cultural capital is thus an expression of status based on effective organisation or other good “dispositions” for hosting events, highly specialised employers, or the possession of other “cultural goods”. In the case of sport events, this could also include facilities and is therefore interchangeable with economic capital, if not immediately (Bourdieu, 2008, p. 282).

Social capital refers to an indirect route to such goods or economic capital as it amounts to the stakeholders’ access to the capitals of other agents through networks (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 183, 2008, p. 286).

Unlike the other three the fourth capital, the symbolic, is not a specific form of capital. Instead,

[e]very kind of capital (economic, cultural, social) tends (to different degrees) to function as symbolic capital (so that it might be better to speak, in rigorous terms, of the symbolic effects of capital) when it obtains an explicit or practical recognition. (Bourdieu, 2000b, p. 242, emphasis in original)

The symbolic capital is the active image of the other forms of capital. When a capital is recognised in a field it is not for instance the cultural capital per se which the members recognise. They misrecognise the cultural or any of the other economic or social capitals and what they only recognise is the capital's symbolic representation. They might for instance respect a person talking eloquently about a topic of relevance to the field. The capability to do so often requires a significant amount of cultural capital yet what is recognised is its symbol, the eloquent speech (Danielsen & Hansen, 1999, p. 58). Likewise, holding a title or having a specific gender in some circumstances give the holders recognition in the field because of the (misrecognised) capitals these symbols represent (Bourdieu, 2009, p. 177). With a recognised albeit symbolic position follows symbolic power. "To be known and recognized also means possessing the power to recognize, (...) what merits being known and recognized" (Bourdieu, 2000b, p. 242). Again, the dominated often misrecognise this exercise of power because the relationship appears to be 'natural'. Bourdieu describes the relation as one based on symbolic violence because the dominated in "their understanding of the situation and relation can only use instruments of knowledge that they have in common with the dominator" (2000a, p. 170).

Symbolic power, capital and violence are interesting concepts for my analysis as they link the other capitals to the dynamics of the field. This could for instance explain why events with equal costs and cultural programmes are perceived differently because of the bidders' difference in symbolic capital (misrecognising the cultural and economic capital). It also makes clear that the value of any form of capital depends on whether the other field members (such as the event owners) acknowledge the content of the capital. What

counts as highly valuable in one field does not necessarily make the same impression in another. When conducting my theoretical field analysis the capitals are handy typologies, but the analysis only follows when I see them in a context of the interaction between the agent's field of origin, the nomos in the field, and the agent's resources or capitals. The exact relations between the capitals and their relative importance in a field are not determined by the field theory beforehand. Instead, these properties always rest on the concrete empirical findings, a field's "peculiar" properties, the power field (i.e. the surrounding society, see below), and the agent (Bourdieu, 2000d, p. 72).⁴⁶ For example, sport organisations have extensive knowledge about the codes and norms around sport facilities or how should athletes behave, but can this cultural capital be used to acquire a symbolic power in a political debate in a municipality? Sport organisations might have the expertise, but it is uncertain whether they are able to convert this into legitimate symbolic capital in the field of local politics because it is outside of their usual praxis. With praxis, we come to the last part on the field theory.

3.2.1.2 *Habitus and the study of organisations*

Bourdieu's original presentation of the field theory in *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977) was a study of people's praxis in a field. Consequently, his term for the individual's habits or prepositions – the habitus – referred to the individual's spontaneous reactions to occurrences in the field I find it reasonable to presume that the organisations in this study can be agents,⁴⁷ but it is difficult to reconcile the spontaneity of habitus with an

⁴⁶ So for instance later research on festivals and other cultural events has developed additional capitals essentially to account for the "resources employed to facilitate any kind of human activity" (Mykletun, 2009, p. 148). Stressing this adaptive approach also counters the often-heard critique that Bourdieu's results are only valid in a French context. His exact results might be, but I would argue that the methods could still prove fruitful in other settings. The important point is "for what purpose he is 'good to think with'" (Lamont, 2010, pp. 1, 5).

⁴⁷ Certain individuals might seem to have important roles, but even these are constrained or supported by the system or the organisation of which they are a part (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 183).

organisation. Although the idea of the habitus is still relevant for my analysis,⁴⁸ to emphasise the organisations' conscious element in contrast to the traditional idea of a habitus, I will use the term strategies instead (Wacquant, 2018, pp. 10–11). Their function will however be similar. Like the habitus, a strategy is not a direct dictate from the structure and the practical consequences of the strategy depend on the organisation's perception and the context (Bourdieu, 1996, pp. 199–200). The dynamics of the field also remain in place and if the strategy fails, just as if a habitus fits badly with the field, the agent's position is damaged. If successful however, the practice and logic described in the strategy could become the 'natural' view on events in the field (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 164). Typical expressions of a habitus, for instance through a choice of words or a certain discourse, are also just as relevant for a strategy (Bourdieu, 2000e, p. 2; cf. Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 135). I will return to this area in the presentation of the discourse analysis.

Finally, it is relevant to note how the field theory also extends to the relation between the event field and the structures of society (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 96). Bourdieu described the overarching structure as the "power field", a meta-field with two poles – cultural and economic – comparable to the domain of the real in critical realism (Mangez & Hilgers, 2015, pp. 2–7). The dynamics are otherwise identical to those within the usual field where an agent interacts with the field. On this more abstract level, it is the field which interacts with the power field (Wilken, 2011, pp. 104–107).

3.2.2 The temporary local event agent

As much as local stakeholders can have a stake in the global event field, they will also always have a stake in the event as a specific, temporary event (cf. Parent, 2008). From

⁴⁸ This is very similar to the approach taken by Shaun Rawolle in a study of the "cross-fields effects" between the fields of politics and journalism and Vincent Dubois in his research on the making of public policies. Dubois describes that "beyond a purely monographic use of the concept of the field, one has to establish (systems of) relations among (systems of) relations" (Dubois, 2015; Rawolle, 2005). This to some degree also resembles Niklas Luhmann's idea of a "structural coupling" in his system theory (Åkerstrøm Andersen & Pors, 2017, pp. 73–75), but a field is distinct from a system in two ways. It develops through constant power struggles rather than self-referential logics. Secondly, a field doesn't have parts and each subfield of a field works along its own logics (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 102–104).

this local perspective, the sport event is a temporary occasion in time, limited in space and associated with a unique mosaic of justifications created by the different stakeholders involved. This mosaic also includes the reasons or demands from the global stakeholders, but from the local perspective the event owner is only one among many voices.

The temporality of the local instance of an international event also dissolves the idea of a relative stability across events, which I presume is the case for the relationship between local and global stakeholders. From the local perspective, the specific event is a state of exception and disruption for many stakeholders. As this project does not primarily look at mega events, one could oppose the idea that the events in this project are sufficiently large to provoke a state of exception. However, that would allow existing research to dismiss any consideration of this possibility. Even local stakeholders with long event records do not have staging of events as their main task and the constant movement of the events means that there are usually newcomers for whom the event is exceptional.

Although this works against any ingrained structures, the structures are not gone. The event loosens the local stakeholders from the doxa in their fields of origin but at the same time they have to recognise the logic and norms of the event field (Bourdieu, 2000d, p. 73; Grabher & Thiel, 2014). However, for some stakeholders and at least for their supporting bases, the feeling of belonging to a global event field must be rather weak. The local sport club is likely to be stakeholder in an event and have hopes for the event, but these rarely will rarely extend beyond the specific event in question. Such organisations do not have a tangible stake in a national event field in situations where their national representatives in the NGB pursue a strategy of hosting one event to enable more events in the future. The NGB must then consider this limited engagement in events in general from their peers to ensure an overall successful hosting of the specific event. Research in mega sport events describes such conflicting interests as “systemic contradictions”, which for instance could occur in a discourse of public ownership because elite sport is

the most direct beneficiary of the event as opposed to sport-for-all (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012a, p. 251).⁴⁹

To analyse these local relations around events, I see the local hosting of an event as a temporary arena. It is a “semi-autonomous” field, affected by the intrinsic logic of the event as well as the external logics of the global event field and the local stakeholders’ fields (P. Thomson, 2014, p. 75; cf. Halbwirth & Toohey, 2015, p. 245).

3.2.2.1 The pragmatic local stakeholders

The engaged stakeholders, placed in-between many stakeholders, are forced to seek pragmatic solutions. By pragmatic, I mean the stakeholder’s ability to adjust their argumentation in accordance with what they perceive as the argument having the best chance of success. Consequently, the pragmatic approach might not change the actual outcome of the event, but it is a relevant perspective for the analysis of why the stakeholders promote the arguments they do. A sport organisation might agree to support the economic outcome as an important reason. While this does not prevent them from fulfilling their main objective, e.g. constructing new facilities, it does change the public argument for the event and possibly the public impression of the event. To qualify the analysis of this local process of pragmatism, the field theory is supplemented by the pragmatic sociology of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot.

Boltanski and Thévenot originally developed their theory on pragmatic sociology as a contrast to Bourdieu’s field theory. Instead of seeing the action of agents as the outcome of field and habitus, they regarded individuals or representatives of organisations as having “critical competence” and being able to establish a “normative constitution” through reflexion (Blokker, 2011, pp. 252–253; Susen, 2014, pp. 320–322). If symbolic violence is everywhere in the view of Bourdieu, it could just as well be nowhere (Boltanski, 2009/2011, p. 20).

⁴⁹ A similar tendency has also been noted in research on cultural events more broadly (G. Richards & Palmer, 2010, p. 122).

In later publications, Boltanski has lessened the division between these ideas and Bourdieu's and in *On Critique* (2009/2011), he even encourages the researcher to combine the two. The researcher should take the "possibility, obtained by stance of exteriority, of challenging reality, of providing the dominated with tools for resisting fragmentation" from Bourdieu and "pay attention to the activities and critical competences of agents" from pragmatic sociology (Boltanski, 2009/2011, p. 48). Other discussions have substantiated this idea of drawing on both theories, e.g. to analyse cases of multiple concurrent justifications or mingling of fields (Atkinson, 2019, pp. 13–14; cf. Nachi, 2014; Susen, 2014). In my view, local sport events exemplify this mixed field. Nonetheless, if this local field is free from a dominating doxa, something other than the field dynamics has to step in to inform the analysis.

This is where the next original element in Boltanski and Thévenot's theory appears: six theoretical 'orders of worth' on which agents can agree to legitimise an action in each situation (see Table 2).⁵⁰ One could describe an order of worth as one of several conflicting ideologies or points of value as each one represents a certain understanding "of the social universe" and how to legitimise actions within it (Thorup, 2015, pp. 300–301). This also implies that some orders of worth can be more relevant in some contexts than others, e.g. because of the presence of certain "national cultural repertoires".⁵¹ Boltanski and Thévenot's original six orders were the civic, the market, the inspired, the opinion, the domestic, and the industrial, each of which has different attributes as a model for analysing situations when the agents decide how to legitimise a certain action (see Table 2).⁵²

⁵⁰ The English translation of the French original "cité" varies between the publications. Some give no translation, other use "city" or "worth". Based on of the English translation of *On justification* from 2006's use of "worth", I talk of different "orders of worths" in this thesis (Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999/2007; Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006; Chiapello & Fairclough, 2002, p. 192; Susen, 2014).

⁵¹ "[E]lementary grammars that can be available across situations and that pre-exist individuals" (Lamont & Thévenot, 2000, pp. 5–6).

⁵² These original orders of worth are not static or universal and later research has proposed additional orders around sport events (e.g. Giulianotti & Langseth, 2016; Tangen, 2016b).

	Inspired	Domestic	Civic	Opinion	Market	Industrial
Mode of evaluation	Nonconformity	Esteem	Collective interest	Renown	Price	Productivity
Medium	Emotions	Exemplary action	Formal communication	Semiotic	Monetary	Measureable
Elementary relation	Passion	Trust	Solidarity	Recognition	Exchange	Functional link
Human qualification	Creativity	Authority	Equality	Celebrity	Desire	Expertise

Table 2: Pragmatic sociology's six orders of worths or modes for legitimising an action.

Source: Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, p. 368.

Initially, the pragmatic analysis of the dynamics around the specific event takes place in the empirical domain (cf. Figure 4) via stakeholder criticism, i.e. reflecting on and questioning the perceived justifications of the event to test the current order of worth. The stakeholders conduct this test by aligning specific discourses with certain orders of worth (Chiapello & Fairclough, 2002). Is an event beneficial to the collective and an act of solidarity?

Ideally, the outcome of a challenge to the current worth is the creation of an equivalence by agreeing on one order of worth (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, pp. 361–362). However, the reality will always remain uncertain, especially in democracies where the demand for transparency institutionalises an “imperative of justification” (Boltanski, 2009/2011, p. 127). Even if no open challenge exists, this instability is evident in the “considerable

means” organisations employ to reduce the uncertainty and maintain their idea/justification of “reality” (Boltanski, 2009/2011, pp. 60–61).⁵³

This accounts for the functioning of the pragmatic sociology in the empirical domain, but how does pragmatic sociology cope with the deeper domains of the critical reality?

As a starting point, agreeing on a specific order of worth involves settling on a definition of “reality”. A stakeholder’s ability to do this depends on gaining sufficient support to form a collective agreement. One way to do so is through “a rise towards generality” in the arguments (Boltanski, 2009/2011, p. 37). This can be achieved, for example, by striking a compromise between two different orders of worth (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, p. 228). Boltanski and Thévenot suggest various possible compromises but have not found any examples of one between the civic and the market (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, p. 325). This is interesting as these areas are closely connected in the international sport events considered within this study. However, even a well-recognised compromise is inherently unstable. Almost as much as it highlights the commonalities of the two orders of worth, it also exposes their differences (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, p. 278). Eventually, a successful justification might institutionalise itself by becoming a point of reference or “type situation” (in contrast to the singular “token situations” of the everyday). This idealises the successful justification and transforms it into an example for future staging of “reality” (Boltanski, 2009/2011, pp. 82, 104). Although pragmatic sociology supposes a critical ability among the agents in society, it is therefore possible to imagine cases of lasting compromises with a relevance for the deeper domains of the critical realism.

This also relates to the limits of the stakeholders’ pragmatism. Pragmatic sociology itself does not suggest any limits, but historian Quentin Skinner provides a suggestion based

⁵³ Boltanski, similar to the ontological split of critical realism, distinguishes between the actual “world” and the staged “reality” through the justification and the critique (2009/2011, p. 57).

on an analysis of civil liberty and public actions historically. In so far as the justifications are public actions, according to Skinner they are:

limited to the range of actions for which they [can] hope to supply recognizable justifications, and (...) thus limited by the range of recognized political principles which they (...) plausible hope to suggest as favourable descriptions (and thus justifications) for their actions. (Skinner, 1974, pp. 127–128, cf. 1998, pp. 105–106)

There are structures on the local level of the single event. While they might only last for the duration of the planning and hosting, they still impose limits regarding what can be seen as legitimate.

3.2.3 The mindful agent

The two theoretical approaches outlined above have considered the justification as external processes. When stakeholders operate on a global level, they interact with other global stakeholders and structures; meanwhile, on a local level, the temporality and particularity of the event force stakeholders to consider their peers pragmatically and produce temporary structures or arrangements (without conflicting with the global event structures and the structures in society as a whole). Justifications however also target the senders and the suggestions from authors such as Bauman that each stakeholder is left to define their own purpose accentuate the relevance of also considering the internal justification. Individuals in the organisation have to convince themselves that the event in question is worth the trouble. A more specific plea comes from the authors of a recent paper analysing the legitimisation of cultural policies in Britain and Mexico as outcomes of narratives; they suggest that because of the post-modern loss of a “grand narrative”, “we may accordingly need to examine the narrators rather than the narrative”, for instance their “unscripted exchanges”, to understand how a policy becomes legitimate (Bilton & Soltero, 2019, p. 11).

Sensemaking, as presented by the organisational theorist Karl E. Weick, attempts this in my reading. Weick proposes seven properties of sensemaking (1995, p. 17) which constitute the theory for my analysis of what happens when an individual, exposed to a form of stimulus (e.g. the idea of hosting an event), develops a frame in which the stimulus appears sensible (1995, p. 4). At the same time, I claim that the application of sensemaking and the addition of a micro-level in the analysis also has the potential to feed back into the other levels.

The first property is to understand the relationship between the agent and the structure, which is established by a mind influenced by its surroundings. Bourdieu focused on the unconscious in this adaptation whereas Weick, on the micro level in the sensemaking, emphasises the active effort of the individual to make the world sensible (cf. Board, 2011).

The individual as the starting position is nicely summarised by Weick in the phrase “how can I know what I think until I see what I say?” or perhaps more clear when turned around, ‘I can only say what I see until I can know what I think’ (Wallas (1926) in Weick, 1995, p. 12). The subject is present as the first person singular “I”, and only comes to know the world after recognising what he/she tells him/herself about the world. The social context touches Weick’s individual, but the product – the meaning – is constructed by the subject.

The second property is thus retrospective – the individual’s notion of previous actions and events in the sensemaking process. Here, the sensemaking theory diverges from my theoretical framework as individuals have a lived experience, which organisations do not have. Nonetheless, organisations play a role, for example when Weick suggests asking the same question for a collective subject, a “we” (Weick, 1995, pp. 61–62). The agent acts in tandem with the environment and is consequently social (Weick’s third and fourth properties). Although the process and level of analysis happens on a micro level, the informants most likely draw on some shared topics or stereotypes about events in the city or the organisation (Weick, 1995, p. 23). There is nothing to prevent the different levels of the organisation and that of the individual from interacting. If the sensemaking, i.e. an operation on the level of the individual, has common traits across several individuals,

then these individuals could give support to a common overarching course. Bilton and Soltero (2019, cf. above) point out how some narratives on an organisational level can become overarching and unite disparate groups behind a common cause. In any case, sensemaking varies over time; it is “ongoing” (the fifth property) (Weick, 1995, p. 43). Recalling the point of sensemaking as retrospective, the individual might change his/her sense of the event. One has to consider the “seeds from which people develop a larger sense of what maybe occurring” (Weick, 1995, p. 50) and how these seeds might have changed with the context from the first idea of the event to the time of its staging – not to speak of my interview with the informant. However, the accounts of these individuals make sense and have a relevance as far as they are plausible rather than because of their factual accuracy (Properties 6 and 7). The individual for instance may like to create myths (Weick, 1995, p. 61). A myth, as described by Roland Barthes, “does not deny things, (...) it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification”. Such myths function as “depolitized speech” (Barthes, 1972/1991, p. 147), which fits particularly well with the sport events’ post-political justifications based on the myth of the sport as an undisputed good. Another form of myth making is so-called “social imaginary”, e.g. broad support for the myth or idea that society runs and should run as an economy (C. Taylor, 2002, pp. 105–106).

Such myths do not make the informants unreliable. On the contrary, access to the worldview which people use to make sense of current actions is especially important for explaining interest in sport events. The picture then is made complete with the addition of context and research’s possibility to link events over time and draw on less visible factors such as an overview of the event network.

Summing up, sensemaking extends the analysis of the external justifications with a framework for analysing the relationship between macro-structures, the bidding situation, and the individual. When speaking of an individual, it is relevant note that I only consider the individual as a professional within an organisation. I do not attempt to psychoanalyse the informants to explain their interest in events as persons.

3.2.4 Neo-institutional theory as an alternative?

The neo-institutional theory on the “organisational field” is an alternative theoretical approach which would not have required the same reservation towards analysing organisations (cf. the role of the habitus).⁵⁴ It also offers explanations for changes. An increasingly similar approach to events across hosts could for instance be because of isomorphism and “public choice theory”, i.e. the application of market mechanisms to analyse and evaluate the behaviour of public organisations (Buchanan, 1984; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Policy learning could be another a relevant aspect of the institutional theory for explaining the spread of event policies. Denmark has a long-running policy and Norway does not. In his introduction to policy learning, Richard Freedman focuses on what is meant by “learning” in policy learning (2006). Among other things, he refers to the political scientist Paul A. Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework which emphasises learning regarding policies as “advocacy coalitions”’ development of “belief systems”. These coalitions:

are people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest – group leaders, researchers) who share a particular belief system – i.e. a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions – and who show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time. (Sabatier, 1987, p. 660)

Such a belief system has multiple parts: deep structural beliefs is one, new inputs/policies another. The members of the coalition combine these levels when making new policies. One implication of this is that a policy is never adopted directly but only “realized in what might be described as a ‘third code’, or a language of translation” (Freedman, 2006, p. 385). Neo-institutional theory has also been used for the study of sport organisations in Norway, even in combination with Bourdieu (Bergsgard, 2005; Enjolras, 2003).

⁵⁴ The “organizational field” appeared around 1970 “as the domain where an organization’s actions were structured by the network of relationships within which it was embedded” (Wooten & Hoffman, 2016, p. 4).

Recently, the theory's concept of "field-configuring events" (FCEs), which describes events as "venues to discuss, define, and debate the issues at stake in a field's emergence and evolution" (Wooten & Hoffman, 2016, p. 8), has brought it even closer to the field theory. Here, struggle is a factor of configuration and fields emerge from states of exception.⁵⁵ The event itself becomes an agent of change in the field as it unites agents from diverse fields under new logics (Lampel & Meyer, 2008, p. 1028; Schüßler et al., 2015, pp. 169–170). There is however little direct inspiration from the field theory as the concept of FCEs has only recently (partially) accepted the notion of Bourdieu's theories (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 213).⁵⁶

Despite these advantages, I find that my theoretical framework, with its assumption that stakeholders operate within certain fields based on the levels of critical realism, is closely aligned with what is meant by the third language of policy learning while giving a better understanding of the changing relations between the agents in the field. Such explanations of dynamics have traditionally been a problem for institutional theory, which has usually focused on acting according to shared rules or increasing similarity (cf. the examples above and Anna-Maria Strittmatter & Skille, 2017, p. 146). Recently, some researchers have begun to see the field as more "dynamic" and have proposed that change can happen because of an agent's successful use of certain resources and position in the field (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, pp. 29–30; Hardy & Maguire, 2017; Wooten & Hoffman, 2016, p. 8). Nonetheless, in my view these discussions do not yet provide the same encompassing framework as the one I will use in this thesis.

3.3 Summing up

This project on the justification of and more generally the interest in sport events in Denmark and Norway operates with three areas of justification. The two first are external to

⁵⁵ This approach has previously been applied, for example in studies on the organisation behind the Olympic Games (Glynn, 2008; Grabher & Thiel, 2014)

⁵⁶ One sign is the only partial use of the field theory of Bourdieu, for instance by not considering capitals, field and habitus together (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008).

the local stakeholders. In this context, these stakeholders have to justify their project before 1) the global event owner and 2) their local peers. The theoretical framework for understanding the first area draws on Bourdieu's field theory, while the second draws on Boltanski and Thévenot's pragmatic sociology.

The main analytical point from the field theory is that, as they interact with the field, the agents or stakeholders often adapt to its norms. They might also try to change the norms depending on their resources and strategies. Their global efforts are in any case limited by their local basis, which they must take into consideration. This area analysed by drawing on the pragmatic sociology suggests that agents locally challenge and negotiate which order of worth can be used to justify an action. Sometimes a single order prevails, but it is also possible to strike compromises. In this way, the hypothesis of Bourdieu's critical and the antithesis of pragmatic sociology melts into a synthesis as this project considers both the global and the local influence on the current interest in international sport events (cf. Nachi, 2014). The third area of the justification is the stakeholders' internal justification. To explain this process, the thesis draws on Karl E. Weick's theory of sense-making to analyse the internal process of justification that takes place among the professional individuals within organisations. Previous professional experiences could also be relevant in explaining why certain representatives within organisations are interested in hosting future events.

Across all three areas, the thesis presumes in accordance with the thinking of critical realism that the justifications cannot be understood by only considering the expressed justifications. It is also necessary to consider the deeper structural conditions under which the events take place and acknowledge that the stakeholders operate as senders of the arguments. Chapter 2 has provided an overview of the global structures for events, and chapter 5 gives a parallel explanation of local structures.

This is the theoretical framework underpinning the thesis, however critical realism presumes an abductive approach. When I came across incidents in the analysis which my framework could not explain or whose findings demanded discussion within the framework of a specific theory, I have drawn on additional theories.

4 Methods

The previous chapter presented the theoretical frame for analysing how local stakeholders justify an event on a global, local and internal level. This chapter introduces the methods for filling that frame. It begins with the sources of the project and a discussion of their possibilities and limits. The next section explores the discursive content analysis used to operationalise my data for the theoretical framework. The chapter concludes with the criteria for selecting the six cases/events presented previously alongside my case study approach.

4.1 Sources

To answer the thesis question, the project draws on 1) textual sources, which cover published (media coverage) and unpublished sources (archived documents) and 2) interviews, which become quasi-textual when transcribed. The sources provide two forms of information: information on historical occurrences (when did what happen to whom?), and the arguments/discourses in the various organisations both around events in general and related to the specific events studied in the thesis. The two forms of data gave similar information but each has required specific reflections, which are discussed in the following sections.

4.1.1 Textual sources

Press material, i.e. the media coverage of the planning and bidding prior to the events in both local and national newspapers, has previously proved to be an efficient method of obtaining material on arguments for events in the public debate (A. Kim et al., 2015; Seipel et al., 2016). The relevance of the media finds further support when considering how Niklas Luhmann and other theorists of media and events see the mass media as important

for the formation of “a rather coherent image of the world” for their readership (Luhmann, 1993, p. 776; cf. Castells, 2013).⁵⁷

My collection of press material is based on my access to full text searchable databases with all relevant newspapers via Retriever/Atekst⁵⁸ (Norwegian media) and Infomedia⁵⁹ (Danish media). For all cases, I searched for the name of the event in the local language in the selected sources from two years prior to the awarding of the event until one year after the event had taken place (cf. Appendix 5: Press sources). In addition, I undertook an extra collection of media coverage for context in which I focused on the founding of the Danish public event organisation SEDK and its predecessor Idrætsfonden Danmark (the Sport’s Foundation Denmark). For this I used these names as keywords in a search for articles published between 1994 (the founding of Idrætsfonden) and 2008 (the founding of SEDK, replacing Idrætsfonden) in all Danish print media.

4.1.1.1 *Published sources*

I differentiated between two newspaper categories: those with a predominantly regional/local circulation and those with a national circulation. Within the newspapers with a regional or even local circulation, I made no further distinctions; in most cases, there would only be one paper, and in the case of multiple papers (as sometimes was the case in Denmark) the limited number of relevant articles made it possible to include all relevant papers in the data material. The selection of nationally circulated newspapers on the other hand depended on three criteria: size, geographical origin and expected stance on sport or sport as events.

My selection of Norwegian newspapers with a national circulation consisted of *Aftenposten*, *Bergens Tidende*, *VG*, and *Klassekampen*. *Aftenposten* and *Bergens Tidende*

⁵⁷ Possibly social media has established a forum outside of the classical media, however I expect that classic media would also report on occurrences in social media and, if relevant, my media survey would catch these reports as well.

⁵⁸ <https://web.retriever-info.com/services/archive>

⁵⁹ <https://infomedia.dk/>

are omnibus papers (in all but format) but differ in their geographical perspective. *Aftenposten* is based in Oslo, the Norwegian capital, whereas *Bergens Tidende* as the name indicates is based in Bergen. *Aftenposten* also reportedly has a serious take on sport and sport politics (Waldahl, 2005, p. 51). *VG* on the other hand is a tabloid paper in both name and form, with a large print run and an emphasis on sport (Lippe, 2010, p. 42). Finally, the study included the left-wing newspaper *Klassekampen*. It has a much lower print-run compared to the other Norwegian papers but a different audience and perspective, which could present alternative debates and (counter) arguments to the study.

The Danish selection followed the same pattern. There are three national omnibus papers (although two of them have a tabloid layout): *Berlingske Tidende*, *Politiken*, and *Jyllands-Posten*. The first two are based in Copenhagen. However, *Politiken* in particular has a reputation for being Copenhagen-centric. The paper does not officially approve of this characterisation, but more than half of its readership lives in Copenhagen (Andreassen, 2016). It is also relevant because of its sport coverage, which in recent years has included several stories critical of Danish events (Nielsen, 2008, p. 218).⁶⁰ Its political observance is socially liberal, whereas *Berlingske Tidende* is conservative. *Jyllands-Posten*, based in Aarhus, is considered liberal. *BT* is very similar to *VG*, a tabloid paper with a strong position on sport. Finally, the search for articles on Danish events included the socially critical (traditionally left-wing) newspaper *Information* as the Danish parallel to *Klassekampen*; however, this particular paper did not yield any results.

I considered the press coverage to be a corpus of front stage arguments and organised these arguments based on a descriptive coding of all the press material in Nvivo (Saldaña, 2016, pp. 103–104). Like every other corpus mine is incomplete, but I have tried to make it as wide ranging as possible (cf. the selection of the papers above) while also keeping it manageable. I completed the coding by reading through all the articles, looking for quotes from proponents of the events or summaries of their viewpoints. When I identified an

⁶⁰ *Politiken* for instance published critical articles on the public financial support and the NGBs' tax planning prior to the Handball World Championship in 2019 and the Ice Hockey World Championship in 2018 (Brock & Heide-Jørgensen, 2019; Koch, 2016).

argument in favour of the event, I gave it a label and linked it to a sender (e.g. a politician commenting in the media or an article quoting a press statement from an organisation). After coding the articles, I aggregated the senders into five categories: sport,⁶¹ politics,⁶² media,⁶³ tourism,⁶⁴ and other⁶⁵ (cf. Figure 5).




Figure 5: Sectors represented in the media sources as proponents of the sport events.

The coding showed 245 senders with 57 different arguments (see Appendix 7 for an overview of the arguments in each of the cases and Figure 12 for the accumulated results). To allow for any local specificities I did not use a pre-configured list of arguments but as a test of my coding's reliability I reread the coded categories one year after producing them. In addition, I compared the results with the legacy categories in research and with the findings of a similar but more limited study involving the Oslo Olympics (Seippel et al.,

⁶¹ Representatives of local, regional and nation sport federations.

⁶² Representatives from public authorities broadly, i.e. both politicians on all levels and civil servants.

⁶³ E.g. letters from the editors.

⁶⁴ E.g. tourist organisations.

⁶⁵ Private persons, consultants, researchers, or other senders who received considerable space in the media but did not fit into the other categories.

2016). The revision only led to a few changes and there was a high degree of similarity in the findings. I have also made a sample of quotes with the ten most used arguments for the events to give an impression of my coding practice (see Appendix 4: Examples of ten most used arguments in the media).

The main point of the coding was to provide an overview of arguments for comparisons of my cases with the general research and to be a first step in an understanding of the public discourse around sport events. In addition, the list of senders functioned as a blueprint for a list of relevant persons or organisations to approach for interviews. To support this process, I added relevant affiliations, sector, city, country, and gender to each sender to get an impression of the composition of the agents in the sport event field in Denmark and Norway.

The search procedure did not make any distinctions between various sections of the papers; it only searched for the words regardless of whether they appeared in the section on business or on sport. Unsurprisingly, the material predominantly originated from the sport sections. This is however important for interpreting the data. The sport press does not always function as the classical critical press. It tends to have a narrow selection of sources, often only from within the sport itself, and focuses solely on the sport as the activities on the field or pitch as opposed to the sport's relation to the surrounding society (S. S. Jørgensen, 2005). My use of press material as a source means I risk applying a similarly narrow view on sport and favouring those enjoying the limited access to the sport press. On the other hand, biased or not, the media is the most important public forum for the stakeholders. It is therefore still relevant to use the media as a source as long as I supplement it with data produced independently of the mass media (i.e. interviews and public documents) in order to get a fuller picture.

4.1.1.2 Unpublished sources

The unpublished sources were primarily minutes and protocols from public and sport authorities. Because the events are very recent, some archival sources were still exempt from the general right of information; however, the majority of my requests for material

from the public authorities and the sport organisations were approved. In addition to requests for specific documents produced by the public authorities⁶⁶ and the sports in question, I have systematically gone through the accessible online journals of the public archives for the involved Norwegian municipalities and counties. In Denmark, the municipalities' online archives limited my search to their minutes from all relevant municipal and regional committees (thus excluding for instance the correspondence of the administrations, which were available in some Norwegian cases). I applied the same procedure for the Danish and Norwegian sport organisations. In Denmark, however, the online access to older documents from the federations was not as developed as in the public sector and I have only been able to access the archives of Danish federations through requests for specific documents. Rather than coding the archival documents systematically in terms of arguments for events as was the case for the press material, I read them intensively to access the discussions behind the arguments expressed in the public media.

4.1.2 Interviews

Interviews are the project's second important source of information for two reasons. Even if the media is an important outlet for opinions and arguments, their nature as media sources means they edit and select arguments. Here, the interviews give a better access to any considerations the informants made before talking to the media, for instance reflections about the initial decision to support the event in an informal circle (cf. front and backstage in the discussion on time and space of discourses below). On some occasions the media had already interviewed the informants about their role in the event before me; however, their interviews had completely different purposes and could not replace the research interview. Although the format is similar, in contrast to my focus on the interaction between the sport and wider parts of society the sport press interviews rarely applied this perspective. The interviews were only similar in the way that they both

⁶⁶ The public authorities cover the elected public bodies, the public administrations and organisations on the local, regional and national level engaged in the events, if not otherwise specified. The engaged bodies are mentioned in the presentation of the events in section 1.2.

were outcomes of an interaction between the informant and an external factor, in my case myself as a researcher. I will return to this issue later.

4.1.2.1 The selection of informants

My main criterion for the selection of a person as an informant was an involvement as a representative of an engaged stakeholder in one or several of the study cases. I have thus almost exclusively spoken with representatives of organisations positive to the different events. Only in the Oslo case did I meet with a representative from an NGB who had criticised bidding for the Winter Olympics. This was the only case with a debate and, in contrast to the political levels of state and municipalities where people openly declared for or against the idea, the top-level of the NIF insisted on a united front, which made it necessary to go directly to the sources (cf. Ryen, 2002, p. 87 on 'negative cases').

Had this been a study of the individual events' role in society, a selection of purely affirmative informants in favour of the events would have given an extremely biased and problematic picture. However, the aim is to understand the sustained interest in events and I therefore regard the selection as appropriate. Had the proponents reported a consistent opposition, it would have been relevant to conduct interviews with representatives of this opposition; however, this was not the case. With the exception of the bid for the Oslo Olympics, no cases were marked by an outspoken opposition. In Oslo, where the public voices did play a major role as a militant stakeholder, it would have been interesting to look into the reasons why the man/woman on the street supported or rejected the Games, preferably with a quantitative approach or focus group interviews. However, this would have qualified as a separate project in its own right, not to mention the methodological difficulties performing such a study 6-8 years after the event. This issue is already problematic in the interviews for the actual project albeit more manageable because my sources are professionals and attached to organisations, which makes it possible to link the interview data with documentation contemporary to the events.

One could still argue that the voice of the public is missing. Could the sustained interest be due to a sustained demand for events from the public? This study cannot answer

this,⁶⁷ but as I will demonstrate later the argument against this idea of an active public is that most of the engaged stakeholders had already made the decision to bid for the event by the time they announced the idea publicly. At most there might have been a perceived demand among the stakeholders, which I am able to capture in the interviews.

I based my initial selection of informants on the list of proponents compiled from the press. First, I selected the sectors to invite by comparing the sectors represented in the media with the sectors which research has highlighted as important stakeholders. Both the press material and the research attached importance to the sport and public authorities on a local, regional, and national level. Research also gave media and private enterprises a prominent role which has not been reflected in my media findings. Based on the importance attributed to them in the general research, I did however conduct an interview with one visible sponsor at one event and a less visible “partner” of another. Interviews also took place with representatives from local tourist organisations, which were often placed between the public authorities, who often supported them, and their peers, local commercial tourist companies. I decided not to interview any representatives from the media but instead show the positioning of the media through its coverage and opinion pieces such as editorials. The “other” group in the media is quite big but also diverse and included for instance private individuals, researchers, and a handful of heads of various private companies, who also participated in the debate. The group indicates a broad interest in the events and not interviewing them might make the thesis less informative with regard to how an event attracts support during the bidding process. However, it

⁶⁷ There is also only limited statistical material available which does not suggest an increased public demand. In Norway from 1996 to 2016 the share of the population somewhat or very interested in sport events fluctuated between 20 and 28% with an average of 23.4% (Norsk kulturbarometer, n.d. - Idrettsarrangement). In Denmark, there are only records of the individuals’ average attendance from autumn 2018 - winter 2019. In that period, between 22 and 35% (average 29.8%) did not in any way (neither via any media or in person) attend a sport match (Kulturvaneundersøgelsen, n.d.). These sport matches of course did not necessarily take place in Denmark. Therefore, this says nothing about the interest in hosting sport events in Denmark, but it does indicate that the interest in sport events is stable, although a longer series is needed to confirm this.

would not have been possible to interview all 245 senders and I prioritised those with a relation to the typical engaged stakeholder organisations.

The final selection of the informants happened by a consideration of their presence in the media and the likelihood that the informant would have been involved in the decision-making process. In the selection process, I also continuously compared my list of informants on the various cases to ensure that the local, regional and national levels for political decisions in sport and society in general in Norway and Denmark were represented in the majority of the cases – ideally on both a political and administrative level. However, I only did this mirroring of informants for the public authorities because this group was highly active in all the cases and represented very diverse areas of the countries and populations in question. This meant that I did not invite representatives of the local sport in all cases but only in those cases where representatives had commented on the event in the media or when they were referred to as important by other informants. While this could lead to a loss of nuances, I also had to limit the number of informants and consequently I prioritised a more complete coverage of the political group as a presumably more diverse group compared to the local sport clubs.

		Half Marathon World Champion- ship	World Champion- ship Ice hockey	The Winter Olym- pics	UCI Road World Championships	World Handball Championships	Event policies in general	Total
Nationality	N	NA	NA	16	17	NA	3	36
	DK	6	12	NA	NA	17	6	41
Gender	F	0	0	3	3	1	1	8
	M	6	12	13	14	16	8	69
Lobbyists		1	3	3	3	4	5	19
	Elected rep.	0	0	5	5	0	1	11
Sport		0	0	5	5	0	1	11
	Officials	1	1	3	0	2	1	8
Civil servants	National	0	0	1	0	0	2	3
	Regional	1	2	0	1	3	0	7
	Local	1	2	2	5	3	0	13
Politicians	National	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Regional	1	2	0	1	2	0	6
	Local	1	2	2	2	3	0	10

During the interviews, I asked the informants to suggest further informants. This meant the list expanded slightly as some suggestions led to invitations and interviews. Many of the suggestions however were people already on my interview list, thus validating my initial selection. The list also shrunk as a few respondents, especially national politicians, declined due to time constraints; sometimes, however, they asked a senior civil servant to take the interview in their place. Although the civil servants could not express their own political views, e.g. on events today, they had a good understanding of the general line of political reasoning and would often have more longstanding experience with events compared to the politician. The cases where the politician also gave the interview to a civil servant without a reference to calendar issues indicate that events are an administrative matter rather than a politically disputed topic.

Ultimately, the criteria with the additional snowballing decided the sampling size, not the principle of “saturation”. However, finishing the last interview did coincide with a feeling of knowing most what of the informant would say before the interview (O’Reilly & Parker, 2013, p. 194). In total, 58 interviews were carried out (32 Norwegian and 26 Danish).⁶⁸ Table 3 gives an overview of the informants and yet does not reflect this number for two reasons.⁶⁹ Firstly, some of the sessions had more than one interviewee and therefore count double in the table. Secondly, several informants, especially in the Danish cases, had been involved in multiple events. These I counted once for every relevant case. Their experience from multiple events also meant some talked about events in more general terms. Although I make use of these general reflections in the project, I have reserved the table’s section on event policies in general to either organisations working exclusively with events (like SEDK) or only events on a general level (e.g. ministries).

⁶⁸ The shortest interview lasted ten minutes (a phone conversation with a Danish ministerial civil servant), the longest 1:54 hours. 47 of the 58 interviews lasted for 45 minutes or more.

⁶⁹ I.e. elected positions within the sport on all levels (local, regional, national).

The low number of national politicians partly has to do with the time constraints, but events are also not particularly political topics on a national level. In Denmark, some informants indicated that certain politicians have had a strong voice in the development of the event policy, yet today this process is mostly left to SEDK. In Norway, given that the government initiated a process with the aim of developing a national strategy in March 2017, there is a will to support the events (Nærings- og Fiskeridepartementet, 2017, pp. 41–42). However, this was not subject to a debate nor apparently an opportunity for public profiling for the responsible politicians.

Regarding the spread of the informants across sectors, the number of voices from the sport in the Oslo case might seem disproportionate compared to the political level. The large number of voices from Norwegian sport is however acceptable because it is well organised but not centralised. In a complex process like bidding for the Winter Olympics, I therefore had to interview representatives from several departments within NIF in addition to representatives from various NGBs and the local sport.

I have two remarks on the general categories of nationality and gender. Regarding nationality, my own Danish/Capital Region origin was an advantage in certain situations. My status as Danish meant that some Norwegian informants treated me as an outsider and explained some concepts more fully than they would have done to a Norwegian researcher. For instance, an informant from the Oslo Municipality characterised some things as “important for us here in Norway” or generalised from specific situations, e.g. “it’s like that for all that goes on in Norway”. None of the Danish informants talked about anything as “typical Danish”. I had to judge that for myself based on commonalities across the interviews and my own cultural background. In Denmark, however, my dialect revealed my origin and status as an outsider in Jutland, which led, like in the Norwegian cases, to some further explanations regarding the local conditions or perspectives.

I conducted all the interviews in Danish (with the Norwegian informants answering in Norwegian). Although I understand Norwegian, this approach did increase the risks of misunderstandings either at interview or when transcribing the interviews. With regard to the first problem, the interview situation provided the solution as I was able to ask the

informant immediately to repeat his/her answer. In the subsequent transcriptions, I only experienced one case where I was unable to interpret an informant's answer. In that case, my supervisor, a native Norwegian speaker, assisted in interpreting the answer (the informants had all agreed that my supervisor would have access to the data).

Regarding gender, there is a remarkable inequality in the informants' distribution, even more skewed than in the press material (177 male and 58 female voices).⁷⁰ This might simply reflect that men hold many of the leading positions within sport organisations, which at least was the case of Norwegian sport in 2009 (Fasting & Sand, 2009, Chapter 5).⁷¹ I have not sought to mitigate the gender difference actively due to the limited number of alternative informants. Typically, an organisation would have only one person working with events. The male dominance does not impact the results of my research as the aim is to explain the current interest in sport events and it is apparent that this interest does not primarily come from men. It does however make it relevant to ask if a more diverse group of stakeholder representatives would change the interest in events in general or the form of events considered relevant in the field.

4.1.2.2 The structure of the interviews

All the interviews were semi-structured, guided by an interview guide to provide information on concrete happenings and give an impression of how the organisation looked at events (cf. Appendix 6: Interview guide).⁷² All informants were informed of the purpose

⁷⁰ This is fewer than the number one would get from adding representatives from all the sectors together (cf. Figure 5) because in some cases it was not possible to determine the gender of the proponents and some proponents were organisations.

⁷¹ Later research on gender representation in Norwegian (e.g. Sisjord et al., 2017) builds on data from the same survey conducted from 2007-2008. I have not come across any more recent data nor any data on the situation in Denmark.

⁷² Cf. semi-structured interviews as discursive interviews (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015, pp. 46, 185–186).

of the study both prior to and during the interview. One informant asked to see the questions beforehand and I sent him a copy of the interview guide, however, I still asked the questions and steered the interview.

The inquiries in the guide ran on two levels: the first on events in the organisation (“grand tour”) and the second exploring the specific case (“mini tours”) (Spradley, 2002, pp. 49–51). I planned to go from the general picture to the specific case and understand the background before going into the details, but often the informants quickly twisted their answers and responded with examples from the specific case, sometimes structured in a chronological narrative. The structure of the narrative as such seldom proved to be a relevant point for this project with the exception of the cases, where the narratives could be interpreted as the informant’s attempt to explain difficulties around the event. Overall, the informants’ want to tell a story did not prevent me asking questions on the general view on events. It did however mean that the grand view and the mini tours on how the organisation handled the event and its arguments had to come as it fitted with the narrative (or in the summing up at the end of the interview).

The only constraint was the willingness or perhaps rather the ability of the informant to think of events in more abstract or general terms. As will be explored further in the section on discourse analysis, looking for abstraction was an attempt to foreground some general logic of which the informants were not always conscious. While the majority willingly engaged themselves in a discussion on why events were generally prominent, at least one, when asked if she had anything to add, said that she did not, stating “I don’t know what you want”. Regardless of the informants’ level of reflection, I as a researcher always added my own reflections too and make my own abstractions from the informants’ descriptive (and abstract) accounts. On a side note, it seemed that the professionals, i.e. civil servants or event officials, showed a higher degree of reflection in comparison to the politicians, who might have had more at stake.

56 of the 58 interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. In the two exceptional cases, I lost the recordings due to technical failures. In these cases, I immediately noted down

the outcome from the interviews from memory aided by the interview guide and my interviews with informants in similar positions.

I conducted most of the Danish interviews in May 2018 and the Norwegian ones over the autumn of 2018. I did all but a few of the interviews in person and mostly the interviewee would pick the location for the interview – typically at their workplace. In general, I encouraged the informant to suggest a place for us to meet, partly because I rarely knew the informant's city and partly to make sure the informant would feel comfortable. Interviews at the informants' workplaces also had the advantage that the informant's role in the interview overlapped with the informant's usual role in that space. I presume this made event associations come more readily to the informants, not least when they had trophies and memorabilia from the events in their offices (Elwood & Martin, 2000, p. 653). One even used the whole city as an aide-mémoire and gave me a tour of the most important venues from the event. I conducted three regular interviews and one follow-up interview via Skype/on the phone. One of the phone interviews differed significantly and unexpectedly from the rest as it was short (approximately 20 minutes) and the informant only gave short answers.⁷³ Overall, it more resembled a phone questionnaire than an in-depth interview (cf. Irvine et al., 2013, p. 102). The informant initially indicated that he had limited time, and this might have both shortened his answers and my follow-ups, but we did manage some short reflective thoughts at the end of the interview and these were useful for my analysis. It is not my impression that the informant felt uneasy and therefore wanted to shorten the interview, but rather that there was a mismatch between my interests and his, in his own eyes, superficial relation with the event. A busy schedule may have been an additional factor. At the end of each interview, I gave/sent each informant a copy of the letter of consent, which they had also received when I first approached them. Most informants signed it immediately and a few followed my alternative suggestion of taking it home and sending me a scanned copy later. Immediately

⁷³ I have previously mentioned that the shortest interview was ten minutes, this however rather had the character of an initial talk than an actual interview and therefore did not stand out as the one lasting 20 minutes.

after every interview, I made meta-notes from the interview on setting, gestures, or other inaudible elements in addition to my general impression of the interview.

As stated above, the interviews were primarily descriptions of local praxis and views on events and I consider the informants as experts. Consequently, in my transcriptions I have valued clarity in text above the details of conversational specificities, e.g. by consequently not noting lengths of pauses, tone of voice, etc. as would have been the case of a conversation analysis (Ryen, 2002, pp. 53–55 cf. fig. 8.11). For example, in the case of hesitations, which might indicate insecurity or uncertainty of how to express oneself, I tried to ask the informant for more details or use other ways to help him/her to articulate him/herself, e.g. by giving them time and not asking follow-up questions immediately. In the end, with regard to the content analysis I see the transcribed interviews as texts on a par with the archival documents. However, the interviews differ from the documents as co-constructions of researcher and informant and require additional reflections regarding their creation and ethics (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015, p. 37).

4.1.2.3 *Interviews in hindsight*

It is perfectly true, as philosophers say, that life must be understood backwards. But they forget the other proposition, that it must be lived forwards.

*And if one thinks over that proposition it becomes more and more evident that life can never be really understood in time simply because at no particular moment can I find the necessary resting-place from which to understand it – backwards. Søren Kierkegaard, 1843
(1938/1959, p. 127)*

Perhaps the situation of an interview is the opportunity Kierkegaard misses, as I encouraged my informants to go backwards and supplement my information on the processes and decisions surrounding the event. However, as Kierkegaard rightly adds, time never stops and going backwards also invites the informants to reflect on the past from their present positions and form a coherent, fitting but not necessarily accurate history which

potentially overlooks forays and mistakes of the past. This does not disqualify interviews as a source. At the very least, the relevance of a source is relative to the questions it should answer. The interview therefore may provide an excellent impression of the informant's perception of events in the moment of the interview, if also a less clear picture of the event perception in the past. This is highly relevant for the project, but not all I want from the interview.

I also wanted to explore the past, where the informant had witnessed certain events central for understanding the interaction between the organisations around the events. To mitigate the bias caused by looking backwards, loyalty to organisations, etc., the interviews do not stand alone. As mentioned, they are supplemented with contemporary textual sources to correct and contextualise the narrative of the informants. Thus refined for my needs, these narratives are an important sources regarding what happened in the organisations and any incoherencies in the story laid bare in the contextualisation are significant additions to my interpretation of the role of events in these organisations. However, laying something bare is not always pleasant and conducted interviews with this aim requires certain ethical considerations.

4.1.2.4 Ethics

The two main ethical considerations were the analysis of the interview data and the relationship between researcher and informant.

Regarding the analysis, Martyn Hammersley sees an ethical problem if the conclusion of a discursive analysis of an interview conflicts with the informant's idea of him or herself as merely providing information. Indeed, this could have happened if I regarded the information out of its correct context (Hammersley, 2014). My approach to the interview as "co-constructed" mitigates this as Stephanie Taylor and Robin Smith also remark in their response to Hammersley. Without explicitly talking of discourses, I for instance asked the interviewees "what they talked about, when talking about events", i.e. to find a way to talk about discourse without making the interview sound like an academic discussion (S. Taylor & Smith, 2014, pp. 543–544). This generally worked well and sometimes

I experienced a rapid understanding of the logic implied in my questions. The informants buy-in on my approach was encouraging and, in hindsight, words such as “discourse”, “narrative” or the general idea that one can consciously construct a specific story around an event seem to have become more prominent in everyday language than I had presumed (cf. M. Bille et al., 2019). However, when informants did not engage in this form of discussion, I did not press the issue. This could have made the informant feel unable to help or irrelevant, threaten her/his perceived role as an expert, lead to frustrations, and eventually cause harm.

With regard to the researcher-informant relationship, the interview as a co-production still does not make the relation equal and the interviewer is still usually considered to have the upper hand (Fontana & Frey, 2000, pp. 663–664; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015, p. 37). In this project, this is less relevant because most of the informants held high positions in their organisations and were experienced in giving interviews about themes with which they worked professionally. This gave them an advantage and possibly even reverted the inequality to my disadvantage. Thorough preparation (researching or making biographies on the informants) helped me to counter this issue, gain their trust, and ultimately ascertain better answers. In addition, I made use of a descriptive approach in the interviews which forced the informant to be more concrete than I expect would have been the case had they delivered a standard explanation or the usual narrative about the role of events in their organisations. The open-ended questions in such an approach also fitted nicely with the semi-structured approach and the theory that elite informants do not like to feel bound (W. S. Harvey, 2011, p. 434; D. Richards, 1996, pp. 201–202).

Only consulting public textual sources would have avoided these problems. However, I believe that the very limited risk of doing harm is justified by the importance the interviews in relation to a successful project which is beneficial for the broader society (Hammersley, 2014, pp. 535–537; Lamont & Swidler, 2014, p. 159). In addition to the reflections above, I also took practical measures to protect the informants. With regard to the data collection and general handling of the data, the Norwegian Centre for Research Data

(NSD) on behalf of the Norwegian Data Inspectorate approved the data-handling plan.⁷⁴ This included the stipulation that all informants are anonymous and only presented in their professional capacity, e.g. “civil servant in Bergen Municipality”. The analysis should not single out personal characteristics but aims to achieve a categorisation of perceptions of international sport events in the eyes of organisations. I have to “to re-interpret the psychological subject as social rather than individual” (S. Taylor & Smith, 2014, p. 544). A vital element of this reinterpretation has taken place through a discourse analysis of the interviews and other texts.

4.2 A discursively based content analysis

In the introduction of the data material for the thesis, I have mentioned two uses of my sources. The first was as testimonials about previous events: what happened, where, when, etc. The other was as empirical data for a discursive analysis of which arguments or discourses the event stakeholders used at various events and in general (cf. the thesis’ first objective). In the qualitative content analysis in the empirical chapters, the two uses however become indistinguishable as cogs in the analytical machinery as what happened at a certain time is closely related to the discourse used and vice versa (Krippendorff, 2012, p. 22).

The content analysis is namely based on a discourse analytical approach (DHA) whereby a discourse is not simply a written statement but rather:

1. *a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action;*
2. *socially constituted and socially constitutive;*
3. *related to a macro topic;*

⁷⁴ <https://nsd.no/personvernombud/en/index.html> (last accessed December 18 2019).

4. *linked to [an] argumentation about validity claims (...).*

(Wodak, 2015, p. 5).

The discourse analysis is therefore highly dependent on testimonials about the context. A section of the interview would usually cover this, however, to process the interview data I had to draw on further material and methods such as the contextual chapters and source criticism. In terms of source criticism, I have questioned the version of the past my sources put on display, compared them, and taken the interests of the senders, their context and the data's provenance into consideration (cf. Olden-Jørgensen, 2001). While this does not make the outcome of the analysis objectively true, it ensures that my research is transparent.

Both the content analysis broadly and the discourse analysis are linked to the theoretical framework as the second and third points in the discourse definition make clear (cf. Fairclough, 1989, Chapter 1; Wodak, 2011). Like the theoretical framework, the institutions' ability to undertake actions in the field and construct discourses are intimately linked with the wider question of structures and power, which are on the other hand not absolute entities but tendencies "constitutive (...) of society" (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 9). Discourses are not static but unstable, subject to change and one cannot pinpoint them "to a single point in the network [of signifier and signified]" (Sayer, 2000, p. 36). Nonetheless, DHA is based on the critical discourse analysis (CDA) associated with Norman Fairclough (1989) and in line with it and critical realism, DHA does not follow the more radical theories of discourse which claim that there is "no sutured space peculiar to 'society', since the social itself has no essence" (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 96).

Question	Strategy
<i>How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes, and actions named and referred to linguistically?</i>	Prediction
<i>What characteristics, qualities, and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events, and processes?</i>	Referential
<i>What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?</i>	Argumentation
<i>From what perspective are these nominations, attributions, and arguments expressed?</i>	Perspectivation
<i>Are the respective utterances articulated overtly? Are they intensified or mitigated?</i>	Intensification/mitigation

Table 4: The five strategies for constructing a discursive with a discourse-historical approach.

Source: Wodak, 2015, p. 12.

Despite the acknowledgement of the relevance of the context, a typical critique of CDA is that it is predisposed in its use of (too little or selective) context (e.g. concluding beforehand that politicians are suppressors and merely quoting interviews in the analysis to prove this). Other have accused CDA of having an overly vague methodology and superficial analyses, overlooking the actions of individuals or becoming too dependent on the researcher's predefined concepts (Antaki et al., 2003, pt. 2: Under-Analysis Through Taking Sides; Billig, 2013, p. 170; Blommaert, 2001, p. 17; Widdowson, 2004, p. 138). This does not disqualify CDA but emphasises that one needs to adjust the approach according to the project (Fairclough, 1989, p. 110). In my case, the DHA branch of CDA has been an important inspiration for adjusting the discourse analysis to include a consideration of the context and accommodate the criticism (Wodak, 2011, 2015, pp. 1–2; Wodak & Meyer, 2009, pp. 1, 5–6, 20).

The actual content and discourse analysis will focus on each stakeholder's discursive strategy: "a (more or less accurate and more or less intentional) plan of practices, including discursive practices, adopted to achieve a particular (...) goal" (Wodak, 2011, pp. 38–40). Wodak presents five such strategies (see Table 4). In doing this, she makes Fairclough's "experiential" values central, for instance how the wording/content relates to the "producer's experience of the natural or social word" (Fairclough, 1989, p. 112). How does a word classify an event?

The argument is the centre of my project but only one of Wodak's five strategies. However, for Wodak an argument is only a simple 'premise-warrant-conclusion'-construction: if a situation fulfils a certain premise, e.g. if something is a threat, if I refer to an authority, etc., then some action is legitimate (Wodak, 2015, fig. 3). I argue that the prediction and referential strategies are not essentially different from the explicit argument expressed as "if-A-then-B". All three are parts of a collective argument for the event or the event discourse. When a stakeholder makes the event a threat, a burden or a benefit, he refers to an event in a certain way, gives it certain attributes *and* thereby makes an argument for or against the event. The study of metaphors by Georg Lakoff and Mark Johnson is a good example of how the current project understands prediction and attributes as arguments:

Metaphors may create realities for us, especially social realities. A metaphor may thus be a guide for future action. Of course, such actions will fit the metaphor and in turn reinforces the power of the metaphor to make experience coherent. In this sense metaphors can be self-fulfilling prophecies. (1980/2003, p. 156)

An example of a prediction is when stakeholders in this project refer to events as cream cakes, i.e. the idea that events consist of layers; some of these are decided upon locally and others internationally, but the outcome is good. Another example could be metaphors' cultural connection, e.g. whether the belief that "bigger is better" is compatible with traditional Norwegian or Danish cultural values (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003, Chapter 5).

4.2.1 Time and space in discourse

The two remaining strategies, “Perspectivation” and “Intensification/mitigation”, serve to locate the discourses/arguments in time and space. In terms of space, it is important whether the argument “events are good financial investments” comes from the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries or a local sport association. It would be expected of the former but not the latter. Discourses are both “socially constituted and socially constitutive”, and unexpected collapsing perspectives indicate a dominance in the event field or a local compromise.

Beyond the perspective/sender, locating the discourse in space also involves the status of the space of expression as open or closed. Imagine a mayor arguing for the event as a matter of better finances in public (frontstage). Backstage, the same mayor meets with representatives of the sport; here the mayor does not directly argue for the event but contends that the economic justification is better than the promotion of the, in his eyes, narrow interests of the sport. This could lead to the sport either promoting the event as a matter for better finances for the municipality or leaving the field to the mayor. If the city gets the event, the required facilities would have been built anyway. In these circumstances, the sport organisations are certain to get a legacy regardless of the arguments they and other stakeholders use. However, new facilities as such do not guarantee that the event will be beneficial for the elite sport in terms of e.g. better chances of winning or more participants (Robinson, 2015, pp. 285–286). In any case, the performance backstage shows how frontstage “illusions and impressions are openly constructed” (Goffman, 1971, p. 69). Finding the constructors would then help us understand potential hierarchies in the arguments and eventually also among the stakeholders representing the arguments.

One should however not interpret Goffman’s parting of the frontstage performance in “those who perform; those performed to; and outsiders who neither perform in the show *nor observe it*”, too strictly (Goffman, 1971, p. 90, my emphasis). Discourses per definition always develop in a social field and in democratic societies with a free press, frontstage performances are accessible for many more than those present. Although a politician

might be addressing a specific crowd, the rest of the public occupies a middle position between audience and outsider through the media.

Finally, there is the strategy of intensification/mitigation. This is related to how discourses changes over time. A discourse is also an argument for validity and “the power to signify is not a neutral force in society” (S. Hall, 1982/2006, p. 123), yet this is often the aim of the sender of the discourse, who might therefore continuously optimise the discourse to that end (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 91–92; S. Hall, 1982/2006, pp. 127–128).

As mentioned briefly in the theoretical chapter, the concrete content analysis took the form of an abductive process. This means that while reading the documents and the interviews I noted instances of Wodak’s discursive strategies. Depending on the senders of the arguments (cf. time and space), I linked the instances to my three main theoretical approaches. In cases where the senders aimed at the event owners or positioned themselves in relation to the owners, I utilised a field theoretical approach. If both the sender and the recipient were locals, I would use the pragmatic sociology, etc. This does not mean that I sought to confirm my theoretical approach; rather, the abductive process ensured that the analysis became a constant comparison of the findings in the data with the theoretical framework and, in the cases of deviance, facilitated the addition/development of theories for explaining these (Ryen, 2002, pp. 146–147).

4.3 Selecting the sport events

The project’s cases should initially fulfil two basic requirements: agree to my definition of an international sport event “as a dramatic, popular, international and temporary sport occurrence”, and be one-off. While an annual sport event would also require legitimisation, I presumed a one-off event would be the outcome of a bidding competition, more likely to yield explicit arguments for hosting and spark a debate. Appendix 1 contains my initial list of recent and relevant one-off international sport events in Denmark and Norway, as well as examples of reoccurring events not considered for the project. Another element that the events have in common is that they are organised within the “traditional” sport systems in Denmark or Norway, which among other things means they are

non-profit. This is still the most typical form of event, despite some recent prominent cases of commercial or privately run events such as X-Games Norway owned by the American sport channel ESPN and the annual Norwegian Arctic Race (A 2.HC UCI race). Their owners often also award these events for several editions at a time, which excludes them from the study.

The events on the list were all awarded/debated in 2011 or later to ensure both relevance and minimise the risk of faulty memories among the informants. From the initial list, I selected the following events for inclusion in the study:

- 2014, IAAF Half Marathon World Championship, Copenhagen
- 2015, IHF World Women's Handball Championship and 2019 IHF World Men's Handball Championship as a single process/outcome of a single strategy.
- 2017, UCI Road World Championships, Bergen
- 2018, IHF World Championship Ice hockey, Herning, Copenhagen
- 2022, IOC Winter Olympics, Oslo (failed 2014)

In addition to the aforementioned requirements, a further criterion for the selection was that the events should represent as wide a spectrum as possible on three different parameters (cf. Table 5):

1. Space
Denmark or Norway? Capital or province?
Case of national and/or international co-hosting?
2. Infrastructure
Use of existing, new or no sport facilities?
3. History of the sport/event
Popularity of the sport? Previous experience as host?

Space: The events took place in either Denmark or Norway. The Danish and Norwegian societies have much in common and in the context of these countries my aim is to conduct a collective case study of the events (cf. section 4.3.1). The initial choice of countries was made for pragmatic reasons (the location of the Ph.D. study in Norway and my Danish background), but as mentioned in section 1.1.1 studying events in small countries is a relevant contribution to the research field. Including both countries also offers some interesting points for comparison, even if my aim is not to conduct an elaborate comparative analysis of these two countries. The most relevant difference is the national approach to events; whereas the Danish state adopted a sport event strategy around 2008, Innovation Norway only presented a suggestion for a Norwegian strategy in December 2019.

There are also general political differences such as the role of regional considerations ('distriktshensyn'), which are an integrated part of everyday politics in Norway to a much bigger degree than in Denmark. The divide between the capital Oslo and the rest of Norway has historically had a close relation to the political orientations, which also influenced the debate on Oslo's bid for the Winter Olympics in 2022 (J. P. Knudsen, 2018; Lesjø, 2018; cf. Rokkan, 1967). To a lesser degree there are also signs of differences in Denmark. A Danish study has for instance showed a significant difference in the engagement of volunteers in Copenhagen compared to less populated areas, which is normally crucial both for the practical hosting and possibly the legitimacy of the event (Storm & Brandt, 2008, pp. 121, 144).

One event can also occupy multiple spaces, i.e. when the event encompasses several hosts either within the same country or internationally. This adds additional stakeholders and potentially new arguments to the event. Including such events also increases the relevance of the research, as the number of co-hostings could increase with the size of the events.

Infrastructure: The need for new sport infrastructure for the hosting of the event is a much studied and debated argument in the research on mega events. Infrastructure as a legacy is not the only form of legacy debated in the research, but the only one I have made a parameter for selecting my cases. This is due to the smaller scale of my events

and the tradition for the sports in most of the cases, which make the infrastructural requirements smaller. If I wanted to be able to see if infrastructural legacies were relevant as an argument in Denmark and Norway at all, I had to pick events with a potential infrastructural legacy.

To this come that even in cases with little need for new facilities or no facilities, it might still be a problem, when events for instance use the general public infrastructure. A close integration of the event with the everyday public space or in more polemic terms, the sport taking over everyday infrastructure such as squares, parks, roads etc. could influence the argumentation for these events as well.

History of the sport/event: With regard to the contexts of the events (their history as an event in itself), all the events, on the global level, are firmly embedded in the global sport event field. There are no cases of newly established events like the Youth Olympic Games, which had its inaugural edition in 2010. On a national level, the events represent sports which differ in terms of their national tradition and position. For instance, with the exception of the half marathon, all of the events build on sports with well-developed professional environments in Denmark and Norway. As the outlier, the half marathon drew on a huge number of self-organised athletes (Forsberg, 2012). Similarly, the Winter Olympics represent some extremely popular (self-organised) sports in Norway in addition to a strong elite sport sector.

The relation between the parameters and the events separates the events into typical and atypical cases (Flyvbjerg, 2015). The typical cases give information on how an event, which I expect to reoccur regularly in the country, is justified. The atypical cases on the other hand show the variation of events possible within the countries and perhaps examples of cherry-picking events best suited for fulfilling specific policies.

The handball and cycling events both have prehistories in the countries and solid national sportive foundations. They are typical events.

The half marathon was the first of its kind in Denmark and not likely to be repeated soon. Ice hockey is also atypical; although it is an organised sport, it has a much smaller geographical spread and a shorter tradition in Denmark compared to handball. It is also a big and internationally popular event which I did not presume the organisers would repeat in the near future. Nevertheless, in May 2019, the Danish Hockey Federation announced that the 2025 IIHF World Championship for Men would be hosted by Denmark together with Sweden (SEDK, 2019b).

Finally, the costs of the Winter Olympics make them an atypical event, which is also reflected in the debates preceding the decision not to bid for the Games. However, the Winter Olympics are also representing the Norwegian skiing traditions and strong position within the international skiing elite and that makes the Games less alien than other atypical events.

The bid for the Winter Olympics is also the only failed case in the setup. The familiarity of event's content to the national population was no *carte blanche*. Despite its failure, the event debate followed a pattern similar to other successful events. The only major difference prior to the outcome is the form of the debate, in which the public took part in the Oslo case unlike the other cases. It is therefore comparable in all but the outcome with the rest of the cases (cf. how previous research shows that even failed bids can function as platforms for stakeholders' messages (Bason, 2019; Pentifallo, 2010, p. 385)).

	Space						Infrastructure			History of sport/event	
	Province	Capital	Denmark	Norway	International co-hosting	National co-hosting	Existing sport facilities	New sport facilities	Other facilities	Popularity of the sport	Hosting experience
2022, Winter Olympics, Oslo (bid failed 2014).											1994
2017, UCI Road World Championships, Bergen.										(Partly)	1993
2019, World Men Handball Championship, Herring, Copenhagen and Germany.											1978
2018, World Championship Ice hockey. Herring, Copenhagen.								(Partly)			
2015, World Women's Handball Championship, Herring, Frederikshavn, Næstved, Kolding.											(European Championships)
2014, Half Marathon World Championship, Copenhagen.											

Table 5: The cases of the thesis and their relation to the selection criteria.

4.3.1 Several events, one collective case

I originally conceived the study's methodological setup as separate case studies of the six sport events. However, as the study progressed this composition of separate cases morphed into one "collective case study". Instead of analysing each of the events, the aim changed to be an analysis of sport events in general in Denmark and Norway based on material collected across several events (Stake, 2000, p. 437). With this approach, I presume the similarities across the events are bigger than their differences and that for answering the thesis' question, it is more relevant to show these similarities than to point out the differences.

An excessive focus on the differences could easily have turned the thesis into an analysis of the effects of certain causal relations around specific cases within fixed limits in space and time. Considering the causes across several events instead shows the range of possibilities for legitimising events in Denmark and Norway and a more general picture of the role events play (cf. Flyvbjerg's idea of cases of maximal variation as a way to generalise from case studies, Flyvbjerg, 1991). On the one hand, the distinction in typical and atypical cases could seem to counter this. On the other, my claim is all the more valid if the similarities are pregnant even across these cases. In addition, a study of multiple cases enables me to consider more subtle incentives to host. If for instance I am right in assuming the interest in events has led to the formation of an event field, it should be possible to show how the stakeholders across events draw on similar logics and mutually reinforcing ideas which would not have been the case if each event was considered on its own. These ideas could for example be the implementation of event policies or that stakeholders base their expectations on global ideas and trends (cf. chapter 2). In this way, the collective approach blurs the lines between the specific causal relations and the general findings in the research and makes the thesis a study of a general phenomenon – the bidding for international sport events. This does not mean the study presents any laws on events; rather, the study gives an insight and understanding of events 'today' (cf. Koselleck, 1979/2004, p. 82) and produces an "analytical" generalisation inviting the reader to co-judge its relevance and develop new hypotheses (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015,

pp. 291–292; cf. critical realism and generalisation in Danermark et al., 2001, p. 77; Flyvbjerg, 2015; Schwandt & Gates, 2018, p. 348).

On this collective basis, I expect the causes found to be comparable and conjunctural. Being conjunctural means that the outcome, the bid, and possible staging of one or in this project several events stems from a confluence of global and local factors in a cluster of causes necessary and sufficient for the event to take place, but without requiring a law like generalisation (Danermark et al., 2001, p. 187). A general example of such a cluster would be the idea that a better longevity of policies stems from a combination of democratic institutions and a well-educated population or an authoritarian regime with a strong bureaucratisation (Ragin, 1989, pp. 24–27). In this project, the causes could be especially effective external arguments either towards the owners or for instance the public on a local level. The effectiveness of an argument is however also likely to be related to another form of cause, namely the structures as described in the theoretical chapter. This further distances the project from the alternative, i.e. an analysis of causes as “additive” which presumes that each cause independently adds to the probability of an outcome and is therefore sufficient (e.g. that democratic institutions add to the longevity of policies regardless of other variables) (Ragin, 1989, pp. 59–63). For this project, the task is to “trace” these conjuring causes across the cases and explain them using the given theories (Bartlett & Vavrus, 2017, p. 8).

The collective approach necessarily leads to the missing out of nuances and details around the specific events as I do not tell their story. I do not for instance explain in detail why the Oslo process failed but only what possibly went wrong when justifying the bid. As described in the previous section, I see the bidding process as a time for the development of discourses which are reliant on the context. I consider few actions besides the stakeholders ‘speech actions’ concerning the formation of the discourse. Moreover, I do not go into detail about how specific persons behaved or the exact decisions they took unless these actions were related to the justification of the event. The world championship in Bergen is a good example of what this approach misses. As it in the aftermath became clear that the event had a severe financial deficit, I often met people who wanted

to discuss the case with me as an event researcher. Unfortunately, I had very little to say about why the event went wrong in economic terms. What I could talk about, based on my analyses of the event discourse, was why the proponents justified the event in the way they did and why they wanted it to take place. This may have disappointed those who asked me about Bergen and in general it may seem like a limited aim; however one needs a limited aim to make a precise and manageable study.

Altogether, I find the project relevant for three reasons despite its limits. Firstly, as mentioned, presuming I am right in seeing the similarities as more prevalent than the differences, sacrificing the nuances provides a broad insight. Instead of understanding the whole of one event, we come to understand events broadly. Both aims could be considered relevant. However, and this is my second point, there is a lack of collective case studies and the broader view is needed for a new perspective in research different from current focus on single events (cf. section 1.1.1). The increase in event strategies and thus the fact that practitioners see events in series makes it logical that research should follow. Thirdly, there is the pragmatic reason of space and the desire to keep a focus in the thesis. Undertaking both specific case studies and a collective study at the same time could very well have ruined both.

This does not mean I have not considered the nuances during the analysis. I only claim that the similarities are bigger than the differences and that it is useful to focus on the former. I do not say that there are no differences. As mentioned in the previous section, I have selected the cases with the aim of investigating whether for instance the space for the event and tradition of the sport influenced the arguments. The most obvious example is section 8.2 on the bid for the Winter Olympics. As the only case, it gives an insight into how the debate around the event moved into a public space.

Finally, I nuance the collective case study by discussing its results in two broader contexts. Although the case study is the main focus and I do not intend to conduct a full comparative analysis it is still relevant to put the case study results into perspective (see Table 6). The collective case first of all took place in the context of two similar and yet different countries. These two countries then lie in a region participating in global networks, including that of sport. The analysis of these regional and global levels draws on the concepts of Most Different and Most Similar System Designs (MDSD/MSSD) (cf. Przeworski & Teune, 1970, pp. 31–39).⁷⁵

MDSD	Global sport						
	Scandinavian countries						
MSSD	Denmark			Norway			
Collective case study	UCI Road World Championship, 2017	IHF Ice Hockey World Championship, 2018	IHF World Handball Championship 2015 (women), 2019 (men)	The bid for the Winter Olympics 2022	IAAF World Halfmarathon Championship, 2014		

Table 6: The thesis' case study, MSSD and MDSD.

An MSSD based on Denmark and Norway focuses on the relevance of a formal strategy as a motivation for hosting events. Both countries host events (and have a similar output)

⁷⁵ This combination of a most similar and most different system design has previously been used to study the construction of various sport facilities in the Oslo Municipality (an MSSD). In a national context this becomes an MDSD because Oslo is an atypical municipality because of its size, status as capital, etc. which nevertheless has a similar output in terms of sport facilities (Tangen & Rafoss, 2009, Chapter 7).

with generally very similar conditions, aside from one potentially crucial factor: a national event strategy.⁷⁶

An MDSO setup is a study of two cases with similar outputs on different backgrounds; in this project, it would be hosting sport events with the backdrop of markedly different national contexts. The task is then to identify the similarities which could explain this unlikely but existing similar output. Denmark and Norway are two small Western welfare states, “atypical cases” in the sport event field (and research) (Flyvbjerg, 1991, p. 150. Cf. also chapter 2). However, despite their difference in terms of soft power credibility, population sizes, form of government, etc., they produce outputs similar to the BRICS countries (Grix et al., 2019a, p. 113). It is for instance interesting to discuss whether two editions of the same event, e.g. the Winter Olympics in Beijing (2022) and a future edition in Norway, would actually be the same event despite of the difference in society and the accumulated symbolic capital (cf. Dayan & Katz, 1996, pp. ix–x).

4.4 Summing up

This chapter has presented the main sources of the project, discussed their limitations, and presented the analytical methods I will use to couple the data with the theoretical framework. It has also introduced the case study approach of a “collective case” alongside the criteria for my case selection.

The empirical data for the analysis originated from different sources collected in two rounds. The first round focused on press material with the purpose of outlining the main arguments in the public and their senders. In the second round, I interviewed a selection of representatives of these senders supplemented with referrals from the informants and archival material from the informants’ organisations. Finally, the contextual chapters add an additional dimension of data-triangulation to the empirical material (Johnson et al.,

⁷⁶ The case of Denmark and Norway in an MDSO also attaches the project to the existing general research on sport policies, which has made initial discussions on similarities and differences between either Denmark vis-à-vis Norway directly (Eichberg, 2012) or the two countries from a Scandinavian perspective (Kulturministeriet et al., 2014).

2007, p. 114). The data provides two sets of information: the first is a testimonial set, which is concerned with what happened when; and the second constitutes material for the discursive content analysis.

This chapter has introduced the basis the latter, DHA, which takes its departure at the analysis of “semiotic practices” but also emphasises the dependency of this practice on the context. The testimonial set of information is thus also relevant for the discourse analysis (Wodak, 2015, p. 5). In concrete terms, this means that I have read the various sources for arguments and further linked them with both their senders and the wider context presented in the contextual chapters and interview data. Subsequently, this relation has been explained in more depth using the relevant part of the theoretical framework (field theory for global-local relations, pragmatic sociology for local relations, etc.). In this way, the analysis of the discourse relates to the theoretical frame and lays the foundations for a deeper engagement with the empirical data in an abductive and retroductive process (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012, p. 171).⁷⁷ This link between the structures and the discourse is also crucial for coupling the justification of a single event to the bigger picture and explaining both single events and the agents’ lasting interest.

Altogether, this approach gives the thesis the form of a “collective case study” based on data from six recent international sport events. All of these events were/would have been “dramatic, popular, international and temporary sport occurrences” and one-off (to ensure that the decision to host this event was a new decision). The selected cases would also show the widest possible range of arguments and motivations for sport events in Denmark and Norway, within three main parameters: space, infrastructure, and history. The events' sports for instance have different traditions in Denmark and Norway, use different facilities, and they either take place across several communities or just one.

⁷⁷ Cf. critical realism’s “theoretical redescription” (Fletcher, 2017, p. 188) and discussions around the potential for using the field theory and the pragmatic sociology outside of a French context. A careful hermeneutic approach is required to make data and theory fit (cf. G. Andersen, 2016; Lamont, 2010).

4.4.1 A guide to the analysis

The theories and methods make the analysis possible, but they have not determined the structure of the thesis. This means that the reader should not expect – on first sight – to recognise the theories and methods from the previous chapters in the chapter headings.

Instead, as mentioned, the empirical part of the thesis is organised loosely according to the three objectives of the thesis: to analyse (1) the stakeholder composition and their general interest; (2) the move from events in general to specific events; (3) and the relevance of backward and forward linkage to explain the sustained interest in events.

The next chapter (chapter 5) introduces the local perspective and structures considering the global trends presented in chapter 2. Then, the thesis moves on to the analysis of the stakeholder networks and their general event conceptualisation (chapter 6). This is followed by an analysis of the motivations within this conceptualisation, including an assessment of the particularities of events based on sport and how events in series might sustain a general interest in events (chapter 7). In the final empirical chapter (chapter 8), the analysis focuses on the development of the justification of a specific event and analyses the impact of the public voice as it happened in in the case of the bid for the 2022 Winter Olympics in Oslo.

That said, the analysis should reflect the critical realist approach as a metatheory as well as the rest of the framework. In that sense, one could see chapters 2 and 0 as descriptions of the structural conditions before the empirical chapters provide the analysis of the agents and their arguments. In these analyses, I supplement the metatheory with specific theories to analyse the arguments and interactions between the agents. The thesis' theories are thus not all always present and only become relevant as the analysis abductively touches on their areas of 'expertise'. Chapter 6 will primarily draw on a field theoretical approach in its analysis of the stakeholders' role and conception of events in general as "investments" and consideration of the global influence. The approach changes to a predominantly sensemaking one in parts of chapter 7, the first section of which is an analysis

of events in light of the stakeholders' personal experiences. The second part then analyses the events as "investments" in greater detail drawing on pragmatic sociology. In chapter 8, when analysing the justification and rationalisation of a specific event, I mainly draw on a pragmatic sociological approach too.

5 Welfare, sport and media in Denmark and Norway

Chapter 2 focused on the global dimension of the international sports events. It introduced their global audiences, global stakeholders and suggested that the global interest is related both to the event-spectators' collective effervescence and to the events as means for legacies.

The second chapter also touched on the relation between the local and the global in general, yet never became explicit about the local levels in Denmark and Norway. This local context is just as relevant as the global for answering the thesis' questions and achieving its objectives concerning the stakeholder network, the event discourse, and the relationship between specific events and their context. This chapter covers the local dimension in two parts. The first part focuses on the influence of the welfare state on the current positions of sport organisations in Denmark and Norway. As a defining trait of the sport-state relationship has been the sport organisations' autonomy, a second section follows on the dominant national sport organisations.

5.1 The status of the welfare state

Both the Danish and the Norwegian public administration structures and their civil societies build on a social-democratic welfare state aiming for an egalitarian society, e.g. by providing universal coverage of welfare goods (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 21, 27–29; Fochesato & Bowles, 2015, p. 30). This has historically led to a rejection of the use of commercial incentives to solve problems in society. Instead, the “de-commodified” welfare state would establish various corporatist networks and use them to operationalise political initiatives or pursue political aims in a more general sense (Brandal et al., 2013, p. 108). The state establishes these networks by granting associations “monopolies” of certain fields. These associations are non-profit, often based in the civil-society, and consequently these corporatist networks evade the market. In return for a monopoly, an association allows the state to observe “certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports” (Schmitter, 1974, pp. 93–94). The section on Danish and Norwegian sport organisations below is a case of such a network aimed at offering

affordable access to physical exercise through volunteer-based, publicly supported associations. It also demonstrates how corporatism can allow the favoured organisations to become extremely powerful.

The welfare state is not only an organisational structure. It also has a strong discursive aspect to it as a central topos in the national and international story of a “Nordic model” (Østergaard, 2015, p. 23; cf. Brandal et al., 2013). The choice of the citizens of Denmark in 2016 to include “the welfare state” as one of ten values for the “future society” is a good example of the national presence of the welfare state as a highly valued idea. The remaining nine values were the Danish language, gender equality, equality before the law, liberality/tolerance, freedom, voluntarism, “hygge” [cosiness], the Christian heritage, and trust (‘Denmark Canon’, n.d.). When a Norwegian sociologist in 1994 published a hypothetical list of the “typical” Norwegian attributes it did not include the welfare state, but it did include equality and impartiality, which could be related to the welfare state. Later research emphasises how many these values that these values are characteristic for the Nordic countries based on their common long-running societal structures such such as Lutheranism (Sakslind & Skarpenes, 2014, p. 331; Skarpenes et al., 2016; Skarpenes & Sakslind, 2010). The list from 1994 also highlights some differences between Norway and Denmark. Supposedly, Norwegian traits like rurality, simplicity, nature and puritanism have no equivalent among the ‘official’ Danish values (Eriksen, 1994, Chapter 3). These lists are of course generalisations and no final truths.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, they suggest some national cultural repertoires or clichés, including the welfare state, which proponents of a sport event can employ when making their event appear suitable for the country.

On the international stage, the Scandinavian countries rally around “the Nordic model” as a brand but also potentially as a vision (Byrkjeflot, 2016). Here, the universality of the welfare state not only means that every citizen holds certain rights but also specifies that

⁷⁸ Denmark and Norway, for instance, do not have a particularly even spread in terms of theatre visitors across different levels of education. Here as elsewhere the numbers increase with the level of education (Mangset & Hylland, 2017, p. 196).

everyone should have these rights, often with reference to the high rankings of Nordic countries in several international comparisons (Deaton, 2013, Chapter 1; Nordic Council of Ministers, 2015; Singh & Wright, 2017; cf. Giulianotti et al., 2019; Bergsgard, Bratland-Sanda, et al., 2019). The result of this is that the “Nordic” brand has become an asset which the countries can use to justify themselves and seek influence as “norm entrepreneurs” in international fora by promoting “particular standards of appropriateness” (Ingebritsen, 2002, pp. 11–12). This entails an active promotion of welfare, high environmental standards, and relief to the rest of world as methods of gaining influence in international politics (Brandal et al., 2013, pp. 109–111).⁷⁹ These efforts are not merely idealistic nor always production. Regarding the former, the Nordic governments use these “unique domestic institutions” and discourses to take on more powerful positions than their limited material resources would otherwise allow (Ingebritsen, 2002, p. 13; cf. ‘soft power’, Nye, 2004). To this then might come that value-based work can be counterproductive. The prominence of the Nordic model – including the desire to keep the welfare state – has contributed to a more limited participation in some areas of foreign affairs, cf. the historic Scandinavian “exceptionalism” inside NATO and the European Union (or outside in the case of Norway) (Lawler, 1997, pp. 570–571, 587–588; Mouritzen, 1995). Making the Nordic ideals universal could limit the countries’ participation in the global networks, which would also impact hosting of the intrinsically global international sport events (Kaspersen, 2020).

The wheel then turns full circle when the use of the welfare state as an international asset also plays a role on the national stage. While Danish development aid can be regarded as “idealistic”, in a more cynical or pragmatic reading it has also:

⁷⁹ This can also include leaving organisations regarded as incompatible with these values. The Norwegian Nobel Peace Centre for instance withdrew its support from the “Handshake for peace” project initiated by the Norwegian Football Association and supported by FIFA in the wake of FIFA president Sepp Blatter stepping down and the corruption allegations against FIFA’s then secretary general (L. Johnsen, 2015). Together with Norway and Sweden, the National Danish Broadcaster similarly decided to stop sending participants to the Junior Eurovision Song Contest in 2005 as it had become “too focused on the competition” (Ellegaard, 2018).

to some degree balanced or functioned as a corrective of the remaining foreign policy driven by interests and focusing on national security and economic growth and welfare in Denmark. In this it has probably contributed to support a broader consensus around the foreign policy taken as a whole (...). (Bach et al., 2008, pp. 526–530)

Similarly, Norwegian development aid has helped the receiving countries, and “the National Do-gooder’s Regime in positioning itself as a central guardian of the morality of the nation (...)” (Tvedt, 2006, p. 69).

Ironically, the international branding of the Nordic model has taken place parallel to national debates over the sustainability of the welfare state (Angell & Mordhorst, 2015; Brandal et al., 2013, Chapter 9). This led historian Uffe Østergaard to conclude that the idea of a Nordic model exists as an important discourse rather than a “specifically Nordic model” (Østergaard, 2015, pp. 23–26). The increased integration of the market into the structure of the welfare state is an important basis for these debates. In addition, over the recent decades, professional lobbying and informal networks have also begun to change the traditionally stable relations between state and civil society in both Denmark and Norway (cf. corporatism). Traditionally strong associations like the unions have lost influence as their member decline while representatives of media and the market gain power (Ruostetsaari, 2007, pp. 169–170, 179). There are no studies specifically on the national sport organisations (Dahlén, 2008, p. 22), but there are indications of similar trends (Togebly, 2003). However, these are trends as opposed to a sudden dissolution of the traditional welfare state. Even if the welfare state in the Nordic model is reduced to a discourse, it does not necessitate a complete change in society. Seeing the model as a discourse however does enable one to raise questions about which structures the welfare is constituted by, constitutive of, and the potential influence it has on the organisation of events.

5.2 The competition state – new accents

The “competition state” [Wettbewerbsstaat] has been and is one such structure which has marked the Nordic model in recent decades. By referring to Joachim Hirsch (1996), the philosopher Mikkel Thorup (2015) uses this term to describe a state system with an increased focus on efficiency through competition compared to the social democratic welfare state. The competition state demands competition on every level of society; it requires competition between cities and states, inside a city or a state, and among their institutions and citizens (Thorup, 2020, p. 124). With the focus of competition comes, as in the case of modern sport, a focus on measurements. In both cases, the aim is to find the best. The sport seeks records, the competition state the most profitable outcome. This brings forth a demand for measurability (usually financial) of all initiatives so that they can be compared and ranked, and which eventually leads to the “financialisation of everything” (D. Harvey, 2005, p. 33).

Thorup argues that these ideas have spread to all levels of society due to the management literature’s increasing influence. Originally aimed at businesses, these books, with their emphasis on keeping the production up and a “de-politicising rhetoric”, have increasingly turned themselves towards society as a whole (Thorup, 2015, p. 306), including the state. “De-politicisation” therefore does not imply a development confined to a space outside of governmental control and political decision processes. States or other public authorities could very well adopt a neo-liberal ideology and use its influence in favour of the market.

Rather than simply being undermined by inexorable structural forces, the competition state [: i.e. the state as a public authority, not state in the meaning of the broader society] is becoming increasingly both the engine room and the steering mechanism of an agent-driven political globalization process (Cerny, 2000, p. 138).

Although it is nothing new that states and cities compete for resources, the basis for the competition has changed. Previously, states would compete for power by promoting

grand ideologies. Each ideology would represent their worldview as the absolute ‘best’ and going for one or the other would mean competing by different rules. Now, the competition among states and institutions takes place within one ideology or one set of rules. There is no case where one set of rules proves to be the definitive best. Instead, the participants compete in order to reach the best placements on the same scale: the international market. However, globalisation also divides. Essentially seeking the same aim, the states do so based on the local skills and traditions, which can give them a competitive advantage be it low wages, technological innovation etc. (Cerny, 2000, pp. 135–136).

Competition happens within states and on the level of national organisations too. Here, the competition state is often coupled with a reform of public administration along the lines of New Public Management and its aims of “competition, disaggregation and incentivization” (Dunleavy, 1994, p. 38). Thereby, public authorities encourage competition or at least stimulate it among its various suppliers of goods. This has led to the splitting of bigger tasks into smaller, more specific parts, which are then handled by either private firms or quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (Quangos⁸⁰) (Dunleavy, 1994, p. 40). The degree of success equals the reduction in use of resources and time per output unit compared to former systems. While this could sound attractive, the robustness of and fairness in the processes has been questioned (Hood, 1991).

In recent decades, Danish politicians have gradually implemented the competitive state and there are similar, if less pronounced, trends in Norway (Byrkjeflot, 2016; Nyseter, 2017; Pedersen, 2011). Its implementation challenges the traditional welfare state’s corporatist networks with their formal division of labour and exposes the citizens when, rather than protecting them from global competition, it encourages increased international economic integration (Pedersen, 2011, pp. 12, 55; Rommetvedt, 2017). However, in line with Cerny’s remark on the importance of the state for the functioning of the competition state, the prominent Danish researcher on the competition state Ove K. Pedersen does

⁸⁰ Agencies created by but otherwise operating independently of the state.

not see the competitive state as a complete break from the welfare state. The competition state is only a new stage in the “reformism”, which he uses to describe the long line of compromises upholding the Danish welfare since 1945 (Pedersen, 2018). Neoliberalism is not one-size-fits all (Campbell & Pedersen, 2017).

With regard to events, chapter 2 showed how cities and states use events as assets in the global competition and in some cases give up political steering in favour of post-political managing. The competitive state has the same aims and as such it could function as a structural support for the focus on events from Danish and Norwegian public authorities. The rather well explored field of cultural policies in Denmark and Norway can give some further indications regarding how the competitive accents have marked this area, with inter alia events often dependent on public financial support just like sport events (cf. Getz, 2008, p. 412, 2012b).

5.2.1 Culture in the competition state

Firstly, the history of the cultural policy development supports the suggestion that the competition state has not been a total and sudden reversal of the welfare state. Cultural policies have in a way always been instrumental, including the use of culture as means for economic gains (Vestheim, 2008). In Denmark, this goes back to the beginning of the 1970s due to a mix between global trends and local developments (Bayliss, 2004, pp. 10–11; cf. C. Gray, 2007). On the local level, Denmark underwent a structural reform in 1970 which reduced the number of municipalities from 1388 to 277 and led to rise in public financed cultural projects (Skot-Hansen, 1998; B. Sørensen, 1998). Later, in the 1990s, followed a general shift from economies based on industry to knowledge in Scandinavia and elsewhere in much of the Western world, which pushed cultural policy development in a more market orientated direction (Power, 2009, pp. 450–451). This inspired business theories like the “experience economy”, which became subject to considerable policy making in a Scandinavian context (T. Bille, 2012; Henningsen et al., 2017, pp. 367–368; cf. Pine & Gilmore, 1999/2011). A focal point in these policies would be the coupling of the existing idea of cultural initiatives as economic potentials with culture as a tool for regional development inter alia through events. The result was that unusual temporary

experiences became a particularly popular aim for cultural policies. This trend is still present. For instance, recent Norwegian research links new financing schemes with a focus on local events and culture centres as a way of increasing the attractiveness of towns or cities (Henningsen et al., 2017; Mangset & Hylland, 2017). Furthermore, in Denmark a study has shown a widespread use of place branding often linked by the municipalities (O. H. Jørgensen, 2016). I have not come across deliberate discussions on the relation between cultural policy development and the competition state, but there are clearly overlapping trends.

The rise of the “experience economy” also spurred a research project on the role of events and sport under the auspices of the Copenhagen Business School (CBS) (2005-2008). The study by Nielsen (2008) to which I have referred extensively in the section of the spectacular event was one of its outcomes (the project also included sport, Storm & Brandt, 2008). Seen from a 2020 perspective the CBS project described the experience economy at its beginning and simultaneously with various reforms and initiatives; the outcomes of this study are broadly followed up on in the thesis. The project was for instance contemporary to the adoption of the first national sport event policy in Denmark and a new structural reform, which reduced the number of municipalities from 271 to 98. Regarding sport events, the study found sport events to be an increasing relevant area but there have never been any broad studies following up on this conclusion.

Therefore, in order to give an impression of the conditions for sport events in the competition state, I turn to the research in events in general. In this field, especially due to the research of the Danish economist Trine Bille, there is a general perspective on cultural policies and the rationale behind them. Based on a model by the sociologist Dorte Skot-Hansen depicting the rationales of a cultural policy (see Figure 6), Bille suggests two primary rationales for cultural policies: market and non-market orientated. Drawing on the works of Niklas Luhmann, Bille explains the current dominance of the market orientation with reference to the claim that as a system culture does not have a single “truth” and therefore it must “parasitic”, meaning it adopts the truth of another system (T. Bille et al., 2016). Because of the New Public Management regime and neoliberalism, culture has

adopted the economic rationale of pay/does not pay and begun to consider “ways in which arts and culture can create market economic value and growth” (T. Bille et al., 2016, p. 240). Public authorities’ use of cultural policies to shape cities and nation states for the global competition is one option. Another is to let culture support specific sectors (e.g. creative industries, tourism or sport) or simply provide an influx of creativity in society (T. Bille et al., 2016, pp. 253–254). Sport events could be subject to similar lines of reasoning, although my previous emphasis on the potential spectacular and speculative elements in an event suggest that the non-market and market orientated rationales are closely related.




Figure 6: The four rationales of a cultural policy and their two groups: the market orientated (right-bottom) and the non-market orientated (left-top).

Source: Skot-Hansen, 2005, p. 33 in T. Bille, 2016, p. 7.

I previously pointed out how one should not regard the competition state as a break with the welfare state. Nevertheless, it is possible to criticise the development, for example as Bille does when suggesting that stakeholders should regard the economic impact as inferior to culture’s empowering potential (T. Bille, 2016). The British cultural policy researcher Eleonora Belfiore has extended this point by adding that economic impacts could not only take away focus from other outcomes but lead to negative impacts such

as the neglect of human rights (2018). Another examples is a recent paper on the Danish conditions for culture which argues that the cultural field runs the risk of losing its autonomy because of its low visibility coupled with a decrease in governmental funding and a change to a rhetoric based on “economic reasoning” (Rasmussen, 2018, p. 242). In contrast to sport event research, the cultural policy field has an ongoing and highly relevant principal discussion of the economic impact as a valid aim for cultural policies. As demonstrated earlier, sport event research is also critical; however, this criticism focuses on the plausibility of the impacts and it does not question whether, for example, economic impacts can be legitimate justifications for sport events at all. On the one hand, Bille and Belfiore’s critiques would suggest this is not the case. On the other hand, this criticism might not be relevant for sport events which are the outcome of a commercialised international elite sport made into a global cultural product rarely seen in the cultural field (C. Gray, 2007, pp. 210–211). The Nordic Cultural Model for funding has for instance begun to focus on connecting art, businesses and sponsoring (Duelund, 2008, p. 17; Mangset et al., 2008). At the same time it is worth noting that research on Norwegian development in particular has concluded that the autonomy of the cultural branch is “very resilient”, despite a closer relation between arts and economics (Mangset & Hylland, 2017, p. 64; cf. Duelund, 2008; Tjora, 2013, p. 23).

In summary, recent developments in public policy development have produced structures which have potentially both eased and hindered the efforts of sport event stakeholders in Denmark and Norway. On the one hand, an association with the Danish/Norwegian welfare state would make an event legitimate both on a national and international scale. On the other hand, the welfare state is exposed to the logic of the competitive state in the public decision processes. Although the competitive state sets new accents in the discourse which could support commercial sport events, research on the related cultural policy development field warns that these accents might lead to a loss of autonomy for the cultural field. Depending on how much their autonomy is based on a non-commercial mode of operation, the market discourse could put the stakeholders in a dilemma. I will consider this in greater detail for sport in the next section.

5.3 Danish and Norwegian organised sport – an overview

This section on Danish and Norwegian sport provides a backdrop for the analysis regarding the national sport context. It begins with an outline of the historical organisation of Danish and Norwegian sport before positioning the most relevant organisations in society according to two dimensions. The first concerns their relation to the welfare state, which is primarily expressed in public policies on sport. The second focuses on the relationship between the sport and the nation. This relationship is used to demonstrate how sport organisations draw on general societal values to define what sport ought to be in Denmark and Norway as an additional source of legitimacy next to the legitimacy originating from the political dimension. The section concludes with a brief outline of the sport-media complex in both nations.

Strictly speaking, Danish and Norwegian sport are organised rather differently. Norwegian sport has one central organisation, where the Danish sport has several. The Norwegian organisation is the NIF (Norges idrettsforbund), often simply referred to as ‘Norwegian sport’, indicating its de facto monopoly on sport (Bergsgard, 2005).⁸¹ NIF’s vision is “joy of sport-for-all” and its “idea” is to make it “possible for all people to do sport, feel competent and experience development in the safe and good community of sport” (NIF, 2019a, p. 7).

Most sport in Denmark is organised by three national associations of sport, of which DGI and DIF (Danmarks Idrætsforbund,) are the largest.⁸² DIF was founded in 1896 to organise modern sport, which had by then spread across many of the Danish cities. As of 2017, DIF functions as an umbrella organisation covering 61 NGBs (DIF, 2017b). DIF’s point of departure is sport as an activity and they “work for the promotion of Danish sport” (DIF,

⁸¹Although founded in 1940 when Arbeidernes Idrettsforbund (The Workers’ Sport’s Association) and Norges Landsforbund for Idrett (The Norwegian National Association for Sport) merged, Norges idrettsforbund only really became functional in 1946 as the German occupation in 1940 quickly led to the dissolution of the new association. The Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee fused with NIF in 1996.

⁸² The third and smallest confederation is Dansk Firmaidrætsforbund, which organises company sport. The Danish Olympic and Paralympic Committee merged with DIF in 1993.

2019b, para. 2). DGI on the other hand traces its roots back to the middle of the 19th century when citizens began to found rifle clubs, often in rural areas, to improve the defensive capabilities of the country. Gradually, the clubs began to include gymnastics and came to overlap with the Grundtvigian inspired peasant movement (J. S. Andersen, 2017; Selle et al., 2018, n. 4). Today, in its statutes DGI still focuses on the local association as a means for public education through sport (DGI, 2013, para. 2). The organisational structure reflects this focus on the community rather than underlining the disciplines; for instance, its member associations are organised into 15 geographical regions and not according to disciplines (DGI, 2017).

Common to both the Danish organisations and NIF is a desire to spread sport motivated by the conviction that sport is intrinsically good (Bergsgard, et al., 2007, p. 178; Skille, 2011). This seems to contradict the aims of DGI as the modern concept of sport-for-the-sport's-sake entails a focus on competition rather than community building. DGI is however not deviant since, as DIF and NIF, it actually describes its activities as “idræt” (Danish) or “idrett” (Norwegian). Although “sport” does exist as a word for physical activity in Denmark and Norway, and I have translated “idræt”/“idrett” as “sport” in the quotes above, this is not a precise translation since “idræt” is intrinsically related to “sport-for-all” (Munk & Lind, 2004, p. 89). “Idræt” is “a praxis of body and movement” centred on competition as well as health, a cultural (“popular”) bodily experience and the creation of identity (Bøje & Eichberg, 1994, p. 30). This is reflected in the worldview of sport organisations as research shows that they justify sport with other logics in addition to focusing on sport for the sake of sport. A study of Norwegian sport suggests that volunteerism is an important additional logic behind the operations of NIF,⁸³ while for Danish sport one study suggests that the pedagogical logic is an influential one (Bergsgard, 2005, pp. 79–80; Munk & Lind, 2004, p. 41).⁸⁴ The absence of Norwegian elite sport in NIF’s listings of

⁸³ This is backed by other, later, specific studies on voluntarism in Norway (Folkestad, Fladmoe, Sivesind, & Eimhjellen, 2017).

⁸⁴ That the sport holds up as an independent field despite these possible “threats” from other logics could also be seen as a sign of strength (Defrance, 1995a, p. 28).

the organisation's contributions to society is another good example of this adherence to various logics. True to the idea of modern sport, there are Norwegian elite athletes; they are popular in the media and internationally successful. Would not constant improvement incited by the prospect of winning fit nicely into a competitive society? Apparently not. Indeed, the NIF's lists of contributions to society from 2015 only contained general improvement based on its work for sport such as the impact on public health (NIF, 2015a, p. 22).

In Denmark, the situation is a bit different because of an "unspoken division of labour" between the DGI and the DIF (Storm & Brandt, 2008, p. 130), which inter alia makes the DIF is the sole responsible for elite sport (J. Hansen, 2017, p. 69; Kulturministeriet et al., 2014, p. 68). Consequently, all events in this project are organised by NGBs within by DIF. In the remainder of this section, I will focus on the DIF while noting that this does not mean that the DIF is purely an elite sport organisation. The DIF also organises sport-for-all, even if the role of DGI according to the division of labour is to have a focus on sport-for-all and especially to take in new sports. One should therefore not exaggerate the difference between the organisations in terms of their operation (Trangbæk et al., 1995b, pp. 122–124). Their running of a ten-year cooperation for the improvement of public health is a good example of this (Dinesen et al., 2017, p. 6).⁸⁵

In their aims and values, Danish and Norwegian sport organisations focus on sport as a public good providing health, democracy and social coherence. The only publicly committed promoters of elite sport values such as competition, winning and sport for the sake of sport seem to be the media (Goksøyr, 2011, pp. 194–196). However in the federations' actual work, research shows that that NIF and DIF do, or used to, have a focus on sport with an emphasis on competitions, a form of "physical art for the art's sake" (Bergsgard, 2005, p. 258; Munk & Lind, 2004, pp. 86–88; cf. Bourdieu, 2000a, p. 120). A ministerial report from 2014, which included survey responses on the municipalities' and local DIF associations' view on the central DIF reported that many local stakeholders saw DIF and

⁸⁵ The campaign is called "Bevæg dig for livet" [Exercise for (your) life], www.bevaegdigforlivet.dk.

its NGBs as “too far away from reality” and “that the elite was in focus at the cost of the sport-for-all perspective” (Kulturministeriet et al., 2014, p. 189). Looking at the budgets for DIF, there has however been a remarkable change towards a more equal distribution of money for elite sport and sport-for-all.⁸⁶

To explain this ambiguity within the organisations, it is necessary to understand the structures and other logics which influence their operations in the sport field, including external impulses such as public authorities and media (Defrance & Pociello, 1993, p. 13).⁸⁷ Despite the sociologist and historian Henning Eichberg’s remarks that linking sport to field logics risks blending out the dynamics of the agents (2006, pp. 10–11), I hope that the empirical chapters will show how the agents, if appearing rigid here, do prove to be dynamic.

⁸⁶ The most recent numbers (as of May 2020) are from 2017, 2016, 2015 and 2014, where elite sport were allocated where elite sport has been allocated 3,5 %, 32,5 %, 71 % and 54 % more money than sport-for-all (“breddesport”) (DIF, 2017a, p. 17, 2019a, p. 24). The budgets for NIF does not allow for a similar overview.

⁸⁷ The field theory explicitly constituting a field of sport or a subfield has also been applied in the study of fitness and sketched out for the Olympics (Giulianotti, 2015a, pp. 175–176; J. S. Maguire, 2007, pp. 5–9) and transnationally for England and France (Defrance, 1995a). The earlier notion that one should rather speak of a sport space than a field of sport because it is less established (e.g. compared to the field of literature) seems to have disappeared (Ohl, 2000, p. 147). For further discussions on the wider application of Bourdieu in the sociology of sport (in the earlier work foremost as a distinction of class or taste (cf. Defrance, 1995b, p. 127)) see Giulianotti (2015a), Jarvie and Maguire (1994), and Laberge (2002). Many of these overviews also refer to the criticism of Bourdieu’s agent as being “over-determined”, and have in turn also been countered by stressing the habitus is “producing choices” rather than determining action (Giulianotti, 2015a, pp. 186–187; Ohl, 2000, p. 154).

5.3.1 Sport and the state – sport-for-all

An international study from 2004 categorised the Danish model of sport as “missionary” (Camy et al., 2004, pp. 56–58). Like Danish research generally,⁸⁸ it did not differentiate between the various national Danish sport organisations. The study found that they were all characterised by a large volume of volunteers, the athletes were not “customers”,⁸⁹ and the sporting aims of state and sport organisations overlapped to such a degree that made it difficult to determine who was influencing whom. This characterisation also fits Norwegian organised sport.



Figure 7: The formal relationship between sport and state.

Even if the Danish state (briefly) mentions self-organised sport in its most recent policy paper (2016), both of the national governments consider the sport organisations’ sport-for-all as the foundation for their relation to sport (Eichberg & Ibsen, 2006, p. 33; Kulturdepartementet, 2012, p. 14; Kulturministeriet, 2016, p. 21) (cf. Figure 7). An important detail is that the governments traditionally do not go further than expressing their support for the sport organisations and securing their funding. They leave the operationalisation of the policy aims to the associations. The origin of the allocated resources limits the state’s role even further as the money is historically based on the revenue from a state monopoly on betting. This means that, in contrast to other political decisions financed via the governments’ regular budget, support is rarely subject to political debates

⁸⁸ However, the lack of differentiation is not necessarily a sign of a united Danish disposition towards the state. It could also indicate that research so far has been too scarce to find differences (Eichberg & Ibsen, 2006, pp. 4–5). The more well researched Norwegian sport for instance shows several examples of internal conflicts, alliances and positions inside NIF (Bergsgard & Rommetvedt, 2006; Enjolras, 2009, p. 52). Another characteristic of the state of the art in research in Danish sport and in relation to society is that most of the research and publications have either been published or at least paid for by the Danish Ministry of Culture (Bøje & Eichberg, 1994; Kulturministeriet et al., 2014).

⁸⁹ At least not once inside of a club, there is however a rise of consumerism inside of the sport as a whole, e.g. as people at least in the 1990’s began to change clubs more often depending on their offer (Trangbæk et al., 1995b, p. 99).

(Rafoss & Tangen, 2017; Seippel et al., 2016, p. 447). When revising this arrangement, the governments have generally been satisfied with the sport organisations as they usually have increased the sport organisations' share of the revenue. As of April 2019, NIF receives 64% of the money (*Lov Om Pengespill m.v. (Pengespilloven)*, 2016, sec. 10, subsection 2). In Denmark, a recent liberalisation of betting regulations means the money no longer amounts to a certain percentage of a surplus from the lottery. Instead, the Danish state guarantees an annual grant based on historic surpluses (adjusted according to the consumer price index) (Kulturministeriet, 2017; Udlodningsloven, 2017; Skatteministeriet, 2016; Trangbæk et al., 1995b, pp. 37–38, 45). As in Norway, sport in a broad sense, including DIF, DGI, as well as other sport related organisations, is the group receiving the biggest part of the money, around 36%.

As far as the governments express any expectations for the sport when giving the money, they focus on general contributions to welfare in line with the idea of corporatism. In Norway, this in praxis means that the role of the state is predominantly to support the construction of sport facilities, especially in the districts (Goksøyr, 2008, pp. 119–121; Tangen & Rafoss, 2009, pp. 21–22, 50, 193). Construction is planned by the municipalities together with representatives of NIF. As such, sport organisations are involved in operationalising as well as forming the Norwegian state's sport policy. NIF's expertise makes it influential but also increases the risk of extravagant sublimity (Goksøyr et al., 1996, pp. 87–88; cf. Fenne, 2011; Bergsgard, Borodulin, et al., 2019). In Denmark, the state generally has the same low level of direct involvement. There is however a difference on the local level as Danish municipalities have been important sources of (non-interfering) support for local sport since the 1930s (Trangbæk et al., 1995b, pp. 22, 27, 34).⁹⁰

Elite sport does not play any role in this corporatism. In Denmark and Norway, the elite sport only obtained their own publicly funded organisations in the wake of some unusually long and heated debates over the relevance of elite sport during the 1970s and 1980s.

⁹⁰ The major regulator of the municipal support of local sport in Denmark is for instance the Act of General Education (*Folkeoplysningsloven*), not a law specific to sport (*Folkeoplysningsloven*, 2018).

Today, elite sport in Norway is supported by Olympiatoppen as part of NIF (Goksøyr, 2008, pp. 135, 167). In Denmark, the parallel but independent organisation Team Denmark was founded after pressure from inter alia DIF but not the gymnastics associations, which would later become DGI (Eichberg & Ibsen, 2006, pp. 11–14; Trangbæk et al., 1995b, pp. 118–130).

Around the same time, the corporatist relation began to change. In Denmark, the formal relations improved when the Ministry of Culture became responsible for sport in 1974. A similar development took place in Norway when the governmental focus became stronger when sport was made a department in its own right within the Ministry of Culture in 1984. Inclusion in a ministry formalised the state's relation to the sport organisations, confirmed the view that sport was important for society and possibly countered the increased level of commercialisation. It also increased the status of sport as NIF and the state developed a more informal "family" relation (Goksøyr, 1992, p. 59; Selle, 1995). The inclusion therefore looks less like a takeover and more like a way of shielding the autonomy of sport (Eichberg & Ibsen, 2006, pp. 24–26; Goksøyr, 2008, pp. 135–136). Now however was also a time where the states began to follow-up on sport funding more closely (Hammersmark, 2010, p. 56; Karlsson, 2014, pp. 80, 83; Waldahl, 2005, p. 75). In Denmark, the increased involvement of state founded organisations became apparent from the 1980s and onwards through a range of new institutions like the aforementioned Team Denmark (founded in 1985), the Danish Foundation for Culture and Sports Facilities (founded in 1994), and most recently SEDK (founded in 2008 on the basis of a predecessor founded in 1994 with public support) (Eichberg & Ibsen, 2006, p. 10; Trangbæk et al., 1995b, pp. 108–109). The increased number of partnerships between sport and the state through these organisations has led to the suggestion that in their relations with the state around 2006 the Danish sport organisations had become more "corporatist" (Eichberg & Ibsen, 2006, p. 21). The generally increased number of concrete corporations at the local

level between Danish civil society organisations (often sport associations) and public authorities supports this argument.⁹¹

Today, it is difficult to pin down the exact character of the relationship between the sport organisations and the state. The relationship is debated but only discussing the relationship does not necessarily change anything. There will only be a change if for instance addition of new partners actually weakens the partnership between sport and state (Thing & Ottesen, 2010, pp. 233–234). If new partners do not weaken the relationship, it might even appear to be stronger as it persists regardless of new partners (Bergsgard, 2005, pp. 272–275; Kulturministeriet, 2009, pp. 14–15; Kulturministeriet et al., 2014, p. 18).

This could be the case for the sport organisations in Denmark and Norway, which today have access to several new organisations without having lost their relation to the public authorities. On the side of the public authorities, New Public Management also has not led to a decline of the state's interest in the sport, but reconfigured the network (cf. Rommetvedt, 2017; Rommetvedt & Thesen, 2007).

5.3.1.1 The EU and the supranational influence

As outlined in chapter 2, this network is also subject to a global influence both on a formal basis within sport around events and in more informal forms such as the rise of competition between 'global cities'. The section above on the competition state specifies a local parallel to the informal global influence. This and the following section follow up on the formal basis by considering the influence of supranational organisations (besides the international sport federations covered in chapter 2) from the perspective of Danish and Norwegian states in particular.

So far, supranational organisations (outside of sport) have only a few areas where they are able to influence the sport's various organisations. From a Danish and Norwegian

⁹¹ Research has indicated a stagnation for the years 2010-2016 and a slight decline in 2016-2018, but this fall comes after several years of growth (2004-10) (Ibsen & Levinsen, 2019, p. 86).

perspective, the EU is the most relevant supranational organisation and its involvement in sport is limited (Dunleavy, 1994, p. 59; Hanstad et al., 2008). Primarily, the EU and sport organisations come together in areas of sport governance with the aim of improving the social and economic benefits for the public (Eichberg, 2012, p. 211). These initiatives do not include international sport events (Commission of the European Communities, 2007; European Commission, 2014, 2018, Chapter 3.5). For instance, when the EU or rather the European Commission supported the Summer Olympics in Barcelona and the Winter Games in Albertville in 1992 with six and four million ECU, respectively, it was a public relation campaign rather than support for the events as sport events (Theiler, 2005, pp. 66–67). The recent launch of various European multi-sport events (the European Games and the European Championships) might change this (European Olympic Committees, 2018), but international sport organisations are slow to disband their traditional form of governance based on their own organisations in favour of a more pluralistic system (Chappelet, 2018; Chatzigianni, 2018).⁹²

5.3.1.2 The Danish and Norwegian supranational involvement

There are however also more specialised supranational organisations which try to influence the sport following agendas similar to that of the EU with focus on governance and ethics in sport. The Danish state for instance supports the INGO Play the Game initiative, which is “aiming to strengthen the ethical foundation of sport and promote democracy, transparency and freedom of expression in sport” (Play the Game, n.d.). It has developed and applied a framework for measuring good governance in national and international sport associations/federations (Alm, 2019; Geeraert, 2015, 2018a). Norway and Denmark are also strongly involved in the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), a supranational organisation where sport representatives and nation states are equal (Houlihan & Zheng, 2015, p. 333). They have had several prominent representatives and have promoted initiatives aimed at reforming WADA in line with the states’, in their own eyes, “unwavering

⁹² Chris Rojek offers a more radical perspective on the role of the supranational when suggesting that certain events, such as global reaching aid events, could themselves be supranational solutions to global problems (Rojek, 2013, p. 37).

commitment to the anti-doping cause” (Tangen & Møller, 2019, p. 651). Both countries also have members in the IOC and in 2017 the then Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen described one of the Danish members, Crown Prince Frederik, as a norm entrepreneur in his work with reference to the IOC’s latest reforms (Om kronprinsens stemmeafgivning i IOC, n.d.).⁹³

Other examples of attempts to set new norms include the branding of the Lillehammer Olympics as the ‘green Games’. Although this was not part of the original plans (Lesjø, 2000), they have come to be portrayed as setting new standards for environmental concerns (Gold & Gold, 2017, p. 74). More recently, as highlighted by a civil servant involved in the Bergen case during my interview, Standard Norway, which is responsible for the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certification in Norway, has taken responsibility for developing a standard for hosting citywide events based on the UCI World Road Race Championship in Bergen 2017 (Standard Norge, 2018; cf. ISO/TC 292, n.d.). The ISO might have strict rules to prevent political entities from exercising influence on their decision-making processes (Loya & Boli, 1999), but this does not prevent these bodies from promoting themselves when national standard organisations contribute to establishing international norms.

Although there are few direct links between these initiatives and international sport events, they show a link between the states’ efforts to act as norm entrepreneurs and sport. This is a source of positive references which local event stakeholders can use in legitimising the event on both the local and the global levels. For a local stakeholder organisation, such a reference to a positive picture of the state or the city makes the stakeholder appear a “do gooder” and a credible partner. The national sport federations also contribute to this image as a sample of Danish and Norwegian NGBs in a recent survey

⁹³ Play the Game has however questioned the purpose of the crown prince’s membership in the IOC because, as a member of the royal family, he is unable to take an openly political position and actively oppose the massive costs of hosting the Olympics. When the crown prince eventually took a stand and opposed the exclusion of all Russian athletes in 2016 this only fuelled the debate further because he thereby contradicted the recommendations of the Danish government and DIF (S.-M. Hansen, 2018a; L. Jørgensen, 2018).

on governance in national sport organisations scored mostly “good to very good” (Geeraert, 2018a, p. 7). On the side of the global sport, the international federations examined in my cases could use such a boost in their credibility. In a report on the governance in international sport federations from 2015 (not including the IOC, event owner of the Winter Olympics) the cases’ federations ranked number 7 (IIHF, ice hockey), 8 (IAAF, athletics), 10 (IHF, handball) and 11 (UCI, cycling) out of 35 federations with scores ranging from 47.6% to 52.8%. More recent and detailed follow-up studies on IIHF, IHF and IAAF confirmed these results (Alm, 2019; Geeraert, 2015, 2018b). Despite their relatively high ranking, the scores are far below the equal to or more than 75% which the study deemed as expectable from medium and large federations (Geeraert, 2015, p. 10).

At the same time, the states’ national engagement in sport-for-all could reduce the level of the support for international sport events, which typically only feature elite athletes – not to mention the commercialisation.⁹⁴ Likewise, a state with strong international and perhaps controversial engagement could also hinder the sport organisations’ efforts to attract sport events.




Figure 8: Sport’s two sources of legitimacy: A policy based relationship with the state and a culturally based relationship with the “nation”.

5.3.2 Sport and the nation – sport for us?

An additional source of legitimacy besides the state for the Danish and Norwegian sport organisations is the claim of representing certain popular values. This section outlines the ideal typical sport practices as a backdrop for the later analysis of sport event practice.

⁹⁴ Some events try to break down this barrier between the elite and sport-for-all. By the IAAF World Half Marathon Championships 2014 in Copenhagen, a race for amateurs started immediately after the start of the professionals following the same route. Similarly, pistes from various ski-events in Norway are open to the public after (or even before) an event, e.g. the Olympic cross-country piste in Lillehammer (<https://en.lillehammer.com/things-to-do/the-olympic-trails-16-7-km-p632583>).

Do the organisations manage to use any sport-related values in their *event practice* and make them correspond to the idea of a proper “Danish” or “Norwegian” sport?

First, it is relevant to note that sport was a factor in society long before the development of the close relation between sport and the Danish/Norwegian state, which only really began after 1945. By then, sport as an idea and its organisations had already existed for at least 50 years as independent, bottom-up developments within civil society. From that early period and up until today, sport organisations have defined themselves as prominent parts of the “imagined community” or idea of the Danish or Norwegian nation (Anderson, 1996; see also Jessop, 2015, Chapter 6) (cf. Figure 8).

The relevance of sport for this sense of community might not be equal in the two countries. For instance, their respective populations’ “pride by sport” and “pride of sport” are significantly different. The two terms come from an international survey on various populations’ relation to sport (cf. Figure 9). “Pride by sport” shows the “share of respondents who report to ‘agree strongly’ and ‘agree’ to feeling proud when their country does well in international sports”. Here, Denmark and Norway are almost equal.




Figure 9: The respondents in Denmark and Norway agreeing to either being proud when their country does well in international sport events (“pride by sport”) and their country’s achievements in sports (“pride of sport”).

Source: Meier & Mutz, 2018, fig. 1.

However, their levels of “pride of sport”, i.e. the “share of respondents who report to be ‘very proud’ and ‘somewhat proud’ of their country’s achievements in sports”, are very different (Meier & Mutz, 2018, p. 535). The Norwegians have a much higher level of “pride of sport” than the Danes. In my interpretation, this indicates a more outspoken personal interest in sport in Norway than in Denmark, meaning the question of how to “do” a sport event could be especially relevant in a Norwegian context. In the following, I elaborate on this claim by building on research involving skiing in Norway, a sport with deep cultural roots combined with high hopes for its elite athletes. Cross-country skiing

has been and is central for the Norwegian self-consciousness in a way which no contemporary sport is in a Danish context.⁹⁵

Tellingly, skiing, long used for transportation, experienced its breakthrough as Norwegian “propaganda” when it proved crucial for Norway’s internationally renowned expeditions to the Arctic and Antarctica during the 19th and early 20th centuries (Bomann-Larsen, 1993, p. 319). From there, it paved the way for further international fame as sporting successes soon followed. Cross-country skiing therefore combines the three dominating paradigms of Norwegian physical culture: Olympic/international success, mass participation, and a close affiliation with outdoor life (“friluftsliv”) (Breivik, 2010, pp. 195–196; Horgen, 2017).

So far, NIF has managed to keep elite skiing as well as other forms of elite sport legitimate for public support based on these paradigms (Breivik, 2011, pp. 13–14; Loland, 2011) and a general set of values for the elite sport, which among other things entails being disciplined, ascetic and a good role model (Augestad & Bergsgard, 2007, p. 92; Bergsgard, et al., 2007, p. 58; Goksøyr, 2008, p. 154). Eventually, this makes it possible to bridge elite sport with several of the Norwegian values mentioned earlier such as equality, simplicity, nature, and puritanism. However, in the beginning the close relationship between these national values and skiing threatened the international success. Participation in the Winter Olympics (an important arena for “modern sport”) was controversial and Fridtjof Nansen, head of several expeditions in the Arctic, encouraged the Norwegian people “to do ‘idrett’, but detest sport and all sorts of records” (cited in Slagstad, 2008, p. 9). Today, the perception of a division between Norwegian and global values in sport persists as a theme for debate similar to how national values have hindered some international relations (Bomann-Larsen, 1993, p. 286; Hanstad, 1991, p. 86; cf. Kleppen, 2014). The case of the Oslo bid for the 2022 Winter Olympics is only the most recent example where research has shown a discursive gap between the idea of a grassroots-based, inclusive, and democratic

⁹⁵ Gymnastics might have been able to do so in the first half of the 20th century and handball to some extent today, but this is pure speculation.

Norwegian sport and the IOC, which is perceived as arrogant, elitist and aloof (cf. Sam & Ronglan, 2016, pp. 8–10). Judging from the failed bid, it apparently proved too stark a contrast to be contained within NIF's usually successful legitimization of elite sport. However, it remains for this project to examine how this criticism affected the proponents' arguments and see this case in a broader perspective of Norwegian sport's efforts to legitimise events in general.

Thus far the overview has suggested various solutions for justifying events. One is for the stakeholders to claim a moral high ground by linking the event to the state and sport organisations' anti-doping work. Another is to maintain the image of a close connection between elite sport and sport-for-all (Ronglan, 2015). This could reconcile the contrast between investments in (at first) elite sport facilities and the state's wish for more physically active citizens and accessible constructions (Rafoss & Troelsen, 2010, p. 647; Tangen & Rafoss, 2009, p. 48). In addition, it is possible that high ethical standards could function as symbolic capital in a time of reduced legitimacy for international sport.

	Denmark (DIF) ⁹⁶	Int. elite ⁹⁷	Event ⁹⁸	Norway (NIF) ⁹⁹	Int. elite	Event
1	Football		+	Football		
2	Gymnastics	+		Skiing	+	+
3	Swimming	+	+	Handball	+	+
4	Golf	+	+	Gymnastics		
5	Handball	+	+	Golf	+	
6	Badminton	+	+	Athletics	+	+
7	Equestrian	+	+	Swimming	+	
8	Tennis	+		Cycling	+	+
9	Sailing	+	+	Martial arts	+	
10	Athletics	+	+	Shooting	+	
36	Ice hockey		+	-		

Table 7: The most popular sports in Denmark and Norway according to memberships and their recent international success and hosting experience.

⁹⁶ Numbers from 2019, <https://www.dif.dk/da/politik/vi-er/medlemstal>. In the ranking, I disregard umbrella organisations within DIF, such as the Workers Sport's Association and the Parasport association (Last accessed April 16 2019).

⁹⁷ Did the sport win any international medals for the country in the years 2015-2018?

⁹⁸ Did the NGB host any major international events (including reoccurring events) in the years 2010-2020?

⁹⁹ NIF, 2019b, p. 20.

Finally, the Danish and Norwegian sport organisations are broad, popular movements. NIF in 2019 had 1,938,518 members (36.5 % of the population) (NIF, 2019b, p. 9). In the same year in Denmark, DGI together with DIF mustered 2,664,907 members (46.5 % of the population) and DIF alone had 1,992,610 members, which equals 34.8 % of the population (Tofft-Jørgensen & Gottlieb, 2020, pp. 6–7). If one sorts the members according to sports and looks at the sports' international presence and hosting traditions, it is also possible to see a conjunctural relation between these three factors (see Table 7). I cannot prove any causal sequences, but the conjuncture indicates that a sport hosting an event would typically be able to claim legitimacy with a reference to its member base. Referring to the universal ideals for sport-for-all in the sport-state relationship, this could be an important source of legitimacy.

5.3.3 The sport-media complex in Denmark and Norway

The shift from the traditional corporatist partnership to a “extended field for the sport policy” for sport not least included new commercial stakeholders (Kulturministeriet, 2009, pp. 14–15). For example, the Norwegian Football Association in their 2020 budget expect 54 % of the income to come from selling broadcasting rights and other corporation agreements [“samarbeidsavtaler”](Norges Fotballforbund, 2020, p. 57). For the Norwegian skiing association, the share was 57 % in 2017 (Norges Skiforbund, 2018, pp. 55–60).

The national media play a crucial role in this – generally along the same lines as the global sport media. In Denmark and Norway, televised coverage's breakthrough had a significant impact on some sports, events and athletes (Frandsen, 2013, pp. 7–11; Kulturministeriet, 2009, p. 95). Show elements, entertainment and a focus on the competition became important aspects for the broadcasters and thus also the sports which were capable of adapting to these conditions (Bertelsen, 2011, Chapter 9; Frandsen, 2013, p. 20). The result was a Matthew-effect, where popular sports were the only ones that could handle this change and the media development primarily served to improve their status rather than diversifying the picture (Dahlén, 2008, Chapters 6, 7, 12; Kulturministeriet, 2009, p. 95; Lippe, 2010, pp. 381–383; Trangbæk et al., 1995b, p. 174).

Most popular sports in the media	
Denmark ¹⁰⁰	Norway ¹⁰¹
Football	Biathlon
Handball	Cross country skiing
Cycling	Handball
Tennis	Football

Table 8: Sports in Denmark and Norway with the most media coverage.

Comparing the event history with the most popular sports in media (cf. Table 8), there seems to be a correlation. All of the top four sports (with the exception of Norwegian football) in both countries have hosted or will host international sport events between 2010 and 2021 (cf. Appendix 1). This is far from being a thorough statistical overview of the relation between a sport's degree of commercialism, media exposure and number of events, but it is sufficient to suggest that some sports' commercial dimension and media interest could be related to their pursuit of events. Although the Danish Ice Hockey Federation refutes the proposed correlation between the popularity of the sport in terms of members and events, like the Danish governing body for athletics it is among the ten most popular media sports (Hedal, 2006, p. 38).

5.4 Competitive sport in a competitive state

This chapter has covered the local context for the thesis' analysis of international sport events. This summary first covers the current relationship between the public authorities

¹⁰⁰ The top four most watched sports in TV accounted for more than 50% of all sport transmissions (1993-2005), with the rest of the top 14 including motorsport, golf, American football, ice hockey, athletics, badminton, boxing, swimming, gymnastics, and tables tennis (Hedal, 2006, p. 38).

¹⁰¹ Lippe, 2010, p. 47.

and the sport organisations in Denmark and Norway before discussing the stakeholder dynamics on the local level generally.

Danish and Norwegian sport organisations have a shared heritage in modern sport. They are also formed by the values of the welfare state, which remains a source for legitimacy for them and their events. However, the sport organisations and the states have recently experienced a shift in their relations due to changing structures in society. In a sense, sport and the public have both drifted further apart and become more alike.

On the one hand, each of them has become more aware of how they can use sport for more than just regulated physical activity. Public authorities have become more explicit in their aims for and evaluations of sport as an instrument for improving public health or the attractiveness of the area in question (Alm & Storm, 2017; Bischoff, 2015, Chapter 9).¹⁰² At the same time, the sport organisations have become increasingly aware of how to use the sport to earn money or gain access to other resources.

In a way they have also become more alike – or rather, the state and public administration has become more like competitive sport. What’s in a name? Right now, it is competition. While there has always been a competitive element in politics, the public authorities now have become subjects to international rankings just like the top-100 golf players or the medal rankings at the end of the Olympics.¹⁰³ As DIF recently began to measure its power against other confederations in terms of international positions, one could say the transposition of a ranking logic from competitive sport to competitive state has turned full circle.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² However, the pluralisation of sport and physical activities have led to the question of whether the construction of facilities for the most popular sports actually supports sport-for-all (Rafoss & Troelsen, 2010, p. 654).

¹⁰³ For countries one example is the *Anholt-GfK Nation Brands Index* (used by the Danish and Norwegian Ministry for Foreign affairs to evaluate the efficiency of branding initiatives (Angell & Mordhorst, 2015, p. 196)), for cities systems like the *Global Liveability Index* are employed.

¹⁰⁴ DIF 2013 founded the *Global Sports Political Power Index* explicitly to monitor its new strategy for increasing its international influence and was launched in cooperation with the state’s globalisation strategy. For sport events, there is the *Global Sports Nations Index*.

This overlapping mindset alone does not explain the interest in sport events, but it says something about how sport and sport events functions in the competitive state. First, any ranking requires numbers. In sport, the numbers define victory; the fastest, highest, strongest, or most aesthetically pleasing performance wins, and all such victories are measured in numbers. This has always been the case for sport and now numbers are also influential in the justification for any policy including cultural policies. Secondly, sport is a setup for finding winners. This is all well in a setting of competitive sport, but not necessarily so for democracy. It is telling that the sociologist Jan Ove Tangen originally formulated “victory” as the aim for sport as an aide in the explanation of sport’s lack of democracy (Tangen, 1997, Chapter 1). As the following discussion suggests, this divergence around what logic to use when justifying sport and sport events might cause debate.

5.4.1 The local event networks

Today, much of the sport organisations’ work is based on their relationships with both the state and the market. In other studies, such alliances for influencing sport policies have been termed “booster coalitions” and most likely they are relevant for sport events too (Alm & Storm, 2017; Bergsgard, et al., 2007, pp. 195, 253; Ibsen, 2009, pp. 286–288; Mangset & Rommetvedt, 2002, pp. 23–25; Tangen & Rafoss, 2009, p. 126). The members’ diverse holdings of capitals make them potent stakeholders and the freedom to form such partnerships could support events. However, their exclusivity also exposes them to criticism (Tangen & Rafoss, 2009, pp. 197–199). They are also potential example of the lack of democracy around sport events indicated above. As is the in competitive sport, the members of a booster coalition are brought together with the purpose of winning, i.e. getting the event and staging it. Such events should be seamlessly run “co-productions” by the sport, the competition state and the market. Democracy might not have a role to play, although it did cause debate in 2019 when Gian-Franco Kasper, head of the International Ski Federation (FIS), outright stated that for event owners “everything is easier in dictatorships” (L. Morgan, 2019). The competition state’s focus on competition and economic legitimisation in general has also been meet with criticism and a counter discourse yearning for a return to the “mythical” welfare state (Pedersen, 2018, p. 13).

While the public authorities see events as a way to solve various welfare orientated tasks and businesses accept global values to stay competitive, this could be problematic for sport at the local level and eventually for the NGB (Cerny, 2000, p. 128; Ibsen, 2018; Pestoff, 1992, pp. 35–36). The chapter shows how opposition could increase because of the mismatch between an economic perspective and the traditional ideas of the correct practice of sport in Denmark and Norway (Munk & Lind, 2004, p. 99). Consequently, the debate is not just for or against events but about how we talk about sport organisations which provide a service to the public while instrumentalising commercial events for their own ends (Bergsgard, 2005, pp. 61–62; Ibsen & Jørgensen, 2002, p. 296). This commercialisation related to elite sport events could also question the close relation between elite and amateur sports which legitimises a significant amount of support for sport in the welfare state. Especially in Norway, sport-for-all not only relates to the welfare state but the national culture, particularly in the case of cross-country skiing.

The chapter has also demonstrated how sport federations can benefit from public involvement in the debate on good governance in global sport. This promotes public authorities as well as sport organisations and could have a positive spill over when bidding for sport events. However, the investment of moral resources in sport events is risky. If/when global sport events become cases of globalism focusing on growth at the cost of local specificities, their practices could make the Danish and Norwegian moral values worthless – if not outright preventing them from bidding at all on principal reasons. The analysis of the bidding processes for events will show whether the resources are an asset or a millstone round their necks. If the values prove to be a hindrance, one solution could be for sport organisations to sever their relationship with the state and abandon the association with the egalitarian welfare state in favour of an essential approach to sport as a physical activity designed to secure “victory” and/or “progress” (Tangen, 1997). The next chapter will explore whether this is the case through an analysis of the sport events’ stakeholders, their general aims and event discourse.

6 The who and what: the stakeholders and their conceptualisation of events

Events are joint ventures which unite several stakeholders across sectors even if most of them only commit during the event. In the planning phase, the number of stakeholders is small and research limits these to the “engaged” and “allied” stakeholders listed in chapter 2. These groups among others included local businesses, the sport organisations (especially the relevant NGB), and the public authorities (especially the municipality) (cf. Figure 3). Of these, the engaged stakeholders stand out again because of their explicit consideration of the specific local event both in its own right (their organisational commitment) as well as of the impact of the event for their peers (their social commitment). This group of peers can be rather broad; for instance, in the case of the host municipality it covers all the citizens. It can also be narrower as in the case of a sport association and its members.




Figure 10: The typical main stakeholders in the four categories in Danish and Norwegian sport events at the beginning of the bidding phase.

As will be explored further later in the next chapter, local representatives from the host municipality and the NGB are by far the most dominant voices in the public promotion of the event in my cases (cf. Figure 12). This leads to the initial claim that these are the engaged stakeholders in my cases (cf. Figure 10), and I begin this chapter with an analysis of them. The analysis' first aim is essentially to show their high social and organisational commitments and substantiate my initial claim, also considering the differences between and within the sport organisations and the various levels of public administration involved in an event. The second aim is more complex and relates back to the thesis' field theoretical approach. From a field theory perspective, acquiring recognition involves holding symbolic capital, i.e. certain resources (money, technical skills, etc.) which in the field are no longer considered simple, acquired/learned resources but only appear in a symbolic form such as good manners or a title. Agents with a high amount of symbolic capital also have symbolic power and consequently a strong influence on the nomos – the view on

events – which is valid in the event field. Thereby, we have a connection between the agents and the general discourse of or logic behind an event in the event field. In other words, this is what eventually constitutes the event field as a field in its own right. The most clear-cut case would be if a stakeholder staged an event simply for the sake of the event in itself (cf. art for art's sake). The opposite would be to stage the event only with the aim of achieving something else (e.g. better public health). The second aim is therefore to analyse the stakeholders' positions on a scale between these two extremes and use that data to better understand what an event is and the current interest in them.

I start by analysing the engaged stakeholders before I consider the other stakeholder groups' positions on the scale or at least influence on the positions of the engaged stakeholders. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the global sources of influence on the local level of the event field from the event owner and more generally through a glocalisation of the event field.

6.1 Engaged stakeholders: NGBs and municipalities

The NGB has the direct line to the event owner as its local representative. Formally, it is therefore the NGB which decides to bid for an event. Typically, it then contacts the potential host municipality as the owner/rights holder of the space for the event. This triggers the municipality's own decision-making process and if positive it and the NGB become the first engaged stakeholders in the event organisation. From this point onwards, they cooperate to attract and eventually organise the event.

6.1.1 The NGBs

Based on the idea that sport is about finding winners and the centrality of sport for sport events (Tangen, 1997), the social and organisational commitment of federations to sport events could appear as given. However, eagerness is rarely sufficient. International sport events are demanding in terms of capital and while some sport federations have easy access to relevant resources either by themselves or by their social capital (i.e. other stakeholders), others are dependent on happy coincidences and help to ensure events happen.

6.1.1.1 DHF and NSF: Experienced strategists

The Danish Handball Federation (DHF) and the Norwegian Ski Federation (NSF) are sport federations with events deeply integrated into their function as organisations. Their stakes and interests show in their event strategies, continued event discussions, and the accumulation of the relevant capital either by their own efforts or through their continuous contact with other stakeholders with relevant resources.

The DHF adopted its first event strategy in 2014, and according to an official they have been able to pursue it successfully. The aims were not humble as the federation aimed at hosting several “A-level” events, i.e. world championships. An official describes the mind-set as follows:

we take one [: event] after another, we sit down and look strategically, what can we go for? Can we make alliances? For instance, we cooperate with Norway and Sweden on the [women’s] world championship in 2023. (...), just saying, there is this strategy for the near future, where we over a period of ten years would like to have a couple of A-level championships.

To this end the federation maintains continuous contact with the relevant municipalities between events. According to a DHF official events in the DHF discourse are still “somewhat extraordinary” but also marked by some regularity, and in 2018 the DHF’s chair described events as “business cases” (Heide-Jørgensen, 2018). This shows in practice when the DHF picks its host cities based on a combination of the city’s willingness to pay, its facilities and some additional element which makes the city attractive for the federation.

Likewise, the NSF is capable of attracting events regularly and is selective with regard to the location of its events. The place is however to some degree given as the federation has three national sport facilities [nasjonalanlegg] which the events should circulate among (cf. Bergsgard, 2005, Chapter 6). With this rotation, the federation ensures that its facilities are updated regularly and able to host world cups – another important arena of promotion and income for the federation. The aim of the strategy is therefore rather

to increase the federation's and the facilities' professionalism rather than promoting the idea of hosting events as such, which seems to be well established within the organisation. The NSF does not refer to events as business cases, but from the role events play it is clear they function in this manner in all but name. For instance, during the interviews, NSF officials would describe how the events provide resources on a continuous basis either as surpluses or by making it possible to ask for public money to renovate or upgrade the federation's facilities.

The combination of an event discourse that describes events as business cases and the ability actually to make the events profitable requires considerable amounts of social, cultural and economic capital. As the federations have hosted more events, they have also been able to acquire cultural capital specifically on events within their organisation. An informant from the DHF described the organisation as one of the most experienced federations in Denmark regarding events and a contact point for other less experienced federations (including the ice hockey federation, which I will come to in the next section). However, at least for the DHF its involvement in events only began recently.

To understand the federations' recognised position in the event field, it is therefore not sufficient to only consider the accumulation of directly relevant cultural capital like technical competences and access to facilities. With reference to the previous sections on sport in Denmark and Norway, handball and skiing are sports with international success and good media coverage. They have a high status in the field of sport. Skiing's symbolic capital has previously played a role in 1999 when the NSF managed to establish three national sport facilities where the norm was one (Bergsgard, 2005, sec. 6.7), and now it gives them symbolic capital in the event field as well.

The federations also convert social capital into relevant cultural capital in the form of access to expertise and especially suitable facilities. This is especially the case for the DHF, which does not have a direct control over its event facilities and therefore has to keep in touch with all relevant partners in order to maintain its access to this capital. The NSF is granted a more direct access because of the permanence and special status of many of

its national sport and event facilities but of course this still requires a good cooperation with the local public authorities.

Finally, economic capital seems to be what these stakeholders would often want to get from other sources such as ticket revenues or by also converting their social capital into economic capital through financial support from public partners.

Although the federations worked directly on improving their position in the event field, they were not idealistic and satisfied with hosting just for the sake of hosting. However, could this be the case when federations make their debut as hosts or host their biggest events in years?

6.1.1.2 NCF and DIU: Ambitious federations

The Norwegian Cycling Federation (NCF) and the Danish Ice Hockey Union (DIU) made their entrance into the event field with the cases analysed in this section. The decisions to bid for these events were not the outcomes of particular event strategies, but rather signals of something on the rise in line with the idealistic hypothesis made above.¹⁰⁵ Both federations had, in the eyes of the informants from the organisations, momentum at the time of the decisions. A then board member of the NCF described how cycling in Norway was at a peak. Thor Hushovd had just won the world championship in 2010 as the first Norwegian ever to do so, the federation could celebrate its centenary, and the interest for “cycling was on a rise”. This led the head of the federation to say that it “at some point” would be nice to host the world championship. According to the informant, several municipalities expressed an interest out of the blue, the media picked up the story and:

¹⁰⁵ The NCF did have a strategy for more events at the time of bidding, but not on the scale of the world championship (Norges Cykleforbund, 2010).

then the process started rolling without us [: the federation] having thought deeply about anything and the enthusiasm, (...) it was a pressure, I have never... I have never been near the way (...) the enthusiasm [spread] in the milieu.

Likewise, the DIU experienced sporting success in the decades before bidding. An official from the federation described the idea of hosting an event as a next step for an ambitious NGB. Although it did not have an explicit strategy, the federation had for some time played with the idea; for instance, it made a pro forma bid for the Ice Hockey World Championship around 2009 (cf. “utilitarian bidder” Torres, 2012). According to a DIU official, they felt:

challenged by not having a multi arena in Copenhagen. (...) it [the first bid] was for putting pressure on the politicians too (...). Surely, it is a bit outside of the strict purpose of a sport federation as DIU, but of course, we also had the ulterior motive, that we would be able to use it too. Therefore we feinted the bid a bit (...).

Although inspired by the momentum of the federations, the organisations nevertheless had had clear aims for what to get from the event in the case of a successful bid both in the form of cultural but also and more importantly, economic capital. For instance, the NCF’s strategy also described getting events as a way to develop the organisation (Norges Cykleforbund, 2010). They should be investments, but with little long-term considerations about future events, which makes these cases different from DHF and NSF analysed above.

In terms of positioning oneself in the event field, the idea of hosting in itself did not provide any cultural capital but the federations had symbolic capital from being successful sports covered in the media (cf. section 5.3.3). In addition, DIU and NCF could boost their relevance in the event field because of the events being offered. The world championships in cycling and ice hockey are significant in terms of visitors, which, according to civil servants on the public side, made it easier for the federations to make business cases of them even if the sports were smaller compared to the sports in the previous section.

The initial motivation for entering the event field drew on an idea of hosting for the sake of hosting. In the end, however, the events did not only have this intrinsic value. In addition to the idealistic nomos, the federations also saw the event as an investment. Even first timers are not idealists. The last case however is about a sceptical federation which became involved in hosting with no expectations. Could this be a case of hosting an event for the sake of the event?

6.1.1.3 DAF: A sceptical federation

The case of the DAF hosting the 2014 IAAF World Half Marathon Championship is an example of a federation with a negative event perspective nevertheless hosting an event. When the Danish public event office SEDK first encouraged it to bid, the federation reacted cautiously. Eventually, it was convinced that the event would not be a risk and agreed to bid. Nonetheless, an official describes how it had no specific aims and only related the bidding to more general strategies such as helping local associations for whom local road races were important sources of income (cf. Forsberg, 2012). Events as such were neither part of the federation's discourse nor a broader story about the federation.

This changed in the bidding process as the federation realised that 10,000 fee paying amateur participants would be required. Luckily,

we discover that there is quite a demand for being a part of it. At the same time, we got some staff members and some politicians¹⁰⁶ in the organisation, which have a view on management, which (...) says that instead of a policy of austerity in a time of crisis (...) we have to go on the offensive and invest. So then you had a mind-set which said invest and all of sudden, because of the participants' fees, you had the resources too, that actually enabled a product development and a completely new approach to how to develop.

¹⁰⁶ Sport politicians, i.e. board members, not necessarily party politicians.

As a result of these changes the federation not only became organisationally interested but also acquired a high level of social commitment. The social commitment outlasted the event and gave events a high status within the DAF. In 2018 (the time of the interview), the official described how events had become “the most important platform” for the federation; the events are now “products”, in which they “invest” for the federation’s development. The exact outcome is not clear. The informant characterised them as “immaterial (...), which someday will be worth some money”. The case of the DAF in 2018 shows how fast a federation can integrate the event discourse and the field’s nomos into its work.

6.1.1.4 Summing up

Regardless of how recently they had entered the event field, all the sport federations conceptualised events as investments. Although sharing this nomos, the federations differed in the degree to which they adopted an event habitus or, better, strategy. A strategy would indicate that one event is logical not only as an investment with an external outcome and adds another nomos to the event according to which the event is also logical because it enables further events to be hosted. This indicates a field since those resources only have a value in the event field. As well as helping the federations to produce better athletes, expertise in hosting also helps them get events.

The discussion above indicates that there is an event field in Denmark and Norway, albeit with a limited member base. The DHF is one of the members as it maintains an informal network focusing on hosting events accumulating social capital specific for the event field. The NSF does the same and has in addition an eye on the upkeep of the facilities, a form of cultural capital. Other federations without event strategies have only been involved for a rather short time and have little cultural capital specific for events. Some compensate for this by drawing on a symbolic recognition of the federation’s sport, which I have previously highlighted as a factor (cf. Table 7). In this, the federations’ popularity as media sports (as for ice hockey) and the size of the event helps. These factors say little about a federation’s practical capability to stage an event, but they spark an external interest and thereby have a symbolic effect on the federation. For others, exemplified here

by the DAF case from around 2014, their position in the event field depended on the event's attraction as investment in the eyes of other resourceful members of field rather than the federation's (the formal bidder) own conceptualisation of the event as a profitable investments.

Conceptualising an event as an investment because of the partners suggests that the federations' main partners, the municipalities, also would consider the event to be an investment. The following section investigates this further and also considers what the municipalities use as their source of symbolic capital if they lack directly relevant event expertise. The federations could be popularised or heavily exposed in the media also before considering events. What do the municipalities do?

6.1.2 The municipalities

Similar to the federations, there were two perspectives on events among the municipalities. All of them evaluated the events as objects of investment and in addition, those with a specific interest in events also considered the individual event's relevance for future events.

Similar to the federations' view on events as "business cases", the municipalities' ideals for an event revolve around a contribution to the city. This could be money, but it is not necessarily so. In Copenhagen for instance, "[i]t is all about making some activities in the city. It could be a sport event; it could be a cultural event. It is not decisive with regard to that", according to a local politician. This quote resembles the conceptualisation of events as investments across all the municipalities. The politician from Copenhagen also made clear that the economic expectations of an event tend to grow with the amount of money a municipality invests in the event. This factor was for instance relevant when deciding to support the ice hockey event. Civil servants administrating the tangible support for events often have more specific criteria, e.g. that the event should be international or last for several days. While these criteria indicate the size of the desired yield, they do not contradict the idea of the event as an investment. Ultimately, a civil servant in Bergen concurs

with the politicians: an event “must be something which leaves something positive for the region”.

The relevance of the event as an investment is formally decided by the city council, but before that the suggestion to bid for an event is often subject to an informal procedure. One Danish local politician describes a decision-making process repeated in several of the cases where:

it was very much top-down, which events we chose, choose to bid for (...) to put it directly, that that [the event] is in [Danish city], is because of me and almost because of me alone. I have not asked anybody, no political decision was made before I said [that] we would like to [host it].

The informant only coordinated his answer with the mayor before presenting the event to the city council: “eventually we have succeeded [every time] but the politicians could just as well have voted against it”.¹⁰⁷ However, rejection was probably only a theoretical possibility; this is not to say that the informant and the mayor were extremely influential politicians, rather their success rate shows that they had adopted the logic of the political field well and were able to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant events.

This also demonstrates that it is not as much the municipality as such which the NGB approaches but individuals with a feel for the political field. It is these gatekeepers that the NGBs have to convince about the benefits of the event and must eventually favour a public organisational commitment to the event. Finding such barriers in a political decision processes is not surprising and has been evident in research since at least the 1970s (cf. Bachrach & Baratz, 1977). It is nevertheless relevant as it dismisses my previous suggestion that the inclusion of public bodies in a booster-coalition would make the process more transparent. The existence of functioning gatekeepers is further relevant because

¹⁰⁷ Later, I will show that this close relation between an event and top politicians is common and also in line with other findings from studies on relations between politicians and branding strategies (O. H. Jørgensen, 2016).

it shows a political recognition of events, which suggests the NGBs do not always have to push their ideas through by themselves. In the case of events, there could also be factors pulling events in on the side of the municipalities.

6.1.2.1 Event-policies: interested in events as such

The most explicit example of such pull factors are the event strategies which municipalities have begun to adopt in recent years. These strategies essentially formalise the – in the words of one Danish public event consultant – “pretty uninspired” aims for events in the city. Off the top of his head, he listed the “tourism economy (...), branding and then something about sense of belonging – local pride-stuff”. An overview of recently adopted event policies in Bergen, Oslo, Copenhagen and Herning confirms his description (cf. Bergen Kommune, 2018, pp. 5–6; By, Erhverv og Kultur, 2008, pp. 7, 11; Kultur- og Fritidsforvaltningen, 2013; Oslo Byråd, 2018, p. 5). The similar and superficial aims underline how these strategies are not to be read too strictly. Instead, they should be read as general statements which, like the quotes from the politicians, present events as things that make a contribution. This is also in line with an earlier study on the cultural policy development in Denmark which concluded that Danish municipalities have “a duality in cultural policy between economic and social development strategies” (Bayliss, 2004, p. 23).

In other words, the strategies make the idea of an event as an investment a *nomos* in the political field that must be considered by the politicians and the other stakeholders. The first ones to do so are the aforementioned gatekeepers. Once they have found the event to be in line with the *nomos*, they bring the event into the system. However, even if the gatekeepers find the event to be in line with a strategy, according to a civil servant from Copenhagen these strategies are not:

an answer book, (...) you [the politician] can say that ‘I do not care about the audience, I am interested in the media and therefore – the Ice Hockey World Championship that is alright’ (...) You can as a politician choose to focus on this and that is enough for me now. (...) You

can also use it to kill something. 'That... that is too expensive or too stupid or it does not fit our sport image and such'.

Strategies do however set the premises for the politicians and stress the focus on the external outcomes. From a broader perspective, the event as an investment with branding as one potential yield aligns it with the aims of the municipalities in a perceived state of competition with other cities and municipalities. Therefore, events fit within the general structures of society and this helps explain the limited debates about them. Once events are made legitimate by a policy, it could also raise the bar for questioning events as such and not just the potential outcomes.

Nevertheless, the most important function of event policies is their promise of an organisational commitment based on an increasingly professional and strategic approach to staging events. Large municipalities like Copenhagen, Bergen and Oslo, as well as smaller municipalities with an extraordinary interest for events like Herning, have realised that regarding events as investments is not enough to be fully recognised in the event field. Their strategies not only note the outcomes; they also describe how to accommodate the event owners' demands for efficiency, good stories, and spectacular setups. The following section examines the development of the strategies in Herning, Copenhagen, Bergen and Oslo. The point is partly to show how the strategies led to the cities' accumulation of concrete cultural capital relevant for the event field. However, the presentation also shows how the informants had a well-developed story of these cities as simply "eventful cities".¹⁰⁸ The cultural capital is the foundation for these stories but when creating a story one misrecognises these concrete initiatives and the cultural capital becomes symbolic.

¹⁰⁸ A study describes eventful cities as cities who "take theming [of an event (sport, opera, art etc.)] to the next stage, where the themes themselves almost become irrelevant. What is important is the role of events as carriers of meaning: the event is the theme" (G. Richards & Palmer, 2010, p. 29).

6.1.2.1.1 Eventful cities

In Herning, the initiative for a strategy came from the municipality in approximately 2001 when the new mayor Lars Krarup took office.¹⁰⁹ A member of the city council described how:

we then formulated a row of guidelines including that we would give priority to art, culture, sport as strategic areas for creating a whole new image for Herning and Central Jutland different from the one we knew (...) existed in the minds of many people in Eastern Denmark¹¹⁰ that (...) it [Herning] was boring.

The strategy encompassed the development of a formal cooperation with stakeholders to develop the cultural and social capitals the city would need to become an attractive host. The municipality is for instance the principal stakeholder in the local exhibition company, Messecenter Herning. It also supported the company's "Vision2025", which included the construction of the biggest arena in Jutland. The result is an event alliance across public and private stakeholders, whose common ground was described by a civil servant in the municipality as "the premise that we would like to be an experience town". The city also began to seek external inspiration, for example by participating in international sport conferences like SportAccord. The point is that Herning did not settle for collecting practical, external experience but made a broad narrative about the town based on this experience.

This was also the case in Copenhagen. Beginning with the concrete initiatives, a civil servant from the Copenhagen Municipality described how their professionalisation was about establishing organisations accumulating expertise on events, acquiring facilities specifically for events, and creating tools for evaluating possible events a priori to their staging:

¹⁰⁹ Lars Krarup also chaired SEDK 2007-2019.

¹¹⁰ Herning is located in the western part of Denmark. The Danish capital, Copenhagen, is in the eastern part.

[Step o]ne was the founding of the so-called Copenhagen Eventures, a part of Wonderful Copenhagen [the capital's tourist office] but made to attract large events. The second thing was that we were challenged by not really having an arena or a venue for it. Therefore, we started to look at what the possibilities were to build one. The third thing we did was to say, if we don't want to host something random just popping up, couldn't we make some kind of system to evaluate all the events?

At the end of this “journey over the last 15 years”, Copenhagen in 2018, according to the informant, has “streamlined [hosting] to such a degree, that we have reached a point, where we actually have the possibility of picking, to say ‘what would we like to pursue?’ (...) back then [approximately 2004], it was more, what can we get?”

The municipality or at least the civil servant however also streamlined the story. The informant sets the beginning to the year when the municipality hosted the MTV Music Awards. “It cost 20 million DKK and there wasn't really any legacy [sic] as you say in Denglish. So we looked at each other, was that it? Did we want to let it be like that or did we want something more?” The informant puts the date as 2004, however the MTV event was in 2006 and the other initiatives, which supposedly followed from the MTV event, also diverge in their chronology from the informant's narrative. Copenhagen Eventures had already been founded in 2003 (Borgerrepræsentationen, 2003). The debate on the venue had begun as early as the year 2000 (Reyes & Kamper, 2000), and the venue, the Royal Arena, only opened in 2017. The standardisation for evaluating events, approximately in 2008 (Kultur- og Fritidsforvaltningen, 2008), is the only initiative which one could say to have begun after the MTV event.

Although the informant's story might not be a valid source for when various things happened as the Copenhagen Municipality professionalised its approach to events, it is a very good source for how a professional narrative is a part or symbol of the professionalisation in addition to the cultural capital the concrete initiatives gave to the city.

Even cities like Bergen, which in the view of several informants had been firmly established as an “event city” for a long time without a strategy, adopted a formal strategy in 2018 (Bergen Bystyre, 2018; Bergen Kommune, 2018). The tradition for events means that unlike Herning or Copenhagen Bergen’s ‘coming of age’ is not attached to clear initiatives. Bergen’s event capital and discourse had a more organic development based on organisations such as the one behind the Bergen International Festival (founded in 1952). The municipality thereby comes close to adopting a habitus of the event field unconsciously, as Bourdieu originally described it.

Eventually, Bergen has adopted a formal strategy but, according to a civil servant, in the years leading up to this they already had had “a – you could almost say a policy, that we want at least one big event every year” with a positive spin-off for Bergen. The municipality also had an increased focus on sport events in order to become a legitimate host for these external events. One civil servant recalled how a half-hearted bid was made for the UEFA Euro 2006-2008 served to this end although:

I don't think we ever really believed that that project would eventually come through. But we thought it would be smart to spend money on showing the city as an event city.

Local sport also played a role in the adoption of the event strategy. According to a local tourism consultant, this was also “[a] bit because the sport wanted to do more in this area too, it is actually an initiative from the sport”. As I will come back to towards the end of this chapter, the sports organisations were also active on a national level in order to establish a national strategy.

Summing up, the Bergen case shows even more clearly than Copenhagen and Herning how involvement in events in the period of the thesis required professionalisation and ideally a story based on this professionalisation (G. Richards & Palmer, 2010, p. 44). Symbolic capital in the event field based on traditions was not sufficient.

Oslo has followed the same path as Bergen, Herning and Copenhagen. Events (in general) are part of the Oslo’s strategy for international profiling from 2015 and in May 2019, the

municipality adopted an event strategy (Fjellestad, 2015; Oslo Byråd, 2018; Oslo Bystyre, 2019, p. 40). However, I will return to Oslo's approach to sport events in general and the Winter Olympics in particular in section 8.2. Due to the size of the Games they transcend any 'simple' aims of a regular event strategy and requires an analysis of their own.

The following section concludes the discussion on the large municipalities with an analysis of how a tangible infrastructural outcome of a strategy can also become symbolic capital.

6.1.2.1.2 The arena

The most prominent example of event infrastructure is the arena. It is the focal point for the event and a recurrent theme among cities with a focus on events (G. Richards & Palmer, 2010, p. 74). The arena however is not merely a sports field. It is the "post-modern stadium", "multifunctional, multi-sport and flexible" (Bale, 2002, p. 135). This flexibility is at the core of the strategies utilised by Copenhagen and Herning as intangible professionalisation was coupled with tangible event infrastructure. They sought to build a narrative about capable of events in general and the infrastructure, which they built to support this narrative, not least the arena, should be just as general in its use as the narrative. Bergen has no similar purpose-built arena, but the local stakeholders show the same desire for flexibility. According to a civil servant, they instead would look for "what the city would be a natural arena for". A public event consultant described how this included looking at the harbour as an arena or interpreting idea of a "natural arena" quite literally, i.e. how the city's physical surroundings could support its event strategy. In the case of the UCI World Road Championship, which did not take place in any typical arena, Bergen's proximity to the sea and mountains made the event "spectacular, sportive attractive and [gave] fantastic TV pictures" (as described by an organiser from the municipality).

However, an arena should not just accommodate events. It is important that it does so in a spectacular way. From this perspective, stadiums could even be limitations compared with nature. The mountains around Bergen were particularly useful not just because of their beauty and the "fantastic" TV pictures but also because of the challenging route

they provided. In the case of the half marathon in Copenhagen, the flat route made it attractive sportswise surrounded by the city as an attractive stage. Going outside of the stadium, the cities are able to combine natural finesse with their cultural assets (picturesque central Oslo with nature nearby, World Heritage settings in Bergen etc.). The setting could also be related to positive contributions to global problems; for example, in Copenhagen a local event consultant described how an event in the harbour had focused on how the athletes “competed on our clean water in our clean harbour. Environmentally friendly event, sustainability, all that...”. By extending the arena beyond the pitch to the whole city, the local stakeholders no longer simply base their position in the event field on their technical resources. Although often linked with tangible infrastructural elements be it multiarenas or the framing of local geographical conditions as arenas, the local stakeholders provide a wide, positive local narrative with a global resonance and a subtle, hardly explainable status as eventful.

6.1.2.2 Small municipalities – coincidental hosts

For smaller municipalities, the event approach is different. Like the bigger municipalities, they too have an interest in events and informants from the sport organisations explained how smaller municipalities were often very eager to make the most of such occasions. However, they rarely have a position in the event field which enables them to pursue events strategically. Instead, their events become independent objects of investments not related to other international sport events. For instance, the Danish municipalities of Næstved and Kolding hosted parts of the World Women’s Handball Championship in 2015 in their new handball arenas. However, the trigger for building these facilities had been a need for better facilities for their local sport not the events. A sport facility administrator recalled how, only during the planning process, did the local sport and the municipalities decide to build them as arenas with stands all around the pitch and in compliance with the criteria for international handball broadcasting. This then decision put them in contact with a representative from the DHF who promised to “do his utmost to give them a group round in the Women’s World Championship [in 2015]”. Although the coincidental handball championships went well in both municipalities, they did not lead to a lasting pursuit of international sport events. This confirms the close association between

events and arenas while also underlining how the acquisition of an arena is insufficient to sustain a position in the event field. The bigger municipalities not only build the arenas but also integrated them into their general event strategy and therefore converted them into symbolic capital. In the cases of the smaller municipalities, the arenas and the events instead became part of other strategies and activities, which nevertheless focused on some of the same outcomes as the bigger municipalities. One local politician for instance explained that they had supported the events “because we believe some of these activities make people [from outside the city] come”.

In one of my Danish cases a small municipality did have a lasting interest in events and attempted to compensate for its size, by engaging in a regional cluster of cooperation, which among other things focused on events.¹¹¹ However, according to an event consultant in such a cluster, they still have to be pragmatic “partly by force of circumstances”. Even the cluster is still a small player and:

[w]e may make a strategy for what we want – right now there are just a lot of regions, cities also out in the world, which really want this. So you want a strategy? That is fine, but sometimes it is a question of ‘what can we get?’

The supply of event has increased, but the so has the demand, and for less prominent hosts it is seller’s market.

6.1.2.3 Conclusion: The municipalities - adaptation as a strategy

Danish and Norwegian municipalities share an interest in events and conceptualise them as investments for the benefit of the city. As such, they reflect the idea of being “eventful” as a way of solving current problems related to the liquid modernity and the global competition, which have been considered in the contextual chapters (G. Richards & Palmer,

¹¹¹ There are several examples of such clusters in Denmark, e.g. on the Danish island Funen (<https://www.sporteventfyn.com>) and in the Triangle Region of Central Jutland (<https://www.trekantomraadet.dk>).

2010, p. 2). Regarding their role as stakeholders more specifically, the municipalities have a high social commitment, i.e. consideration for the event's impact on their peers. As municipalities are important as providers of facilities too, they have also proved to have a high organisational commitment.

For some, the commitment extends beyond the individual event. Instead of the event using incidentally available resources, these stakeholders would provide infrastructure and other resources comes specifically for events in general. The most tangible sign of the adoption of such an event logic was the development of event strategies in some municipalities. The strategies for one confirm the interest in events as investments, but this section shows that their most important contribution has been spurring the municipalities' organisational commitment in the form of a more professional event approach. In some cases, this has taken the form of concrete new facilities or organisations and a direct acquisition of relevant cultural capital. In other cases, the cities have used existing resources to increase their symbolic capital in the event field. In the case of Bergen, for instance, the city has adopted a new event perspective with regard to its existing resources by considering the natural environment to be an arena. The most engaged of the municipalities in this way adjust to the structures in the competitive event field by accumulating of a cultural capital focused on professionalism, spectacular events and the image as "eventful". These structures also help explaining the successful informal, political processes. Stable structures make it easier for the gatekeepers to assess the relevance of an event for the rest of the political field.

6.1.3 Engaged stakeholders: the event as investment

The presentation of events as investments in the event discourse among both federations and the municipalities produces a good fit with the general discourse involving the competition state. However, looking at the relations between events in particular, this section has also demonstrated how the relationship between some NGBs and municipalities and the events functions according to the dynamics of a particular event field. In both sectors some stakeholders made strategic efforts to improve their position in the field, for instance by accumulating cultural capital through the construction of facilities and adapting

a more professional event approach. As most of them have only started this effort recently, they also draw on their symbolic capital from their fields of origin (the field of politics and sport respectively). The federations for the most popular sports highlight their cultural ties to the nation or international success, whereas the cities use existing assets such as landmarks or brands, for example being sustainable. Although not directly relevant for hosting events in the way a new stadium would be, these resources could still be converted into relevant symbolic capital. After the event, the conversion would then be expected to function the other way around and make a positive contribution to the city or the sport federation. I will analyse this investment further in the next chapter.

However, not all engaged stakeholders have access to this symbolic capital. Some hosts are less prominent members of the event field but come to host an event nevertheless. In my cases this was usually smaller municipalities. It was necessary for these actors to ally with more recognised stakeholders to be able to carry out the event. These were typically bigger municipalities, but it is also possible to imagine national, concerted efforts to accumulate relevant capital through national event policies. I will return to this area in section 6.4 after my analysis of the latent stakeholders below.

6.2 Latent stakeholders

The latent stakeholders are organisations not strictly necessary for the event but with whom the engaged stakeholders might consider an allegiance because of the latent stakeholders' access to certain resources. The passive, militant and allied stakeholders are all latent stakeholders, with the exception of the event owner which will be discussed later (cf. Figure 10).

Based on the general structure of sport events, references in the media and my interviews, I have sorted the latent stakeholders in my cases into:

1. Allied stakeholders (low social commitment/high organisational commitment): the regional and national public administrations and sponsors.

2. Militant stakeholders (low organisational commitment/high social commitment): commercial stakeholders such as the media and lobby organisations (mostly tourism organisations).

These stakeholders are not given members of the event field since they have no interest in the event as such and their initial state is passive. Nevertheless, they have the potential to influence the field as allied or militant stakeholders if invited or in other ways made interested of the event (cf. the arrows in Figure 10). If invited, they will however have no direct influence on the event field as they do not adapt to the event field. They might at best have an indirect influence based on the engaged stakeholders' interest in gaining access to their capitals. The aim of this section is to analyse this potential influence and how it supports and potentially forms the discourse and interest in events. It begins with the potential allied stakeholders before analysing the influence of the militant stakeholders.

6.2.1 Allied stakeholders

Allied stakeholders have low social commitment and high organisational commitment. The social commitment describes the stakeholders' concern regarding an event's impact on their peers. Low social commitment around events does not mean that these stakeholders have no social commitment at all; rather, their social commitment is low relative to the social commitment of the engaged stakeholders. Organisational commitment is aligned with the stakeholders' contribution of capitals. For the cases in this thesis, however, not all of the allied stakeholders chose to use the organisational influence for which their contributions opened.

6.2.1.1 *The regional public authorities*

The regional levels of public authority – the counties – are probably the most predictable of all the latent stakeholders. They typically get involved as allied stakeholders early in the process as providers of tangible/practical resources for the event. Still, they do not belong to the engaged group as they operate at an arm's distance and typically refuse to join before a municipality has accepted the role as the host. The exact type of resources

they provide differ from Denmark to Norway because the counties have different competences. Danish counties can only support events financially, so that is what they do. As one county civil servant puts it,

[i]f we did not have any money, people would not want [to talk to us].

We do not have any authority in the area. It is not as if they have to talk to us if they want to borrow a square or something. It does not matter. It is all we've got – money – in a way.

In Norway, the counties regulate public transportation and, regardless of the prospects of financial support, the engaged stakeholders would have to involve the county at some point.

Money or economic capital is however a principal contribution from both and like the engaged stakeholders, the counties have conceptualised events as investments. The outcome of the investment is broad. The strategy for the Capital Region in Denmark for instance includes local pride – for the whole of the county not just the host municipality – as well as economic outcomes.¹¹² Both Danish and Norwegian county politicians as well as the civil servants repeated similar broad scopes in the interviews, with the Norwegian counties in particular resembling enlarged municipalities. An event is an investment and the economic aspect is important, but it is also about “activity” for the county.

In Denmark, despite the broad public aims, according to a Danish civil servant the counties had “a clear growth perspective. It is like tourism turnover we look at primarily”. This is the case because the financial support comes from the budget for “the Strategy for regional development. Everything we do has to fit into that (...). There is always this

¹¹² The wording of the relevant section of the official county policy is “the cultural money in the region would especially create growth and regional value by supporting mega-events and larger reoccurring events. These have a great potential for provide for international attention and branding as well as quality of life and pride among the region’s citizens (...)” (Regionsrådet, 2014, p. 34).

agenda of [economic] growth behind it". The strategy for events is thus "to create tourism turnover something-something through larger events.' That is not how it is formulated, but that is what it means" (cf. reference to the official strategy above).

The specific aim also explains the limited influence on specific events. The economic capital is relevant for the engaged stakeholders but it is form of capital which is not in any way specific to the event field and holds little symbolic value. Regional authorities leave the staging of the event to the engaged stakeholders. As one Danish civil servant in a county put it, "we believe that the organiser has an interest in selling it as clearly as possible to the right target group". The NGB's main task is "making a successful sport event. (...) [and] of course they themselves have an interest in selling a lot of tickets". Accordingly, an official from the Ice Hockey World Championships described how, aside from the national event office, SEDK, they discussed the aims of the event with:

*the two host cities, Copenhagen and Herning, the two municipalities.
And then in principle also the two counties, the Central Region and the
Capital Region. But it is debatable how much they have been involved.
They contributed financially, that they did...*

The counties have however been able to influence the general level of events. The Danish counties for instance require that events are international and this has become an established norm among all stakeholders. According to one civil servant in the Central Region,

*[i]t is really, really few events we [: the administration for events in the
county] have to reject, because the municipalities know what level we
ask for, and if relevant, we also often talk with officials beforehand
(...). So it is only a minority which eventually reaches the politicians.*

The county's administration therefor acts as a gatekeeper, emphasising the importance of an economic outcome from international events only. However, it might also be the case that some events bypass this through informal procedures. The bid for the Grand Depart, i.e. the first stages of the Tour de France, which Denmark is set to host in 2021, for instance,

never went through the (...) evaluation tool we got. [Instead, the order came from the political level to] make a case on this, and then we made a case (...) I mean, there are some projects which are like prestige projects in Denmark, Tour de France, Formula 1. All that is above our [: the civil servants] paygrade.

6.2.1.2 *The state*

What also makes one of these “prestige projects”, the Tour de France, special is the direct involvement of the Danish national government (direct in the sense that the money from the state would come from the national budget). Such direct support is otherwise rare in Denmark because of the national event office, SEDK, which has a budget dedicated to event support.

In Norway, which has no similar office or policy, such ad-hoc support became increasingly normal in the course of the 2010s because it was the only way for the state to support events. This at least was the case until May 2019, when the state allocated a pool of money for supporting sport events (Kulturdepartementet, 2019b). This was the culmination of an increasing turn-away from the position which the government had taken in the most recent policy paper on sport from 2012. The paper was the first explicit governmental position on sport events in general and in principle it opened for governmental financial support for events by acknowledging that events could have a positive impact on e.g. the national pride, economic growth, tourism, civil society etc. (Kulturdepartementet, 2012, pp. 114–115).¹¹³ However, as a rule of thumb, the government would not support them since “the hosting of tournaments and championships is a part of the federations’ core business” (Kulturdepartementet, 2012, p. 115). It would only consider supporting

¹¹³ A policy paper was not put to a vote in the Norwegian parliament, but the committee on culture and family policies in Stortinget, with the exception of the right-wing party Fremskrittspartiet, unanimously agreed that “it should be an aim in the sport policy that Norway regularly host international championships” (Familie- og kulturkomiteen, 2013 - Komiteens merknader, pkt. 2.10). The two previous policy papers on sport from 1992 and 1999 only discussed hosting sport events related to the facilities built for the Lillehammer Olympics in 1994 and new national sport facilities (Kulturdepartementet, 1992, p. 112, 1999, sec. 4.3.5.1).

events which were interesting for Norway because of “sport and other interests” (Kulturdepartementet, 2012, p. 116). These events should also leave facilities with a realistic perspective of subsequent use and build on Norwegian advantages such as the climate. “In reality, this means that the large international sport event which could be eligible for support from the state would be the Winter Olympics” (Kulturdepartementet, 2012, p. 116). The adoption in 2012 of this overt (albeit heavily restricted) governmental support for events did not cause any debate, indicating that it confirmed the existing praxis.¹¹⁴

Since the publication of the policy in 2012, the strict limits and focus on the Winter Olympics have slowly deteriorated. In 2013, the government introduced a policy for large sport events in general as one of its aims (cf. Statsministerens kontor, 2013, p. 52, 2018, 2019, p. 66) and since then several international sport events such as the annual cycling race the Arctic Race, the X-Games, Raw Air, the Lillehammer Youth Winter Olympics, and the World Orienteering Championship have received support via the state budget. The Ministry of Culture also previously administered an annual pool of five million NOK for funding volunteers at international cycling races in Norway (Kulturdepartementet, 2016b), while the Arctic Race received 15 million annually from 2016-2018 from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries (Nærings- og Fiskeridepartementet, 2015).¹¹⁵ Such cases of support from several ministries often occur because the organisers ask for support with references to several, specific benefits from the event such as public health, child’s education etc. The Ministry of Culture, responsible for the Norwegian sport in general, is often

¹¹⁴ Only two times in the discussions on the paper did politicians comment at length on the sport event policy. The comments revolved around the joy associated with events, e.g. “large parts of the population are co-owners when we have large events”, “Sport policies encompasses a lot (...) not least (...) the great joy we have when attending sport events”. They also highlighted the relationship between elite sport and sport-for-all (Stortinget, 2013, pp. 2470, 2480). None of the NGOs or other organisations commented on this during the public hearing (Familie- og kulturkomiteen, 2012)

¹¹⁵ In 2019, the Ministry of Culture took over and supported the event as any other sport event. In 2020, the reason for the support was again based on the event’s relevance for “the business and industry policy”. However, the support continued to come from the Ministry of Culture (Kulturdepartementet, 2019a, p. 79).

the one, which receives the initial application for support only to redirect it to the ministries responsible for the various potential benefits highlighted in the application. In the case of Bergen 2017 for instance, the organisers applied for support from a wide range of Ministries including Transport & Communications and Trade, Industry & Fisheries (Kulturdepartementet, 2016c; Nærings- og Fiskeridepartementet, 2016; Samferdselsdepartementet, 2017). This unregulated support gave a national civil servant the impression that “perhaps somewhat exaggerated, [it is] almost a bit coincidental which events get supported” and meant that the applicants were dependent on lobbying. The civil servant concluded that since 2012 it:

all trickled a bit and some events (...) received support. And that means today we get a lot more applications (...). And most of them get a letter of rejection, which just refers to the fact that there are no support schemes in budget and that lottery money is not used for events.

The main change in 2019 is thus not the idea of supporting events as such. The new money seems to come in addition to the money already allocated to events by the government. In the two most recent governmental budgets (2019 and 2020), this existing support amounted to 38 and 41 million NOK (approximately 3.8–4.1 million €), respectively (Kulturdepartementet, 2018, pp. 12–13, 2019a, pp. 43, 79; Stortinget, 2019, p. 17). To this would then come the approximately 20 million NOK (two million €) for which the federations can apply (NIF, 2019d). Compared with Denmark, the support for events from the Norwegian government even before the current policy by far exceeds SEDK’s budget of 24.2 million DKK (around 3.2 million €) (Udlodningsloven, 2017, para. 12). Including the direct support from the Danish government does not change this picture of a relatively limited budget as the only recent example is the one-time support of 17 million DKK (approximately 2.3 million €) provided for the start of the Tour de France (Erhvervsministeriet, 2017).

The new aspect introduced by the change in 2019 is the formal regulation for how to apply for event support. The event inter alia has to be a European or world championship,

organised by member-based organisations and preferably with a high number of participating countries (Kulturdepartementet, 2019b). As with the regional public authorities, the national public level does not hold any symbolic capital relevant for the event field. It does however contribute with economical capital and thereby sustain the field while also setting criteria for what constitutes a relevant event and who should organise these events. My cases fulfil these criteria and are therefore poorly suited to showing any controversies around these demands in the field. However, the debate in the Norwegian media over the public support for privately owned events indicates a potential conflict over the *nomos* or the ‘proper’ event in the event field (Juven, 2016; Magnussen, 2018). Essentially, this is a debate over access to the event field. So far, the criteria from for instance the Norwegian state emphasise the civil society as organisers of the events, which fits well with the traditional partnership between sport organisations and the welfare state described in the previous chapter. This prioritises the *sport* in the sport event and gives the sport organisations an increased legitimacy and symbolic capital in the event field compared to commercial agents, despite the organisations’ own embracement of the idea of the event as an investment.

6.2.1.3 Sponsors

For the project, I have interviewed representatives from two sponsors of two different events. One was a main sponsor and the other a “partner”, i.e. contributing primarily to the event in kind.

In line with the general research’s notion that sponsors want to “influence the content of the event”, the sponsors in my cases emphasised that they would like to go beyond the simplest idea of sponsoring – giving money in return for exposure (G. Richards & Palmer, 2010, p. 163). They wanted to co-produce the event, if only in specific areas and with no intention to influence the event in general, for example by setting an overarching goal for the event. As of 2020, that still seems restricted to events directly owned by private companies such as X-Games. Co-production in my cases simply meant contributions of more than money or practical goods. The partner, who received VIP events for their business contacts in return for their goods, for instance also organised activities in the fan zone.

The main sponsor, which sponsored specifically for visibility, ensured this via billboards and by organising public events integrated within the general setup of the sport event.

The sponsor initiatives were visible, open to the public and contributed to public celebration. All the stakeholders regarded the sponsors' contributions as beneficial for their own agendas, which would explain why none of the engaged stakeholders reported any influence from their sponsors. The idea of the event as an investment clearly makes it an object to which various stakeholders attach their products and in the case of the sponsors, they contributed to the object's "shared value" by conducting a form of Corporate Social Responsibility "through sport" while also improving their brands or business in general (François et al., 2019, pp. 90, 93; cf. discussion in Dembek et al., 2016; Lash, 2007).

6.2.2 Militant stakeholders

Militant stakeholders are groups with high social commitment in the event. The commitment might be due to a desire to change the event for the better or to stop it from happening due to a fear of harm for the militant stakeholders' peers. In any case, they cannot implement their suggestions alone. They resemble – or are outright – lobby organisations and as such they "do not commit themselves to implementing negotiated agreements in the same way as interest group representatives" (Rommetvedt, 2017, p. 13). In other words, they have little or no organisational influence on the event. Any success relies on getting their voice heard by stakeholders within the event organisation. The aforementioned NOlympics movement is a good example of this. However, there are also positive militant stakeholders with social or economic capital relevant for the engaged stakeholders.

6.2.2.1 Lobby organisations

Lobby organisations for various branches are the clearest examples of pro-event militant stakeholders. In my cases, the national Danish Chamber of Commerce and the Oslo branch of the Norwegian equivalent were involved in two events.

For the engaged stakeholders, lobby organisations are relevant in so far as they provide relevant social capital through their networks and access to the political field. However,

these organisations are selective. Senior officials from both organisations emphasised that their involvements in the particular events under study were exceptional. The Oslo section of Norwegian Chamber of Commerce only supported the bid for the 2022 Winter Olympics because of the Olympics' potential for boosting tourism, the building of new infrastructure and innovation. The chamber sought to ensure the latter by coupling the Olympics with a project entitled "Innovative investments" – a long-running scheme aiming at ensuring that public investments contribute to some form of innovation. The department for tourism in the Danish Chamber for Commerce was active around the Ice Hockey World Championship. Like in Oslo, this event was relevant because it was a convincingly profitable investment. It, according to the official, had a good match between the facilities for the sport, the number of visits, etc. They too saw the chamber's support as a public service since "with that much money, the private sector has to be involved. We have to make sure we use those [public] resources in the best possible way". By promoting good examples such as the ice hockey event, the Danish Chamber of Commerce helped in "making the society run well [which in turn] makes it easier to run a business". Thus, lobby organisations promote the investment discourse in the event field and the idea of the event as public service even when depending on private "sponsoring". They therefore suggest a compromise between a civic and a market-based order of worth which Boltanski and Thévenot were otherwise unable to find (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, p. 325). I will come back to the variation in orders of worth for events and the potential compromises in the next chapter.

The local offices for tourism are the local parallels to the national lobby organisations. They too underlined the importance of the events as investments for an economic outcome. For their members, the events must make an economic impact. One Bergen tourism official described how this is not necessarily always as important for the municipality, which is "very concerned about the non-economic impact, health, culture and such things".

6.2.2.2 *The press*

The media rarely has a direct organisational stake in any events – if one excludes cases of direct ownership like ESPN’s X-Games and the French sport event organiser ASO’s Tour de France. Most contemporary sports journalism is not the “active journalism” from the beginning of the 20th century (cf. G. Richards & Palmer, 2010, p. 165). The only other involvement which could qualify the media as more than a passive spectator is critical journalism, whereby the media has a social commitment. However the debate around the events studied here was limited, which made reporting difficult because there were no obvious conflicts on which to base a story. Journalists often had to dig out conflicts themselves through investigative journalism. This is complicated and the Danish newspaper *Politiken* is as mentioned a rare case of a newspaper which makes an effort in that regard.

The bid for the Winter Olympics in Oslo was the only case which caused some debate in the media. Some informants from the NIF even claimed that the media had contributed willingly to the failed bid. Although a survey of the written press coverage of the debate shows that some papers did have a trend in their coverage either in favour of or against the Oslo Olympics, this does not mean they contributed to the bid’s failure (Seippel et al., 2016). Only a few publications overtly declared themselves for or against the bid. A trend in the coverage could therefore just as well be related to media as adherent to a commercial logic. This would mean that the coverage was responsive to the public sentiment/the customers, be it through critical coverage or by inviting readers to contribute through short text messages or letters to the editor, as opposed to an outlet’s original negative attitude to the event (Sarpebakken, 2017, p. 74)

In the other cases, there was minimal debate. In line with sports journalism’s usual stand on sport, the media generally remained uncritical and enthusiastic. I only found seven

examples of letters from the editors across all the cases and only in local papers.¹¹⁶ As in the case of the Oslo bid, this could be explained by the media's interest in telling the story the way their audience wants it. However, in these cases this perspective was unambiguously beneficial for the event too. Some informants from the case in Bergen for instance experienced the media as supportive, pushing the event forward. This extends the importance of the media. I have previously described how the media was important for the globalisation of sport because of the coverage *during* the event.¹¹⁷ It could also be important before the event. As a platform for typically only the positive sides of the event in question (cf. list of the pro-event arguments used in the media in Figure 12), the media could be said to support the general doxa in the event field; however, our lack of knowledge regarding the public's perception of this coverage makes it difficult to make any absolute statements about the media's role.

6.2.3 Conclusion

In conclusion, there are important supporters for events among the latent stakeholders because of the capital they hold. They have little symbolic capital directly relevant for the event field but a considerable amount of social and economic capital, which the engaged stakeholders can convert into cultural and eventually symbolic capital in the event field relatively easily.

The potentially allied stakeholders are the regional and national levels of public administration and the sponsors. Their most important impact is the supply of economic capital, but in the eyes of an NIF official the public event policies can also provide "legitimacy for the idea of weighing the options for getting the Olympics to Norway". From the sponsors,

¹¹⁶ Two from the Ice Hockey World Championship (Larsen, 2017, 2018), four concerning Bergen 2017 (Bøe et al., 2017, 2017; Karlsen, 2016, 2017) and one on the Women's Handball World Championship (C. F. Hansen, 2012)

¹¹⁷ The Norwegian sport researcher Jon Helge Lesjø has also previously pointed out how the logic of sports journalism (Lillehammer as the underdog fighting against all odds) advocated the idea of getting the Winter Olympics to Lillehammer during the early phases (2020).

their contribution in kind also contributed to the outcome for the stakeholders in general by making the event more popular.

An event is an investment for all the allied stakeholders. The regional and national levels were similarly broad in their formulations about the outcome as the engaged stakeholders (except for the Danish counties, which has an exclusive economic perspective). The sponsors' aims were limited by their parallel to a policy, their business plan.

Their contributions to the events gave the allied stakeholders a potential organisational stake. However, for the most it remained a potential stake. The main sponsor used it the most but not to a degree which led the engaged stakeholders to report on it in the interviews when asked. The public levels had aims but at the county level they found that the organisers served the counties' aims well. The Danish state left this aspect to SEDK. In Norway some ministries might have followed up their support more closely, but I have not come across reports of a direct organisational influence.

The militant stakeholders did not make any financial contributions and had no organisational commitment. Although they were important due to their social capital, the relevance of the militant stakeholders should not be overstated as they were not present in all the cases and would often activate themselves rather only following an invitation from the engaged stakeholders. When supportive, the lobby organisations were eager supporters of the investment discourse and thus promoted the interest in events generally since this also was the main discourse among the engaged stakeholders.

The section has also considered the influence of the media. It is however difficult to say anything conclusive about the role of the press because of their limited active involvement in most of the project's cases.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ Obviously media activities such as TV stations paying for the broadcasting rights are immense sources of economic capital during the event. This project however only considers the influence of the print media on the interest in the event prior to the event.

The shared nomos of an event as an investment eases the cooperation between the stakeholder groups and limits any potential frictions caused by corporations, e.g. regarding the event field's autonomy, which could be affected when the members of the field recognise the aims of allied or militant stakeholders in return for economic or social capital. This section has however also mentioned how the inclusion of commercial agents caused some debate over the access to public support and essentially what an event should be. In chapter 7, I will return to how an investment discourse focused in particular on an economic outcome is controversial within some of the engaged stakeholders too. First, this chapter concludes with a perspective on these local stakeholders' relation to the global level.

6.3 The global level: The event owners

The local event field is based on a mutual recognition between the NGBs and the public authorities around the event as an interesting investment. The exact outcome of this investment is not given, but it gives a common nomos in the field and leads some of the engaged stakeholders to accumulate capitals specific to the event field. If one imagines these stakeholders as horizontally connected, there is space left for vertical connections. These connections are explored in this section with a focus on the influence of the international federations/event owners on the event discourse. Their prominence is based on a formal and wide-ranging influence. They set the criteria for the event both concerning the rules for the sport and the surrounding sport facilities, in addition to any requirements for general infrastructure, accommodation, etc. However, these formalities are merely... formalities. A Danish event consultant from SEDK described them as the "hard-core part of an event". They are relatively easy to fulfil given sufficient economic resources. To win the event requires, again with reference to an SEDK informant, something "extra" from the bidder to stand out. Here too the event owner is central, only this time in ways which can be hard to grasp.

With regard to the event owner's role as the event 'overseer' or keeper of the formalities, the local stakeholders generally did not see the owner as particularly involved. An informant from the Ice Hockey World Championship experienced a rather distant event owner:

[T]o be completely honest, we do not see them as a partner. We rather see them as... how to put it? Some kind of schoolmaster. They are just... here is the reading list and then you are examined in four years more or less.

In the case of the DAF, the official mentioned about their approach to the hosting of the Cross-Country World Championship in 2019. The event owner, IAAF, according to an official, trusted the host/the DAF to change the rules. The DAF namely wanted to use artificial obstacles, and:

really you are not allowed to do that according to the rules, but we suggest that and get permission. (...) we have also said, that we open for amateurs to qualify for the race, to participate in the world championship. The rules forbid that too. We... that was actually a condition for us bidding at all.

The Oslo bid showed how there also might be close relations between event owner and bidder. In a highly unusual move, the owner or at least its local representative and then Norwegian member of the IOC, Gerhard Heiberg, disseminated the positive view the "world" had of Norway as a host in the Norwegian media (e.g. Overn, 2011). Heiberg also pointed out the expected support from the IOC since "Oslo [could] offer all the IOC talks about when it comes to 'compact games'" (Bugge, 2011).

The event owners seem to trust the local Danish and Norwegian event stakeholders. This trust does not come just because of technical capabilities; almost any bidder could get these using the most accessible of Bourdieu's three capitals, the economic. More plausibly, it comes when some federations, like the DHF, convert their recognised position in the sport field to into a symbolic capital relevant for the event field. An official from DHF points out that for the event owner,

the potential for spreading the handball [is important]. [And DHF then promises][w]e will spend money on support for the smaller handball nations, e.g. by inviting them to Denmark and holding some seminars telling them how we develop the handball in Denmark.

SEDK used the same strategy when bidding for the ICF Canoe Sprint World Championships in 2021. It promised to increase the number of participating nations from 80 to 100. While this also has to do with the economic resources a federation is willing to invest, the DHF and SEDK's promises have a weight beyond the financial capital their promises require. They claim a symbolic capital originating from a nation with a good reputation for handball and events.

Here, it is important remember that this use of symbolic capital is based on the expectation that the DHF will fulfil the "hardcore" or formal part of the event completely. Cultural competences are an important symbolic capital but they only really show their effect when the local stakeholder has the economic and technical resources required to fulfil the "hardcore" criteria. However, in Bergen in 2017 the cultural competences might have helped fulfilling the technical requirements. It was a successful event and a study on the organisation concludes that even "[i]f the organizational infrastructure was fragile the cultural infrastructure was certainly robust" (Kristiansen et al., n.d., p. 27). As the event however ended in an economical disaster, possibly the strong cultural infrastructure was a poor substitute for an organisational ditto.

In general, continuing the metaphor of the event owner as a schoolmaster, Denmark and Norway are not anarchists. They stay within the institutions as good students who know that in the words of an official from SEDK, they only:

borrow their [: the international federations'] events. They are the ones who got them and then we take them and do something about them in Denmark. What you have to remember in this process is that for them it is all about playing it safe. 'This has to go well, if we give them this

*event. Yes, first and foremost it has to go well, and can they do something which makes it shine...’ we borrow the event from the owner, a sign of confidence.*¹¹⁹

When they have gained their trust, the ‘students’, qua their ‘socioeconomic background’ and cultural capital, understand what the event owner wants as “extra”. The value of the symbolic capital held by the Danish and Norwegian stakeholders is dependent on the owner’s approval. This study of mainly successful cases makes it easy to misrecognise the symbolic power held by the event owners. I have not come across any broad statistical surveys of local bid failure rates, but in 2017 SEDK prided itself of succeeding with around 80% of its bids (SEDK, 2017a, p. 2). Despite their symbolic capital, the 20% lost bids show that the local stakeholders do not control the field and that the global level still has the “last say” (cf. chapter 2).

On the local level, these cultural assets and symbolic capital are not equally available to all national federations. The NSF and the DHF are well known both for their sporting capabilities and their events, but what about less fortunate federations or small municipalities? I have previously suggested that they benefit from a national source of cultural and symbolic capital. This would mean these capitals would be accumulated somewhere. In the chapter’s final section, I analyse the Danish and Norwegian containers for these resources with a focus on how they glocalise the global event field.

6.4 Glocalising the event field

Putting the above discussion in more precise terms, I see two such “containers” or perhaps better institutions in the national Danish event policy and the Lillehammer Olympics. As of 2020, Denmark has had an event policy for more than ten years. The centre of the policy is SEDK, a publicly financed organisation supporting international sport events in

¹¹⁹ This also means that the event owner might step in if this trust is breached, as UCI perceived it to be the case in Bergen (Kristiansen et al., n.d., p. 23).

Denmark with advice and money. While Norway does not have a similar policy,¹²⁰ it has hosted the Winter Olympics twice. This analysis looks at what role the most recent edition, the Games in Lillehammer in 1994, plays for Norwegian stakeholders regarding how one should host events and what yield one should expect from them. Potentially, these are institutions in both Denmark and Norway which give a frame for how to translate incoming global events in the proper “Danish” or “Norwegian” way. In addition, I follow up on the question on the global influence and events as cases of glocalisation.

6.4.1.1 Analysing the creation of a field

In the analysis of the event field so far, I have – in accordance with the field theory – based my analysis on the stakeholders’ capabilities depending on strategies, capitals and practice. But can a “frame” have an agency? Do the Lillehammer Olympics have a practice and a strategy? The Lillehammer Olympics today exist only as a story and in the facilities they left. SEDK exists as an actual organisation, but it is there to support the NGBs and the public authorities rather than to stage the events alone. What is the agency of SEDK? For all the stakeholders analysed above, it was the promises of benefits specific to their field of origin, which first led them to join the event field. Does SEDK have any aims beyond attracting events? How can we understand its role if that is not the case?

Instead of seeing the Lillehammer Olympics and SEDK as stakeholders and agents, I suggest that it is more useful to see their role in the field as frames for the stakeholders. The Lillehammer Olympics and SEDK did not come to the field; instead, they have been there all the time. They created it, or were used as strawmen by those who actually did. They then attracted the stakeholders and entranced them. The Lillehammer Olympics and SEDK never acquired a feel for the game; they were the ones who developed or were used to develop the game (cf. Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 286).¹²¹ What I analyse in this section is therefore not the practice in, but the creation of a local event field related to

¹²⁰ An outline of a Norwegian event strategy was, as mentioned, only presented in 2019.

¹²¹ At least generally, for instance the NSF is able to handle its events on its own and maintain a reputation less dependent on the “Norwegian” way of doing events.

its global counterpart. Leaving practice means a divergence from Bourdieu's field theory, which furthermore has little to say about how fields come to be except that it is most likely to happen during periods of upheaval. This could explain the creation of an event field around single events but falls short of explaining how an event field can form outside of the chaos which a sport event can bring. In the following, I instead see the creation of the local event field as the outcome of SEDK and Lillehammer's "translations" (or glocalisation) of the global event field. The idea of translations was first presented by the French sociologists Michel Callon and Bruno Latour in 1981. They described translations as "negotiations, (...) thanks to which an actor or force takes, or causes to be conferred on itself, authority to speak or act on behalf of another actor or force" (Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 279). SEDK and Lillehammer are not the actors but resources that the stakeholders can use to grasp the global event. This does not mean the local stakeholders fully control the global event; rather, it is a "negotiation" and SEDK and Lillehammer are the interpreters.

In a later paper, Callon (1984) devised four acts for a translation process and these are used to guide this analysis. The first act is problematisation. Here, an association presents a problem and positions itself as the solution or at least as "indispensable" for the finding of the solution. The second act, interressement, takes place when the association makes sure that the other agents focus on it. It is closely linked to enrolment, i.e. the forming of actual alliances in the third step. If these alliances form successfully, the Lillehammer Olympics or SEDK can mobilise/be made to represent the event stakeholders and say "what these entities [i.e. the event stakeholders] are and want" (Callon, 1984, p. 217). It is important to note that when I say "SEDK can", this could just as well be "SEDK can be made to". SEDK or Lillehammer do not have to be active. They can also be used by other organisations who might break the alliance or connect them to new problems. The translation process is not straightforward or finished once some stakeholders form an alliance and mobilise behind it.

Finally, I do not mean to abandon the field theory. The translations help explain the mechanisms by which these institutions come into place. However, when Callon and Latour ask "who will win?", their answer is "the one who is able to stabilize a particular state of

power relations by associating the largest number of irreversibly linked elements” (1981, p. 293). Power in translations accumulates when an actor/institution is able to put things into “black boxes”, i.e. things “which no longer needs to be reconsidered, those things whose contents have become a matter of indifference” (Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 285). How is this possible? With the accumulation of power, there must be talk of a stabilisation. Thereby, we have moved beyond the creation of the field and this means the field mechanisms are once again relevant. The black boxing could be understood as a form of symbolic violence. In the field theory, this occurs when an agent, based on her/his position in the field, is able to make other agents “misrecognise” the agent’s influence on them. Instead of seeing exercises of power/symbolic violence, they consider the influence as part of everyday life (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 192). They have become indifferent; the power has been put into a black box.

6.4.2 “Our Lillehammer”: Events based on a national identity

The Lillehammer Winter Olympics were staged in 1994, but more than 25 years later the Games or rather the story about them is nevertheless influential on the way Norwegian event stakeholders think about current events. The Lillehammer Olympics not only left legacies relevant for Norwegian and global editions of the Olympics like being environmentally friendly and the Games as a boost for urban development (Girginov, 2018, p. 2), the Games also introduced three more general features which will appear throughout this thesis’ analysis of contemporary Norwegian bids.

Lillehammer’s three features relevant for every Norwegian event come from a study of the 1994 Olympics conducted by the Norwegian social anthropologist Arne Martin Klausen (1996). The first feature of the Games then (and, so I claim, later international sport events in Norway) is the demand for Winter Olympics on Norwegian “conditions”. “[O]ne could often get the impression that it was a special mission for the Norwegians to show the world we could bring back the Games to this [original] state of innocence, to

push it a bit” (Klausen, 1996, p. 29).¹²² This would e.g. include putting a distance to e.g. to the global development of commercialisation of the sport by bringing people close to the action and the athletes. Thereby the Lillehammer Games has already become a potential symbol of some more general problems in global sport (commercialisation) and as well as the solution to the problems namely a Norwegian approach stressing e.g. a close connection between athletes and spectators.

This intimacy is closely related to the second theme, the justification of the Games by the expected national public celebration. It was both a theme in the branding as well as an accepted argument in the budget negotiations before the Lillehammer Games (Klausen, 1996, pp. 103, 127). The Olympics as an occasion for huge public celebrations also happened when the country first hosted the Games in Oslo in 1952 (Heyerdahl, 2014, p. 200), but the Lillehammer Games confirmed the public celebration aspect as central.

The third feature is the event as an outcome of a local initiative. At the time of the Games, a local myth developed around the idea for the bid that it came from inter alia stakeholders in the local tourist branch and politics – consequently also with the expectation of a local outcome.

Outside of Norway, there is nothing that would link these features uniquely to the Winter Olympics. In Norway, however, the event stakeholders’ point of reference when discussing these features would very often be the Lillehammer Olympics. The majority of references of course appeared during my interviews with informants attached to the Oslo bid. An NIF official explained how the Lillehammer Olympics were a “huge success” for both Norwegian sport as a whole and the inland Lillehammer Region after the oil-induced growth in coastal Norway (cf. the third feature). They and any future Olympics were and would be “not just a sport project, but a project for the general society” (the second feature). As the research in legacies shows, this is not an expectation exclusive to Norwegian

¹²² Later research indicates that this happened to some degree as the Lillehammer Games did produce a resonance between the Olympic values and the Nordic model “relating to peace, internationalism and the environment” (Bergsgard, Bratland-Sanda, et al., 2019, p. 518).

Olympic stakeholders. The local experiences resonate with a global discourse to which the local stakeholders add specificities and more importantly can associate with a local occurrence. An NIF official described how NIF as such considers “the Olympics [as] a unique opportunity to involve large parts of the Norwegian society (...) and unite the nation (...) a common point of reference”. In the eyes of an NIF sport politician who was involved in the application for the Games in 2022, this common point for the Norwegian people, began with “the Games in 1994”.

This myth has had the consequence that the Winter Olympics have become a credible answer to any questions regarding what an ambitious municipality in Norway should pursue as its next goal (cf. the third feature of the Lillehammer Games). At least according to two NIF officials, the answer would be to “go for the biggest project in the world, the Olympic Games”. Although the NIF formally representing the Olympic movement in Norway appoints the Norwegian candidate cities, at least until the Oslo process, the Winter Olympics were bigger than the NIF. There was a living local interest in the event without the NIF undertaking any advocacy work. The Lillehammer initiation and the initiatives to bid for the Winter Olympics in 2014 and 2018 all began outside the NIF beginning with local coalitions of inter alia district sport associations, municipalities and often also tourist organisations (Lesjø, 2007).

The clearest example of the Lillehammer Olympics’ successful not only interessement but also enrolment, i.e. forming of alliances, is the Lillehammer Municipality. According to one local politician (not involved in the Games in 1994), the Olympic discussion has been ongoing “almost continuously since... 94 or shortly afterwards”. The Games in 1994 were “an experience and it was something which meant a lot to the city, the region”. It left the image of an active city, or at least that is the story today: “[W]e are a small town, but here a lot more happens than in other small towns”. There was no need to lobby for local political support when Oslo asked for a partnership around the 2022 bid as the support had been present since February 28 1994. However, the Oslo bid constituted a break with this tradition of the event as a local effort since NIF initiated this bid centrally. The NIF never gave up the right to initiate a bid; it simply had not used it and according to one

NIF official, the organisation had and still has “a steady ambition” to host the Winter Olympics (cf. NIF, 2015b, sec. 7.5.2).¹²³ When the circumstances in 2011 therefore called for a quick decision on whether to go for the Games in 2022 or not, the NIF took the initiative and appointed Oslo as host city.¹²⁴

Even though the Oslo Municipality did not initiate the bid, a local politician did see a city in need for a boost – just like Lillehammer once had. In 2014, in the eyes of the politician, Oslo was in a period of transition caused by a significant influx of new inhabitants. Another politician in the support group Ja til OL 2022 [Yes to the Olympics 2022] wanted city development, improvements for sport in general and public celebration, “like we knew it from Lillehammer”. This group campaigned alongside the NIF, which also took up the Lillehammer theme with the motto that every generation deserved to experience the Olympics at home with the benefits “like in Lillehammer” (Røste, 2013; cf. Bugge, 2013).

Admittedly, I only found a few explicit references to Lillehammer in my material from Bergen. On the level of the practitioners, an informant from the local sport in the Bergen case believed that “(...) the world championship should be a success for Bergen, [so] that we could look back [and say] this was our Lillehammer Olympics, that here we created a public celebration”. On the formal side, Bergen’s application to UCI for the Road World Cycling Championship did however make a reference to the “best Olympic Winter Games ever” in Lillehammer to support their claim for Norwegian event experience (Bergen Kommune, n.d., p. 26).

¹²³ From 2019, the NIF has adopted a less detailed format for their strategic documents which makes it impossible to determine whether the aim is still valid as my interview (conducted in 2018) – in my reading – would suggest.

¹²⁴ The Oslo bid later failed, but it seems that the NIF wants to retain this right to initiate a bid for the Olympics in the future. When another local initiative was on the agenda at the NIF’s general assembly in 2019 as item 8.2., NIF’s board had its own proposal as item 8.1. which would authorise it to “explore the possibilities in the sport and by the government/parliament” for a future Norwegian application for the Winter Olympics (NIF, 2019c, p. 12). The assembly unanimously adopted the board’s proposal and the local proponents immediately withdrew theirs. Without any apparent protest, the NIF restricted access to the Winter Olympics and reaffirmed its position as the local ‘owner’ of the Winter Olympics.

Existing only as a narrative and intangible institution The Lillehammer Olympics obviously cannot speak for themselves, except in the cases where earlier members of the organising committee speak of the Games as it happened at least once during the debate around Oslo's bid for the Winter Games in 2022 (NTB, 2014). According to an NIF official involved in the Oslo bid, several of these members also stayed in various sport organisations and from there had helped to keep the idea of the Lillehammer Olympics alive.

Nevertheless, it is mainly through "negotiations" that the stakeholders of Norwegian events translate the Lillehammer Olympics and mobilise it as a source of authority for their events. As the stakeholders as in the examples above present an event as a solution to their problems combined with references to the Lillehammer Olympics, they are able to create interest and alliances based on the continued local and a global appeal from the Games in 1994. This confirms the impression from an NIF official who found that the success came because Norwegian hosts combined their experience with "a tradition, a history and an interest in winter sport". Anybody can gain experience from hosting events, but not everybody gets the events. The Lillehammer Olympics have been successful as a glocalising instrument because they have a reputation in the world yet remain in line with the Norwegian expectations. When translated and successfully mobilised, the Games are a source of symbolic capital, cultural capital, and the needed "extra" credibility in the event field which is difficult for other nations to match.

6.4.2.1 Limits to Lillehammer?

The Lillehammer Olympics were an important source of legitimisation for the Norwegian events analysed in this thesis. However, concurrent with the staging of these events, there have been two initiatives for developing an official event policy for Norwegian sport and a national policy for Norway. This would suggest that there is a need for a more professional approach to events than the Lillehammer myth can provide.

Within sport, it is the association for Norwegian NGBs (Særforbundenes Fellesorganisasjon (SFF))¹²⁵ which has lobbied the NIF and managed to ensure that events were part of the NIF's policy document for 2015-2019 (NIF, 2015b, pp. 20–21).

On the national public level, there have been various initiatives to make events better tools for tourism since a policy paper published in 2007 by the Norwegian Ministry for Trade and Industry followed up with a plan for events in 2011 (Innovasjon Norge, 2011, p. 17; Nærings- og Handelsdepartementet, 2007, pp. 60–61).¹²⁶ In 2017, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries then asked Innovation Norway to “develop a national event strategy for how Norway can attract international sport and culture events” in cooperation with the major cities (Nærings- og Fiskeridepartementet, 2017, p. 42). A civil servant within the ministry asserted that The Ministry of Culture was informed about this plan but not involved. Again, it is important to get behind the decision as the Ministry for Trade, Industry and Fisheries also asked Innovation Norway to make this policy because of lobbying by the tourism sector, including Innovation Norway. However, once adopted, a national event policy could become a legitimising factor in the work of Innovation Norway of attracting events to which, at least one senior official saw no alternative in the future:

Not at all, because... we have to have more events in Norway. Both to fill the hotels and make restaurants and businesses profitable. We have a government policy on this. That this is in a way the new path for Norway to follow.

Innovation Norway thus has a clear interest in this policy, however one no longer recognises this once it has been made into a national policy.

¹²⁵ SFF is thus not equal with the NIF. The NIF organises two forms of association: the NGBs based on different sports, and the regionally based district sport associations.

¹²⁶ The 2011 white paper became the fundament for the event policy in the following two government policies (Nærings- og Fiskeridepartementet, 2017, pp. 41–42; Nærings- og Handelsdepartementet, 2012, p. 61)

Several sport organisations were eager supporters of these efforts and became very engaged and were among the best represented at the public hearings held by Innovation Norway around the policy development (see Table 9). In a way, the sport and tourism organisations caught the government and the Ministry of Culture in a pincer movement by using the argument that events are good for local business development to pave the way for national event support. Business development might not be generally associated with sport, but one official argued that to have the possibility of hosting events, the SFF had decided to give the state’s arguments priority when deciding which sport events its members should support.

	1. meeting	2. meeting	1. and 2. meeting
Sport	14	12	26 (30.2%)
Public authorities	4	6	10 (11.6%)
Tourism sector	15	11	26 (30.2%)
Reg. development	4	1	5 (5.8%)
Culture	0	4	4 (4.7%)
Other	8	7	15 (17.4%)
Total	45	41	86 (100%)

Table 9: Absolute and relative numbers of representatives from sport and tourism at the open hearings Innovation Norway held as part of the development of the national event strategy 2018-2019.

Innovation Norway presented the strategy in December 2019. It suggests that future events in Norway should be innovative and sustainable and that a national centre for events should be established. It makes no references to Lillehammer (Innovasjon Norge, 2019). There might be limits regarding the efficiency of the Games, where a strategy would be better – if also only for formalising the same features as originally associated with the Lillehammer Games. As the next section on the on such a strategy, namely the

Danish national event policy as well as the other empirical chapters will show, these features, which the Lillehammer Games ease the mobilisation for in Norway, cover some very fundamental elements of the Nordic event approach.

6.4.3 Events as a national strategy: Sport Event Denmark

Denmark does not have a sport with a history and popularity like skiing in Norway, nor has it ever hosted an event comparable to the Winter Olympics. Nevertheless, there is a national idea about how a Danish event should be which I see as an outcome of the official event policy managed by the publicly funded organisation, SEDK.

SEDK was founded by the Danish government in 2008 as a part of a broader initiative for “a resolute [offensiv] global branding strategy for Denmark (...)”. The aim was to make Denmark one of the best countries in which to live and work in a globalised world (Kulturministeriet, 2007, p. 3; Regeringen, 2006, p. 6). Ten years later, SEDK, in the eyes of the informants, has come to embody the Danish national sport event policy. The fact that politicians rarely comment on the efforts to attract events in the press supports this argument.¹²⁷ This could be a sign of independence or, as is the case for the sport organisations, an almost complete overlap between the interests of the government and SEDK. Formally and with regard to its funding, SEDK is quite independent. The Ministry of Culture keeps an arm’s distance to SEDK and remains a “patron”, which leaves the decisions to SEDK (Chartrand & McCaughey, 1989). Furthermore, SEDK in 2014, became a beneficiary of the same law, which also regulates the public support for the sport in general and thereby acquired a similar economic independence (Kulturministeriet, 2014).

¹²⁷ I have only come across two comments on my cases. In 2014, then Minister of Culture Marianne Jelved in a short comment said events “put our country on the international map of sport”, while in 2018 then premier minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen commented on the positive sides of events as part of a wider interview on sport (Brock, 2014; S.-M. Hansen, 2018b). The only major case of a political initiative to change SEDK’s area of operation was in 2012 when the then ruling centre-left government obliged SEDK to have a popular/sport-for-all perspective in their work. A politician explained that this was needed to increase the organisation’s legitimacy by having more popular appeal (Brock, 2012). An evaluation of SEDK, also referred to in the newspaper, made the same proposal, however with the argument that international sport-for-all events could have high branding values and generate income (see Deloitte, 2011).

On the other hand, it was the Ministry for Culture which first formulated SEDK's official aims in 2007 and these aims have not changed significantly since (Kulturministeriet, 2007, p. 4). They demand that sport events should improve society in two ways: nationally, they shall generate "experiences, happiness, pride (...) [and] raise the participation in sport"; internationally, they must attract tourists, brand Denmark and develop trading relations (SEDK, 2017b). Similar aims are evident in the city strategies and in that regard SEDK simply reinforces existing trends. However, the translation perspective in the following section shows that SEDK also supports the "Danish" event brand (and consequently itself) in ways beyond promoting the legacy argument. Municipalities, sport federations, etc. already understand these potentials; they buy into the idea of events as solutions to their problems. SEDK's main role is therefore not in the problematisation and I will only cover it and the interessement phase briefly. The focus will be on enrolment and mobilisation. My aim is to demonstrate how SEDK has a central role and yet not operates to promote itself but rather focuses on improving recognition of the 'Danish' event both locally and globally.

6.4.3.1 Problematisation and interessement

In general, across sport and municipalities, one SEDK official believed that the organisation:

has had a continuous dialogue with the large event cities and the large event governing bodies, [so] where does it[: the idea for an event] start? It might have been much so earlier that we were more isolated and one contacted the other. Now we talk about something happening... 'And then how about...?' It's like an ongoing dialogue.

Most of the engaged stakeholders from the public authorities and the sport organisations are regularly in touch with each other via SEDK. They exchange ideas and the question is not why but how they should host events. This has not always been the case and one SEDK official recalled that they “had to reach out more” before. The media coverage of SEDK’s predecessor, Idrætsfonden Danmark (1994-2008), also provides evidence that one of its most active areas was to highlight the events’ economic impacts to raise the level of interest in events among municipalities (e.g. Ankerdal, 1994; Idrætsfonden Danmark, 2006; Kampmann, 1998).¹²⁸ Although SEDK still makes an effort to showcase the economic outcomes of the various events it supports (SEDK, 2018, 2019c), its operations also go beyond such considerations.




Figure 11: The so-called "event triangle" used by Sport Event Denmark (SEDK) to describe the default coalition behind events in Denmark.

6.4.3.2 Enrolment

In the translation theory, enrolment is the forming of alliances behind which the members can mobilise. In the Norwegian case, the Lillehammer Olympics was a banner for the engaged stakeholders when promoting their events. This blurred the division between

¹²⁸ Idrætsfonden Danmark was founded on the initiative of the DIF in 1994. According to a then board member the initial motivation had been the desire to keep up with the number of events in Sweden and Norway. Eventually, a focus on tourism and economic impacts had become part of its aims. It for instance also received support from the Danish Tourism Council (Idrætsfonden Danmark, 1998).

the alliance and the mobilisation. Whoever used Lillehammer to promote events both became an ally of the Lillehammer Games as such and mobilised behind them in the particular case. This mobilisation and making of alliances is more formal in Denmark due to the work of SEDK. Overall, SEDK has developed two forms of alliance. The first, the “event triangle”, is a model for the alliance around an individual event, whereas the second form of alliance involves more permanent institutions for the time in-between events.

The event triangle is a basic model for how to organise events in Denmark. Whereas the cooperation between the host city and the NGB would be recognisable in almost any country, the participation of SEDK or a similar public organisation is not given (cf. Figure 11). The image of the “event triangle” was originally brought in by SEDK but today it is omnipresent among all members of the Danish event field. The confidence with which several informants outside of SEDK refer to the “event triangle” as the way of organising events in Denmark shows that this organisational scheme is no longer solely associated with SEDK. Indeed, an informant from Wonderful Copenhagen described the process behind the Ice Hockey World Championship by stating that it is:

both the Herning Municipality, the Central Region and then the Copenhagen Municipality and the Capital Region which finance it, together with SEDK. Then we get, what we call – and you will hear that too – what we call the event triangle, that is the federation, the ice hockey federation, then we have the city, in this case the cities, and then SEDK. That is the triangle which makes the things connect.

During the study, I only came across one major international sport event which could have bypassed the triangle. In 2017-2018, local politicians in Copenhagen had to decide whether or not to support the idea proposed by a group of individuals that Copenhagen should host a Formula 1 Grand Prix from 2020 to 2022 (Haarløv, 2018). A local, public event consultant in Copenhagen explained how:

it definitely isn't something we started nor Lars Lundov [manager of SEDK] or DIF. It is private guy who has taken an initiative, Helge

Sander,¹²⁹ got some other private [individuals] on board, maybe with some capital and good friends with even more capital, that is Lars Seier Christensen¹³⁰ and then had a bit of an unusual take on it.

SEDK might have taken note of this development and in their latest strategy (2019-2022) one of the aims is to work for “one united national event effort” (SEDK, 2019a, p. 3).

For the period of this thesis, however, through the triangle SEDK has “connected” events and the stakeholders by holding the relevant cultural, i.e. expertise, and economic capital for the stakeholders to use. For instance, similarly to the aims of the Canadian sport event policy (Leopkey et al., 2010), SEDK advises and provides financial support, especially to federations which it regards as the most vulnerable in a bidding and organising process:

As a rule of thumb SEDK and the host city split the costs 50-50 (...) [and] in campaign mode [: the bidding phase], we go higher. There we take 75% of the campaign costs and the remaining 25 % we get from the host city. What we actually do with this model is to exempt the national governing body completely.

Of equal importance is the fact that SEDK also maintains a framework in-between events by enrolling the stakeholders in more lasting alliances. For the networking among the public stakeholders SEDK organises the Sport Event Alliance Denmark (SEAD), which Idrætsfonden Danmark initiated in 2004 (Idrætsfonden Danmark, 2004).¹³¹ As of 2017 SEAD had nine municipalities/regions as members and they are, in the wordings of an informant from one of the members, the:

¹²⁹ Former minister and former mayor of Herning.

¹³⁰ Danish investor.

¹³¹ As of December 2017 SEAD had the following members: Frederikshavn, Aalborg, Randers, Aarhus, Herning, Esbjerg, The Triangle Region, Funen, and Greater Copenhagen (SEDK, 2017a). In 2004, the Danish Tourism Council was also a member but otherwise the member list covered the same geographical areas as in 2017 (Idrætsfonden Danmark, 2004).

event cities in Denmark, (...) and what we do in reality is to talk, exchange and say: each city gets the possibility to say what they are interested in, so that they know each other and this means that for a great part you avoid fights over the different events.

The Lillehammer myth would have difficulties providing similar agreements. However, informants from the Lillehammer Municipality and the NSF pointed out that there had been talks about a gentleman's agreement regulating when Norwegian cities would bid for international skiing events. SEAD is able to regulate this on a broader scale. For instance, through SEAD, SEDK mediated the partition of a larger bid for several UCI events between its members. This was, according to a civil servant from one of the cities, "[a] national bid where... track racing that could only in one place: Ballerup. And then we have some road races here and some dum dum dum". To the civil servant SEAD is useful because the members recognise that they "are too small to fight each other". One member would for instance never bid for an event when another Danish city had already made a bid, "then there is a sort of gentleman's agreement not to go in and try to obstruct it". Another public event official describes how his municipality:

doesn't do dance events, those belong to Aarhus. We don't do sailing, those go to Kerteminde and Aarhus etc. In a way we all have this subtle understanding... we shouldn't do curling that belongs to someone else. You try not to cannibalise each other and to join forces when you need cities to partner.

This is markedly different from the open bidding in the case of Bergen 2017 and the recent Norwegian bids for the Olympics in 2014 and 2018 whereby several Norwegian cities competed for the position as national candidate city. Indeed, in the eyes of one public event official, SEDK even "has a responsibility to make sure the cooperation works... because the money we spend on events, that should be used as efficiently as possible and that is not the case if we have internal bidding competitions". For the most engaged federations, SEDK organises "Erfa-Grupper" [: Erfarings-grupper, literally translated as Experience-groups]. An official from a member federation explained how these groups allow

the NGBs to “gather and sit and talk about challenges and draw on the experiences from one another”. Some engaged federations might participate less because they would have sufficient expertise by themselves. A member from the DHF remarked how, as one of the more experienced members, they can handle their strategy themselves to a large degree. Even if they are practically able to organise the events themselves, it does not mean that they are on the outside of the Danish event brand.

SEDK’s consideration of Denmark’s position in the global event field also means that it not only helps agents with an a priori interest in events but also takes on the role as an activist, expanding the local event field. I have previously described how the organisation brought in the DAF because of the potential contact with the IAAF, but SEDK also cooperates with federations which themselves are interested in staging more events. Through SEDK, these NGBs can establish themselves more quickly in the event field than would otherwise have been the case and which eventually also support the general Danish brand.

Because of the omnipresence of SEDK/the Danish event brand developed by it (cf. below) and despite the prevalence of the event triangle as the central metaphor, it would be more precise to see Danish sport events as outcomes of a cooperation between the municipalities and the NGBs with SEDK as an all-encompassing force instead of just a corner in the triangle. Continuing the translation metaphor, SEDK is an interpreter located in the centre of the triangle. A sport politician gave a good example of this on a concrete level by describing how SEDK could interpret between the other stakeholders in the triangle. If, for instance, “the federations say, if we don’t get it in this way, (...) then we aren’t interested, [then] SEDK sort of tries to massage further and tries to get the involved municipalities to commit a bit more”.

SEDK lowers the threshold for hosting events by facilitating networks while pushing the limits of the agents. It pulls them into the event business and, by supporting and shaping their efforts, greases the Danish engine. The most important area of this shaping is the efforts to ensure events conform to the Danish event brand.

6.4.3.3 Mobilising for the “Danish” event

While introducing SEDK, I also listed the organisation’s official aims. In praxis however, as argued by an official for SEDK these are “metre long rubber bands”: “there are very few events which can do it all [deliver on all the aims] – and that is alright with us. We just have to cover them in the course of some years”. In its everyday practice SEDK is much more geared towards being an organisation for which the end is attracting events. An SEDK official described it as their “core business”. The guidelines for choosing events are thus not only focused on fulfilling the official aims; events can also be relevant because of their contribution to the Danish event brand. SEDK has three requirements to ensure this relating to the level of the event, its popularity in Denmark, and its production. Although these are the criteria for SEDK, the following section shows that they are acknowledged and adopted among the other stakeholders too. They rally behind the event brand which SEDK has constructed.

SEDK’s criteria for the level is that the event should be either a European or a world championship. On the local level, an official in a local event organisation described how this criterion also had an impact on their operation. The idea for an event could for instance start when:

the federation gets an idea about hosting a world cup, which isn’t that big. And then we [the local event organisation and SEDK] ask: ‘Do you have any ambitions about hosting that World Cup?’ ‘Yeah, actually it is because we would like to host a European or world championship later’ and then we say, we can support it. Because then it has potential (...).

In another regional event organisation, the levels of SEDK were utilised as the base for their involvement. While the expertise and financial might of SEDK raise the ambitions of the local initiators, among other things for “the logical reason that they could then give us their money”, these factors also give the local field a global perspective.

Secondly, according to one official, SEDK “looks at where the Danish athletes are good”. Again, on a practical level, in a local event organisation the result is the reasoning that:

[w]e all know, I think, whether a politician would get turned on the most by a Badminton World Championship or a Minigolf World Championship. You know, it is almost self-explanatory unless you have some really good argument for... yeah minigolf.

Finally, events should also brand Denmark “as an international sport event destination”. This criterion also has a local impact. In Norway, the Lillehammer Olympics did this on their own, whereas in Denmark a more conscious effort has been required.

6.4.3.3.1 Producing the Danish event

Once a federation or public authority is enrolled and an event has been awarded, SEDK is ready with a model for how it should function. In this, SEDK must find a compromise which combines the idea of the event as a contributor to society (the speculative event) and a case which puts the Danish event capabilities (the spectacular event) on display. This dualism is evident in the different descriptions provided by the SEDK-informants regarding the hosting of the 2017 European Short Course Swimming Championships in Copenhagen.

First, they talked about it from the perspective of the official (speculative) aim. They described how the “event triangle” assembles and develops the specific arguments for the event:

SEDK 1: “Sometimes we make (...) a layer cake with several layers. The very top layer for instance, it has only two elements, which have to be outstanding (...). Just to finish swimming [the European Championship in 2017 in Copenhagen], I cannot remember what the lights [: another way of describing the top layer] were in the cake then?”

SEDK 2: “It was involvement (...).”

CTJ: "So in that case it was the federation?"

SEDK 1: "Yes primarily, that was just... the one who had the most then."

The issue here is whether or not SEDK is sure to get its share regardless of the precise look or content of the "cake". There should be some lights for the stakeholders and the event has to fulfil the "hardcore part of an event, [but then] (...) we [SEDK] of course want it to be more than that. There has to be something for the spectators too". Power is rarely a clear entity but something acquired by exploiting the structures to one's advantage. In the case of events, SEDK has been particularly influential in creating the structures which define this "more". Indeed, SEDK has a motto for its (Denmark's) approach to events: "we take the event and 'add something new' [sic]". This "new" is often reflective of a spectacular staging founded on the display of public support:

We like to talk a lot with the national governing bodies and the municipalities about this surely isn't a tournament. A sports tournament is where somebody comes, takes time and goes home again. There is a lot going on around the tournament, and that's what makes the difference.

SEDK does not need to organise the "more" itself. By creating the structures, the other stakeholders usually do this on their own. Consequently, this "new" is not necessarily equal to the cake's top layer. The top layer for the swimming championship was involvement in the sport, but at the same time the event was an effective event production. This showed when one of the informants pointed at a picture hanging in the meeting room, when discussing event production later in our interview. It was a picture of a swimming pool seen from a stand. There were stands all around the pool filled with spectators, and the informants were happy to describe the context:

SEDK 1: "It is from The European Swimming Championship in the Royal Arena in December [2017]. I do not think the event owner, the European Swimming Federation, has experienced what they experienced there."

SEDK 2: "And it had to do with the event production and the way we presented the event. Previously that tournament had been held in existing swimming pools. Obviously there you cannot even come close at creating anything so pretty or impressive in terms of an event."

As in Bergen, arenas do not necessarily have an advantage compared to well-staged pictures of nature. In this case too, it was not the arena as such but rather the full, celebratory arena or rather audience which made it useful for SEDK's international work. Similar to the Norwegian translation based on the Games in Lillehammer, when possible SEDK likes to present its events as "public celebrations".

Altogether, SEDK functions as an intermediary between the local and global. Through networks, financial and advisory support, it produces a local field adhering to the global requirements and the "Danish" event brand. This is even true for the handball federation, the DHF, which a DHF informant as mentioned saw as quite competent. Still, another DHF official remarked:

that [; to increase the professionalism of event hosting in Denmark] is what Sport Event Denmark has to do. They are the ones pushing it, but the international federations do that too. They challenge us all the time by demanding more and more. They want it to flash [sic], no doubt about that really.

The event field is a glocal field and SEDK is an ambassador for the global that institutionalises the global doxa on a local/national level. Although SEDK does not and cannot forbid the staging of an event, its requirements have an impact on the local stakeholders' standards. The potential for such organisations to create dissent is evident in Great Britain where some sport event hosts have criticised demands from UK Sport, an organisation

similar to SEDK (only with a much wider scope and also responsible for the development of elite sport in the UK) (Salisbury, 2017, p. 1876; cf. Houlihan & Green, 2009). In Denmark, however, SEDK's efforts have not led to any widespread public debate so far.

6.4.4 Conclusion on the glocalised event field

Albeit in two different ways, the Lillehammer Olympics and SEDK act as frames for the construction of the proper Danish and Norwegian sport event. This lowers the threshold/raises the interest for local stakeholders to engage in the field and improves their status in the global field by providing a ready-made brand. This could explain why the influence of the event owner is limited in the individual cases as these institutions have already primed the local for the demands before the owner of the specific event enters the conversation. In the case of the Lillehammer Olympics, this does not happen through the advice of a central organisation but through the influx of event ideals left by the Games in 1994.

The two efforts also have some similarities. The public celebration is an important element in both countries' event brands and also resonates with the local contexts where equality and a close relation between sport and the general public are prominent. The similarities might come from a recognition of the other country's event field. Firstly, the stakeholders draw on hosting experience from similar events in other countries.¹³² Both Danish and Norwegian stakeholders also explained how the Danish strategy had inspired the recent Norwegian efforts. The most direct sign being Innovation Norway's use of Burson Cohen & Wolfe, (BCW) for the development of their proposal for a Norwegian event strategy (Innovasjon Norge, 2019, p. 5) – a consultancy bureau, which also has assisted SEDK on numerous occasions (Burson-Marsteller Sport, n.d.). During the presentation of

¹³² Copenhagen for instance hosted the UCI Road Racing World Championships in 2011 and there are several examples of collaborations within handball (cf. Appendix 1).

the Norwegian strategy in December 2019, a representative from BCW even pointed directly to SEDK as a case to learn from and emphasised that Norwegian hosts have to hand back the events they host to the owner in an improved condition,¹³³ a direct echo of SEDK's desire to add something "extra" to the event.

In 2020, SEDK and the Lillehammer Olympics appear to be unchallenged. Although I have indicated that there might be limits to the Lillehammer myth in a time marked by increased competition, I have not identified any criticism or dismissal of their ideas. It seems that SEDK and the Lillehammer Olympics are the answers to the translation theory's question of "who will win?", i.e. 'who is capable of putting the process in a black box?'. However, it is possible to question the metaphor of translation as a competition since this would presume an agency and I do not see any competitors with whom these agents can compete. The competitors may arrive in the future, but as of 2020, the two appear as successful frameworks qua their wide use than agents. On the one hand, it is a sign strength that the institutions have imbued the other stakeholders with their values to such a degree that the institutions appear as frameworks rather than agents themselves. On the other hand, this is also a dependence, which could become a weakness in the future. They are only powerful because they are useful. They have only won "by associating the largest number of irreversibly linked elements" rather than by being something in their own right (Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 293).

6.5 Summing up

Chapter 6 has presented the typical stakeholders involved in the bidding for sport events in Denmark and Norway. It has given a preliminary answer to the question of why they engage in events and highlighted the differences between the stakeholder groups.

¹³³ Own notes from BCW's presentation at Innovation Norway's launch of the strategy in Oslo, December 2019.

The chapter has presented four different stakeholder groups with the engaged stakeholders at the centre. This group typically consisted of the NGBs and the municipalities characterised by high social and organisational commitments. They had a focus on making the event successful both as an event and as an investment for their organisations. This similarity was also evident across the municipalities and the sport organisations. Although their resources varied, their interests were overall the same. This confirms the possibility of analysing the cases as a collective and makes the partition of typical and atypical cases less relevant.

The engaged stakeholders in some cases would receive support or meet resistance from allied or militant stakeholders. These have either a (potentially) high organisational or social commitment. Chambers of Commerce and the media were examples of militant stakeholders in my cases. They have no organisational commitment, but a high interest in the success of events because of the outcomes for their members/spectacular stories for their readers. Among others, the group of allied stakeholders included the Danish regional public authorities and sponsors. Both groups had specific aims for the events focusing on economic growth and in particular the regional authorities made little use of their potential organisational influence.

The chapter has also clarified that the allied and militant stakeholders had the potential to influence the event field despite not being members. This has been possible because of their social and economic capital and their resultant value to the engaged stakeholders. To obtain these resources, the engaged stakeholders have had to acknowledge the aims of these other organisations as part of the field's nomos. So far, this has not led to a loss of autonomy for the engaged stakeholders because they all agree on the event as an investment and the focus on international rather than local or national events. Although this plurality of external positive influences indicates a support for and potential sustained interest in events, it has also caused some debate in Norway over whether (publicly supported) sport events should be reserved for non-profit NGBs or be allowed for

commercial enterprises too. The external support would namely often emphasise the importance of an economic outcome, which the next chapter shows is debated among the engaged stakeholders.

The chapter has also analysed the role of the event owner, whose influence the engaged stakeholders generally regarded as limited. This is in sharp contrast to the prominent position I gave the event owner in both the introduction and the theoretical framework as one of the focal points within the local stakeholders' justification.

This does not mean that the global agents have no influence in the local field. As described in the last section, they set the premises which then are channelled to the local level through national event institutions. In Denmark, the publicly funded SEDK for instance hold a supply of financial and cultural capital for the local stakeholders while also representing the global demands for event hosts. Norway has no formal organisation and policy, but the narrative around the Lillehammer Olympics in 1994 serves a similar purpose.

These institutions have not only lessened the direct presence of the event owner; they also mean that local hosts gain access to global events faster than would otherwise have been possible. This contributes to the sustained and broad interest in events which feeds back into supporting SEDK or the Lillehammer-discourse viz. the general event discourse in the countries. The national event brands/institutions are of particular importance for the less resourceful stakeholders. These stakeholders, mostly municipalities such as Næstved in Denmark or Fjell¹³⁴ in Norway, have focused otherwise on the immediate outcome of the event for local policies and not considered the event from the long-term perspective of an event policy.

¹³⁴ Part of the Øygarden Municipality since 1 January 2020.

Regarding why the stakeholders engaged in the bidding process, as mentioned they all agreed to consider it as an investment. Even if some informants associated this idea with the coming of certain individuals,¹³⁵ the generality of the trends shows a shared understanding constituting an event field. This is also an idea which, as shown in chapter 2, international sport federations have promoted since the 1980s. This global support makes the the local trend very stable since as any subsequent change would require more than a change of mind among the local stakeholders.

The event as an investment is however not the only logic uniting at least some of the stakeholders. If that had been the case, the members would have no common stake unique to events and there would have no event field. The engaged stakeholders would then have operated in a more general field such as public policy development or simply under the influence of the dominant (economic) logic of the power field in society. This chapter has however indicated that for some engaged stakeholders an event is more than just an investment for outcomes external to the event field. These stakeholders are members of what I previously described as event sociotopes, but now can call the event field. They consider the hosting of one event in the light of events in the past and the future. For them, an event (also) has value because it improves their chances of attracting similar events in the future.

These stakeholders have made the global criteria their own or at least reconciled their local desires with the international demands. They do not seem to attempt to transform the field; instead, their aim is to acquire relevant cultural and symbolic capital and strengthen their position in the field. Therefore, they benefit from the reputations of or-

¹³⁵ An informant from the DAF for instance explicitly connected the turn of the federation with a change in the board wanting a more aggressive investment strategy. In the cases of the DIHF and the NCF, the then chairs Henrik Bach Nielsen and Harald Tiedemann Hansen had backgrounds in business, and in a newspaper interview the chair of the DHF explained that DHF considered its events to be “business cases” (Heide-Jørgensen, 2018). I cannot point out any direct causality, but overall there are trends on the both the level of the real and the experienced which in tandem can explain the development.

ganisations such as SEDK and the Lillehammer Olympics, which the chapter suggest effectively function as reservoirs for national symbolic and cultural event capital (and economic capital in the case of SEDK).

Every engaged stakeholder in the analysed cases drew on these shared resources, but some in addition made their own contributions. Some NGBs used their symbolic capital based on their sport's popularity or the momentum of their sport to make themselves relevant in the event field and public stakeholders adopted event policies. Importantly for the event field, the chapter has demonstrated that these policies did not primarily serve to develop the events as investments. Their main role was to increase the organisations' professionalism in the event field. In municipalities like Herning, the strategy confirmed the investments as an interest and then laid out initiatives for attracting more events and creating a narrative of the city as "eventful". Similarly, in Bergen the administration concurrently with their policy adopted an event perspective on the city and began to look at the municipality's existing features as potential event facilities.

Such are the interactions of the event field between its structure and its members' practice. There is space for agency but as members of the sport event field associate themselves with the practice, the result is often a steadily increased commitment according to the values of the field. One SEDK official described how "in these strategic processes [them cooperating with NGBs to get more events], (...) there is nothing like a full stop for events. (...)". A successful commitment gives status (and requires investments, which could make a break costly). Previous research limited to considering single events has not been able to show such links between events. As the stakeholders develop strategies and the interest in events manifest itself, the findings of these chapters shows the necessity for studies of future events, including of their impacts, which consider not only an event's immediate outcome but also its provenance and links to future events.

"Outcome" brings me to a final discussion of my conclusion on the event as an investment. An investment requires that a stakeholder invest something, i.e. make a contribution. Some stakeholders make monetary contributions, whereas the contributions of others are less tangible. To understand the relevance of the intangible contributions one

must add the factor of the event as a public celebration, i.e. considering both the speculative and spectacular sides of an event. The sponsors examined above for instance not only contributed with money but also made contributions that increased the spectacular dimension of the event. Both contributed to the improvement of the other stakeholders' outcome.

In the next chapter, the stakeholders' motivation for engaging in events is examined in further depth. An important argument there is that the spectacular side of the event is more than a means for improving other outcomes and functions as an argument in its own right. Eventually, the spectacular event and the "public celebration" could be just as important for understanding the motivation of events as the investment discourse.

7 The why: The stakeholders' motivations

The previous chapter showed that all stakeholders consider the event to be an investment. However, the section on the event myths of Lillehammer 94 and SEDK also highlighted the importance of the public celebration as an additional motivation. This chapter begins by giving further details on what these investments look like and a better assessment of the relevance of the public celebration by exploring the arguments used by stakeholders in the media and the interviews.

Legacies	Argument (rank in parenthesis)
Cultural and political legacies	Public celebration (1), Branding (2), 'Norwegian model' (6) and 'Events as series' (9).
Economic	Improved economy (3).
Sport & health	Sport-for-all (4), [General] improvement for the sport (5), Improved sport infrastructure (7) and Elite [sport] (8).
Infrastructure & environment	Infrastructure (10).

Table 10: The most used arguments for sport events in Denmark and Norway and their corresponding legacy category (cf. Figure 12 and section 1.1.1).

The most used arguments in the media reflect the spectacular and speculative motivation behind events (cf. Figure 12; Appendix 7 shows the arguments as they were for each of the events). The most used argument is 'public celebration' emphasising the spectacular element. It is also the argument with the broadest group of senders, possibly indicating its broad appeal. In contrast to the other most used arguments, public authorities and sport organisations are almost equal in their use of this argument. The rest of the arguments focus on the speculative or instrumental motivation for the events and the public celebration is only the most used argument when I maintain the differences between the four arguments specific to sport in the top-10 of the most used arguments: Sport-for-all,

Improved sport infrastructure, Elite sport, and a “General improvement for the sport” (used when the stakeholders were vague about the exact beneficiary and the form of the improvement). It is not possible to give an aggregation as the quotes around the benefits for sport often contained several different arguments. It is however clear that the sport argument altogether is the most used argument.

The arguments in general also show a clear correspondence with the dominant legacies in the general research (See Appendix 4 for examples of the ten most used arguments). Despite the often-critical research, the conceptualisation of an event as an investment has clearly also been used publicly. The only remarkable aspect is the limited use of the infrastructural legacy compared to its prominence in the research. The bid for the Winter Olympics was the only case where the argument “infrastructure” was among the ten most common arguments (cf. Appendix 7). The Oslo bid was also the only case which spurred a debate, which is shown in the ranking as the ‘Norwegian model’. This category covers arguments predominantly associated with the Oslo process and the engaged stakeholders’ promise that if the IOC awarded Norway the Winter Olympics, they would stage the Games according to Norwegian values. It is also interesting that “events as series”, i.e. the linking of one event with another, is among the ten most used arguments, confirming the strategic approach to events analysed in the previous chapter and showing that it apparently might also have a public appeal.

The speculative arguments are also all internal arguments, i.e. arguments made to make events sensible for the organisations which disseminate them. The stakeholders making such arguments want to get something for themselves or their peers. This could sound egoistic, but it is worth remembering that for a municipality the peers would be the public, thus blurring the division between internal and external arguments. Furthermore, such arguments are still relatable to the spectacular arguments. As described in the previous chapter, the stakeholders’ interest in making an event a public celebration is often related to their interest in improving the speculative outcomes (cf. the analysis of the sponsors’ role). This maintains the event as a thing or an instrument. I have however previously suggested that this is only one way of looking at events. Sport events are also

events per se, i.e. spectacular occasions with intrinsic value that bring change to their participants. Applying this perspective to the public celebration detaches it from the investment argument and make it possible to look beyond legacies as motivations for events.

The aim of the remainder of this chapter is to analyse how the spectacular and speculative motivation contribute to the current interest in events. I begin with the role the public celebration/the sport event as event plays both before and during the event. This follows an analysis of the other most used categories of arguments: the economic, cultural and sport specific arguments. Although the use of infrastructure as limited almost exclusively to the Oslo case does not qualify for an analysis of its own, I include it when relevant and return to it in the next chapter when analysing the debate accompanying the Oslo bid in greater detail. Based on this analysis of the arguments for sport events, the chapter concludes with a discussion of what makes events based on sport stand out from others.




Figure 12: Most used arguments for sport events sorted according to sectors.

7.1 A public celebration as motivation

Sport events can be instruments and events. Events as events are based on their quality as a novel experience for their participants, often marked by a feeling of community or effervescence. In the case of a sport event, for most people the event originates from the performance of the athlete's body in the arena. However, for the planners, the body marks the conclusion of the event as an event.

When the stakeholders use public celebration as an argument in the media, they usually talk about the event beginning with the body in the arena, a facility, which as mentioned in the eyes of several informants was a precondition for hosting events – if also in itself insufficient for making it a success. Eventually, the event in question should expand beyond both the body and the arena – perhaps, as described by the organisers in Bergen, it should turn the whole city into one “boiling” arena (Bergen Kommune, 2013b, p. 12), or work like the Olympics, which *Aftenposten* expected to “elevate us for the future” (‘Ja Til Oslo-OL’, 2013). As stated by an official within the organisation the DHF, representing probably the sport most comparable to the status of skiing in Norway,¹³⁶ they want “Denmark to (...) be in some sort of handball euphoria” when hosting an event. To achieve this is not given. The public celebration is “our bar at its highest and then you always have to lower it a bit”. In other words, the event discourse around a public celebration takes the perspective of the spectator and the local populations rather than just the spectators in the arena. The organisers want to include everyone.

The typical way to make a sport event a public celebration is to organise side events. These ensure at least a literal transcendence of the arena, e.g. via free activities in the city centres. For instance, in the eyes of one SEDK official, when hosting the Ice Hockey World Championship, Herning was “going all in and really creating a public celebration every night on the square”. This celebration had no immediate connection to the arena, which was located approximately 3.5 kilometres away. The celebration was based on the

¹³⁶ At least in terms of success, attention and events, if not public participation (Hedal, 2006).

screening of the matches, the sale of beer and food, and various other forms of entertainment. In this way, the events gain legitimacy or are justified by what Boltanski and Thévenot described as a civic order of worth. This implies a distance to market value and specific outcomes. Instead, the stakeholders present the sport event as a celebration for the public to enjoy. Joy would probably be a relevant motivation in all but pietistic societies, but it might be especially effective in Denmark and Norway because these countries have positive attitudes towards inclusion and egalitarianism.

However, the universal appeal of joy does not make an event local in the same way as a new arena or being present at a match. The joy of the public celebration is only realised and legitimated if the public celebration extends the arena and finds a local or national expression. To watch a match in the local arena would constitute local joy, but the number of local people in the arena is small compared to those who are watching the match on television. The locals who watch the match on television only share a global experience (which may be an event in itself). However, they also see the decorations in the city centre, and it is these decorations which make the event local and differentiate it from any other sport event. If these extra specifically local elements are taken in, they add an element of novelty and the sport event becomes a public celebration and local event.

The broad appeal is reflected in the stakeholders' relation to this part of the event production. An official from Bergen 2017 described how the public celebration became the common thread across all the stakeholders. However, since the public celebration was predominantly based on side events, it often led to a division of labour between the engaged stakeholders. According to a civil servant from the Bergen municipality, in that case, the role of the municipalities "and the county, [had been] to make the city ready for a party (...) and (...) what happened inside the fences was the responsibility of the Bergen 2017 organisation". Similarly, one sport official from the DAF asserted how the municipality's support for the Half Marathon World Championship simply came with the demand that "[w]e are going to stage a world championship".

In the case of Bergen, this division of labour had happened unconsciously or at least it caused a moment of unease when UCI, the international cycling federation, awarded Bergen the event and the organising committee shifted its focus towards organising the sport part of the event. The NGB, dominating the committee, went from engaged to allied stakeholder. Hosting the event became more of an organisational commitment rather than a social one (cf. Figure 3, note the position of the organising committee). A member of the board for the organising committee outlined how, as the event came closer, “staging the event, to stage a world championship for the cyclists. Top priority. That was in my head”. That left the social commitment primarily with the municipality, which in this case did not prove to be a problem. The municipality acknowledged the problem and allocated extra money for this purpose in cooperation with the committee.

Had both the federation and the municipality dropped the social commitment, the legitimacy of the event could have suffered. In the eyes of an NGB official, this happened in the case of the Ice Hockey World Championship. It went well in Herning, but contrary to the NGB’s expectations the Copenhagen Municipality made few efforts to promote the event outside of the arena (cf. Hougaard, 2018). This might have been due to different expectations and expected ends for the event. The previous chapter mentioned how the identity of Herning today is based on the events; however, this is not the case in Copenhagen. In contrast to the situation in Herning, according to a local politician Copenhagen had a monetary perspective on this event which might have made the public celebration less relevant as a justification. Eventually, similarities in approach and a shared view of events as means also do not guarantee that the sport and the city recognise each other's ends. Indeed, when asked about the aims of the Bergen Municipality, an informant from the NCF stated that:

[t]hey sure did [have aims] [short laugh - hesitates]. No, I think they let themselves get carried away, when (...) the cyclists in Bergen contacted the Bergen Municipality (...) I don't know I wasn't there, but they sure liked the concept or the idea of hosting it in the city centre.

In summary, the event as a public celebration is important for legitimisation because it broadens the appeal of the event, but it is also difficult to achieve. It requires a plan, experience, and alliances. The sheer addition of members in an alliance however does not necessarily support the promotion of the event as broadly appealing. All the stakeholders support the idea of the event as a public celebration, but they are not equally involved in its making. The NGB in particular is engaged in the staging of the sport related part of the event, whereas the municipality – as demonstrated in Bergen – embeds the event in the community.

An event with the status of a public celebration would justify the event as a civic order of worth. However, in the previous chapter, I presented the event as an investment which one would evaluate according to its market value. A public celebration in this context therefore not only includes happiness and effervescence (cf. the spectacular event) but also means that the event will be able to attract as many visitors as possible, which supports the speculative side of the event (cf. Chalip, 2004, p. 233).

Pragmatic sociology claims that the different orders in the outset are irreconcilable. At best, the stakeholders can make unstable compromises. Interestingly, Boltanski and Thévenot have examples of every possible combination except between the market and the civic orders of worth – exactly the orders which are at odds here (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991/2006, p. 325). If the theory holds and these aspects are irreconcilable, one of them must be less relevant than the other. Given the prominence of the conceptualisation of events as investments and the high ranking of arguments based on the view of events as investments, the market would appear to be the obvious answer. However, this is a finding based on a front-stage image of an event's justification as a thing or instrument.

In the next section, I add a backstage perspective, which changes the perspective on the sport event as an event. The argument falls in two parts. In the first (section 7.1.1), I go backstage and make the case that the spectacular event has played an important role as a motivation in the individual narrative for the stakeholder representatives interviewed for this thesis. In the second (7.1.2), I make the body in the arena the end and not the beginning of the event. I do this by interpreting the planning phase as a carnivalesque

outlet for the organisers and argue that the spectacular character of an event already has an impetus during this early stage in the process. This outlet is partly made possible by the access to new resources that the event grants to its organisers (cf. the event as a bearer of novelties). Here, I want to argue that the conceptualisation of events as investments is not equally relevant throughout an event's bidding and planning process. My point is not to invalidate the investment discourse, but to support the claim that the stakeholders seek to host events based on both spectacular and speculative elements.

7.1.1 The agents' personal experiences

Event policies or relating an event to an organisation's strategic aims give a specific and explicit form of meaning to an event, but this meaning coexists with the process of sense-making on a personal level. In the previous section, I analysed how the stakeholders used the public celebration to justify their event by making as many as possible enthusiastic about the actual event in the arena. In this section, I change the perspective to look at how this enthusiasm also touches the professional individuals representing the stakeholders. This is a subtle process, traceable in the settlement of impressions, stories and anecdotes from events, which – if positive – leave the impression that an event is a sensible thing to support.

A likely place for such settlements to surface is when someone questions the stakeholder's support for the event and a representative must answer. When journalists do this, they rarely have the time or space to go beyond the immediate generic outcomes. In contrast, when a researcher with as much time as the informant is willing to give him or her asks the question "why do you host these events?", there is unusually sufficient room for a more detailed exploration.

As in their media interviews, my informants would usually begin by explaining the interest with generic arguments and describe the event as an investment. However, several of them added anecdotes to explain the sensibility of the event in question.

In Herning, a civil servant from the municipality recalled from the Ice Hockey World Championship how a Danish radio broadcaster in its morning programme called two persons in Herning and got:

five minutes of enthusiastic talk from each of them, mostly about the party in town, not really about the ice hockey in the Boxen [the arena]. At the end, the host says, 'I wish I were in Herning now'. And then you just think, 'Yeah'. Could you have bought that? No, you couldn't. Ten minutes in Go' Morgen P3,¹³⁷ a segment we would really like to reach (...).

A civil servant from Næstved had a similar experience of having reached an audience, only on a local scale, when a little girl called a pink bike a:

'World Championship bike' because of the use of pink as at the event's colour, and then you think, okay, it had reached everyone, that pink is the colour, we host the world championship and it just works. (...) So no, I did not experience any resistance. There really wasn't any.

Further, an employee from a main sponsor of one of the events explained how he “still gets the willies because we have been a part of it and made it possible, and it was a party from the beginning until the end”. A similar sentiment was echoed by a regional politician from Bergen, who recalled how, after criticism out of fear for low local backing, at the opening it “was just jam-packed. Then I just thought, this is amazing”. Later the politician overheard an interview with a boy, approximately five years old,

and the journalist asked, 'who do you cheer for?' And the boy looked up at him and just said 'Those who bike of course'. And I just thought, yes, that was what the whole Vestland¹³⁸ did those days. They cheered

¹³⁷ A morning show from the national Danish public service radio broadcaster DR P3 aimed at people aged 20-40.

¹³⁸ The part of Norway in which the UCI Road World Championship took place.

on everyone who biked from all over the world and made it a public celebration.

For some informants, it was not only my questions that reminded them of the event. Several of them had trophies from the events in question and others either in their offices or in the corridors of their departments. Some used them actively during the interview while others did not, but in any case the trophies being exhibited several years after the event in question's conclusion visibly demonstrate that events often hold strong, lasting positive connotations. For some individuals, the events had clearly been milestones in their careers, which fits well with the finding in the previous chapter that certain individuals put in an extraordinary level of effort to win the event for his or her organisation. However, for this to explain a more general interest, all the mayors/CEOs, etc. should have developed a specific interest in events over the last 20 years. I do not think this is the case. Rather, people in these positions have always had a desire to achieve great things. As an example, historian Paul Veyne has made the following comment to the Roman emperor Trajan's initiative to funnel money into a fund for helping Roman farmers and poor children:

A sovereign thought he had done wonders if he erected an institutional monument, often a picturesque one, whose usefulness was more doubtful and which soon fell into ruin, but which enabled the problem to be forgotten while nevertheless continuing to prove by its existence that the government cared. A 'work' is less rational than an activity, but it is more conspicuous and it entitles one to sit back once one has seen that it is good (Veyne, 1992, p. 370).

The case of Lillehammer was the most extreme example. When I wrote the thesis, around 25 years had passed since the Games, and yet the informant's office and the whole town were a symbol of the Winter Olympics with placards and signs in addition to the myth described in the previous chapter. The Lillehammer Olympics would not only motivate futures events in Lillehammer but in Norway in general. According to a local politician, in the campaign for Oslo 2022 the Lillehammer Municipality played the role as "the example

that showed it makes sense to host the Games, ‘look how it went in 94 and in the aftermath’”.

Other informants also attached their stories to the mythical frames for backing both individual events and the event strategies on a local level described earlier when discussing local event narratives. For instance Bergen does not just host for the investments or the personal anecdotes, but also because “if there is one thing people in Bergen are good at, it is throwing a party”. At least this was the view of some of the local initiators behind the road cycling championship. In Kolding, as argued by an informant from the local arena hosting the handball championship in 2015 went smoothly because among other things Kolding is a “handball town”. Along similar lines, one Norwegian sport politician explained that “the Norwegian people are... sport enthusiasts (...) especially for winter sport. So (...) one would think it would be fantastic [to host the Winter Olympics]”. This supports the suggestion made in chapter 5 that a sport’s popularity eases the hosting of events, a factor which is even a formal requirement for SEDK when considering which events to support.

In Herning too, as well as linking the events to the strategic event narrative presented earlier, informants would also link recent events to a larger story where they are the pinnacle, which began with the building of the first exhibition hall in 1954. From these first exhibitions, it expanded into conferences and culminated:

*in the 2000s’ exhibitions, conferences, music, and championships
[：“the four ms”, messer, møder, musik og mesterskaber in Danish]. (...)
It is a bit like the story about the bumblebee which cannot fly, because
actually we are too small to host these things. The argument in the
city or out in the world usually is that we are just small enough to get
everyone involved and just big enough to host.*

Several informants also mentioned this unique DIY culture and willingness to punch above one’s weight, often linked to the town’s distance from the capital (cf. Lindhart, 2019). “Herning” had been helped in its development by its prosaic approach to decision

making, a close relation between local businesses, the public authorities and not least “a rather big interest in sport”.

An obvious flaw in my argument is that the anecdotes come from the events on which I base my study. Naturally, the stakeholders did not use these anecdotes when they decided to support ‘my’ events. However, like Kierkegaard, the informants understood their events as their lives – backwards – and when they made the decisions for these events, I suppose they drew on anecdotes from even earlier events. Sensemaking is “ongoing” and it is unlikely that there was ever a time when a person had no relevant experiences for making sense of an event (Weick, 1995, p. 43). The anecdotes therefore do not explain the exact justification of the event discussed in this thesis, yet they show a mechanism which helps us understand the interest in events in general. This works because the personal memories have lasting characteristics. Some of my informants vividly recalled anecdotes from events four years ago. This stands in contrast to much of the existing research on impact of events on the local public’s memory. The studies on the local perceptions of the event are not conclusive, but some suggest that local pride increases during the event only to decrease a few months later (B. W. Ritchie et al., 2009; Kavetsos & Szymanski, 2010; S. S. Kim & Petrick, 2005; Storm & Jakobsen, 2019). My findings indicate that the feeling of pride among those involved, not least decision makers, last significantly longer.

With regard to the relevance of legacies as arguments for events, it is interesting how all the anecdotes, except for those from Lillehammer where the myth supports a discourse of events as investments, focus on the events’ spectacular dimension. Here, the informants moved away from the supremacy of the investment discourse dominant in the press material. Investments and legacies are conspicuously absent in the anecdotes. They are not stories about hugely increased turnovers for local businesses, the year the hotels were fully booked or how the housing prices increased; instead, they provide small, everyday experiences of communal, popular celebrations. The informants explained how the events added to or improved the sense of a local identity. This corresponds with the finding in the study of the locals’ general perception of an event. Although these intangible

legacies did not score very high as a perceived impact from the current event, they were rated highly with regard to what would motivate hosting events in the future (Balduck et al., 2011, pp. 108–109). The anecdotal justification altogether represents a naïve, but apparently long-lasting and personal perspective on events and emphasises the civic order of worth as an important supplement to the market-oriented idea of events I presented in the previous chapter.

However, it is unrealistic to expect anecdotal proof to become the only public legitimisation of an event. The anecdotes promise no measurable return and the money for such ideas is often limited to what one Danish local politician describes as “money we are willing to allocate for the good life”. As soon as an event requires more than this (and the prevalence of the economic argument would suggest this happens regularly), the event enters a direct competition with more fundamental welfare tasks (healthcare, education, etc.). The immediate solution is to make the event an investment, which presumes a return for reinvestment in the public welfare (Young et al., 2017, p. 153). However, even if an event is securely founded in accordance with the investment discourse as in the Danish counties, politicians might still want to stage the event as a celebration. One Danish civil servant in a county described how events make it possible for politicians to escape the political humdrum. Events “are often also good stories. (...) Normally our politicians deal with healthcare¹³⁹ (...) budget cuts all the time, it is just a bit..., I believe. Here comes some sport. That is positive”. Similarly, when asked about a potential national event strategy and centre for events, a Norwegian county civil servant did not “think that the [regional] politicians are going to give up that power [to a national event centre], it is fun and important to them”.

7.1.1.1 Anecdotes as deterrents?

So far, I have only shown how personal experiences can contribute positively when stakeholders decide to support an event. Since I only study cases which received at least initial

¹³⁹ The Danish counties’ main responsibility is to take care of Danish hospitals.

support, I have no systematic inquiries into whether anecdotes can have the opposite effect. However, an informant from the DAF did give one example of how anecdotes can function as deterrents. As mentioned, at first the organisation was reluctant about the idea bidding for the IAAF World Half Marathon Championship and this was, according to the official,

because the traces from '96 still haunted us.¹⁴⁰ Nobody was left of the then managers, but the story lived on that one should be careful in these matters. So, it was only after several talks with the city [Copenhagen] and Sport Event Denmark, where we agreed how certain conditions on our side would be fulfilled, that we changed our mind and said fine, let's do it.

One of my cases (Bergen 2017) also developed into a similar potential deterrent because of the cost overrun, which became evident in the aftermath of the event (cf. Solberg et al., 2018). These revelations overlapped with the period in which I conducted my interviews and some informants commented on how, just a few months after the event, they had already experienced a negative impact.

A civil servant from the county had sensed a newfound scepticism from the politicians when writing a letter of support from the county for an up-coming event bid: “we have to be very clear about what we write. They [the politicians] don't want to commit to a lot”. A Norwegian sport official working the development of a national event strategy also described how they, the Norwegian sport organisations, “now face Bergen 2017 everywhere because it went so terribly wrong. We realise that we have no margin for error. When we are going to do events in the future everything has to come out with a surplus”.

¹⁴⁰ Earlier in the interview, the informant described the DAF's hosting of the IAAF World Road Relay Championships (a form of marathon relay) in 1996 as a “mixed experience”.

During the actual events in question, however, the organisers were enthusiastic (as demonstrated by the anecdotes) and this was a mood which is not only apparent when actually staging the event.

7.1.2 The event planning as an event

For most people, the event starts when the athletes enter the arena. For a small minority this is the culmination. Most theories on events focus on the actual event, i.e. the sport competitions, their rituals, and the spectators sharing an experience out of the ordinary. This study of the process prior to the event however shows that many of the stakeholders experience the break with the everyday long before that. In terms of explaining the interest in events, anecdotes or positive experiences from the period of planning are possibly just as important as the anecdotes from the actual event in the previous section.

As shown earlier, the decision-making process for an event tends to be informal. Linking this with the idea of the event as a break, I suggest that we can understand the decisions regarding events better by considering them (and not just the events) as forms of carnival. In its medieval origin, a carnival meant topsy-turvy days, not unlike modern events, where the organisers expected the city to be “boiling”, “elevated”, and in a state of “euphoria”. In the Middle Ages, such upheaval could let off steam and help preserve the usual order or it could be a sign of social protest with the potential for long-term impacts. Whether a carnival would result in one or the other most likely depended on the context. In any case, a carnival was a period of misrule which broke the usual social expectations (Humphrey, 2001, pp. 6, 8, 41–42).

I would argue that modern event planning – like the idea of the carnival as a safety valve¹³¹ – offers the bidders/organisers a limited period of participation in an out-of-the-ordinary project. The period lasts until the start date of the event or the deadline for the application. Then, a new event takes over which – as shown above – also often leaves a lasting impression in the organisers’ memories. Importantly, misrule in medieval times did not include breaking the law. All that happened was sanctioned by the authorities, and likewise in the modern age the event planners should only break the expectations

not the law – and (ideally) only in a positive manner (Humphrey, 2001, p. 33). In his seminal study of the carnival in the works of the renaissance author François Rabelais, the Russian literary scholar Mikhail Bakhtin summarises the traits of the carnival by referring to Goethe’s description of the Roman carnival:

[Goethe] first of all stresses the popular character of the carnival and the people’s initiative in its celebration. It is a festival offered not by some exterior source but by the people to themselves. Therefore, the people do not feel as if they were receiving something that they must accept respectfully and gratefully. (...) Instead a signal is given to each and everyone to play the fool and madman as he pleases. (Bakhtin, 1965/1984, p. 246)

The public aspect of the event is as important as the letting loose found in various expressions of the carnival/at the event and in the events’ planning phases. There was and is a “suspension of all hierarchic differences, of all ranks and status; carnivalesque revelry is marked by an absolute familiarity. Differences between superiors and inferiors disappear for a short time, and all draw close to each other” (Bakhtin, 1965/1984, p. 246). This sounds familiar when we consider the sport aspect of sport events, but some informants experienced a similar rally during the event planning process. It united the organisation in question, paved the way for new priorities and pragmatic approaches, and served to justify new endeavours with reference to the event. In the eyes of one sport politician participating in the Oslo case, the process meant that the NIF “closed ranks as never before”. While this was the aim for the public impression, sources at the time and in my interviews have questioned how united the organisation was in reality (Sandven & Bugge, 2012).

Closed ranks are not only nice because of the feeling of a collective effervescence as it is also crucial to find broad support for the planning to proceed at all, first within the different organisations and then across them. If the proponents do not manage to close the internal ranks, the outcome is either immediate failure or a marginal majority, which, according to a Danish municipality civil servant, amounts to almost the same thing. A

marginal majority “is not good, because all those against will point out problems all the time (...). You need a broad coalition for attracting an event otherwise it gets too difficult in a politically led organisation”. From this perspective the informal decision-making process is an advantage; the gatekeepers ensure that usually only events with high chances of broad support become subject to a formal process, thus saving resources.

Once a broad coalition decides in favour of the event, the course is difficult to change. One study describes the structure of event planning as “collective phenomena (...) clearly constitutive and energizing” (Pearce, 2007, p. 58 with reference to Durkheim). An informant involved in the bid development in the Bergen case “felt that, when the political system had decided to go for this, ‘now, Bergen has to deliver now’, then (...) you have to work for it, to protest now would not feel right”. Although the stakeholders might be motivated by the tangible outcomes, in the planning phase the event is also a prestige project. Who wants to be a killjoy at this juncture? The media does not make a distinction between a spectacular success and a spectacular failure. Participating in a bid, like participating in a carnival, only functions well if one goes all in and abides by the rules, even if the rule is to disband all rules for a short time in favour of any legal effort to improve the organisation’s stake in the event.

Event planning therefore takes place in a setting of broad backing from politicians. Once motivated by certain outcomes and their reputation, they often willingly invest in the event. A civil servant from one of the host municipalities around Bergen recalled how:

the city council simply found it to be a good idea. The top administrative level found it to be a good idea. Actually, we were cheered on [when] getting the case ready to continue the process, like ‘how are you doing?’, ‘will we succeed?’, ‘are we going to make this happen?’

In the carnival, there is also a tradition of “uncrowning” a ruler or even mock murders in combination with births, thus representing a new life (Bakhtin, 1965/1984, p. 247). The uncrowning relates to the dismantling of the hierarchy but in combination with the murder it is also an indication of the renewal which should follow in the wake of the carnival’s

upheaval. The unique status of the event provokes a similar effect. An event is a large, prestigious and public project, all of which urges the stakeholders to make it a success. The dynamics of the planning phase assist the stakeholders in this. The general positive atmosphere in the planning phase ensures access to resources and levers which otherwise would not be accessible for the stakeholders. Either the engaged stakeholder organisations set new priorities in their own budgets or they receive access to new sources of funding from their allies. In the eyes of a local politician, an event provides “momentum”. It is a window of added pressure on the decision makers to pursue political wishes. Indeed, for one Norwegian civil servant in a municipality, “we got backing for everything we presented and had a really close dialogue with the head of the political committee. He and I talked all the time (...). It was almost like two brothers”. The event made possible “something one had thought about for long, but which had been impossible before”. The politicians “weren’t free with their money, but... politically they were very willing to allocate money for it”.

The potential funding increases with the size of the event, especially if the state becomes involved. The involvement of the state is a requirement by the IOC for hosting the Olympics and the promises linked to the Winter Olympics in Oslo stand out as particularly large and tangible compared to the other cases. The Games should not only bring new or modernised sport facilities but also new trams, improved highways, railroads, etc. For the municipality, the aim simply was city development. According to a local politician,

*Oslo grew so rapidly that it needed a huge transformation of the city.
(...) [W]e saw that by hosting the Olympics, we could get the Norwegian state to take a bigger share of the costs and we saw that the transformation could happen faster.*

Later in the interview the politician described the Olympics as “a marathon while (...) other [smaller international sport events] were just happiness [sic]”. On the one hand, stakeholders in editions of the Winter Olympics can attract or allocate sufficient resources that a state of exception occurs. Other research confirms this fact and demonstrates how it is even possible to use the bidding process of the Olympics as leverage

(Bason, 2019; see also Leopkey et al., 2019). On the other hand, the Olympics' prolonged period of planning compared to the other cases also indicates a limit to the carnivalesque; the temporary carnival cannot bear the Olympics' lasting, tangible and comprehensive impacts.

The pure excitement of an individual is part of the impetus for an event. Later this spills over into the structure of the event planning and makes it a process, which slacks the regular, formal procedures. The prospect of a sport event brings with it a range of other events in advance. Some organisations embrace these events and the changes they bring. They see the multiple breaks as positive features. Several informants from both sport organisations and local public authorities regarded an event's strict deadline as a positive aspect and the carnivalesque planning process actually helped to meet these deadlines. With its links to both the speculative dimension because of the aims of the planning and the spectacular because of its carnivalesque character, this motivation is located in the middle between the personal anecdotes above and the legacy-based arguments presented in the second part of the chapter.

A carnival cannot however be a help all the time. A perpetual carnival is impossible as it would make misrule the rule and lead to a loss of the carnival's immediate aura of inclusion and sense of being out-of-the-ordinary (Nielsen, 2008). It requires both a starting signal, where "all those present, even the most serious, have put aside their austerity", and a set end (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 249). A carnival should be only "a temporary transfer to the utopian world" (Bakhtin, 1965/1984, p. 276). Traditionally, the end was often Lent, a time for piousness and fasting. This meaning of Lent got lost and, for Bakhtin, in the 19th century the carnivals had become bourgeois celebrations. Even if the carnival "cannot vanish", its content has lost its ambivalence (Bakhtin, 1965/1984, p. 276). There are signs that events have lost some of their ambivalence in my cases too. For the participants in the event planning, the planning is only an event as long as the participants experience it as a process of transformation. In the case of the DAF, the hosting of the Half Marathon World Championship coincided with a generally new mindset; however, since then events have become part of the routine in the organisation. Sport event is a new area for

Bergen (but comes on top of a long event tradition). The event stakeholders in Herning have probably come furthest in the development of a conscious, strategic, and possibly lasting phase of event organising. An official from a tourist organisation, which routinely assisted the Herning Municipality with events, refused to call events “business as usual” but acknowledged that hosting events had become “more accessible”. Trust, relations, and certain routines had come into place and “we have a good tradition that the city dresses up for the occasion (...)”. Similarly, the municipality administration can shift to “sport event mode” according to a plan. It has an effective local network and knows how to adjust its expectations.

7.1.2.1 Can the carnival mitigate deterring anecdotes?

I finished the previous section (section 7.1.1) on the agents’ personal experiences with some examples of how negative experiences could hinder future events. Given that it is not uncommon for events to suffer from cost overruns – for most Olympics Games it has even been the rule (Flyvbjerg et al., 2016) – and the critical research presented earlier, there are plenty of negative experiences which could deter stakeholders from participating. However, in chapter 2, I also referred to a more general dynamic of projects described by Bent Flyvbjerg (2016) which suggests that the liability of some stakeholders to use the event to aspire to “sublime” ideas, e.g. building the most complicated architectural design, would increase the costs but also raise the level of interest in the project. Conversely, an awareness of this problem of the sublime should hinder the use of the spectacular dimension as a motivation in the planning phase.

Based on the idea of planning as a carnival and the functions of the event field analysed in the previous chapter, it is possible to discuss some suggestions for why such warnings or negative experiences – either direct or anecdotal – have not always deterred stakeholders from staging events. Regarding the individual event, the carnival unites the stakeholders and provides a space where there is little room for criticism once the planning has started. The event field could also have a similar impact in-between events since it is based on the members’ shared belief in the event as something good. In addition to Flyvbjerg’s “sublime” linked to single stakeholders, cost overruns could therefore be due

to a collective flaw in the field supported by the carnivalesque aspects resulting in a form of “groupthink”. The psychologist Irvin Janis inter alia used this concept to explain the dire (both in absolute terms and certainly relative to any sport event) political fiascos in US foreign policy making such as the US organised Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961 and the failure of the US garrison on Hawaii to foresee the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941. In these cases, among other things the decision makers were blinded by an impregnable conviction in the supremacy of their own ideas and consequently their “close-mindedness” when faced with alternative scenarios. This prevented them from making rational decisions and contributed to their failures (Janis, 1971, 1983, fig. 10.1). Organisers of sport events are obviously not subject to the same pressure as people making war and peace decisions, but some similar mechanisms are at play such as a need for cohesion, which makes criticism difficult. Sport events should also not be subject to the same degree of secrecy which would enable the press to expose the illogical thinking of the decision-making group. However, considering how criticism tends to subside in the sport press once a sport event starts, the idea of the planning as an event could also explain the minimal journalistic criticism in that earlier phase.

7.2 Events as means for money, pride and a better sport

Again referring to Flyvbjerg’s sublime, the good thing about a consciousness hampering of the carnivalesque dimension of the event is that it could reduce the costs and make the speculative side of the event more effective. At the same time, if the carnival/the event-as-event were removed completely from the event, it would probably prevent the event from happening at all. Perhaps we could view the legacies and the carnival as buildings in relation to their foundations. Accordingly, an official in a local Danish event organisation stated that events:

are just something you use as a foundation to build on, and there are still more local politicians demanding that you have to [expand through side activities]. They do not simply want the circus in town for a few days and then off again. They want something, which... to put it directly; they want value for money (...).

The speculative depends on the spectacular and the spectacular on the speculative. Likewise, nobody would be satisfied with only a solid foundation when wanting a house and vice versa. In its three parts, this section outlines how stakeholders speculate in events for economic, cultural and sportive legacies. It also shows how local circumstances, values and a specific event's setting in time and space influence how they do this

7.2.1 Economic impacts - a controversial argument?

The focus on measurability, ideally in money, in the general public administration and the idea of events as investments gives ample evidence as well as explanations for why the economic argument is prominent in the media. However, the stakeholders interviewed for this thesis were often not at ease when talking about this area. For example, when asked about his organisation's interest in events, an official from a Danish tourist office explained that:

first of all, we like to have guests over. Both from a... there are many perspectives. Of course, there is a plain and pure financial perspective. If we have a championship lasting 14 days or three weeks, there follows a turnover which is really interesting for a city of our size.

This statement is not surprising, especially considering the branch of the sender, and yet the "of course" indicates a defensive stance as if it were wrong to earn money on sport events.

Sport federations show the same tendency. As an example, I had the following exchanged when asking an informant from the Ice Hockey World Championship about financial gains:

Informant: [w]ell, it was then... there were various strategic aims... if you by gains hint at economic...

CTJ: Not necessarily, but you said before there were risks and some gains... And yes economic, if that was what you aimed for. But I was more thinking of aims.

Informant: Yes, exactly. Clearly there was – and I won't hide that – no reason to do really... Of course, there was an economic aim – a financial aim that this... it should generate a profit, which the sport could use for whatever costs money, development, etc.

An official from the DHF likewise mentioned money as the primary motive. He then immediately refused but thereby highlighted the potentially controversial nature of this motive. “One, and we do not really hide it, that we, if capable, earn some money by hosting these championships”. Later in the interview, the official elaborated on this but remained divided on the issue:

[w]e are in the entertainment business, (...) and there is nothing odious about us earning some money too. But we are still, I think, influenced by some association stuff. Let us just call it amateurism of some sort. We grew up with that, so all the time we struggle to find the balance.

Refusing to see business “odious”, the informant rejects the unspoken accusation that this business is odious. As the informant also touches on, the sport federations dealing with events position themselves between the locally rooted associations and the global, commercial sport event. The event might be a way of generating money for the local sport, but the very idea of talking about sports as business cases is not always *comme il faut* (cf. the traditionally close relation between the ideal of the “de-commodified” welfare state and the Danish and Norwegian sport organisations). In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how federations were able to use some of their symbolic capital based on their status as sports to improve their position in the event field as well and that they did not draw on any economic capital. Neither on the global nor the local level do the sport federations have a space in which they are recognised for their financial capabilities; like Boltanski and Thévenot, they are unable to make an effective compromise between the market and the civic orders of worth. They attempt to, e.g. by emphasising that the money will be used for the development of sport-for-all but this is still on the backdrop of money earned by business, which e.g. might involve a secrecy incompatible with the

general view on public supported events. The DHF for instance increased their profit from an event by using a VAT exemption, which later proved to be controversial. In addition, they did not make the accounts from the world championship in 2019 public before this was criticised in the media (Brock & Heide-Jørgensen, 2019; Koch, 2016). Here, the methods of the business and the sport association collided and in their efforts to reach a compromise between the market and the civic they came to reveal the differences as well.

Civil servants from the municipalities were not as defensive yet still tried to distance themselves from economic arguments. In the words of a civil servant from the Copenhagen Municipality such arguments overshadow “a cultural political discussion”, and in Herning they “try to generate this sense of pride. (...) I know that many places you try to show how this pays off with economic reports. (...) But that is an argument you might have to discuss from here to eternity”. Does this mean that the economic argument is not as important as its frequent use in the press would suggest? This suggestion was supported by a civil servant from a municipality engaged in Bergen 2017, seeing the issue from two sides:

*Of course, it was a question of what would remain for us afterwards.
For example, in terms of money. However, politically, you were... (...)
really not that interested in really knowing what we would, the local
businesses and so would earn on this. Perhaps it was not the focus.
The main thing was to show off the municipality (...).¹⁴¹*

Another municipality involved in Bergen 2017 had initially been attracted by the potential for various outcomes, but eventually focused on the public celebration in its planning for the event. Previous studies of local events show how economic aims are sometimes dismissed by the organisers and that could also be the case there (Hjalager et al., 2016, p. 58; Jæger, 2019). Even if the event has a global reach, for the locals staging it a local event

¹⁴¹ cf. a study of public authorities’ sensemaking of sport events in 25 French cities noting that public authorities often do not control the observed positive impact of the sport events, thus leading to a poor understanding of the actual relation between event and the observation (Djaballah et al., 2015, p. 72).

should mainly be successful as a spectacular event, as argued in the first part of the chapter.

The lessened economic focus could also be due to a move from being an explicit aim to “more of an expectation”, as stated by a civil servant from the Bergen Municipality puts it. The civil servant added that:

[i]f we as a city are going to use so much money on an event, there is the hypothesis, that the businesses, the tourism industry get a spinoff, that in economic terms [: samfundsøkonomisk set] us spending money on this event nevertheless has a positive outcome in the end, even if it is all negative for the municipality.

In 2019, SEDK manager Lars Lundov in a similar vein dismissed the idea of making more precise cost-benefit analyses of the events:

You all the time have to see it [: the analysis] in relation to what you want to get out of it. Is it worth it making an expensive and complicated cost-benefit analysis (...) when you maybe already have the feeling that it [: the event] in no way would be a bad deal? (Brock & Jørgensen, 2019, emphasis added)

For the critical research as well as for some stakeholders, this leaves us with the intangible outcomes, i.e. those which are evaluated “a finger in the air. Do people think it is nice, does it do anything positive”, in the wording of a local Norwegian public event advisor. A Danish NGB informant concluded in a similar way, stating that the outcome is

very difficult to answer, what is the added resource? (...) There is some intuition in this, do we believe in it? We do not do spreadsheets on it. We make an evaluation. We have a subjective evaluation on various parameters (...). It is to be honest somewhat unsystematic, but we have... attempted to have an eye for the lasting value [in] the short and in the long run.

In this, there is a change of perspective from the direct economic impact to an economic legacy as a long-term and indirect – or perhaps more precisely misrecognised – outcome, which the increased focus on events in series could promote further. In these series, what counts is less the outcome of a single event but rather how the events collectively brand the city as “active” in the hope of enticing “attractive” businesses and workers (cf. Richard Florida’s theory of the “creative class” (R. L. Florida, 2002/2014)). Nonetheless, there is still an economic rationale behind these approaches.

However, my study can also show how this misrecognition does not happen in the planning of the event. Arguments based on a direct economic impact are still relevant during this stage. A civil servant from the Municipality of Copenhagen explained that they still “always write that it [: an event] has a turnover for tourism of 70 million DKK and so. But it is not the main argument”. An informant from Wonderful Copenhagen, the Copenhagen Municipality’s event office, supported this statement as:

there are a lot of things you cannot measure. How proud are you of the city? (...) That is important for the politicians too, but it is always good to have that one to fall back upon, ‘According to our analysis, 6,000 people stay for five days and that generates... so and so many thousands, so and so much turnover.’ You can’t run from that.

Today, SEDK also claims to promote a more diverse focus than the “economic impact [sic]”. According to an official,

I don’t know, 20-30-40 years ago, the economic impact was the only thing. But that is far from the case today. Some of our partner cities do not look too much at that and some look a lot. They have different approaches.

Yet, as long ago as 2011, representatives from SEDK suggested that there was a shift away from an economic focus (Major Events International, 2011). Furthermore, as of May 2019, the most recent event analyses SEDK has published or referred to on the organisation’s home page all had the economic impact as a major theme (SEDK, n.d., 2018, 2019c).

7.2.1.1 *The economic argument in the competition state*

Summing up, there have been attempts to lessen the importance of the economic outcome as an argument. Some public informants reduced the economic outcome to a given, 'natural' outcome, which would make it irrelevant to discuss economic outcomes. The implementation of event policies might also reduce the immediate relevance of the economic argument if those involved change the economic perspective from short-term to long-term. However, the short-term view remains relevant as the civil servants continue to produce economic arguments as a plan B and representatives from sport federations and public authorities frequently refer to them in the media.

Money is simply a fundamental resource for all stakeholders, which gives the economic outcome a special position compared to all the other policies mentioned in an event policy (health, integration, community, infrastructure, etc.). For example the health sector (hopefully) should not rely on the benefits from events, whereas some businesses are dependent on a continued stream of visitors coming for events. In Bergen, a public servant described the impact of events as something which makes "the annual cycle 'healthier' for the local businesses, it is important to get additional activity into the darkest months".

The financial outcomes are also pressed to the forefront because of the required financial input. All events cost money and there are an infinite number of alternative uses for the money one chooses to spend on events. As stated by a regional event official, the result is that "you just always have to be able to justify [the event]; when a journalist is coming saying 'but those 800,000 DKK, you could have hired two social and healthcare assistants for that money'". Even worse, in the case of a cost overrun,

[t]hose you cannot... (...) Me sitting here, saying it is peanuts, you cannot go and say that to the public. A politician would not survive that. Three million? Phff. You cannot say that, and you shouldn't because in the same moment you say three million, you could have hired six social and healthcare assistants for that.

The event proponent's typical defence is to answer money with money and make the argument that the event is not an expenditure but an investment. It is possible that money has always had this central role in discussions over distribution of resources, which would mean the competition state is only the current incarnation of a long-running trend. In this incarnation, as long the stakeholders prove capable of expressing their outcomes in monetary terms or at least in numbers, they also ensure events are compatible with this machine (cf. Muller, 2019; Tynell, 2016, p. 56).

The counter position would be to insist on sport events as events, as out-of-the-ordinary occasions freed from the logic of the market. However, the idea of the competition state in combination with the sheer number of events might have devaluated this possibility already. Public stakeholders evaluate events in the same way as any other public investment, and due to the number of events in some organisations they are means rather than ends in themselves. The Winter Olympics 2022 is the most explicit example of an event as a public investment evaluation. It was simply formally required that the Oslo Municipality followed the regulation for public investments in Norway as the costs exceeded 750 million NOK (ca. 75 million €). This meant the municipality had to undertake a so-called Concept Study for the project (Konseptvalgutredning (KVU)). Research on the general effects of this regulation points out that it has increased the awareness of the economic impacts of projects on society and encouraged the measuring of as many outcomes as possible in monetary terms.¹⁴² The regulation supports an alignment with the competition state while the research also reflects my informants' ambivalent relationship with this development (Samset & Volden, 2013, pp. 10, 50). It is also evident that, whereas the civil servants regarded the countable impacts as important for the politicians' decision making, this was not the view of the politicians themselves (Bull-Berg et al., 2014, pp. 60–61). This corresponds well with my findings that some civil servants felt

¹⁴² The concept study model was implemented nationally in its first version in the year 2000 (Concept - NTNU, n.d.).

that in the aftermath politicians put less emphasis on or possibly misrecognised the economic relevance of certain events in favour of their value as spectacular occasions.

Of my cases only the Winter Olympics were subject to this regulation, but the smaller cases experienced similar formal procedures. It is for instance common that local tourism offices and regional public administrations calculate the expected economic outcome of an event as part of their initial valuation. In both Denmark and Norway, standardised so-called “event calculators” exist for estimating the ‘added value’ in the host area of the event (SEDK, n.d.; VisitNorway, n.d.). In Bergen one official stated that the destination company uses these tools to check the claims from the NGBs “because often you hear sport and cultural organisations, they say that this will give ten million NOK back to Bergen”. However, the company also uses the results to provide arguments for engaging additional stakeholders. Stakeholders such as the municipality and the county require calculations which judge the event to be “sustainable” in financial terms before agreeing to support it.

After all, public stakeholders rarely have a purely evental or cultural perspective (if one ever existed). At the time of my cases, the cultural departments in the municipalities of Herning, Oslo and Bergen included business in their area of operation. A politician from Bergen described it as changing culture and sport from being a burden “to... business politics, experience politics (...) to make business from things, which used to just be an economic strain”. Similarly, the only recent Danish example of financial support for an event from the national budget (Le Grand Départ of Tour de France in 2021) came from the Danish Minister for Industry, Business and Financial Affairs as opposed to the Ministry of Culture, but (Erhvervsministeriet, 2017). At the regional level, the Danish counties take the money for their event support from a budget earmarked for supporting regional financial growth and consequently a local public stakeholder described the Capital Region’s take on events as “much about growth, numbers, facts”.

The result is that sport organisations and event offices adapt to the public criteria in their applications. One Danish public event consultant, who only functioned as an advisor to events and did not have any money himself, asserted that when one has money, “a lot of

the people you talk to, they become obsessed with saying all the things which qualify them for this money". In the Bergen case, the Ministry of Culture and the organisers held preliminary talks prior to the sending of an application for financial support to ensure that it only included areas eligible for support. Indeed, an official from a Danish NGB remarked how some stakeholders' focus on the event as a business forces the federation to function like a business. These stakeholders see their contribution as an investment, and "in the moment they invest some resources, it becomes important what they want in return. For then again, if they do not get something in return for the money they spend... Well, then you can't come again another time". Ultimately, as a Norwegian sport official referring to discussions among Norwegian NGBs on how to secure funding from a potential national event strategy concluded, "[i]f the event isn't socioeconomically profitable, then we [the sport organisations] cannot make it a priority because of the aims of the state".

The risk of this planning approach is to kill the spectacular side – the carnival. For the Olympic department in the Oslo Municipality, the event planning's focus on urban planning made it an event. Although a civil servant acknowledged that the process was "intensive", it was also "a very enjoyable process. It was really funny". However, this focus, in the eyes of an official from NIF, left little space for:

(...) enthusiasm and sports joy. (...) We talked about airports, new tarmac, new skating rinks. It all became [the informant hits the table with his index finger rhythmically three times – dock- dock- dock] factual, boring.

At the same time, the NIF informant recognised the "need for justifying the costs" and the related need for the investment approach to feel "safe". Perhaps the view on the Olympics would have changed later in the process when the major decisions about infrastructure had been made. Looking at an unfinished process like Oslo 2022 however makes it clear that the spectacular and the speculative motivations intertwine and, in some cases, are also mutually disruptive.

Altogether, the market order of worth aligns the justification of the sport event with that of any other public investment in a competition state. From this perspective, events compete for resources on an equal footing with other investments aiming at economic growth or improved public health. The perfect sport event is popular due to both its spectacular staging and its profitability. Therefore, there is at least in the actual domain, i.e. the stated justification (cf. Figure 4), a compromise between the civic and the market orders, but like every compromise it is unstable.

This compromise was also not only advantageous to the stakeholders. In the cases, the sport federations in particular were sometimes reluctant to use the economic impact as an argument. Their history as bottom-up movements and non-profit associations stood in opposition to a market orientated approach. As argued by Bourdieu (cf. 1996, fig. 3) with reference to the emergence of art as a field, top personnel in the sport organisations found themselves between sport as an aim in itself and the instrumental view of sport events as businesses, with the dependency on partners outside of the sport which this instrumental view entails. However, the public debate does not reflect this hesitation. The economic argument here is an influential argument, yet it is not exclusive as it should have been if sport events were indisputably good investments. The public celebration is a just as prominent an argument. As covered earlier, part of its value come from the sport event as an event. The public celebration however also has value as a thing, more precisely as a branding instrument.

7.2.2 The public celebration as a brand

Generally, the arguments I marked as “branding” focused on how the event would make the host stand out. The event should put the host ‘on the map’ and improve the host’s standing in a competition for attention. For capitals like Oslo and Copenhagen, this is part of a perceived global competition between cities to become central nodes in a global network – and a display of importance by being big enough to compete at this level. Copenhagen, or at least some of its politicians, saw the city in a competition with the other Nordic capitals, as well as large European cities like Paris and Berlin. For the provincial cities, hosting is part of a national competition – not least against the capital. For instance,

one of the local initiators behind the UCI Road World Championship in Bergen was motivated by the prospect of countering the trend that “everything is likely to move eastwards [: i.e. towards the capital, Oslo]”. Likewise, a civil servant from the county involved in the events in Herring stated that:

the region has had an interest in that something happens in Herring and everything does not happen in Copenhagen. The hint of a competition between Copenhagen and Herring is an element too, especially from a political perspective (...).

From this perspective, the event is there to support a general branding of the country or region. However, the national brand also feeds into the stakeholders’ work on the event brand. As highlighted previously, the Nordic countries have a shared strategy for using “Nordic” as brand and Denmark and Norway draw on the welfare state, the countries’ efforts as norm entrepreneurs, etc. in their diplomacy (Utenriksdepartementet, 2013).¹⁴³ Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish the general national brand and the event brand. For instance the national Norwegian branding values are very similar to three points for selling Norway as an event nation which a consultancy firm developed in 2019 as part of the work on a national event strategy for Norway (cf. Table 11). The consultants later presented these points in a workshop primarily for representatives from national sport organisations and regional and local public authorities, which agreed to the values (Innovasjon Norge, 2018b).

¹⁴³ In 2015, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry ceased to maintain a central public diplomacy strategy, only to relegate the public diplomacy effort to the individual country offices (cf. mail-correspondence with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2018). The same is true for the Danish day-to-day use of public diplomacy (Udenrigsministeriet, n.d.)

International selling points for Norwegian events	International selling points for Norway as a nation
Professionalism and quality	Engaged
Safety and sustainability	Reliable
Norway as unique with a characteristic nature	Resourceful (both in economic and natural resources)

Table 11: International selling points for Norwegian events compared to selling points for Norway as a nation.

The relation between a general brand and the branding of the events is not surprising but still relevant for the explanation of the current interest in events. An effective event brand is namely a cultural and symbolic asset in the event field which can lower the threshold for stakeholders engaging and staying in the event field. Although the national brand provides support, the stakeholders have also worked on developing a specific event brand.

The foundation for the event brand is the aforementioned event myths, which focused not least on the public celebration. Events should be open, accessible, popular, etc., even if the informants rarely used these words directly. Instead, they would often define the character of their events negatively, i.e. describing what their event approach avoids in contrast to their global competitors. For instance, in the wording of an SEDK official:

we do not do as they do with [cycling] races in China and such. There you have a long distance, before there are some fences and then some runners or riders or something and then a couple of people. It just is not that interesting because you cannot come close. Here you can come close and experience the event.

The stakeholders in Bergen used similar arguments, which apparently gave them a rather free position in the planning. A member of the board for the organising committee in Bergen explained that,

they [: UCI]... probably had the hope that Bergen would make the World Championship – you have to remember Richmond 2015... not so good. Many people on the last day. Doha, Qatar 2016, a catastrophe for the cycling sport, no people there.

A civil servant from Bergen also mentioned that the municipality also refused to engage in a bidding competition against Qatar for the 2016 edition. They “wanted to show the cycling sport that it is possible to make a public celebration (...). We can show this is a spectator event. In a way we wanted to set a new standard”. This norm entrepreneurial perspective also showed as a doping scandal erupted during the planning phase and several of the organisers expected to turn this into an advantage for the Norwegian bid with reference to Norway’s position as a frontrunner in the fight against doping (Bergen Byråd, 2013; Gjesdals & Pamer, 2012; ‘Tror Skandalen Kan Bidra Til å Gi Bergen VM’, 2013)¹⁴⁴

The most obvious example however was the Oslo bid for the Winter Olympics in 2022. The Games, according to an NIF official, would have offered “enthusiasm, involvement, popularity (...). We are a sporting nation, we know sport, we understand sport” in contrast to countries like China, Singapore, Brazil, and South Korea. “[T]hey have had world and car fairs, Formula 1, but no Ski-VM [: FIS Nordic World Ski Championships] nor curling matches”. A civil servant from the Oslo Municipality found that the city should host so that also other “Western democracies would want to host”. The feeling was that the time was ripe for the Olympics to adjust to a global sport event field influenced by Norwegian values (cf. section 6.4.2 on the Lillehammer Games as the norm for Norwegian events).

As the informants describe what their events should not be, what remains for the events to be is the features of the Lillehammer Olympics and the Danish event brand not least being public celebrations. The organisers of the 2022 Games (and all the other events discussed in this study) would definitely in the public have accepted the aims from 1994 of “sober, simple, worthy [and] efficient” Games (Klausen, 1996, pp. 81–82).

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The public celebration is both motivating for the local stakeholders in line with local values and improves the host's position in the event field in a manner that is difficult for rivals to copy. These overlaps between the local and global appeal make it impossible to discern when the local stakeholders have addressed the event owners and their local peers. When for instance the applicant committee for Oslo handed in their first application to the IOC on March 14, 2014, then Minister for Culture Thorhild Widvey and president of the NIF Børre Rognlien stressed the importance of Norwegian values within the national media. Rognlien explained that "we will have to stand firm on the demand that we want the Winter Olympics in Norwegian – built on Norwegian values and traditions" (Bergh, 2014a, 2014b). Essentially this established the theme for the upcoming negotiations for the IOC, but here stressed in the Norwegian media.

This event branding makes Denmark and Norway stand out at the explicit expense of previous hosts. Given the international debate on large events and their failed or negative legacies, the local stakeholders might have seen a demand to be associated with these values among the event owners. A cynical reading would label this as market optimisation and a planned accumulation of symbolic capital. The local stakeholders simply play a game of globalisation. A less cynical reading would be that they have a genuine interest in 'saving' the sport and their events. The stakeholders do not reject the idea of global events as such, but they are critical of their current form and think that they can bring events back on track.

Drawing on pragmatic sociology, both options are possible when one sees the event branding as the local stakeholders' attempt to strike a compromise between the event as a civic good and the global market order of worth. The compromise seems rather stable and a factor which lowers the threshold for attracting events, thus supporting the interest in events.

However, this compromise also has its limits. The "bigger is better" metaphor is present on the national level, not least when the stakeholders applied for governmental support (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003). The proponents of the Winter Olympics sold the event as attractive because the Games are the "biggest" event Norway can host (OL-etaten,

2013b, p. 8). Likewise, the stakeholders of the UCI Road World Championship envisioned it as something positive when describing their event as the biggest “summer event” Norway can host in their application for public support (Bergen Kommune, 2013a, p. 3). In Denmark, no one have recently talked seriously about the “biggest” events possible. When asked in my interview, the Danish stakeholders have been rather swift in their dismissal of the idea of hosting the Summer Olympics. Yet, on a general level, SEDK’s event approach is to develop the event in question and some the federations experienced that this meant pushing the limits. Considering Denmark’s hosting history from 2010-2020, the trend has also been towards still bigger events. Hosting the so-called Grand Depart – the first three stages of the Tour de France – in 2021 will be the most expensive recent sport event in Denmark with public support of 87 million DKK (approximately 11.65 million €) (Brock, 2017).

Furthermore, structural changes to global sport take time. In the meantime, Norwegian (and Danish) sport must undertake “lobbyism (...), very un-Norwegian in a way”, according to an NIF official referring to the Oslo bid for the Olympics in 2022. This put the Olympic bid at odds with the other values of the Norwegian sport as:

it [the public debate] gets really ugly and the rhetoric starts about how waffle hearts is the measure of everything. And that is a really difficult debate for a sport organisation covering both elite and sport-for-all. Internationally, the world is not made of waffle hearts. It isn't stew and fruit juice, it is wine and dinners.

As effective as the Nordic event brand currently is globally, it is not risk-free for the local stakeholders to link “Nordic” and events. A global legacy for events based on Norwegian or Danish event perceptions would in their eyes help the global sport movement (and align the field with their resources, thus making it easier to attract events in the future), but they also risk compromising the general national pride. As stated earlier, national values have previously led to Scandinavian exceptionalism in international politics.

Nevertheless, there are evident limitations regarding the size of events. In Norway, the failed Oslo bid is an obvious example and in Denmark, a majority of the politicians in the Copenhagen Municipality rejected the idea of Copenhagen hosting Formula 1 in 2018, for which the initiators speculated that a budget of 300-500 million DKK (40-67 million €) would be necessary (Gluud, 2018; TV 2 Sporten, 2018). Environmental concerns also played a role when the politicians made their decision, and in the future stakeholders might not only explore the upper limits but value events, which can be easily integrated into the local development (cf. Solberg & Ulvnes, 2016).

7.2.3 Sport's events as sport's means - between elite and sport-for-all

The economic legacies and the public celebration are prominent in the media but have no ties to the events as sport events. The arguments in this third category on the other hand are only applicable to this form of events. Yet, as Table 12 shows, this does not mean these arguments are exclusive to representatives of sport federations. They make up the majority of the senders, but the public authorities are well represented too.

	Sport organisations	Public authorities
<i>All sport arguments (number of references)</i>		
Sport-for-all	34	20
Improved sport infrastructure	28	12
Improvement for the sport	45	10
Elite sport	22	10
<i>Sport arguments used together with nonsport arguments (number of references)</i>		
Sport-for-all	19 (55.9%)	14 (70%)
Improved sport infrastructure	6 (21.4%)	3 (25%)
Improvement for the sport	16 (35.6%)	6 (60%)
Elite sport	9 (40.0%)	7 (70%)

Table 12: Total references to sport arguments by the sport organisations and public authorities and number of sport arguments presented together with nonsport arguments.

“Sport” however can mean many things. Based on the legacy research and the introductions to the global sport culture and the culture in Denmark and Norway, there are at least three ways of relating sport to sport events. The first is sport as an activity in the

tradition of “modern sport”. Here, sport is a system working to ensure improvements in the athletes’ performances and eventually victory. This perspective makes extra injections of resources for sport activities means for improving the conditions for a sport, which is competitive per definition. Modern sport as a system does not have additional utilitarian aims of pleasing or helping as many as possible as is the case for the public authorities (except out of self-interest in terms of ensuring even better chances for improvements in the future). The second form is sport as “idræt/idrett”, a more inclusive idea of sport as a physical culture and non-competitive development. Thirdly, the legacy research suggests an instrumental perspective on sport as a means for other ends, for instance sport as a form of healthy activity or as a provider of extraordinary experiences for both athletes and spectators.

Unsurprisingly, the public authorities often applied the third perspective. As Table 12 shows, compared to sport representatives they were more likely to use sport-related arguments together with arguments not related to sport. At the same time, the sport organisations and public authorities were both frequent users of the sport-for-all argument. To obtain the broadest possible support, the stakeholders seem to have agreed that this third perspective is the most effective argument, even if sport events are predominantly events for elite athletes (the least used sport argument) and the trickle-down effect from the highest level is questionable (cf. section 1.1.1).

I did not come across any critique in the media nor in my interviews with representatives of local sport associations, despite the fact that local sport organisations predominantly offer sport-for-all activities and are dependent on support from the municipalities, who, in the case of supporting an event, would find the money on the same general budget as its support for the local sport. This is not the case for the NGBs, whose main source of money, the lottery money, is unaffected by the event (Søvsø, 2018).¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ A sport event is usually financed fully by a combination of public money, sponsorship and income generated by the event itself, e.g. sales of rights and tickets. In the case of the UCI Road World Championship,

The hope among the locals that the sport events would bring some benefits usually trumped any of these potential objections. The trickle-down effect that the event would inspire people to become active was for instance an important motivation for a local cycling association in the Bergen case. On a larger scale, the DHF also used the IHF World Men's Handball Championship to leverage an existing initiative to increase the number of handball players in Copenhagen with the support of the municipality (Københavns Kommune & DHF, 2017). This ensured the event became relevant for the local and national levels of the sport in addition to the public authorities, whose support for sport is traditionally founded on sport-for-all activities. The sport-for-all argument obviously has a direct interest for the sport organisations, i.e. getting more members, but furthermore its use in the media also improves an event's appeal beyond the sport organisations.

The picture changes in an atypical case like the Winter Olympics where significantly more resources are available. Here, there are clear examples of conflicts which I could only speculate about in the smaller cases. In the following, I focus on a case of local-national disagreement within the NIF caused by the Olympic bid. In chapter 8, I will return to the disagreement between the NIF and other parts of the Norwegian society.

For those at the top level in NIF who initiated the bidding process, the idea of the Winter Olympics as a boost for elite sport in general and new facilities in particular were important motivations. As mentioned in the chapter on sport organisations in Denmark and Norway, although the national federations often regard elite sport as very important the policies rarely reflect this. The idea is not new and goes back to at least the Lillehammer Games. In the interviews, several representatives from the NIF and the skiing federation explained how the Lillehammer Olympics had been a boost for Norwegian elite sport.

for example, the general assembly of the NCF stressed that hosting this event should not "be a burden to the NCF" and that one would depend on support from the Bergen Municipality and sponsors (Norges Cykleforbund, 2012, p. 12). In the Danish cases of the 2019 IHF World Men's Handball Championship and the 2018 IIHF Ice Hockey World Championship, neither of the NGBs included any of their own resources in the events' budgets (Kultur- og Fritidsudvalget, 2014, nos. 12-enclosure 4, 2017, nos. 18-enclosure 1).

Considering the Olympics' potential, an NIF-informant also remarked that it is usually "much easier [for Norwegian politicians] to support local sport associations and sport-for-all, children (...) than elite sport" (cf. Lesjø, 2011, p. 402). Along that line, the initial inquiry from the NIF board to the winter sport federations regarding their view of a bid for the Winter Olympics asked them to consider where to hold the Games and how they could benefit elite sport and its facilities, yet said nothing about sport-for-all (Idrettsstyret, 2011).

The winter sport federations supported the idea and promoted Oslo as their preferred host city. Some sports within the Oslo District Sport Association however reacted cautiously when they were informed. One board member recalled a fear about a shift of focus and resources away from sport-for-all. This did not happen in the other cases but neither did they require any money from the sport organisations, least of all their local associations. The Olympics however required the NIF to use some of its "own" money, i.e. lottery money,¹⁴⁶ which is usually utilised for sport facilities (a major aspect of the budget for the Olympics too). The normal procedure for new facilities is that the money from the lottery funds covers around one third of the costs of the facility. It is the state which allocates the money to the local associations or municipalities via the counties. The national funding is therefore never sufficient to entirely fund a facility but functions as an important "catalyst" for attracting additional local money (Bergsgard, Borodulin, et al., 2019, pp. 530–531). In the case of the Winter Olympics, the model in 1994 foresaw a cost share between the state budget and the lottery money of 78-22%. In this model, the municipality would not participate. In the case of Oslo, the NIF centrally proposed a model even more favourable for the confederation by proposing a share of the costs with the state, the sport and the municipality covering 66%, 11% and 22% of the costs for the Games, respectively. This increased the municipality's share compared to 1994, decreased the costs covered by the state and kept the "sport's", share i.e. the use of lottery money, well below the usual 33% share for a new facility. In addition, to prevent local

¹⁴⁶ No sport organisation ever comes to possess the lottery money in any legal sense, but the impression that the lottery money is the sport's money was nevertheless prevalent among some NIF representatives.

fears from outside of Oslo, the model also forbade the use of lottery money allocated to regions not hosting the Olympics (NIF, 2012, pp. 71–75).

According to a then board member the Oslo District Sport Association eventually supported this idea “for one reason: hosting the Olympics would make it possible for us to get more sport facilities”. “Us” here means the local sport associations in Oslo, and “sport” is sport-for-all. Later, the district association secured their perspective when proposing an amendment at the NIF’s general assembly in June 2012 to the proposal that the NIF should support a bid for the Winter Olympics in 2022. The assembly voted in favour of the amendment, which ensured that children and youth would have access to the Olympic facilities like any other municipal facility (NIF, 2012, pp. 71–75). In an interview, an NIF official also touched on this change from a central perspective: “eventually, the rhetoric developed into converting them [the new facilities] to sport-for-all purposes”. Later in the process, the central level of the NIF considered spreading some of the Olympic facilities to neighbouring counties to lower the costs and increase the support of the project. The Oslo district association engaged in these discussions too and stood firm on their demand that the facilities, not least an ice rink, would have to be built in Oslo.

The use of arguments directly coupled with a benefit for the sport is uncontroversial for both representatives of the sport federations and the public authorities. The two groups might not have the same ends, but in line with the consensus around sport in general they agree that an increased public participation in sport is good. The only exception in the cases studied here was the Oslo case, which caused some discussion both between the NIF and the municipality and within the NIF itself. With regard to the municipality, the NIF felt that the infrastructural aims jeopardised the otherwise agreed justification of sport events based on public participation in sport. Within NIF, the local levels saw this justification put at risk too by a focus on elite sport development instead of sport-for-all in the use of the “sport’s” resources.

The sport related gains are huge if a city's Olympic application is successful. However, once again the potential access to such high amounts of resources makes the Olympics an extremely challenging process compared to less costly events.

7.2.3.1 *Why 'sport' events?*

As the sections above have showed, even representatives of sport organisations, the only among an sport event's stakeholders, who would naturally front a sport agenda, rarely talk of events as related to improved chances of winning, the chance of putting pressure on local elite participants or other arguments based on the idea of improvement and victory as central to sport. Expressions like "it is in the nature of the sport to stage the biggest events possible [and] the Winter Olympics are... Mount Everest" are rare and tellingly this one appeared in an interview of my own with a NIF-official, not in the media. Admittedly, the broad sport related arguments were prominent but still far from being the sole dominating arguments. Yet an NGB's most important partners, the public authorities, which would be free to pick any event, seem to have developed a particular interest in international sport events. In Denmark there is an institution for attracting international sport but not cultural events, and in Bergen half of the local event strategy's examples of "big events" are sport events (Bergen Kommune, 2018, p. 7). This also links back to my introduction to the spectacular dimension of the event and the suggestions from research that medialised sport events "mainly function as spectacles" rather than physical contests (Bourdieu, 2000a, pp. 123–124). Eventually, the qualitative difference between a local sport club arranging a city festival with no sport participation and a national federation arranging a world championship might not be that big (and on the level of mega events, there is also overlaps in e.g. the focus on legacies (Bocarro et al., 2017)). So, why this interest in sport-based events?

In the following, I present three reasons for this: the appeal of sport, the appeal of sport events, and the organisation of sport.

Firstly, several public stakeholders considered sport events to have a broader public appeal than many cultural events. Informants from Herning Municipality portrayed the city

as highly interested in sport (and events) and a civil servant from Bergen described the city as “an active sport city” (further studies considering not only sport events is obviously needed to qualify this suggest). In addition, sport seems to be especially appealing to politicians. The previous section provided several examples of the widespread idea of sport or sport events as solutions to a huge array of problems in society. The sport organisations are aware of these positive associations and use them as a selling point. An official from a Norwegian sport association explained that all of these factors aside from the sporting context itself are important selling points for the sport since “most events which have this added bonus [various intangible legacies in addition to an economic benefit] are sport events. There are some cultural events which have it too, but few business events”.

Secondly, the existing research highlights some intrinsic features of sport events such as “the fan” and the sport events’ almost given authenticity (cf. Slagstad’s description of watching a sport event as watching “incalculable mysteries of the coincidences” and witnessing “history in the making” (Slagstad, 2008, p. 639)). The road to making a spectacular event while hosting a sport event seems short, which supports the first point about sport events as having a particularly broad appeal. However, as the stakeholders have become more professional, they no longer base the spectacular dimension only on the sport in the event. Sport events have become subjects to an increased “blurring of event types” as side activities have become important for substantiating the idea of the event’s broad appeal (Getz, 2012a, p. 28; cf. Gammon, 2012, pp. 110–116). Increasingly, “event management is largely about delivery of experiences” (Berridge, 2012, p. 274). On the one hand, this means that while the sport as the event is relevant for many, still more might attend simply to receive a form of experience. The sport organisations might maintain their relevance as content providers, but the side activities might blur out the sport in the eyes of the spectator and as a consequence sport events become very similar to the festivals which are already organised for many of the same reasons as sport events. Festivals are also intrinsically local and regular, which are structural advantages compared to sport events (Wilson et al., 2017). If a city like Bergen wants to host one big event every year

and make it a public celebration, local stakeholders have the opportunity to own a festival, whereas they would have to buy the sport event. On the other hand, the sport event can offer an accessible if also expensive shortcut to some of the same outcomes.

This shortcut is possible, as the third point, because of the sport organisations' structural conditions which make sport events very distinct from other events. Most importantly, the sport organisations are well organised on the local, national and global levels. The international federations inform everyone, including stakeholders outside the sport, about events in need of a host city. They also have clear plans for how to stage them and the chance of the event getting cancelled or moved is very limited.¹⁴⁷ The events are complex, but there is a well-developed, supportive infrastructure around them; as a result, according to a Norwegian public event consultant the supply is much clearer compared to cultural events. To this come the support from the national and local sport organisations. A civil servant in a Norwegian county for instance presented the sport's role in the current process of developing a national event strategy as very engaged (cf. Table 9). In contrast,

[t]he cultural life [is] like, many are to themselves enough and in a way not as well organised. That makes it harder too – we have – we are supposed to make a strategy for culture and sport that is for cultural and sport events. We are a bit like, maybe we should just make one for... the sport? It is so much easier.

Overall, the appealing sport content in international sport events combined with sport's better organisation and ability to accommodate a myriad of discourses, interests or policies mean that such events stand out compared to non-sport events of similar sizes (Rowe, 2011, p. 143). This supports my suggestion that the backward linkage and more context in general should be included in the study of events. Understanding the interest

¹⁴⁷ The impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the sport calendar in the spring and summer of 2020 is unprecedented. The only previous cancellations of the Olympic Games were due to World War I and II.

in sport events requires a look beyond the legacies/forward linkage, although these are important motivations too.

7.2.4 Summing up: The legacy-based arguments

Summing up, the local context did mark the stakeholders' use of legacy-based arguments, however not to a degree that excluded any argument described in the international research completely. The limited use of arguments based on infrastructural legacies was the most concrete difference and can be attributed to the difference in size, as suggested in the state of the art. The stakeholders were nevertheless perfectly capable of collecting favourable arguments.

This section has explained how they did this both by emphasising other benefits for themselves but also by using arguments associated with alien sectors, for example when the public representatives talked about the events as good because of the improvement they would bring for the sport. The federations and the public authorities might differ in what they mean by sport (sport-for-all or elite sport), but generally, this did not lead to any debate. A civil servant from a Danish county summarised this pragmatism by stating that "principally, you could say it [the differences in aims] does not matter, as long as we all think it is a good idea and pay the same amount in some way – or think it is fair and agree on it". Moreover, a public local Danish event consultant confirmed that "[s]tuff like attention and branding – that is no zero-sum game". This, however, is only true when looking at different sectors. When several municipalities of the same size and perhaps even in the same region go together, "there are things like: 'some things we do together, but somehow, if we kind of could do it on our own, then it would pretty cool too'". It may not be a zero-sum game, but there remains a touch of *realpolitik* in the effort to include and cooperate with new stakeholders.

7.2.4.1 *Event legacies: Carnivals or revolutions?*

Although several of the stakeholders described the outcomes from their events as "legacies" and I have also used this term for the sake of consistency, it is important to note most of the events did not set a "new [sustained] level of activity" (Spilling, 1998) or in

any other way provide the structural changes which define a legacy (Preuss, 2019). The bid for the Winter Olympics was a possible exception. The process failed to progress sufficiently for it to be possible to discern all potential legacies, but the wish to change the values of the global sport in the bidding phase was an early attempt to leave a global legacy. The difference between the Olympics and the other cases is also supported by the resources they required in the planning also from the persons involved, which for instance led one informant to describe the planning as a marathon. These various depictions of the Olympics as something lasting go against the Olympics as a carnival, at least in the understanding of the carnival as a temporary upheaval after which one returns to the hierarchy of the everyday. The capability of providing legacies, i.e. changing the structures permanently, instead gives such events what the historian Charles Tilly has described a revolutionary-like outcome (Tilly, 1995, Chapter 1; cf. Darnell & Millington, 2015; Orttung & Zhemukhov, 2017). While this could have happened in the Oslo case, in all the other cases the events were merely carnivals and temporary upheavals.

Talking of events as potential revolutions might seem abrupt but it is a useful metaphor for raising some other questions relevant for understanding the position of events today. Where are the oppressed revolutionaries, i.e. those who in a 'classic' revolution would have attempted to overthrow the elite? They are not there. Contrary to a revolution that targets the elite, it is the elite who have the prerogative of organising international sport events. This leads to an important point about the events' structures. In the theoretical chapter, I suggested that the agents in the event field cannot ignore the field's structures. Seeing events as the project of the elite nuances this claim. As members of the elite, the agents are not interested in changing the structures; in contrast, they might want to use the events to strengthen them further. The lack of a revolutionary quality of individual events however does not discount the idea that as a collective they could lead to long-term structural changes. Based on the analyses in this and the previous chapter there seems to be at least one such legacy, namely the persistent interest in events reflected in event strategies and a shared event conceptualisation (cf. Leopkey & Ellis, 2019).

7.3 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the stakeholders' motivations for bidding for events divided into two main groups. The first group covers an often personal motivation based on previous positive experiences of spectacular events. While the second contains an often professional motivation driven by a speculative perspective, for instance when an event motivates the stakeholder because of the prospects of certain outcomes or legacies.

The motivation based on previous experiences functions on an almost unconscious level. The rich use of anecdotal proof by some informants during the interviews showed how, for those deeply engaged in their organisation, the events often left positive, lasting memories. These memories could then be reactivated under the right circumstances such as the research interview, i.e. a long discussion about why the informant's organisation decided to support the event. The anecdotes focused exclusively on the event as a public celebration. Sport events are both things and events and the first section made the relevance of the sport event as an event clear. When understanding sport events, one should not ignore the importance of the personal experience and with it the intentions of the individual agent in the event field (Danermark et al., 2001, p. 164; cf. Pearce, 2007). At the same time, the prominence of the "investment" as an important element of the event field described in the previous chapter underlines that the individual sensemaking does not stand on its own.

Other research has showed that sensemaking around an event's "supposed outcomes" also include legacy based/speculative motives (Djaballah et al., 2015, p. 66). In the cases of this project, legacies were mainly related to economic, cultural and sport specific outcomes. Using interview data, it has also elaborated on the background to explore the importance the stakeholders attached to these arguments as well as highlighted the contested position some of the arguments had because of the local contexts.

The economic argument was widely used in the media and also featured prominently in the interviews with some reservations. These reservations had little to do with the stake-

holders feeling hit by the critical research; rather, the economic argument was controversial due to the context and the general non-commercial image of sport in Denmark and Norway. This was in general less of a problem for the public authorities. The economic argument is easily expressed as a form of investment, which aligns the event with the prevalent New Public Management discourse. As previously mentioned, Ove K. Pedersen however suggests one sees the competition state as the latest of a series of compromises which Danish politicians have made to keep the welfare state afloat. The commercial argument might have become more explicit, but there is nothing new about the fact that applicants for public money have to demonstrate how their idea – i.e. an event – would be in line with the welfare state.

Some informants reported that their organisations would like to drop the economic argument. However, the prominence in the media and the fit between structure and argument showed little evidence that such a move would be possible. Indeed, it would require a will to accept the event as an expenditure for what a public representative simply called “the good life”. The prominence of the economic argument to me suggests that, if it even exists, this post on the budget is extremely limited.

Any limitation of the economic impacts as an argument also only concerned the direct impact of the event on the city, for instance due to an increased number of visitors. The informants did not talk about limiting the use of arguments based on the cultural legacies, which not only relate to pride and happiness but also branding. As mentioned in the section on culture in the competition state, there has been an increased focus on branding through cultural initiatives as way of improving the host cities’ standing in a wider competition, e.g. increasing the number of well-educated inhabitants. This chapter has shown this is the case for sport events too. Further, there is evidence that the stakeholders not only framed these outcomes as beneficial for the local and national communities, but they also emphasised how their events would leave a legacy for the global sport field. In this argument, the global field should begin to comply with Scandinavian standards rather than the other way around. These standards came from the sport organisations but also drew on a general image of the “Nordic” society. Such wishes have not kept the event

owners from awarding events to Denmark and Norway, and it is possible that an association with Nordic events and sporting values is currently desirable for them. This is beneficial for the local stakeholders, especially as the public celebration is also in line with local values.

This gives the local stakeholders power by exercising a form “conspicuous modesty”, a term, which Daloz (2006) used to describe the members of Nordic political elites. The point was that Nordic politicians had to be careful not to appear elitist, e.g. through overly conspicuous consumption. While some politicians did have houses above the average size, they would present them in ways which signalled authenticity, e.g. by arranging or even building them themselves. That imbued the conspicuous modesty with a just as conspicuous surplus – just not in monetary terms. Conspicuous modesty is therefore still an expression of power, but it is more subtle and adjusted to the context (Daloz, 2006, p. 181; cf. Veblen, 1899). However, excessive encouragement from global agents to bid risks encroaching on the legitimacy of the local values. The same could be the case for an extreme local emphasis on the size of the event as a positive argument, which the chapter also could show was used around the bidding for the events in e.g. Bergen and Oslo. In such situations, the local stakeholders are walking on a knife’s edge between exploiting the advantages of their modest image in the global field and maintaining the local appearance that the participation in the global event field does not endanger the local virtues. Too intensive branding of the modesty image is indicative of a case of globalisation (growth+globalisation), while combining “growth” with modesty would most likely lead to reduced credibility. For the local stakeholders the influence would ideally function one way only (from the local to the global), but this is not realistic. An NIF official acknowledged that one still had to play by the global rules, and chapter 6 outlined how SEDK made the globally recognised spectacular event a prerequisite in addition to any local specificities. Sport events are outcomes of glocalisation processes and local stakeholders have the upper hand only as long as the global market favours the local cultural capital.

The arguments based on the use of sport in the event generally did not prove controversial. Chapter 5 described a division between the sport event as an arena for elite sport

and the focus on sport-for-all, especially among the public authorities, yet this did not carry through to my analysis. Most likely, this was possible because of the medium of the senders. While representatives of both the sport organisations and the public authorities used the sport arguments, they did so in a setting (newspaper articles) suited for short statements and little space for nuances. This is good for making the argument broadly appealing since the reader can interpret more general statements in any way they choose. The inclusion of interview data and the atypical case of the Winter Olympics have then clarified that the arguments based on the sport were more nuanced than the first media analysis showed. Only in the case of the bid for the Winter Olympics did a split surface within the sport as, unlike the other (less costly) cases, the NIF had to use some of its “own” money, i.e. lottery money, which would otherwise have been used for other areas of sport.

Based on the very similar use of the arguments by representatives from both sport organisations and the public authorities, this chapter has also discussed the prominence of events based on sport specifically compared to events in general. The analysis shows that sport is well organised with representatives on local, national and global levels and with clear plans for future events, meaning that its events are typically more accessible and stand out compared to many other forms of events.

Finally, the chapter has also shown a third form of motivation placed in-between the speculative arguments mentioned above and the spectacular arguments reflected especially in the the informants’ personal perspectives. This form occurred during the planning phase, which the chapter has suggested also functions as an event in itself. This phase holds both an appeal to the individuals because of its extraordinary character as well as a link to the speculative dimension. While the most obvious link was the focus on how an event’s extraordinary qualities facilitated access to new resources, the event planning also required a cohesion in the organisation which made it easier to achieve the desired outcomes in addition to staging the event.

Overall, this chapter has shown that sport events are things/instruments and events. Both motivate the stakeholders and both exist as discursive structures within the event field. At what point each of them is more relevant is impossible to say with certainty. The decision makers clearly had particularly strong memories of the events' impact as events, yet while this way of making sense of an event could spur an interest it presumably has little value in the global event field or in meetings with an organisation's peers. The bid for the Winter Olympics for instance, arguably an extreme case, shows how the carnival cannot bear very costly cases alone. The NIF representatives believed that the excessive demand for resources for the Games killed the joy of the sport and also led to internal conflicts within the organisation. Although the celebration might be a motivation for the individuals, the stakeholder organisations supplement the celebratory aspect with an instrumental perspective in the media. After the event however, some informants reported that the stakeholders would focus less on the tangible or measurable outcomes after the event – or simply take them for granted – which relativises the importance a purely media based analysis would ascribe to the instrumental motivation.

In the end, the evaluation of the legacies from the event might not be that different from the informal process that marked the local politicians' initial decision to support the bid (cf. chapter 6). On the one hand, this means that the meaning of a specific event is eclectic because it is constantly renegotiated before, during and after an event. On the other, by drawing on the material from different events in a similar context this section has also shown that it is possible to identify some general motivations for events, which are also relatable to the assumptions from chapter 2 that events are primarily relevant because of their speculative and spectacular dimensions. They are investments which can also give their attendants a sense of belonging or liveliness. In the final empirical chapter, I analyse what happens to these general motivations and the eclecticism when the stakeholders are faced with a specific event.

8 And how “it all makes sense” – explaining a specific event

Chapters 6 and 7 laid out the stakeholders’ general ideas, concepts and personal motivations for supporting an(y) event. These concepts included arguments based on the events as investments, events as celebrations, and the importance of events for attracting further events in the future. The chapters also explained how the use of the arguments within the cases studied for this thesis stood in a relation with the local and global structures of an event field. The arguments were not universally valid. As helpful as the investment discourse was in some cases, it also exposed the stakeholders to criticism.

Each stakeholder would therefore use various arguments. However, the chapters have only explored these diverse arguments from a general perspective and have not considered any changes during the bidding and planning process. This last empirical chapter analyses the arguments with the addition of this perspective of time and space. More specifically, it focuses on the development of the argumentation as the stakeholders move from thinking about events in general to planning a specific event. Here the justification of the event might depend on yet another layer of “rationalisation” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 92). The event is still the point of departure, but the arguments from the engaged stakeholders could become more local as, once the event is acquired, the global level become less relevant. Thus, the perspectivation of the discourse changes.

In the analysis, the chapter views the event as an object to which the stakeholders and their peers attach various orders of worth (cf. pragmatic sociology). When a public authority for instance refers to an event as an investment, it is an attempt to make something relevant to the collective because of the expected (economic) yield and strike a compromise between the market and civic orders of worth. This example also shows that the generic arguments are expressions of orders of worth too; however, pragmatic sociology is more than just labelling discourses as the theory also argues that agents can challenge the stakeholder’s current order. This introduces a dynamic element to the discourse development as well as the notion of the public voice, which otherwise could have

been overlooked. This challenge is unlikely to happen if the generic arguments are only words in a policy and present in the negotiations with the global level of the field where the aim was mainly to fit in. However, the challenge is a very relevant element in an analysis at the local level, i.e. once an event has been awarded and the event policies have practical consequences. At this point, I presume the stakeholders attempt to embed a specific event in the political and possibly even the physical landscape. In some cases, the public challenge becomes explicit, whereas in others the stakeholders act based exclusively on their perception of a public sentiment.

This chapter analyses this move from the generic to a concrete argumentation by the public authorities. All the stakeholders use the event's potential as "platform" for other initiatives, but I presume the demand to be specific is especially prevalent for the public authorities. Although the federations might have specific aims too, the previous chapters also pointed out their intrinsic interest in events as part of their general engagement in competitions. For the public authorities, events are not similarly, intrinsically interesting (but might become so as in the case of Herning). Consequently, public stakeholders are more exposed to criticism from their peers when supporting an event compared to the federations. I expect that public organisations make considerable efforts to embed an event within the city and agree on an order of worth which is acceptable for both themselves and the (perceived) challengers. In other words, they work on producing a sensible narrative of the event, similar to the personal anecdotes presented in the previous chapter, only extended to the whole peer community.

This process begins with the aforementioned attempt to make the general idea of an event as appealing as possible through broad aims in the event strategies and by organising side activities. While these initiatives are important building blocks when embedding an event locally, they are also generic measures expected of any event. I expect that a more place-specific rationalisation is needed to firmly root a specific event in a local context.

In the first part of the chapter, I analyse the rationalisation in a typical setting. The public voice is not directly present and the public authorities make their rationalisation based

on perceptions. The second part shows the dynamics of the rationalisation in the atypical case of an overt public debate – the Oslo bid for the 2022 Winter Olympics. The Oslo case shows how the rationalisation of an event can change over time and not only appear because of the stakeholders' perceptions of a passive public.

8.1 Public stakeholders embed the specific event

The road cycling championship in Bergen was the clearest example of public authorities making efforts to embed a specific event by linking it to other initiatives. When Bergen won the event, a civil servant in a municipality involved in the championship described how “[w]e [: the civil servants] were asked to think strategically [by the politicians]”. The civil servant also explained how a biking strategy:

was made right before the championship and so everything goes together in order to promote and get things done, which would not have happened without the championship. (...) Politically, you are more ‘Of course we should be both have [a] Bike City [label]¹⁴⁸ and [a] biking strategy and All Children bike’, of course all this gets priority.

In the same vein, employees of the municipality in Bergen and the county involved in the organising process recalled how biking had not been that prominent. The county mustered any existing biking initiatives such as the Tour de Fjords race and an increased interest in bike-based tourism to create a rationale for the event. While the municipality had a policy paper, one of the members of the project group in the municipality stated that

when the world championship came, then more politicians, not interested in biking, started to think, ‘gosh, we have to – to have any credibility, then we have to do something for everyday biking’.

¹⁴⁸ Recognition awarded by the UCI to cities, which host UCI events and take additional initiatives to improve the conditions for biking, e.g. by adopting a biking strategy (UCI, n.d.).

This was not the reaction of the federation after the city won the event. Like the municipality, the event became a product, albeit for a much more limited group of costumers and furthermore only for immediate consumption by elite cyclists. As described earlier, within the organising committee the sport federation was solely focused on the tournament. There, the event was an extremely specific instrument. For the federation and the ideal typical modern sport, the event was justified by pragmatic sociology's industrial order of worth. The event – or perhaps just the tournament in the event – is simply the most reliable way to measure the performance of the athletes and determine who is the best (cf. Tangen, 1997). The cost and wider appeal of the tournament as an event is less important. This approach contrasted with the aims of the municipalities, cf. the unease in the Bergen case as NCF increasingly focused on the sport-related part of the event. The media too began to question the late planning of the broader cultural programme (Garvik, 2017; F. Johnsen & Ullebø, 2017), and as the municipality found that the organising committee did not give sufficient priority to the cultural programme it allocated additional money for, together with the organising committee, hiring a third party to handle this aspect of the event.

While the authorities in the case of Bergen 2017 enhanced its event's legitimacy by adding concrete local initiatives, in most of the other cases cities managed without such additions. Of course, the public authorities in those cases still had to make the events legitimate but the lack of any significant protests indicate that they succeeded. As a basis they, just like Bergen, used the generic arguments presented in the previous chapter. They however did find ways to localise their events beyond these arguments, just in a manner less explicit and concrete compared to Bergen. In the case of Herning for instance, which hosted parts of both of the handball events, the local public authorities and their stakeholders have incorporated events to such a degree that many events are embedded per default without any need of extra initiatives. Accordingly, a DHF official involved in the 2018 championship concluded that "Herning of course just wants to be visible as a host city, of course with the subtitle 'and sport city too'". Hosting an(y) event (and hand-

ball) is therefore already deeply embedded in the city's official story. As mentioned previously, however, it did do something extra for the Ice Hockey World Championship due to its extraordinary size.

New infrastructure is a tangible outcome which in several cases helped the local embedding of an event. In the case of the parts of Ice Hockey World Championship staged Copenhagen, even before the city had won the event the local politicians, according to a civil servant in the municipality, coupled it

with the Royal Arena.¹⁴⁹ We also built the ice-skating rink right next to it and therefore you got Royal Arena, our own rink and the world championship, which mutually pulled each other through... (...). So then all came together and made it right to support ice hockey. In that way, it made sense even though it is a relatively little sport.

This story of acquiring facilities and only then getting an event also played a role in the case of Næstved and Kolding, which hosted parts of the handball championship in 2015. They had both just decided to build new arenas before the concrete negotiations over acquiring the event began. Once they got the event, they did more to embed the event as an event compared to any embedding activities related to additional, concrete initiatives. A civil servant from one of the municipalities described how they were “rookies” and “much more, in a positive sense, aggressive [: than the DHF and Herning] in our focus on getting something out of this”. The aim however was not to use the event primarily as an instrument, but rather to do things which first would brand the event and eventually also the city. This led to an intense focus on branding the event in the city and reaching out to as many stakeholders as possible. An official from the DHF could still remember how these new municipalities “made a lot of efforts to... simply make the most of it for their city”. With probably the costliest decision (new infrastructure) already taken, the proponents were fully committed to the event and produced a sensible story through its

¹⁴⁹ Multi-use arena in Copenhagen. Planning began in 2011 and the arena was inaugurated in 2017.

exceptional status. This is probably difficult to replicate in bigger cities where a single event cannot sway a population in the same manner.

8.1.1 Conclusion: Garbage can rationalisation

Despite popular belief that the Games are a once in a lifetime opportunity that needs to be used by everybody to 'do something', it took the UK two years after the Games were awarded to London in 2005 to vaguely decide what this 'something ought to be' (Girginov, 2018, p. 76).

Post-award rationalisation is nothing unusual and it does not have to be particularly concrete. Indeed, in most of my cases there was little evidence of concrete planning. This contradicted my initial presumption that the arguments in the organising phase would be increasingly concrete and local in an attempt to legitimate the event as a civic order of worth. While I found examples of this in the case of Bergen, the planning phase generally rested on no more than the deep conviction that events were useful and the focus was simply on about making the most of these occasions.

The main thing for the stakeholders was not to be concrete but to embed the event locally in a sensible way. The focus on the event as a civic order of worth prevailed and this resulted in a pragmatic, garbage can inspired decision processes (cf. Stark, 2017, p. 392). The eclecticism is therefore allowed to continue as this theory suggests that some decisions are outcomes of an anarchy, i.e. not based on bargaining between clearly marked parties but made by “occasional members” whose attention can be directed towards but also away from a decision (Cohen et al., 1972, pp. 1–2). In the case of deciding to host an event, the deep conviction of events as ‘a preferred solution’ (cf. chapters 6 and 7) means the stakeholders are highly motivated to look for problems to which they in some way can use the event as a solution. The decision to host an event becomes a “choice situation”, i.e.

a meeting place for issues and feelings looking for decision situations
in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which

they may be an answer, and participants looking for problems or pleasure. (*Cohen et al., 1976, p. 25*)

My cases' similarity to a garbage can process is reflected in the findings of a study involving the decision making among the organisers of the 1999 Pan American Games. As the organisers in the implementation phase (i.e. making the immediate preparations for and staging the event) had to make quick decisions they went from being proactive to reactive, which meant making decisions based on the best available information without the time for thorough rational considerations (Parent, 2010). While time was also a constraint in my cases, more importantly the stakeholders involved might not have had the need to make such rational considerations. Alternatively, what they needed was a sensible way of embedding the event in the city. For example, the hasty implementation of a biking policy might not be rational in hindsight but may have been sensible at the time the decision was made.

The garbage can model shows how difficult a municipality's position is when using an event to develop a programme of side activities and leverage other policies. It is hard to make a (random) event fit into a running policy. The developers of the garbage can model do not propose any way of avoiding the chaotic choice situation. Perhaps it would also not be beneficial to avoid this but instead, as was the case in some municipalities, embrace it, be open for any stakeholder and acknowledge the carnival in the planning phase. Here, it is relevant to remember Quentin Skinner's remarks on the demands for politically legitimate actions. He believes that these are legitimate to the degree their proponents can make them appear legitimate. Although very imprecise regarding what exactly makes something legitimate, the remark makes the point clear that legitimacy cannot be delineated in any definite way (cf. Skinner, 1974). Successful garbage can processes underline this. We can then return to pragmatic sociology to understand why these processes succeeded. Although open and chaotic in the case of sport events, the public stakeholders all had the criterion that new stakeholders or ideas should qualify the event as an initiative for the common, civic good. The final aim of course being to make the event legitimate in the eyes of the peers of the municipality – the public.

8.1.2 Embedding in the future

As the number of events increases, as described earlier the stakeholders have developed routines for their participation in the global competition for hosting rights. It is possible that similar processes of professionalisation follow for the embedding of specific events locally. At the time of my data collection in the spring of 2018, the Copenhagen Municipality for instance had recently decided to allocate money to the organisers specifically for ensuring “activation” as an integrated part of the event procedure. A civil servant explained how

the applications always claimed that (...), there would be so and so many additional members and more of this and that (...) but the closer we got to the actual staging, the more you focus on that [: the staging] at the cost of the legacies and such. Therefore, we typically allocate that money ourselves and then make a special agreement, so that we have two agreements with the federation: one about the event and one about activation.

The DHF noted this when organising the Men’s World Handball Championship in 2019. The federation was active in both Herning and Copenhagen, “and especially Copenhagen has really emphasised in the agreement that they expect us to make a lot of side events aimed at handball for all” (the interview with the DHF official took place during the event planning in 2018).

This is a strategy for big cities with resources to invest in events. Smaller cities might not have sufficient finances to embed their events in this manner not to speak of attracting specific events. Therefore, they will probably continue to use the garbage can approach when embedding event. It is a cost-efficient and flexible method based on local allies. In the Danish town Kolding, for instance, the support for local mountain biking currently goes through events; however, a local event consultant described the reasoning behind this as a “package (...). It is about making synergies, so that the public money we spend on mountain bike tourism supports the events we do too and vice versa. It is about getting a holistic view on it”.

8.1.2.1 *Events as arenas for innovation?*

Another potential method used to ensure a specific event is of interest to the collective is based on the use of events as arenas of “innovation”. “Idrættens Innovationlab” (the Sport’s Innovation lab) founded by the DIF and a private Danish foundation is one example. This lab has two areas of focus, one of which is “event-based innovation”. The partially EU-funded EVINN-project (Event-Innovation) is another example which worked with event-based innovations as a means to increase the economic outcome from sport events (DIF, n.d.; Industriens Fond, n.d.; Storm, 2014). Most recently, the proposal for a Norwegian national event strategy made the promotion of Norway as innovative and the encouragement of innovation one of its two fundamental criteria for events (Innovasjon Norge, 2019, p. 19).

While these attempts focus on improving the outcome of events for various stakeholders, I suggest they also play a role in increasing the interest in events. My central point is that the focus on innovation makes specific events generally legitimate because the link between the event and innovation focuses on the event as a basis for innovations *in other fields* (K. H. Sørensen, 2016, p. 124). This is different from innovation, for example that sought by SEDK when Danish NGBs host international events which focuses on innovating the event field. SEDK has for instance advocated the creation of a project to improve the link between sport events and regional business development.¹⁵⁰

“Event based innovation” with a focus outside the event field invites everyone to make use of a specific event as a ‘raw material’, e.g. in line with hackathons and other open data initiatives. The connection between the event and innovation might make the event relevant for organisations which otherwise would not get involved in the staging of an event. If this happens, the typical stakeholders could be joined by “semi-engaged” stakeholders positioned in-between the engaged, allied and militant stakeholders. They make

¹⁵⁰ Mail correspondence with SEDK, August 2019.

little or no organisational and social commitments but develop their businesses by drawing the material and data from a specific event. Despite their narrow interest, these semi-stakeholders can still be beneficial for the regular, engaged stakeholders due to their numerical potential and the tangible proof they give regarding a specific event's relevance for society. In addition, the very association with "innovation" is beneficial as it is a concept which in the 2010s became central in public policy development and the competition state in places where one previously found terms like "progress", "development of the society", or "planning" (Pedersen, 2011). These terms circle around the "need" for continued economic growth and a global competition ("not falling behind"), reiterating the rhetoric of the local and national event strategies (K. H. Sørensen, 2016, pp. 112–114).

The first part of the chapter showed how public stakeholders legitimise their decision to host an event further as it comes closer. However, they do not do this only by attaching the event to specific concrete events as I presumed. The process is very much marked by an ad-hoc approach whereby the public authorities seek local stakeholders and potentially concrete policy programmes with the aim of making the event look sensible.

This at least was the case when the stakeholders did not experience significant public reactions. It all happened in a rather teleological way (the event as the given aim) where the politicians and administrations combined various free-floating elements into a new whole. The second part of the chapter explores what can happen in the unusual case of an outspoken public opposition by examining the Oslo bid for the Winter Olympics in 2022.

8.2 When the public has a say - the case of Oslo2022

The start of Oslo's bidding process echoed the smaller cases. The bidding process began as an unforeseen incident mixed with a latent desire. In this case, the unforeseen accident was the IOC's unexpected awarding of the 2018 Winter Games to PyeongChang, South Korea instead of Munich, Germany in July 2011. With an Asian host in 2018, the highest levels of the NIF and the Norwegian member of the IOC Gerhard Heiberg believed that the IOC would be open for having a European host in 2022.




Figure 13: Distribution of press coverage per quarter of a year (Q) regarding the Oslo process for the Winter Olympics in 2022 (n = 718).

In September 2011, the NIF then took the initiative to plan a bid. The central initiative was new and possibly not only due to the unexpected decision of the IOC, which required a swift decision. The most recent and locally-initiated bid for the 2018 Winter Games had ended in October 2008 with a newly elected NIF board withdrawing the organisation's support for Tromsø's candidature because of the costs (Higraff & Okstad, 2008). This somewhat chaotic process might also have led to a wish for tighter control and in the autumn of 2011, instead of calling for local bids, the NIF board therefore invited the winter sport federations to recommend a candidate city considering the requirement for facilities, its general suitability and the future use of the facilities for elite sport (Idrettsstyret, 2011).

	Phase 1	Phase 2a	Phase 2b	Phase 3
<i>Sport</i>	21	7	14	11
<i>Politics</i>	12	0	16	16
<i>Media</i>	3	0	5	3
<i>Lobby organisations</i>	1	0	1	0
<i>Other</i>	7	3	14	5
Total	44	10	50	35

Table 13: Participants in the Oslo debate in the print media sorted according to branch and phases.

The invitation marked the beginning of the first of the 2022 bidding process' four phases (marked by the vertical lines in Figure 13). The first phase ends with the official expression of support from the Oslo Municipality on May 23, 2012. This is followed by an intermezzo over the summer and autumn (2a), until the Oslo Municipality in December 2012 decided to hold a local referendum for or against hosting the Olympics. The next phase, 2b, covers the debate prior to the referendum, which took place in September 2013. It is immediately followed by the final phase, phase 3, marked by the Olympic debate flaring up as the costs of the Sochi Winter Olympics (staged in February 2014) become known. The debate and the third phase end when the leading government party dismissed the idea of providing a state guarantee in October 2014.

8.2.1.1 Phase 1: The initiative

Over the autumn of 2011, the winter sport federations were unanimous in their positive response to the NIF's invitation, with all pointing at Oslo as their preferred host city. According to an NIF official this resulted in a very high emphasis on the Games as a provider of new sport facilities compared to the arguments for the Games in the 2018 bid and other previous bids. Internally, the Games became legitimated by an industrial order of worth. They are an efficient tool for acquiring facilities.




Figure 14: Arguments used in favour of the Oslo bid for the Winter Olympics in 2022 in the first phase.

Improved sport infrastructure was also one of the most used arguments in the media in the first phase (see Figure 14). This does not mean the internal NIF motive was particularly widespread. As mentioned it is a common legitimisation for Norwegian events, if also not part of the Lillehammer myth, which rather focuses on the broader public outcomes. These broader outcomes might have had less of a significance in this early phase because of bid being solely sport-initiated, which the finding that representatives from various sport organisations were the most active in the debate in this phase support (see Table 13). The Lillehammer Games however were most likely relevant as inspiration for the argument “the Norwegian model”, which here refers to the generally good Norwegian reputation in the IOC. The other regularly used arguments “event momentum” and

“events as series” represent another group of arguments related to recent good experiences with winter sport events. In the Oslo case, these arguments gained prominence because of the hosting of the FIS Nordic World Ski Championships in Oslo in February-March 2011. The success of this event spurred a debate in the media over hosting the Olympics again in the spring of 2011 (before the NIF had begun a formal process), which according to a civil servant in the Oslo Municipality also linked the Winter Olympics to Oslo’s new brand as the “world’s winter capital”. The world championship was in addition a common point of reference in the argument that the Olympics would be a public celebration. A civil servant from the Oslo Municipality also linked it further back to the Lillehammer Olympics. “Cheap(er)” was also a national reference at this point. Although it was not related to the international debate about overspending, the impression was that the Oslo event would be cheaper than the aforementioned bid from Tromsø for the 2018 Winter Olympics. This argumentation in the phase resembles the general development described in the previous chapters; there is an initial interest based on legacies supported by a general impression of what events could do coupled with one own’s recent positive experiences.

8.2.1.2 Phase 2a: Intermezzo

In accordance with the recommendation from the winter sport federations, the NIF contacted the Oslo Municipality in November 2011. It gave its official support to the bid in May 2012 and a quick formalisation of the bidding organisation. The Oslo politicians not only supported the bid in words but created a special department with 11 employees and a budget for 2012 of 60 million NOK (approximately 5.5 million €) (OL-etaten, 2013a). These organisational changes however did not result in more interest in the media. There

was little interest in the bid from the press and overall the most used arguments from the first phase remained in front (see Figure 15).




Figure 15: Arguments used in favour of the bid for the Oslo Olympics in 2022 in the second phase's first part (the intermezzo). Research

Perhaps this was because the development of the arguments did not keep up with the organisational developments. A local Oslo politician for instance described the initial motivation as

not very clear or quantifiable, but the motivation revolved around making Oslo better known, making Oslo more attractive as a city for investments, students, tourists, a place to move (...). [The idea for the Olympics] came in a time of great population growth for Oslo (...) you could say with inspiration from Richard Florida¹⁵¹ and the 'city of talents', we wanted to attract talents, technology. (...) the second main

¹⁵¹ An American researcher within urban studies to whom I have referred to earlier in the discussion over the role of the global city. Florida inter alia in 2002 coined the term the "creative class" as part of a theory

motivation was (...) that Oslo grew so rapidly that it needed a huge transformation of the city. (...) we saw that by hosting the Olympics, we could get the Norwegian state to take a bigger share of the costs and we saw the transformation could happen faster (...).

For the support group Ja til OL22 [Yes to the Winter Olympics 2022] with inter alia former local politicians among its members the motivation was also unclear. A member describes how “(...) most people in the movement just had this... gutfeel, right? That this is good. We want this. And then you, like, learn [: the arguments] along the way”.

There was no significant increase in debate even when the Oslo Municipality brought in additional stakeholders associated with the private sector such as the Oslo Chamber of Commerce. According to a civil servant in the Oslo Municipality, the idea was that the Winter Games in Oslo 2022 should be “a social responsibility. It was something which should develop a whole... where the public and private [companies] should join hands and make a collective effort”. “Social responsibility” would indicate a justification based on a civic order of worth for the benefit of the collective. Considering the wider context and the second part of the quote, it is clear how this collective is not just private individuals but encompasses private enterprises too. As mentioned earlier, this was also a wish from the Oslo branch of the Norwegian Chamber of Commerce. The process however never reached a point of commitment and there are no examples of more concrete connections comparable to the biking initiatives from the case in Bergen. According to the civil servant from the Oslo Municipality, they/the organisation “weren’t there yet. [But] [w]e were very keen on innovation and how to do this in a way, which would make us all better”.

On the side of the sport, the top level of the NIF had an eye for these broader positive outcomes (general infrastructure, health, etc.) of the Olympics, but as one official said

for future urban and economic development based on the attraction of creative people, needed for both filling existing positions as well as creating new ones, instead of focusing on attracting companies (R. L. Florida, 2002/2014).

“these were not the main reasons for the Norwegian sport to [bid for the Games]”. The official instead listed elite sport, volunteerism and new facilities for sport-for-all, all extensions of the regular aims for the NIF. This confirms the NIF’s justification as an industrial order of worth, wherein sport-for-all is also relevant for the municipality.




Figure 16: Arguments used in favour of the bid for the Oslo Olympics in 2022 in the main part of the second phase.

8.2.1.3 Phase 2b: The referendum

The decision to hold a referendum in December 2012 marked the beginning of phase 2b and challenged the agreement that each stakeholder could have and promote their own arguments. In the media, this phase is characterised by an increased amount of and variety in the arguments. Among the most used arguments, very broad ones such as the promotion of the Games as a benefit for the children and youth pushed out arguments with explicit sporting connotations (see Figure 16). If the inclusion of new stakeholders in the previous phase was as move towards particularity – each had been able to imagine

their own outcome from the event, then the referendum provided the impetus for a “rise towards generality” (Boltanski, 2009/2011, p. 37). The NIF and the municipality needed the public’s explicit support and had to identify some broadly appealing arguments for the Games.

The focus on the children and youth was the contribution of NIF; while this argument was broader, it remained in line with the traditional legitimacy of Norwegian sport as something for everyone, especially the children. However, as the local politicians decided not to campaign prior to the referendum and leave the decision purely to the public (Table 13 shows that some politicians participated eventually), several of the informants from the national and local sport organisations felt that they could not leave it by talking about making children active. According to an NIF official, they also had

to argue with the wishes of the municipality. So it is we who own the rights to the Olympic rings, are experts on long and short intervals, and bench-press, we have to argue (...) [for] what would be in it for Oslo.

Consequently, as asserted by a local sport informant, the arguments, although primarily presented by the NIF and the Oslo sport associations, emphasised the benefits of the event for broad groups in society. This meant the use of arguments such as the improvements for the “community”, “the children and youth”, and more generally the positive effects for Oslo. In the media, the argument for the Olympics as providers of general infrastructure suddenly becomes very prominent compared to the idea of new sport facilities. With regard to the sport facilities, the NIF’s arguments also changed from a perspective focused on elite sport to one based on sport-for-all. This would probably have happened in any case. I have previously mentioned how it is difficult to use elite sport as an argument and the NIF made a similar post-bid rationalisation in the case of the 2016 Youth Olympics in Lillehammer. It was only after deciding to bid that the NIF added the more general youth sport aspect [ungdomsløftet] as a reason for hosting (cf. Anne-Marie Strittmatter, 2017). Furthermore, the general lack of a sectorial partition of arguments indicates that it is generally unproblematic for representatives of bodies such as the NIF

to use arguments one usually would expect a local politician to use (cf. Figure 12). This pragmatism however finds its limits in an atypically big case like the Olympic bid. Here, the NIF did seek additional political credibility by allying itself with the aforementioned “Ja til OL2022” group.

Beginning with phase 2b and the referendum, the Oslo case deviates from the other cases. Even if its premature end in October 2014 (when the Norwegian government refused to give it a financial guarantee) makes it stand out from the other cases, stakeholders generally refuse to support events for economic reasons all the time. Failure is by far the most common outcome of a bidding process. The interesting aspect is how the referendum took control from the gatekeepers despite these actors having initially been right in their assessment. After all, the formal organs of both the NIF and the municipality agreed to support the bid.

8.2.1.4 Phase 3: Sochi and the Norwegian model

From the referendum and onwards, the NIF and the municipality had now to be reactive to external challenges. At first, the NIF and its allies managed to provide some credible arguments as most of the voters were in favour of the Olympics. Backstage, however, the ensuing third phase showed that the relationship between the NIF and municipality had broken down. In the referendum they had managed to establish an overarching civic order of worth as the legitimising factor behind the bid, but such a general order of worth is only stable as long as it does not endanger the legitimacy of the sender’s original legitimate position (Susen, 2014, p. 335). As described by one civil servant, this was unproblematic with regard to the question of sport facilities as initially both parties agreed “*that the region of [: omkring] Oslo had a serious lack of facilities*”. In the grander perspective of the municipality, however, the sport facilities were only part of a large city development project with a focus on Oslo – and Oslo only.

This difference in perspective led to internal differences. An NIF official described the organisation as side-tracked and disempowered in the meetings with “the consultants [from the Oslo Municipality] [who] were like, watt, volt, ampere, cubic metres and what

it would cost to use this and that steel construction (...). And it is beyond my expertise". Although the municipality's expertise in presenting the event as an investment legitimised the idea of the Games as a civic order of worth, it also meant a shift away from the "enthusiasm and sports joy", in the words of an NIF representative, and the idea of the Olympics as legitimised by an inspired order of worth. Informants from the NIF also described the Olympics as a time to "a unite the nation". In the Oslo case, the national sport confederation instead came to work in favour of an event which was predominantly about planning the local outcomes for the city. After the referendum, this became a major topic in the debate not only because of the mismatch between a national organisation working for local outcomes but also the recently retracted Tromsø bid and the aforementioned long-standing structural dichotomy in Norwegian politics between Oslo (/Eastern/Southern/urban Norway) and the rest of (Western/Northern/rural) Norway. Ultimately, as a then NIF-official concluded it was "just messed up [: feil] for the national sport to fight for Oslo. (...) The result is like... the rest of the country [turned] against us".

After securing a local backing in the referendum, the aim for the engaged stakeholders in the third phase was to secure a financial state guarantee. This led the Olympic proponents in the NIF to suggest a break away from the focus on Oslo following the logic that the more people who benefited, i.e. gained access to new facilities, the more support the bid would receive in the national parliament. They therefore proposed to spread the facilities over a greater area. This led to the aforementioned internal debate between the national and local sport in Oslo and, as the Oslo Municipality also rejected the idea, it failed. “It was the money talking”, as an NIF informant put it with reference to the fact




Figure 17: Arguments used in favour of the bid for the Oslo Olympics in 2022 in the third phase.

that the Oslo Municipality paid for the application. This is an example of an organisation using economic capital to influence the event field, which for instance did not happen in the case of the allied stakeholders described in chapter 6.

In early 2014, this internal debate was exacerbated by the knowledge of the costs of the Winter Olympics in Sochi. The enormous costs discredited the IOC in the national debate

and fuelled the Norwegian scepticism towards the IOC.¹⁵² The result was a debate almost limited to the question of the IOC's legitimacy. An NIF official described how Sochi confined them to "damage limitation". Although the range of arguments in phase 3 is not diminished compared to phase 2 (29 vs 30 different arguments), there is a clear concentration on the "Norwegian model" (see Figure 17). This not least meant distancing the Oslo Olympics from the Sochi Games. "Norwegian" Games should be cheaper, hosted according to Norwegian principles, and a national project like Lillehammer (cf. section 6.4.2 on the Lillehammer Olympics as among other things requiring Norwegian events function as a corrective to the global sport). The bid for the Oslo Olympics missed such "big narratives". As Terje Tvedt's studies on Norwegian development aid show, a rhetoric based on righting wrongs had won over a national audience previously (cf. Tvedt, 2006). In the case of the Oslo bid, the "Norwegian model" did not manage to make the Oslo Games a successful expression of such norm entrepreneurialism.

8.2.2 Oslo2022: A case of lost control

In its initial phases, the arguments in the Oslo debate developed similar to those of the first part of the chapter focusing on specific benefits for the various stakeholders. However, with the referendum, these various arguments developed into a cluster centred on a broadly appealing civic order of worth. Despite the vote in favour of the bid, the debate continued and, in contrast to the other cases, the order of worth was challenged. Following the financial revelations of the Sochi Games in particular, the proponents lost the possibility to come forward with original arguments. Any new arguments were merely responses to the criticism. Some found for instance that the risk of increased costs discredited the idea of the Games as beneficial for the collective. The response from the proponents was to assure that the Oslo Games would be "Norwegian". The NIF and the Oslo Municipality however failed in this attempt of take control of a global event in order to satisfy local demands.

¹⁵² The estimated costs of the Sochi Olympics amounted to 21.9 billion USD, seven times the average costs of the Winter Olympics (Flyvbjerg et al., 2016, p. 9).

On the one hand, part of the reason for this was the structures within which the NIF and the Norwegian public authorities operated. Nationally, it was difficult to align the traditional focus on equality and simplicity with the costly Olympic Games. The local stakeholders' dependence on the – in the eyes of many Norwegians – discredited IOC to carry out the promises they made to the Norwegian population did not make it easier. In pragmatic sociology, a precondition for the agents' ability to settle on new orders of worth is dependent on their ability to set a "normative constitution" (Susen, 2014, p. 322). When the debate began to include a global level, this became difficult.

On the other hand, although the development of new arguments as new flanks was exposed, the very development of new arguments does not seem to have been a problem. It was unproblematic not to use some of the prominent arguments from the other cases such as branding. This is not to say the general motivation from chapter 7 was irrelevant. Most likely, it was through these generic arguments that the proponents found the initial support for the Games and developed a positive "gutfeel". Furthermore, although "unclear", these initial arguments did not change backstage during the public debate. At most, they, like the smaller cases, became more effectively embedded into existing policy programmes in the municipality; this at least was the view of a civil servant in the Oslo Municipality. This confirms the previous conclusions from chapters 6 and 7 that a legacy-based motivation is an important part of the motivation in the current event field and the sensemaking (cf. Djaballah et al., 2015)

From an analytical perspective, the Oslo case has a very causal development in its arguments compared to the other cases' garbage can development. The development of the new arguments can be traced back to explicit public criticism. However, this did not make the process any easier to control for the stakeholders. Although the criticism was clear, its sender was diffuse. The opponents (apart from a few reoccurring researchers) were many and from highly diverse groups ranging from politicians, private individuals, Facebook groups and researchers. Some media outlets also became part of the opposition through their coverage (cf. Seippel et al., 2016). This is not to say that the media created this anti-Olympic opinion. Rather, the media and the general opinion benefitted mutually

from each other and some of their deeper resentments, which were also relevant as hindrances for factors such as the economic argument (as discussed in chapter 7). Despite the causal development of the arguments, the Oslo case too was marked by the anarchy which is characteristic of the garbage can process.

8.3 Conclusion

An event exists to solve the problem that is presented by the rationale and concept of having the event in the first place. (Berridge, 2012, p. 276)

The quote comes from a study on how events can be designed, and its point is relevant for the stakeholders in my cases too. When producing a rationale for hosting a specific event, stakeholders adopt a pragmatic approach because the solution (the event) tends to come before any precise definition of the problem. This pragmatism results in the addition of specific ad-hoc reasons for specific events on top of the more general legacies and experiences gathered from previous events. A public event consultant compared the planning of an event to cooking: “It all comes together [tangible and intangible criteria] (...) eventually, it’s about pouring it all into the pot, stirring and then seeing how the soup tastes”.

The municipalities are the most involved stakeholders in this ad-hoc rationalisation. For sport organisations, events (or at least the tournament aspect) can often be justified with reference to the sport’s “nature”. An event is a product which the sport organisation makes occasionally and is justified in itself through this repetition. In comparison, municipalities have a much wider range of priorities to consider. This ad hoc method of developing policies is not limited to events but a general feature in policy making as politicians decide on a policy before adding the rationale behind it (Tynell, 2016).

The ad-hoc reasons varied significantly in terms of how concrete they were. In and around Bergen in the case of the UCI Road World Championship, the municipalities linked the event to obviously related policies such as bike policies. In other cases, the municipalities

were less concrete but still worked on embedding the event in the local context. In Herning, for instance, specific events were qualified simply as contributions to the city's general effort to attract events. These stories did not have the same obvious relation to the specific event, but still they embedded the event within a local narrative.

This confirms the leverage research's general association with smaller events. In most of the studied cases, the stakeholders often used an event to leverage current or recent initiatives instead of launching new ones. However, most of the planning for this leverage only happened after the city had won the event. The leverage was therefore often "event-led" (A. Smith, 2014), which in a positive reading would suggest that the event matures in its "pregnancy period" (Bason, 2019, p. 27; Weed, 2007, Chapter 5). A more optimal strategy however would be to put the event fully in the service of existing strategies, i.e. to produce "event-themed" strategies and decide what to leverage before winning the event (A. Smith, 2014).

An "event-themed" strategy could be relevant for bigger cases with little public opposition or participation in the debate on the event as well. In the case of the bid for the Olympics, however, the public did not remain passive. Although this did not influence the very concept of the event among the stakeholders, the proponents were to continue to develop their frontstage arguments. In the other cases the stakeholders made their initial arguments more concrete, but they did not add fundamentally new reasons to the mix. In the Oslo case the proponents added "the Norwegian model" as a new argument for hosting the event.

This chapter has shown how prominent but general arguments cannot justify a specific event alone because of their generality. The eclecticism holds. Stakeholders add, develop, or expand their justification/rationalisation behind the event throughout the entire bidding and planning process. These rationalisations however happen within certain frames. They are simply the final layers in the domains of the actual placed on top of the domain of the empirical and the real. The frontstage ad-hoc arguments cannot contradict or dismiss the general arguments.

More specifically, the chapter also showed that the changed argumentation does not follow a change in the engaged stakeholders as the public authorities and national sport organisations remained central. Their central position however does not guarantee a smooth relationship. Thereby chapter 8 confirmed the findings in chapter 7 that, within the organising committee, the sport organisation focuses intently on the sport in the event and leaves the side activities to the municipality. The public authorities show a much greater involvement in embedding the event in a broader context, whereas the NGB might focus on the tournament or the “joy” of the event as such.

9 Conclusion

This thesis has sought to determine why Norway and Denmark currently host, or seek to host, international sport events. Based on interviews with representatives from six different international sport events, the press coverage prior to the events and insights into documents from the organisations, the thesis gives an answer to the question in three parts.

Firstly, the thesis demonstrates that the stakeholders of sport events in Denmark and Norway have a shared conceptualisation around events and in particular that this general event discourse is maintained across events. Using the field theory by Pierre Bourdieu, the thesis therefore argues that the most engaged stakeholders form an event field. As members of the event field they adopt an event identity and host events for the sake of improving their position in the field, i.e. acquiring relevant symbolic capital. At this point, rather than being solely based on the event's immediate outcomes, their interest includes a logic specific to the event field based on the hosting events for the sake of future events. The thesis also shows how national institutions in both Denmark and Norway provide capital for field members, which lowers the threshold for entering the event field. Finally, on a macro level, the thesis argues that the prevalence of an event's speculative dimension (see below) in the field's nomos aligns the field with the focus on economic capital in the wider society/the power field.

Secondly, the thesis shows that the stakeholders' interest in events has a speculative and a spectacular dimension. The speculative dimension covers how the stakeholders' interest on the one hand is based on a common conceptualisation of events as profitable investments or useful solutions to the organisations' problems. This was for instance a common theme in the stakeholders' event strategies. On the other hand, based on *inter alia* the sensemaking theory by Karl E. Weick, the thesis shows that the interest also stems from the events' spectacular dimension. This finding is in particular based on the importance several stakeholder representatives attached to their positive experiences with previous events when explaining why events are interesting.

Despite the general nomos of the event as an investment, the third part of the answer is that the development of the particular arguments for a specific event is subject to change during the bidding and planning process. Applying the theory of justification and orders of worth by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, the thesis shows how various stakeholders use different forms of orders in a garbage can process. The exact public reason for hosting a particular event is far from certain at the outset and it only takes shape gradually.

9.1 The event: Stakeholders and their motivation

The three-part answer specified above corresponds to the thesis' three objectives. The remainder of the conclusion elaborates and discusses the findings related to the objectives. Section 9.1.1 covers the first objective concerning the Danish and Norwegian event stakeholders and their general discourse on/conceptualisation of events; section 9.1.2 discusses the second objective concerned with the backward and forward linkage of the event, i.e. how the events' relations to previous and future events contribute to the sustained interest in events in a field; and finally section 9.1.3 discusses the interest in events in greater detail based on an event's spectacular and speculative motivation and the thesis' third objective concerning the transformation of the general arguments into arguments for a specific event. The chapter concludes with a discussion of this study's limitations.

9.1.1 The stakeholders

Chapter 6 examined how the stakeholders behind sport events in Denmark and Norway fall into four groups according to their organisational and social commitments (engaged, allied, militant and passive). The organisational commitment depends on the stakeholder's importance with regard to the event's organisation. The degree of social commitment on the other hand describes how important it is for the stakeholder to ensure the particular event is relevant to its member basis (voters, members of local sport associations, etc.).

Given this thesis' focus on the motivation behind events, the most relevant stakeholders were the local public authorities and the relevant NGBs as these were "engaged stakeholders" with high organisational and social commitments. This meant they were not only fundamental for organising any event but also focused on making the event in question relevant for their huge peer groups. This combination of being necessary for the organisation of the event and having large peer groups eventually also made these stakeholders highly influential regarding how the events studied for this thesis were justified publicly. Firstly, any argument convincing their peers of the event's usefulness would give it a broad backing; secondly, while other groups could have made similar arguments, only the municipalities and the NGBs were able to state the arguments in a credible manner and often also realise them because of their concurrent organisational influence.

Still, the engaged stakeholders' influence was not unconditional. When organising the event, they had to consider other stakeholders either out of a need for resources or because of the local structures of the event field. "Militant stakeholders" like the local and national Chambers of Commerce for instance had no organisational influence or commitment. However, in for instance Oslo's bid for the Winter Olympics in 2022, the Oslo Chamber of Commerce made a social commitment to form the event in accordance with their peers' agenda and the engaged stakeholders' perspective. Although not strictly necessary, from the perspective of the engaged stakeholders the Chamber was still relevant because of its access to resources that would potentially be useful in organising the event in question. Regarding the discourse on the event, the inclusion of the new stakeholders in this case led to an increased focus on the event's economic outcomes. With regard to the "allied stakeholders", this group inter alia included the counties in Denmark, which as most other allied stakeholders kept the events at arm's distance and had a very general aim (economic growth) for all their event support. Consequently, the (potentially) high organisational commitment remained a potential for most of the allied stakeholders. Surprisingly, this was also the case for the event owner organisation. Its influence on the engaged stakeholders was considered to be limited by the local stakeholders. Chapter 6 suggests that this is because the engaged stakeholders already, from other sources such

as previous hosting experiences, had acquired the needed skills, reputation and conformity required by the global event field which made it less necessary for the event owner to make direct use of its organisational influence. Although the local stakeholders were not free to do as they pleased, the global influence became less visible because of the local imbuelement of a suitable global event mindset.

In addition to this shared mindset aligned with the global event demands, the thesis has also determined that all stakeholders would conceptualise international sport events as “investments”. This means that in general they viewed events as objects that should yield some sort of return often, but not necessarily in monetary terms. I will discuss this in greater detail in section 9.1.3. Eventually, this discourse and conceptualisation proved to be so permanent and widespread that, drawing on the field theory by Pierre Bourdieu, the thesis can conclude that an event field exists in Denmark and Norway.

9.1.2 The event field: A sustained interest in events

The field shows itself in two ways. First, on a general level, the consensus among all the stakeholders that an event is good amounts to what Bourdieu describes as the doxa of a field – the given and unquestioned belief. More specifically in the event field, the “good events” expresses itself in the aforementioned conceptualisation of the event as an investment (the nomos). However, considering the spending of resources as an investment is not particular to events. To attain a recognised position as a member of the event field, the stakeholder should not only adhere to this nomos but also acquire cultural and symbolic capital relevant to the event field. Not all stakeholders studied here did this. For some, the involvement in an event remained a one-off, yet a considerable number of the analysed stakeholders have adopted event strategies and also in other ways worked on aligning themselves with the field.

The highly engaged members of the field focused not only on exploiting one event to fulfil aims in other areas, but also produced events or ‘behaved’ in certain ways in order to obtain access to further events in the future. The field theory describes this as adopting a habitus, which is an almost unconscious process. The result was similar in my cases

albeit more conscious and strategic than the original idea of a habitus would convey. These organisations changed from being organisations “with events” to “eventful” organisations as has been the case elsewhere for cities (cf. ‘eventful cities’ in G. Richards & Palmer, 2010). By identifying themselves intimately with events, their position in the event field no longer depended solely on their event expertise (cultural capital). They also accumulated symbolic capital through their seemingly ‘natural’ association with events. The Danish town Herning is probably the best example of this but the Norwegian city Bergen showed similar trends by drawing on a long-standing reputation of being a city with a festive population. In other words, these stakeholders embed their event strategies in more general local narratives (cf. Žižek, 2014, Connection 5.2). The local narratives conversely also come to depend on the cities’ position in the event field, and their events’ backward and forward linkages. To change the discourse around events would be to change their worldview, not just of events but eventually the organisation or the city as a whole. Such cases of integrated event strategies coupled with the threat of exclusion and loss of capital if deviating from the established nomos contributes to a sustained event engagement (cf. Vestheim, 2009, pp. 34–35). For instance, such dynamics in the comparable field of culture have been shown to hinder a break with the investment discourse (C. Gray, 2007, p. 206).

By the threat of exclusion, the field not only unites those interested in events but also creates a hierarchy among them. For those with few resources and yet an interest in events, such as smaller municipalities, the solution would either be to draw on the credibility of the more engaged local stakeholders or on the national event brands.

9.1.2.1 The national support

The thesis shows how these national brands or discourses on events were sustained in various institutions.

In the Danish case, the support is formalised and organised as the publicly financed event organisation SEDK has positioned itself as the central institution for disseminating the characteristics of international sport events in the country, which ensure the events’

compatibility with both local and global demands. This includes an emphasis on the public celebration but also the creation of a positive notion of the investment discourse, e.g. by highlighting the positive impacts of previous events. While SEDK did not develop this discourse by itself, it is an important local representative. In Norway, the field members cannot draw on a similar public institution. Instead, they find inspiration in the hosting experiences of other stakeholders and not least the Lillehammer Olympics from 1994. Among their legacies, the Games left an idea about what any international sport event in Norway – not just the Winter Olympics – should do for its stakeholders.

SEDK also provides tangible support when it regulates and facilitates the local field by providing its members with cultural and economic capital. This includes direct financial support for events, which lowers the threshold for stakeholders interested in events. The Lillehammer Olympics cannot function in the same manner as they exist only as a myth. The study however demonstrates how the international success of the Games still provides symbolic capital for the Norwegian bidders in the international competition. Just like SEDK, the Lillehammer Olympics thereby also function as an intermediary between the global and the local. SEDK actively primes the local stakeholders for the global expectations, e.g. regarding the expectations and the informal decision procedures (Emery, 2002b, p. 329), while the Lillehammer Olympics achieve this indirectly through a legacy in the form of experienced organisers. Such a knowledge reservoir in addition to a tradition for hosting winter sport events and a good image could explain why the first Norwegian sport event policy was only proposed in 2019, whereas Denmark, which does not have any Olympic hosting experience, adopted an event policy in 2008.

The national governments as such did not generally play an overt role as supporters of the events studied here. The only influence from a more general national level was the larger cities' use of the national brands as sources for event capital; they would for instance argue for Danish and Norwegian editions of international events with references to the countries' reputations as generally credible and international norm entrepreneurs. Consequently, the national level became a source of legitimacy for and support for the

event interest in the host city, which would use the general national brand to increase its symbolic capital within the event field.

9.1.2.1.1 A global perspective on the national support

This use of national support fits well with the current discussion on the role of the state in a globalised world. The sport events thereby gain in relevance by being areas where cities and states can practice new ways of cooperating and adjusting to the new global competition in which cities are often central figures (cf. Angell & Mordhorst, 2015, p. 197; Petersen, 2006, p. 641 on the current role of the nation for branding in Denmark and Norway).

In the background, therefore, as evidenced in more general research in globalisation by Phillip G. Cerny, the state does play significant a role. Cerny remarks that once a state begins to benefit from the system such as the events promoting a general national brand, it becomes interested in avoiding changes and eventually “state actors are probably the most important single category of agents in the globalization process” (2000, p. 121). So far, the Danish and Norwegian states have been able to keep a low profile because of their existing reputation/symbolic capital in the international community (Grix et al., 2019b, p. 29). The thesis does show the overlaps between the states’ work on the related field of public diplomacy and the event brand, but this connection is very subtle. Although it is possible to see the events as cases of soft power, the Danish and Norwegian states can limit their focus to the general brand and thus exercise soft power through the sport events in a less outspoken way than it is the case in many other prominent host states where events and the governments often have a very close and obvious relationship. That said, the event interests of the e.g. the BRICS countries and the Danish and Norwegian national public stakeholders are quite similar – at least if one keeps them abstract. They all instrumentalise events in the countries’ interests, e.g. by showing a compatibility with the global system or securing an existing position. However, there are also differences. For emerging countries, the event often serves a national purpose of mitigating the “ambivalent internal identity stemming from an uncertain understanding of the constitutive nature of the state and its evolving society”, which I cannot recognise from my cases

(Cornelissen, 2010, p. 3022; cf. Brownell, 2008; Orttung & Zhemukhov, 2017). Several emerging countries also have a “money is no object” attitude. If they are able to change the nomos in the event field in a way which make economical capital more important, it could challenge small nations like Norway and Denmark with an event model based on a “conspicuous modesty” (Daloz, 2006; Houlihan & Zheng, 2015).

Ultimately, the event field is no exception to the general field theory’s emphasis on a hierarchy. This was the case on the local level and a global perspective only underlines this finding. This should have an impact on the future stakeholder analyses of sport events. Previous stakeholder analyses of sport events have emphasised how considering a wide range of stakeholders is beneficial for the event (Parent & Smith-Swan, 2012, p. 188). My application of a field theoretical perspective makes clear that some stakeholders are more likely to have an influence on the nomos in the field than others. Influence does not necessarily equal a will to change the nomos; it might just as well mean the ability to sustain its present expression. The thesis shows that this is generally the case on the local level. At the same time, regarding the global demands for local event stakeholders, this is currently a case of glocalisation. In the period on which the thesis is based, the local stakeholders appear to have had sufficient symbolic capital in the field to be able to adjust and form the global demands according to their values. However, this privilege could be challenged in the future.

This section has concerned itself with the conclusion on the thesis’ first and second objectives with regard to the stakeholders, the event discourse and their sustained interest in events. It has summarised the existence of the event field, its investment-based nomos and how it has contributed to the sustained interest in events. This lasting relation adds an interesting dimension to the concept of an event sociotope. In the second chapter, I used this term to describe the interactions between the local stakeholders when coming together in a specific space around a shared “use value” – in my cases how to use events. In its original form, the concept of a sociotope emphasised “the space of place” and put itself at a distance to the global, timeless “space of flows” focused on instant gratification and without a sense of anything but the present. In line with Richards and Palmer (2004,

p. 420), my study supports the idea of events as linkages between the local place and the global flow. Although the local stakeholders rarely considered the event owners as particularly involved, their attempts to promote a globally relevant Danish or Norwegian event brand signal a notion of time (past – present – future events). For these local members of the event field, the event is not an instant gratification but an increased stake in the national event reputation with the hope of getting more events in the future. This is a novel perspective which has not been taken into consideration in the event research. While individual events have been criticised, there is a lack of research on the consequences of series of events.

This is not to say the prospected outcomes of individual events play no role in the motivation for events. The thesis also shows that this is indeed the case and this section has therefore concluded only fully on the thesis' second objective (the relevance of an event's forward and backward linkage). The conclusion on the first objective (the stakeholders and the event discourse) is only complete with the addition of the presentation and discussion of the thesis' findings regarding the stakeholders interest in events based on the spectacular and speculative dimensions of events in section 9.1.3. It also concludes on the third objective regarding the move from the general interest to the specific event.

9.1.3 The spectacular and speculative event

The thesis' analysis of the motivation for events nuances the aforementioned speculative "investment discourse" and the research's focus on legacy outcomes in two ways. Firstly, it has demonstrated that speculative investments, albeit well aligned with the wider structures in the society and the event field, were controversial for some stakeholders. Secondly, it has shown that when making the event relevant for their peers the stakeholders also considered the spectacular side of the event. The sport event should also function as event by giving its attendants an extraordinary experience of effervescence. The thesis has even highlighted how these extraordinary experiences for the organisers began to take place already in the planning phase.

9.1.3.1 *The spectacular motivations*

Beginning with the latter, the stakeholders had a common focus on improving the spectacular dimension of the event. In accordance with the suggestion (cf. chapter 2) that one should not make too sharp distinctions between the spectacular and speculative dimensions of an event, this was partly due to the belief that it would benefit their investments. This for instance was evident in a division of labour as the event came closer whereby the sport organisations would focus on the sport tournament and the municipality on the surroundings and not least broadly appealing side activities. This practical division however did not dissolve the shared stake in the event as a public celebration, which was also the most used argument in the media and promoted equally by both groups. This confirms the importance of the spectacular element for making events broadly appealing and supports the link between the current interest in events and the post-modern society also suggested in chapter 2.

The study has however also found that the spectacular side had a relevance for the event discourse beyond supporting the speculative outcomes and improving the public appeal during the actual running of the event. In the cases studied, it was an important factor from the very beginning of the decision-making process. Chapter 7 shows this with reference to the informants' anecdotes in the interviews, where they often recalled the events as spectacular experiences. They would for instance recall their own experiences of the general happiness, which marked the city during the event. Of course, they would not have used these exact anecdotes when promoting the event being discussed, but it reveals a mechanism by which previous successful events function as motivations for subsequent events because of the positive memories (and suggests that the opposite happens in the case of negative). The chapter also clarifies that some of these positive experiences were gathered in the planning phase of the event, which consequently functioned as an event in its own right. The planning for instance provided a sense of community among the organisers, gave access to new resources, and allowed for more flexible or direct approaches to otherwise onerous and complicated procedures.

9.1.3.2 *The speculative motivations*

Aside from the “public celebration”, the most common arguments in the media however focused on the events’ speculative outcomes. The second and third most common arguments were branding and the economic outcome, respectively. This finding confirms that these cases of smaller events in Denmark and Norway are no different from most other events considered in the sport event research. The use of these arguments in my cases was however significantly affected by the context of the event. In the case of the economic argument, informants from the NGBs and the public stakeholders explained that they wanted to drop or at least move away from using financial arguments. Indeed, one civil servant explained that it took focus away from the other outcomes and for the sport associations it held a potential conflict with their origins as volunteer-based non-profit associations. Although the spirit was willing, the flesh was weak. Several informants within the public sector explained that they always prepared the numbers as a plan B because numbers are a well-recognised way of justifying political decisions. Several of the sport associations reluctantly also acknowledged that profiting from the event was an important aim.

The high ranking of “branding” confirms that the stakeholders wanted to ‘put their city/sport on the map’. Hosting is a way of gaining an advantage in a competition for attention. For the sport organisations this was part of a competition for facilities and members, whereas for cities major and mega sport events are ways of improving their standing in a perceived global competition; cf. the aforementioned discussion on the role of the state and the national brand as event support. Drawing on a national brand for the sake of events is however not without risks. Some informants pointed out that the mechanisms of the global event field are slow to change and forced them to compromise on these national values from time to time. During the period of this project, the Danish and Norwegian stakeholders might have benefitted from the crisis in the global sport field, where authenticity and modesty – values also found in the respective national cultural repertoires – were in high demand. A possible implication of this, depending on the future development of the event field, could be that Danish and Norwegian stakeholders are currently only free to host events as stereotypical paragons of virtue similar to how small

states in international sport achieve success by developing a high level of expertise within a niche sport (Houlihan & Zheng, 2015).

None of the three most used arguments – “public celebration”, “improved economy” and “branding” – were related specifically to sport. This is not to say that the sport as an activity did not play any role in the event discourse at all; indeed, several of the lower ranking (but still widely used) arguments focused on outcomes related to sport. The thesis has however determined that these arguments did not give the sport associations any dominant position in defining the event. Both the NGBs and the public authorities were unconcerned about using whatever argument they thought would support their aim, i.e. justifying the event. The sport organisations talked about the branding possibilities of events and the public authorities talked about how the event would deliver an improvement for the sport activities. However, given the public emphasis on sport-for-all and the sport federations’ combination of sport-for-all and elite sport, the public authorities and the sport organisations did not necessarily talk about the same form of sport. Something, which the generally vague references to the events as improvements for the sport in the media usually would prevent the public from perceiving. Only by analysing the exceptional debate in the case of the Oslo bid for the Winter Olympics in 2022 and drawing on interviews has it been possible to show how the Norwegian sport organisations began to make explicit statements about the Games as beneficial for sport-for-all when faced with increased public opposition. From the perspective of pragmatic sociology, the federation thereby attempted to reach a compromise between the Games as a civic order of worth, i.e. as something beneficial for the broader society, and an industrial order of worth, which would promote the Games as an efficient way of fulfilling the particular interests of the federation itself.

The vague use of sport-based arguments indicates that this is a limited factor for explaining why events based particularly on sport have become such popular forms of events among potential hosts. Instead, the thesis can show that sport as a basis for events has several advantages, including its broad appeal and generally high status within the Danish and Norwegian societies. The thesis stresses especially one advantage for sport events

namely the organisational network behind sport on a local, national and global level. Few other forms of events have such networks with e.g. local representatives promoting sport events of which international organisations secure a stable supply making it relatively easy for stakeholders interested in sport events to become involved (if not actually winning the bid).

9.1.3.3 From the general to the specific

Regarding the third objective, the move from the general interest to the specific event, the thesis shows how, instead of working towards the event with well-defined aims, the stakeholders based their motivation on the very general nomos of an event as an investment and only settled on increasingly concrete reasons for hosting the specific event through a garbage can based decision-making process. Importantly, these increasingly concrete arguments did not compromise the original idea of the event as an investment. The Olympic bid was the only case where stakeholders developed their motivation to a degree which compromised some of their initial motivations. The instrumentalisation of the event by the Oslo Municipality for instance yielded arguments for the event that some NIF representatives felt compromised the event as a public celebration based on the joy of sport. The Olympic bid was also the only case where, because of a public debate, the stakeholders added new original arguments which went beyond the investment discourse by assuring the Norwegian public that the Games would be staged according to Norwegian values.

The Olympic bid failed where the other cases succeeded, yet the stakeholders' approach to motivating their peers for these events still could be problematic. The garbage cage process meant that the specific argumentations never predated the events. Rather, the events themselves determined the arguments, with the consequence that the events' leverage might not have been optimal (cf. event-led vs event-themed leverage in A. Smith, 2014). A tentative alternative would be the staging of an event picked specifically for its capabilities to support the most relevant strategies for a society. However, several informants pointed out that the uncertainty of the bidding competitions makes such long-term planning/cherry-picking difficult.

In summary, the stakeholders' interest in events originates from a combination of the event's spectacular and speculative dimensions. Taken together, these factors produce an efficient cultural frame (Dalen et al., 2018, pp. 680–682) within which the stakeholders combine several orders of worth as proposed by pragmatic sociology.

The speculative dimension is foundational for all the stakeholders' conceptualisations of an event as an efficient means for reaching a certain, often measurable aim which is also expressed in the doxa of the event field and pragmatic sociology's industrial order of worth. This measurability eases the legitimatisation of the decision on a more general level since most public management is based on management by objectives. In addition, the sport in the sport event enables the stakeholders to couple the event with another general idea in the Danish and Norwegian societies: sport as an undisputed civic good. Despite the presentation of research contradicting this image of events in the section on the state of the art, the proponents are nevertheless rarely punished when using such arguments.¹⁵³

The stakeholders supplement the speculative aim with the spectacular dimension in two ways. The most obvious way is during the event, when the stakeholders frame the event as a public celebration often with additional side activities to ensure a broad appeal beyond those interested in sport. Consequently, the event's relevance relates to both of the initial theoretical explanations I gave for the interest in events in chapter 2: firstly being compatible with the competition state, and secondly the events as providers of a sense of community in the individualised post-modern society. That said, it is possible to imagine how a combination of the speculative and spectacular motives could have negative implications for how the events are perceived by the public. An increased use of side

¹⁵³ So far only very obvious overstatements have forced stakeholders to lower their expectations. The stakeholders behind the Danish bid for Le Grand Depart (the start of the Tour de France in 2021) give a rare example of this as they acknowledged that there would not be "billions" of people following the stages in Denmark (Ritzau, 2019). This is in line with a more general study of British applicants for cultural support, who cherry-picked and fabricated arguments in order to get additional funding without facing any consequences (Belfiore, 2009). This prompted the author to compare them to Harry G. Frankfurt's "bullshitters", i.e. persons to whom "the truth values of his statements are of no central interest" (Frankfurt, 2005, pp. 55–56).

events could blur out the sport in the sport event and, with such planning for a maximally appealing event, the stakeholders run the risk of a Weberian disenchanted world (Weber, 1919, p. 16).

The second way of combining the spectacular and the speculative occurs when the organisers plan the event. The spectacular dimension is not something separate from the speculative which is only realised during the staging of the event. At first, the spectacular is prominent in the individual's own attempt to make sense of the event. Moreover, when the organisation eventually considers bidding, the event is not merely a burden or a future instrument. During the planning stages, the spectacular and the speculative have already formed a double helix as the spectacular event's break with the everyday facilitates the pursuit of new speculative objectives.

Thus far, research has only suggested that the celebration could be the actual reason for hosting since the economic argument rarely stands up to a thorough evaluation. My thesis substantiates this suggestion with an actual analysis of the role the celebration plays for an event. Perhaps, as pointed out above and elsewhere (cf. Pentifallo & Van Wynsberghe, 2014, pp. 80–81), a more elaborated idea about what a public celebration can give, strategies that are more specific, and ownership of local events would ease the disbanding of the economic benefits as an argument and counter the risk of estranging the locals from the events.

9.1.3.4 *Cui bono?*

The events' alignment with structures of the competition state and the desire for a sense of belonging helps us understand the interest in events. However, these structures did not create the events analysed within this study in the first place. The decisions are still made by people and that makes it relevant to discuss who benefits from these events (Rojek, 2013, pp. 176–177).

The thesis mentions examples of how, in some cases, personal motivations among members of the stakeholder organisations contributed to the bid for a specific event. However,

even if some individuals (often mayors) lobbied eagerly for an event based on partly personal interest, e.g. to get re-elected, this alone does not explain the general interest in events. Instead, I believe that, as discussed in the section on revolutions (in section 7.2.4), they want merely to maintain the current structures favourable to them or their policies. This might involve doing “great deeds” but it does not necessarily mean “doing events”. The task of this thesis has not been to explain their desire for great deeds, but rather to explore why great deeds often take the shape of sport events. In other words, from the perspective of an organisation like a municipality, how have sport events become the answer to several immanent problems like creating jobs, improving public health, etc.? The answer has been summed up in the previous sections but that said, the structure of the interview and the discursive approach I have used is not the best way of identifying examples of significant personal involvement. This is not a question of either/or but possibly a both/and, which is underexposed in this thesis and represents an area for future research.

The speculative reasons and the composition of the stakeholders, not least the militant ones, also show that there are organisations with explicit economic interests in events; however, while the event field – once in – lowers the threshold for bidding for events, it would be a step too far to say that the field orchestrates the current event interest in Denmark and Norway. At most, the Danish cooperation in the SEAD shares traits with a cartel as its members coordinate their bidding and thereby lessen the national competition in order to enable a more efficient use of their resources in the international competition for sport events. New Public Management might require increased competition in public administration but as suggested in the thesis with reference to the Danish researcher Ove K. Pedersen, there is no one-size-fits-all solution to its implementation.¹⁵⁴ The SEAD is in any case an example of an initiative to lessen inter-city competition.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. the paradox of small states participating in international sport. It is difficult to both encourage national competition while benefitting from the close networks and contacts which set small states apart from their larger counterparts (Sam, 2015).

9.2 Limitations of the study

As already hinted in the previous section, the thesis' research design has its limits. The study has given detailed analyses about how stakeholders legitimise events and outlined how these legitimisations are particularly useful because of their relation to general trends in contemporary society. It has however not explored how the individuals at the receiving end of these arguments react. The only conclusion has been that the current strategies often work given that most of the events took place with minimal debate. The failed Olympic bid provides an opportunity to investigate this area, although it would be methodologically challenging. The Olympic bid is also the only failed case. Given the aim of the thesis – to explain the current interest – it was sensible to focus on cases which managed to mobilise sufficient support. Future research into failed cases would however be useful for improving our understanding of certain arguments' limitations, at which this study has only been able to hint. Future research could also explore at other forms of sport events. This study has admittedly been conservative in its case selection and for instance has not considered the emerging commercially driven events or e-sport events which could potentially face different challenges or motivate the stakeholders in new ways. It has also not considered reoccurring events principally as I needed to ensure that it would be possible to study debates on the decision-making process. Had I selected events which the stakeholders had decided should take place at an existing sport facility over the course of several years, like in the case of world cup races, I imagined this would not have been an option. There were however few debates even for the one-off events under study. The stakeholders generally had significantly fewer debates and made far fewer distinctions between events than I anticipated. Future studies would benefit from not making the same distinctions for instance between typical and atypical events but either disband any distinctions or at least develop new ones.

Regarding the stakeholders, the decision to use the event as its point of departure means that the thesis only shows how events function for those public organisations or sport federations involved. It does not say anything about why certain organisations choose not to engage themselves in event hosting or – presuming for instance these cities also

see themselves as part of a global competition – what they use as alternatives. The study can only offer some preliminary speculations based on the various hurdles which the successful cases overcame. Essentially, a sport event seems to face three hurdles: internal opposition within the NGB, opposition from the public partner, and finally public opposition. The first seems to be the easiest to overcome, while the second is the most difficult because the event must fit a general story while remaining economically viable. Managing this often meant that events would manage the third hurdle too, but as already mentioned, the study cannot give any substantial support to this claim as it does not include the public voices nor several failed bids directly. I have only covered the public voice indirectly through the print-media, which gives a good picture of the argumentation of organisations but possibly a less clear picture of the private individuals. In addition, by considering only print-media, I might have undervalued the role of the TV-media as a potential pro-event lobbyist.

The study also has limits in time and space. In time, it only considers how event legitimisation functioned between 2010 and 2020 with no historical studies of international sport events in Denmark and Norway for comparison. Future historical research will be able to shed light on how the arguments for events have developed over the years, just as the problems for which sport as an activity has been considered a solution have changed throughout the 20th century (Österlind & Wright, 2014; cf. Tangen, 1997 on sport as a system/solution through history).

Looking into the near future, it is also already possible to point out various changes, which are likely to impact events in Denmark and Norway in the future and make further research relevant. In 2018 the Danish government for instance reformed the counties and relegated their role as business supporters to the municipalities (Ritzau, 2018). Future Danish events will most likely have to manage without the support of the counties. In Norway, Innovation Norway in December 2019 proposed an official national event strategy for the country. It made no references to the Lillehammer Olympics – perhaps another Lillehammer legacy has come to an end. Furthermore, on January 1 2020 the number of counties in Norway dwindled from 19 to 11 and the number of municipalities from

426 to 358. Previously, such regional reforms have had an impact on the local cultural policies, which also could be the case now.

These limits in time and, as I will outline now, also in space, are also part of the broader question regarding the generalisation of the project's findings. On the one hand, the findings based on the individual cases of local host communities handling international sport events are similar to other studies involving events of the same size. On the other hand, the conclusions of the study – i.e. on the role of events in small, social democratic welfare states with an intimate relationship between the state and the sport organisations – might be difficult to generalise and use to deduce outcomes elsewhere. However, the study has presented – in line with the critical realist approach – an explanation for this phenomenon founded on a combination of occurrences in the domains of the real, the actual and the empirical. It has also embedded the findings within more general trends, thus making it possible to use the causes for my events as a perspective for studies of other locations affected by similar trends. Nonetheless, the focus has been on local development; the study has not studied the macro developments in detail. For instance, the thesis has only presented the fact that the supply of sport events has increased dramatically and has not investigated whether this was a result of an increased demand or some other factor which only then encouraged the event owners to create a demand for their new commodity: the event.

9.2.1 The relevance of international sport events

A final caveat is the size of the events in this project. Firstly, in contrast to the Olympics and the other mega events, most of the events in this study are not mega projects. They are popular, and they make headlines in the media, but there is no perceptible influence for significant portions of the surrounding society. SEDK has an annual budget of approximately 24 million DKK (3.2 million €),¹⁵⁵ whereas some of the municipalities in the case

¹⁵⁵ So far, there are no estimates of what a potential Norwegian strategy would cost.

of Bergen contributed with a 1.5 million NOK (0.15 million €). These might be considerable sums for a municipality, but they are incredibly small figures compared to the billions spent on hosting any edition of the Olympics.

The study of smaller events is still relevant if one follows my idea that regardless of the size all events have a dramatic and popular dimension and thus have some very important traits in common. The stakeholders' use of the same legacy terminology depicted in the research on much more costly events only served to reduce the need for a distinction. When I began this project, I talked about my cases as mega events. Later I adjusted my terminology and began to talk about the events as major sport events. In one of the last revisions, I then finally decided to talk about my cases as simply international sport events. One could say that the Olympics stand out because their legacies are much bigger in comparison to the other events under study. Although this is often correct, it is possible to imagine that a host would choose to make a usually small event much larger and more extravagant than formally required and would also be capable of including argumentation which would not have been relevant in most other host countries. This potential for "doped" events leads me to the conclusion that it is most useful to approach an event without of making any prior distinction regarding its size or prestige, only discussing its particularities at a later point.

Why events? Each event has reasons of its own and yet this study through its collective approach has been able to show some general traits. For the individual participants, it represents a unique and extraordinary experience. The spectacular character of such occasions however is also what all events have in common and is one important factor for understanding the current interest in events. The event stakeholders know this and stage their events accordingly. They do not do this because they are event idealists; rather, they do so both for the carnival aspect and for supporting their speculative motives, the second motivational dimension.

Much critical event research and the debate in general have come to focus on the second, motivational dimension. Just as Marx famously postulated that the "philosophers have hitherto only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point is to *change* it" (Marx,

1888, p. 72, emphasis in original) most event researchers seek to change the way events are staged. In contrast to Marx's philosophers who at least got round to interpreting the world in various ways, scholars in event research have rarely offered competing interpretations. This thesis has shown that understanding events requires consideration of their spectacular and speculative dimensions, and not least their relation to other events. Hopefully, this interpretation of events will help to clear new paths into the discussion around events, and possibly also qualify the debate over how to change events.

Postscript

In the *Decameron* published in 1350, Boccaccio tells the story of a group of young people, who leave the plague-ridden Florence for the countryside. There they pass the time telling stories. These stories are often satirical comments on the society, which the plague in the background lets appear all the more powerfully (Steel, 1981, p. 90). Since Boccaccio, times of plague came to inspire several other works of fiction and like him, they too would often use the carnival to depict the impact a plague on (some) people (Steel, 1981). To image a plague as a carnival is to focus on how it ruptures the flow of everyday life, dismantles existing hierarchies and leads those living through them to new insights (Bakhtin, 1965/1984, p. 273). These rosy pictures, Michel Foucault in 1974 described as “the literary dream of the plague” in one of his lectures at the Collège de France (Foucault, 2003, p. 47).

The current (the spring 2020) corona pandemic is no exception to the image of the plague as transformative. At the end of the pandemic waits a new normal, not a return to the world of yesterday. However, whether the transformation will be positive remains to see. The pandemic namely also shows us the dark side of the carnival. A plague does not include the carnival’s “free and familiar contact among people” (Bakhtin, 1965/1984, p. 123) Instead, some people are put under pressure either by the plague directly or by the reforms of society to which the plague leads (Hollis, 2001). The power to carry through these reforms, Foucault presented as the “political dream” of the plague, the “dream of an exhaustive, unobstructed power that is completely transparent to its object and exercised to the full” (Foucault, 2003, p. 47). Foucault excavated from this image of the plague, his concept of positive power, the idea that “through the ‘discipline of normalization,’ [there would become] a power that is not in fact repressive but productive, repression figuring only as a lateral or secondary effect with regard to its central, creative, and productive mechanisms” (Foucault, 2003, p. 59). When leaders in Norway talked of a national “dugnad” (a common effort for the sake of the community) in order to overcome the pandemic, it is in full accordance with Foucault’s conceptualisation of power as based on shared norms rather than state repression.

Events soon became important expressions of this “dugnad” in several countries, not just Norway. Following the shutdown of whole societies, all manner of collective events (although not sport events) soon followed from people applauding health workers publicly to e.g. televised communal singing in Denmark. The pandemic made the post-modern idea of a liquid society tangible and increased the need for common experiences (cf. Bauman, 2000), even if such experiences for the foreseeable future are only going to be available through digital media. The communal singing of traditional Danish songs is also a good example of how many events staged in reaction to the pandemic have acquired the form of restorative occasions rather than the ruptures traditionally associated with e.g. the carnival as event.

Where does such an extreme event as an international pandemic, which impacts hugely on the lives of the individuals and the workings of the state leave international sport events?

As of May 2020, the national politicians and the national sport federations in several countries have begun to discuss sport events at least with regard to the national football leagues. The state, living the political dream of the plague, forbade events and now it will have to make them legal again before the events can take place.

At the state level therefore, the pandemic does not change the relation between the state and the events. Before the pandemic, sport events depended on the state and they depend on its support during the pandemic. They will probably also continue to be dependent on the state after the pandemic. However, before the pandemic much of an event’s public justification was based on the potential to attract additional visitors. Perhaps, with a vaccine, it will be possible for us to return to a world where gathering of thousands of people are feasible. If not, then the argument that events attract large numbers of additional visitors will be unsustainable and the organisers will have to change radically the way in which they justify events. They might develop new formats which allow them to continue to justify the events as profitable investments. They could also change format so that the events would be viable without the support of the economic argument. Perhaps they will begin to focus on the event as event, i.e. simply finding value

in using the event to be spectacular in some way. That would fit well with the interests of public stakeholders, which I show in the thesis already would like to disband the economic argument for events.

Only time will tell whether the pandemic will be a truly formative incident for international sport events.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Selected international sports events in DK and N (2011-2022)

Denmark:

1. 2011, World Men Handball Championship (**bid failed**)
2. 2011, Capital One World Women's Curling Championship, Esbjerg
3. 2011, UCI Road World Championships, Copenhagen

4. 2013, World Men Handball Championship (**bid failed**)
5. 2013 Men's European Volleyball Championship 2013 in cooperation with Poland
6. 2013, European Short Course Swimming Championships, Herning

7. 2014, Half Marathon World Championship, Copenhagen
8. 2014, European Men Handball Championship, Aalborg, Aarhus, Herning, Brøndby
9. 2014, BWF World Championships, Copenhagen
10. 2015, World Archery Championships, Copenhagen
11. 2015, World Women's Handball Championship, Herning, Kolding, Næstved, Frederikshavn
12. 2017, UEC European Road Championships, Herning
13. 2017, European Short Course Swimming Championships, Copenhagen
14. 2017, Ice Hockey World Championships (in cooperation with Latvia - **bid failed**)
15. 2017 European Badminton Championships, Kolding
16. 2018, Ice Hockey World Championships, Herning, Copenhagen
17. 2018, Sailing World Championship, Aarhus
18. 2019, World Men Handball Championship, Herning, Copenhagen (together with Germany)
19. 2019, IAAF World Cross Country Championship, Aarhus
20. 2021 (originally 2020), European Football Championships, Copenhagen (co-host)
21. 2021, Le Grand Depart (Three stages of Tour de France)

Norway:

1. 2010, European Woman Football championships
2. 2011, FIS Nordic World Ski Championships

3. 2012, FIS Ski Flying World Championships, Vikersund
4. 2013, World Allround Speed Skating Championships

5. 2013, Bandy World Championship (together with Sweden)
6. 2016, European Weightlifting Championships
7. 2016, Biathlon World Championships
8. 2016, UEFA Super Cup
9. 2016, Winter Youth Olympics,

10. 2017, World Allround Speed Skating Championships
11. 2017, World Men Handball Championship (**bid failed**)
12. 2017, UCI Road World Championships

13. 2020, European Men Handball Championship (in cooperation with Austria and Sweden)
14. 2022, Winter Olympics, Oslo (**bid failed**)

Large repeated events (not considered as cases):

- Biathlon/Alpine World Cups, Norway
- Winter X-Games, Norway
- PostNord Danmark Rundt, Denmark
- Denmark Open, Badminton, Denmark
- Made in Denmark, Golf, Denmark
- Danish Open, Tennis, Denmark (2008, 2010-2012)


Joint bids (Denmark and Norway):

- 2008: UEFA Euros (Together with Sweden and Finland) (**bid failed**)
- 2010, 2020: European Women Handball Championships
- 2023: World Women Handball Championships (Together with Sweden)

The selection is formed from Wikipedia listings of sport events in Norway and Denmark since year 2007 and for the Danish cases events with multiple highlighting on the homepage of Sport Event Denmark (as of September 2017).

Furthermore the list of hosts of World and European Championships in bandy, swimming, curling, gymnastics, handball, luge, football (soccer), badminton, skiing, rowing, ice skating, curling, ice hockey, the Olympics, cycling have been checked for possible cases.


Appendix 2: International Olympic sport events in DK and N 1896-2020



The figure only counts European and World Championships. Norway for instance hosts several winter sport world cups, which the graph does not account for. The decline from around 2019 might only reflect that the countries have not acquired any events yet and not a change in policy.

Appendix 3: Arguments for events according to sectors in DK and N

N



Appendix 4: Examples of ten most used arguments in the media

<i>Improved economy (3)</i>	<i>Sport-for-all (4)</i>	<i>Infrastructure (10)</i>	<i>Events as series (9)</i>	<i>Branding (2)</i>
<i>Economic as a part of an argument cluster; variance in beneficiaries</i>	<i>Explicit references to sport for the public.</i>	<i>Strictly non-sport infrastructure</i>	<i>Events as motivations for future events</i>	<i>Variation in senders</i>
<p>We are really looking forward the visit of thousands of spectators. Handball fans will be pouring in, who are going to live in our hotels, shop in our shops and eat in our restaurants.[1]</p>	<p>I think it will mean a lot for getting people into the sport. (...) Even if cycling has become bigger in Norway, it still far behind some other countries.[2]</p>	<p>We will get a massive construction of new homes in connection to a new participants' village in Grouddalen, there will be new investments in infrastructure and new and existing sport facilities.[3]</p>	<p>I think we should have a World Championship from time to time and in addition some of the the big events in Norway. I think it is a suitable time now.[4]</p>	<p>This is big. We are talking about reaching hundreds of millions of people. We get the opportunity to show Norway with the qualities we have.[5]</p>
<p>Head of sport emphasises the economic revenue from a tournament on home ground and in that way, the three tournaments on Danish soil over the coming five years essential for the future of Danish handball. [6]</p>	<p>Oslo need new facilities and they have to be made with an eye for the future sport-for-all. [7]</p>	<p>The Olympics "will make considerable improvements of Lørenskog Station and an extension of Lørenskogveien".[8]</p>	<p>The combination of an elite rund and one for all is a winner. It is super that the world championship from 2014 can result in an annual world class half marathon [9].</p>	<p>This is one of the world's biggest events with regard to media coverage. (...) [W]e will benefit from the synergies we get between marketing and profiling.[10]</p>
<p>I think the investments will be small considering what we might get in publicity. (...) Now, I mayor for business, and this is a matter of business too.[11]</p>	<p>It is important for Danish handball, that we have these tournaments, so that we hopefully can increase the interest in handball.[12]</p>		<p>Of course we have both spectators and participants for each event, (...) but it is important to see the event in a bigger context [of other events][13]</p>	<p>We get a lot of publicity in the rest of the country. It is a clear strategy to use these events to brand Herning and make the city an attractive place to live.[14]</p>

<i>Public celebration (1)</i>	<i>Norwegian model (6)</i>	<i>Improved sport infrastructure (7)</i>	<i>Improvement for the sport (5)</i>	<i>Elite [sport] (8)</i>
<p>Spectacular, popular events. Events beyond the sport arena – for all.</p> <p>I think, the Olympics would be just great for Norway again. Internationally, we are known as a skilled hosts and make a decent public celebration, and I know my colleagues in the IOC would be very happy if we applied again.[15]</p> <p>We have to find a way to spread the event and make it a world championship for all of Denmark.[20]</p> <p>Not every championship in Herring has had what it takes to make a public celebration, but this one does.[25]</p>	<p>Especially used to present Oslo 2022 as a contrast to Sochi 2016.</p> <p>The Lillhammer-experience is still present for the eyes of the most important members of the IOC [16].</p> <p>We can revitalize the Winter Olympics. But then we have to make our Games [21].</p>	<p>New or improved facilities for the sport organization the event.</p> <p>Naturally, it will spark some interest in out sport in the area. Finally, there is also talks about new facilities – either a new arena or an improvement of the existing facilities.[17]</p> <p>[The Olympics] will give us an unique opportunity to make a modern ice rink which we will benefit from long after the Olympics. [26]</p> <p>I really hope there is support for this [a new ice rink] among the other parties [22].</p>	<p>Unspecified improvements</p> <p>An Ice Hockey World Championship is one of the biggest things we can host in Denmark. There will be a lot of international guests and we will get Danish ice hockey showed at its best.[27]</p> <p>The World Championship is important for continue the development in Norwegian cycling. And it is important that our biggest profiles get to drive on their home ground so that we can make new heroes.[23]</p>	<p>Advantage for the elite sport; to be a part of the elite of a sport. Often in connection with sport-for-all arguments.</p> <p>Oslo shall be the winter capital of the world. This means we have to take on such event from time to time. (...) I think this a fantastic opportunity for Oslo and Norway to distinguish ourselves as the world's most important ski nation.[19]</p> <p>Børre Rognlien underlines that a future edition of the Olympics in Oslo will mean a raise for all of Norwegian elite sport.[24]</p> <p>I then hope that our Danish male team participates and get a huge support (...) so that the players will feel it as their home ground.[28]</p>

1. Jørn Pedersen, Mayor for the Kolding Municipality. Andersen, S. (2014, July 7). Kolding bliver værtsby for håndbold-VM. *JydskeVestkysten Kolding*, p. 1.
2. Kurt Asle Arvesen, former professional Norwegian road racing cyclist. Hele Sykkel-Norge jubler for Bergen. (2014, September 26). *Bergens Tidende*, 21–22.
3. Libe Rieber-Mohn, then Vice-mayor for the Oslo Municipality. Johnsrud, I. (2013, January 19). Splittet om OL. *VG*, p. 26.
4. Stian Berger Røslund, mayor in Oslo. Vedeler, M. (2011, July 12). Vil ha OL til Oslo. *Aftenposten*, 16.
5. Heikki Dahle, general secretary for the Norwegian Cycling Federation. Forbundet har ingen forhåndsfavoritter. (2011, July 16). *Bergens Tidende*.
6. Ulrik Wilbek, then head of sport, the Danish Handball Federation. Paaske, S. (2013, October 29). VM kommer til Danmark. *BT*, p. 12
7. Norvald Mo, then chair of the District Sport Association for Oslo. Bugge, M. (2011, October 26). Dette vil Oslo gjerne se igjen. *Aftenposten*, p. 29.
8. Lars Lundov, manager for Sport Event Denmark. cmo. (2014, April 9). Succesfuldt løb giver mod på mere. *CityAvisen*, 8.
9. Heikki Dahle, then general secretary for the Norwegian Cycling Federation. Hansen, E. (2011, November 22). Skjønnheten Bergens x-faktor. *Aftenposten*, p. 29.
10. Ole Warberg, head of tourism, VisitBergen. Oppfordrer Bergen til å søke eksperthjelp. (2011, November 22). *Bergens Tidende*.
11. Gunnar Bakke, then deputy mayor for sport, Bergen Municipality. Vil ikke arrangere VM for enhver pris. (2011, November 16). *Bergens Tidende*.
12. Per Bertelsen, chair of the Danish Handball Federation. Paaske, S. (2013, October 29). VM kommer til Danmark. *BT*, p. 12.

13. Head of tourism, Anne Marie Michelsen. Petersen, J. A. (2015, June 9). Turistchef: Gentagelse er vigtig. *JydskeVestkysten Kolding*, 1.
14. Lars Krarup, mayor for the Herning Municipality. Nielsen, F. (2013, December 13). Alt er muligt i Boxen. *Herning Folkeblad*, p. 15.
15. Gerhard Heiberg, then Norwegian member of the IOC. Overn, K. (2011, February 18). Nå vil vi ha OL. *Aftenposten*, p. 32.
16. Hanstad, D. V. (2011, July 9). Grip denne sjansen! *Aftenposten*, 55.
17. Manager Torben Skovsgaard, Blue Fox (professional hockey team). Kristensen, J. J. (2015, February 26). Nye faciliteter skaber optimisme hos direktøren. *Herning Folkeblad*, 12.
18. Kjetil André Aamodt, former professional skier. Kjetil André Aamodt. (2013, September 4). *Aftenposten*, 37.
19. Stian Berger Røslund, then mayor of the Oslo Municipality. Vedeler, M. (2011, July 12). Vil ha OL til Oslo. *Aftenposten*, p. 16.
20. Lars Vermund, chair for the Danish Athletics Federation. Godtfredsen, C. (2011, November 12). Danmark skal finde sko frem til VM-løb. *Politiken*, p. 14.
21. Andersen, H. (2014, January 11). Folkefest og etterbruker ikke nok. *Aftenposten*, 4.
22. Carl Christian Ebbesen, deputy mayor for culture. Edvard, F., & Frederiksen, T. (2014, September 3). Borgmester vil have skjøtetal. *Østerbro Avis*, 54.
23. Harald Tiedemann Hansen, president for the Norwegian Cycling Federation. Strande, A. C. (2012, June 23). Slik skal Bergen få sykkel-VM. *Aftenposten*, p. 64.
24. Børre Rognlien, president for NIF. Hole, A. (2013, April 26). Vil ikke at hele landet skal stemme over OL. *Aftenposten*, p. 69.

25. Jørgen Krogh, manager for city development, business and culture in the Herning Municipality. Damm, T. (2017, February 10). Ishockey-VM er skudt i gang. *Herning Folkeblad*, p. 21.
26. Åge Tovan, mayor in Lørenskog. Fremmerlid, T. (2013, September 11). Styrket i troen på Oslo-OL. *Romerikes Blad*, 16–17.
27. Lars Lundov, manager for Sport Event Denmark. Carlsen, J. (2014, January 10). Nu skal VM til Danmark. *BT*, p. 10.
28. Conny Jensen, member of the Central region council. Jensen, C. (2017, January 26). Gode events i Herning støttet af Region Midtjylland. *Herning Folkeblad*, p. 20.

Appendix 5: Press sources

2011-2014, Bid for the Winter Olympics 2022, Oslo

Provider: A-tekst, Retriver. Period: 01-01-2009 – 01-10-2015

Search term: oslo vinter-OL 2022

Sources: *Aftenposten*, *Bergens Tidende*, *Klassekampen*, *VG*. Local papers: *Budstikken* (Bærum), *Gudbrandsdølen Dagning* (Lillehammer, Øyer), *Romerikes Blad* (Lørenskog)

Results: 718

Aftenposten	240
Bergens Tidende	48
Klassekampen	73
VG	163
Local papers	
- Budstikken	39
- Gudbrandsdølen Dagning	99
- Romerikes Blad	56

2014, Half Marathon World Championship, Copenhagen

Provider: Infomedia. Period: 01-09-2009 – 01-04-2015.

Search term: vm halvmaraton 2014.

Sources: *Berlingske*, *Politiken*, *BT*, *Jyllands-Posten*, *Herning Folkeblad*, *Information*, local papers in Copenhagen from the publishing house North Media – Hovedstadens Mediehus¹⁵⁶

Results: 57

Berlingske	8
BT	12
Information	0
Jyllands-Posten	14
Politiken	24
Copenhagen local papers (only papers with results listed)	12
- City Avisen	4
- Frederiksberg Bladet	4
- Østerbro Avis	2
- Nørrebro Nordvest Bladet	1
- Vesterbro Bladet	1

2015, World Women's Handball Championship, Denmark

Provider: Infomedia. Period: 01-01-2009 – 01-12-2016.

¹⁵⁶ *Østerbro Avis*, *Vesterbro Bladet*, *Vanløse Bladet*, *Valby Bladet*, *Nørrebro Nordvest Bladet*, *Frederiksberg Bladet*, *City Avisen*, *Amager Bladet*, *Kgs. Enghave Bladet*.

Search term: vm håndbold 2015.

Sources: *Berlingske*, *Politiken*, *BT*, *Jyllands-Posten*, *Herning Folkeblad*, *Information*, all local papers from Frederikshavn, Næstved, Kolding indexed by Infomedia.

Results: 387

Berlingske	50
BT	116
Information	2
Jyllandsposten	144
Politiken	85
Herning	
- Herning Folkeblad	71
Frederikshavn	
- Lokalavisen Frederikshavn	8
- Nordjyske Stiftstidende Frederikshavn	0
Næstved	
- Næstved-Bladet	12
- Sjællandske - Næstved	53
- Ugebladet Næstved	5
Kolding	17
- JyskeVestkysten Kolding	11

- Kolding Ugeavis	1
- Kolding Ugeavis Lørdag	2
- Lokalavisen Kolding	3

2017, UCI Road World Championships, Bergen

Provider: A-tekst, Retriver. Period: 24-09-2012 – 25-09-2018

Search term: Bergen sykkel-vm 2017

Sources: *Aftenposten*, *Bergens Tidende*, *Klassekampen*, *VG*, *Vestnytt* (local paper for Fjell, Sund and Øygarden), *Askøyværingen* (local paper for Askøy Municipality)¹⁵⁷

Results: 418

Aftenposten	5
Klassekampen	2
VG	43
Bergens Tidende	312
Vestnytt	58
Askøyværingen	29

¹⁵⁷ Both local papers are owned by *Bergens Tidende*.

2018, World Championship Ice hockey. Copenhagen and Herning

Provider: Infomedia. Period: 01-08-2011 – 31/05 2019

Search term: vm ishockey 2018

Sources: *Berlingske, Politiken, BT, Jyllands-Posten, Herning Folkeblad, Information*, local papers in Copenhagen from the publishing house North Media – Hovedstadens Mediehus (see list in note in Half Marathon case)

Results: 590

Berlingske	43
BT	85
Information	2
Jyllands-Posten	70
Politiken	202
Herning	
- Herning Folkeblad	164
Copenhagen local papers (only papers with results listed)	12
- Amager Bladet	8
- City Avisen	1
- Østerbro Avis	3

2019, World Men's Handball Championship. Copenhagen and Herning

Provider: Infomedia. Period: 01-01-2011 – 29-02-2020

Search term: vm håndbold 2019.

Sources: *Berlingske*, *Politiken*, *BT*, *Jyllands-Posten*, *Herning Folkeblad*, *Information*, local papers in Copenhagen from the publishing house North Media – Hovedstadens Mediehus (see list in note in Half Marathon case).

Results: 372

Berlingske	31
BT	75
Information	3
Jyllandsposten	102
Politiken	247
Copenhagen local papers	
- Amager Bladet	1
Herning	
- Herning Folkeblad	70

Appendix 6: Interview guide

Main themes including sample questions¹⁵⁸

A. *Position of the informant:*

1. What was your position and thereby relation to the event? What was your role?

B. *The organisation's general view on events at that time*

1. How did this particular event relate to the other events, you were working on (if any)?
2. What is an event for you? "What do you talk about, when you talk about events?"
 - a. Where does this picture of events come from?
 - i. Policies, either nationally or internal sport policy aims ('core' arguments).

C. *The chronological course of the event [planning/bidding].*

1. Can you describe how the organisation became the aware of the event?
 - a. Alternatively: Why did you take the initiative to propose the event?
2. Did you become directly involved in staging the event? When? On whose initiative?
3. How far was the planning of the event when you entered? With whom did you cooperate?
4. How did it go from there? Did new partners enter?

D. *The formal and self perceived role of the organisation at the event in question.*

1. Can you describe what role you played in the staging of the event?
 - a. What were your responsibilities?
 - b. What was expected of you in the planning?
 - c. What did you expect from the event? And from your partners?
 - i. Legacies?

E. *The organisation's own reason to support the event?*

1. Do you support all event, e.g. from all NGB's?

¹⁵⁸ Generally, all interviews would cover the main themes. The exact forming of the questions however depended on the informant. The original guide was in Danish.



2. If one were to sum up the reasons for your support to exactly this event, what would that be?
3. How did you come to that reason?
 - a. Did you draw on your own or the event experience of others? Like, events more generally?
 - b. Or did the expectations relate to some specificities of this particular event?
4. Did you relate the event to other events, which you have hosted or did you make other practical or political considerations?
5. For what did you use the reason?
 - a. Whom was it supposed to convince? Internal, external recipients?
 - b. How was the reason disseminated? (cf. the role of the media)
6. Did the reason change in the process?
 - a. Why?



F. Collective reasons for the staging the event (that is including the reasons of other stakeholders)



1. An event often requires many resources or can be a bother for some people. Do you recall any reason for why [city/country] should host the event besides those of your own organisation?
2. Where did these other reasons come from? [civil society, the state, the market? Partners from theme C]
 - a. Did the demands from the international federation play a role? Or their sponsors?
 - i. Did it for instance have specific demands or wishes for the event (that it should be staged compact, environmentally friendly, with a view for children and youth etc.)
 - b. The state?
 - c. Other organisations, e.g. other national governing bodies or partner municipalities (nationally/internationally)?
 - d. Other lobby organisations? E.g. chambers of commerce?
 - e. Commercial agents? (Companies, sponsors?)
 - f. Unforeseen occurrences?
 - g. Did you seek other agents or did they come by themselves?
3. Why did these other reasons come forwards?
 - a. Did they target specific groups in society?
 - i. The local sport in the municipalities?
 - ii. Members of the city council
 - iii. The public
 - iv. Sponsors
 - v. The state

- b. Or did you rather saw it as if the different organisations had their own views on the event?
- 4. Were there any reasons/arguments, which you find was considered as more important than others were or you chose to promote in particular?
 - a. Did any of the arguments, in your view, constrained each other? Did the event point in (too) different directions?
 - b. Were the organisers collected behind one "story" behind the event? E.g. expressed in a press strategy or a vision?
 - i. Why/why not?

Appendix 7: The arguments used in the project's cases







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