

Organizational Culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron in the Royal Norwegian Navy

A comparative study of the culture's influence on learning in the 1. Frigate Squadron in the Royal Norwegian Navy

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Abstract

The purpose of this research is to analyze the culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron to explore potential links between organizational culture and organizational learning. To achieve this, the study builds upon insights from two previous master's theses in the field. Eirik Vatne Nilsen and Sindre Røsland's study from 2021 assessed the Royal Norwegian Navy, concluding the Navy qualifies as a learning organization "to a less extent". The 1. Corvette Squadron was identified as more aligned with the principles of a learning organization than the 1. Frigate Squadron. Furthermore, Karl Martin Aarsrud and Jørgen Gulland's study from 2022 examined the relationship between organizational culture and organizational learning within the 1. Corvette Squadron and other naval units, uncovering a potential correlation. This research aims to explore if the 1. Frigate Squadron's lower classification as a learning organization is reflective of its organizational culture, particularly in comparison to the 1. Corvette Squadron, which has demonstrated greater success as a learning organization.

This master's thesis uses the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI), which is based on the Competing Values Framework (CVF) (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983). The survey (OCAI) was sent out to all employees who sail in the 1. Frigate Squadron. 65 responses out of a possible 580 form the data base for the study. The response rate is relatively low, and this could have an impact on the validity of the research.

The study's findings indicate that while establishing a direct link between organizational culture and organizational learning is challenging, there are several indications suggesting a connection between the two. The organizational culture seems to relate to organizational learning in the 1. Frigate Squadron compared to the 1. Corvette Squadron to some extent. The 1. Corvette Squadron might have a culture that is more conducive to facilitating organizational learning overall. Consequently, this may be applied to other departments in the Navy, and reinforces the conclusion reached by Aarsrud and Gulland (2022). A shift in the 1. Frigate Squadron's culture towards greater flexibility, increased discretion, and a more pronounced external focus and differentiation could potentially enhance organizational learning within the squadron.

Acknowledgments

This master's thesis signifies the conclusion of my studies at the University of South-Eastern Norway. Reflecting on the last three and a half years, I am grateful for the experiences gained. Balancing a demanding full-time career as an Officer in the Royal Norwegian Navy, I have enjoyed the freedom to progressively expand my academic and professional competence. The education has deepened my understanding within subjects of maritime management and proved valuable in practical application within my career. The journey has been intense, a balance between academia, military service, personal health, and an extended struggle of renovating an apartment in Oslo. It is with a sense of accomplishment and relief that I submit this thesis, a testament to the considerable effort invested.

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1 Introduction

How can an organization facilitate learning if its current culture doesn't actively support growth? In the complex environment of maritime operations, where every decision carry significant implication, and the margin for error is extremely narrow there are some influences that might remain concealed to external observers. How the crew of the ship feels and acts may be significant to overcome the enemy. Is the crew and the management loyal to each other? How is the teamwork? Do people dare to take risks? Is there a feeling of stability and efficiency? These factors form the foundation of the organizational culture – a dynamic factor that shapes the Navy's approach to dilemmas and critical decisions. Organizational culture, characterized as shared values, norms, and perceptions, stands as the foundation for an organization's response to adversity and strategic course (Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 2015). A well-defined culture can be driven by cooperation, individual initiative, control, and competition, when it's confronted with challenges (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). These factors may influence the organization's ability to learn, and progress towards improvement (Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 2015; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983; Schein, 2004; Smollan & Sayers, 2009; Strand, 2007; Wadel, 2008, 2008).

While businesses have examined organizational culture, its significant influence in military settings, especially within the Navy, has received less attention. This lack of focus overlooks the possible connection on how organizational culture influences organizational learning. It is specified in "Forsvarsets grunnsyn på ledelse", in English "The Defense's basic view of leadership" (2020), that the organization's culture and environment are important factors in tying the organization together, which forms the prerequisites for effective management. Furthermore, it is highlighted that leadership behaviors oriented towards development should facilitate to understand the environment and make the necessary adjustments to adapt. Behavior among managers must contribute to strategic planning as well as development and change to meet new situations. The behavior encourages creative thinking and new ideas and facilitates collective learning (Forsvaret, 2020). This significance may become even more pronounced in the Royal Norwegian Navy when considering the naval vessels where personnel interact daily within a limited environment. Organizational culture may affect the ability of an organization to learn and adapt (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983).

Given limited research on the impact of culture on learning within a military framework, this thesis draws upon insights from two preceding master's theses which concerns the fields: Organizational culture and organizational learning. The master's theses by Eirik Vatne Nilsen and Sindre Røsland (2021) investigated the Royal Norwegian Navy's status as a learning organization, ultimately determining that, according to a specific benchmark, the Navy qualifies as a learning organization 'to a less extent.' Within this framework, the 1. Corvette Squadron was identified as more aligned with the principles of a learning organization than the 1. Frigate Squadron. In a separate master's thesis, Karl Martin Aarsrud and Jørgen Gulland explored the potential correlation between organizational culture and the organizational learning within the 1. Corvette Squadron, the Coastal Ranger Command, and the Naval Special Operations Command. Their findings suggest a tentative link between organizational culture and organizational learning. Thus, a more extensive investigation into the organizational culture across various squadrons of the Royal Norwegian Navy could yield more definitive insights, provided that a broader data set is employed. In contrast, this study seeks to investigate whether the 1. Frigate Squadron's relatively low rating as a learning organization reflects its organizational culture, especially when compared with the 1. Corvette Squadron, which has been recognized as a more successful learning organization. This research will collect primary data exclusively from the 1. Frigate Squadron and draw upon secondary data from the 1. Corvette Squadron provided by Aarsrud and Gulland (2022), along with insights on learning capabilities in the Royal Norwegian Navy from Nilsen's and Røsland's (2021) work. This may be an interesting comparison as these squadrons have many similar procedures and methods for learning and culture building.

Before the research question can be introduced, it is necessary to provide an empirical context as the Norwegian Armed Forces is a unique organization and can be perceived as unfamiliar to most people.

1.1 Empirical Context

This section will describe the empirical context for the thesis. Some of the following information is based on the researcher's expertise gained as an employee in the Royal Norwegian Navy. The study will deal with two specific departments. The departments are

referred to as squadrons. In the Royal Norwegian Navy, a squadron typically comprises four to six warships of a similar class. The 1. Frigate Squadron has been selected for an in-depth study, while the 1. Corvette Squadron has been chosen as the comparative squadron due to its suitable groundwork for analysis and its likenesses to the 1. Frigate Squadron. The two squadrons have some similarities in operations and internal tasks onboard. The squadrons diverge from each other as learning organizations in the study by Nilsen and Røsland (2021), which provides good basis for discussion in this thesis.

1.1.1 The Royal Norwegian Navy

A simplified description of the organization, the Norwegian Armed Forces, is followed. The Armed Forces, command level 1, are led by the Chief of Defense and his staff. The Norwegian Armed Forces is divided into four defense branches, command level 2: the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Cyber Defense. They are in turn led by their own commander. For example, the Royal Norwegian Navy is led by the Commander-in-Chief and his staff of the Royal Norwegian Navy. Next is command level 3. This level consists of subordinate departments in each of the branches. In the Royal Norwegian Navy, there are five subordinate departments, however, the Royal Norwegian Navy can be divided into two main branches “the Navy” and “the Norwegian Coast Guard”. The 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron are squadrons that are part of the Navy, among many other squadrons and departments (*Forsvaret*, 2023). When the term "Navy" is used in this thesis, it specifically refers to the branch with the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron, unless stated otherwise. Figure 1 is a simplified figure of the organizational chart of the Norwegian Armed Forces.




Figure 1 - Simplified Organizational Chart of the Norwegian Armed Forces (Forsvaret, 2023).

1.1.2 The 1. Frigate Squadron

The 1. Frigate Squadron consists of four vessels of the Nansen-class, and five crews. The frigates, measuring 134 meters in length and 16.8 meters in width, were constructed to strengthen Norway's maritime defense capabilities, both at open sea and along its coastline. The frigates are specialized in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), focusing on underwater combat, specifically designed for submarine detection. To achieve this, they employ multiple sonar systems positioned beneath the ship or towed behind it. Additionally, the frigates are equipped with various systems for detecting other vessels (Anti-Surface Warfare - ASuW) and for identifying aircraft and helicopters (Anti-Air Warfare - AAW). Notably, these frigates also have the capacity to carry helicopters, which can contribute to submarine detection and other missions. The operation pattern of the frigates varies as they can be used in international NATO forces at open sea, or along the Norwegian coast. Mainly its job is to deter, and therefore it is equipped with several weapon systems: Sting Ray- Torpedo's, to take out submarines, Naval Strike Missiles, to take out surface targets, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles, to take out air targets, Oto Melara Kannon, and search mines (*Fakta Om Nansenklasse Fregatter*, 2003; *KNM "Fridtjof Nansen,"* 2007).

The crew on each of these four vessels consists of somewhere between 100-130 soldiers, of which 30-40 are serving as conscripts, 45-60 are sailors and non-commissioned officers, and the rest are officers. This means that large parts of the crew are heavily trained within the Armed Forces with military school for non-commissioned officers, the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy for officers, and professional training for sailors and conscripts. Although it may seem like a large crew, this is a relatively small crew for a frigate compared to other countries' frigates, for example the Netherlands, which have close to equally large frigates size wise, but a crew of over 200. The Norwegian model, lean manning, demands that one crew member should be able to solve many different tasks. Resultingly, the hierarchy must foster a short distance between the one making the decision and the one conducting it, meaning a flat and flexible structure (*Fakta Om Nansenklasse Fregatter*, 2003; *KNM "Fridtjof Nansen,"* 2007; Forsvaret, 2019).

Training and support for the squadron are facilitated by a small, specialized organization located on land in Bergen, placing significant operational and planning responsibilities on the vessel's crews. Leadership positions on these ships demand extensive education and experience, underscoring the high standards and robust requirements of the Royal Norwegian Navy (*Forsvaret*, 2023).

1.1.3 The 1. Corvette Squadron

The 1. Corvette Squadron is composed of six Skjold-class vessels, each measuring 47.4 meters in length and 13.5 meters in width, considerable smaller than a frigate. Designed for agility and speed, these vessels excel in coastal operations. Their quick and agile qualities, along with a deep understanding of the coastal landscape, enable them to smoothly move through the numerous small islands and reefs along the Norwegian coastline. Each corvette is manned with a crew of 20 to 25 professionals, including 3 to 4 conscripts, 4 to 6 enlisted sailors and non-commissioned officers, and the rest being officers. This composition underscores the fact that a significant portion of the crew is highly trained and educated (Aarsrud & Gulland, 2022; *Forsvaret*, 2023).

The vessels are engineered as a hybrid of a hovercraft and a catamaran, known as "Surface Effect Ships," which allows them to achieve a very high speed. It is a saying that the crew "can have breakfast in Bergen and dinner in Tromsø" - a demonstration of their rapid transit capability. While these ships have several of the same weapon systems found on a Norwegian frigate, they lack the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) ability. The Skjold-class corvettes are equipped with the Naval Strike Missiles, an OTO Melara cannon for surface threats, and Mistral anti-air missiles to ensure air defense (Hope, 2005).

The corvettes may not have the extended operational duration typical of a frigate, yet they compensate with periods of heightened intensity, where the crew endures demanding conditions on board. The 1. Corvette Squadron also adheres to the "lean manning" model, which streamlines its hierarchy, creating a flatter organizational structure. Additionally, this squadron benefits from the same training and support provided by the specialized onshore organization based in Bergen. Despite some notable differences between the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron in external factors, they share a striking similarity in the way teams and small groups onboard are structured and how they manage similar tasks internally (*Forsvaret*, 2023).

1.2 Research Question

The current study extends from two previous master's theses. Firstly, "Marinen – en lærende organisasjon" in English "The Navy – A learning Organization", authored by Eirik Vatne Nilsen and Sindre Røsland (2021). Secondly "Legger Marinens kultur til rette for læring?", in English "Does the Navy's Culture Facilitate Learning?" composed by Karl Martin Aarsrud and Jørgen Gulland (2022). Nilsen and Røsland investigated the organizational learning capacity of the Navy and its subsidiary units, relative to an established benchmark. Their thesis provides a presentation of quantitative data concerning the learning capabilities of the Royal Norwegian Navy's constituent units and squadrons. This examination is structured around three primary characteristics of learning organizations: 1) Supportive learning environment, 2) Concrete learning processes and practices, and 3) Leadership that reinforces learning. Furthermore, Aarsrud and Gulland undertook an investigation into the possible influence of organizational culture on the organization's learning capacity within the 1.

Corvette Squadron, the Coastal Ranger Command, and the Naval Special Operations Command. Their findings imply the existence of a potential partial correlation between organizational culture and organizational learning.

A more comprehensive examination of organizational culture spanning more similar squadrons within the Royal Norwegian Navy could, therefore, yield a more definite conclusion, grounded in a more expansive dataset. Independently, it would also be interesting to assess the current and desired culture within the 1. Frigate Squadron, as this could serve as the basis for the management's potential initiation of a cultural change. This study is therefore intended to map the organizational culture within the 1. Frigate Squadron and investigate whether the culture has an impact on how the organization appears to be a learning or not.

In this thesis, the organizational culture is assessed using the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) developed by Cameron and Quinn, which is based on Quinn and Rohrbaugh's Competing Values Framework (CVF) (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983). The model categorizes organizational culture into four distinct culture types: clan, adhocracy, hierarchy, and market culture. The thesis aims to investigate whether there might be a correlation between these different culture types and the three areas of learning organizations.

Main research question:

How may organizational culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron in the Royal Norwegian Navy influence the organizational learning?

Subsidiary Research Objectives:

What characterizes organizational culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron?

How does organizational culture relate to organizational learning in the 1. Frigate Squadron compared to the 1. Corvette Squadron?

To address the research question, two subsidiary research objectives were formulated. These questions will have to be answered before answering the research question. The purpose behind the comparative examination of the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron lies in the necessity to establish a fundamental groundwork for comparative analysis. By comparing the squadrons, it is possible to gain a clearer understanding of the potential relationship between culture and learning, further potentially support the conclusions of Aarsrud and Gulland.

1.3 Outline

In the next chapter the theory will present the concept of organizational culture and specifically the framework for competing values. Furthermore, theory about learning organizations will be presented. Chapter 4 describes the method used for the thesis. The mapping of culture is done with a standardized survey on organizational culture, OCAI by Cameron and Quinn (2013). In chapter 5, results are presented. Chapter 6 will discuss the theory and the findings presented in chapter 5 from the 1. Frigate Squadron and further compare it to the data from the master's thesis by Aarsrud, Gulland, Nilsen and Røsland. Their data, relevant for comparison reason, is presented in Appendix A – The Culture in the 1. Corvette Squadron and Appendix B – Organizational Learning in the Royal Norwegian Navy. Finally, the thesis will summarize and conclude.

2 Theory

This chapter presents relevant theory for the study. Firstly, theory about *organizational culture* will be presented, whereas different factors that may affect organizational culture will be explained. The framework for competing values (CVF) is the foundation of OCAI and will therefore be presented with the intention of describing this context as the data collection and the survey, i.e., the primary data, are based on this (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983). Secondly, the theory of *learning organizations* will be presented. David A. Garvin is the main source in this part as the theory is fundamental to the secondary data used in the thesis and was the main source used to discuss the findings from the thesis by Nilsen and Røsland (2021). This theory will therefore provide a basis for further comparison (Garvin, 1993; Garvin et al., 2008). Lastly, *learning* and *culture* will be described in relation to each other.

2.1 Organizational Culture

The term *culture* may have many different interpretations. In everyday language, it may refer to arts, music, or literature. However, within a sociological context, and for the purposes of this thesis, culture refers to the values, norms, traditions, behavioral patterns, and knowledge that are collectively shared by the members of a specific group, society, or community system. Culture plays a significant role in shaping identity, values, and behavior, and it influences how people think, act, and interact with one another. In the context of organizational culture, the prevailing understanding often revolves around concepts related to society and social groups. When defining the concept of culture, it is normal to explicate the cognitive processes through which individuals perceive reality, interpret ongoing events, and establish causal relationships within their social milieu (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2019). Furthermore, Jacobsen and Thorsvik elaborate on this by stating that the transfer of values and norms from one generation to the next is an essential aspect that underlies the structure of every culture. Extensive research indicates that cultural elements, despite their profound influence, are frequently overlooked and may operate at a subconscious level, shaping individuals' thoughts and behaviors (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2019; Strand, 2007).

Over 150 definitions of culture have been identified (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952). Cameron and Quinn emphasize that these definitions often capture ingrained values, underlying assumptions, implicit expectations, and shared interpretations that shape the identity of organizations and their members (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). Additionally, they highlight the widely accepted notion that organizational culture is a socially constructed attribute that serves as a cohesive force binding an organization together (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). Deal and Kennedy succinctly define culture as "the way we do things around here" (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 2015). Moreover, Schein said that organizational culture is the pattern of underlying assumptions that a particular group develops as it learns to cope with its problems (1984). It may either be external adaptation or internal integration. The underlying assumption has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore is taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (Schein, 2004). The different definitions on culture are rather broad, and even anthropologists, who are renowned for their studies of culture, have not reached a consensus on a singular definition (Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 2015). However, Henning Bang claims that it is generally acknowledged that most researchers agree on the substance of opinions. The Norwegian organizational researcher summarized: "Organizational culture is the set of shared norms, values and perceptions of reality that is developed in an organization when members interact with each other and the environment" (Bang, 2011; Kaufmann & Kaufmann, p. 367, 2015; Strand, 2007). Organizational culture is thus shared in interaction between the people who make up the organization.

Furthermore, there are different elements to divide culture into. Schein believes that culture can be divided into three elements, artefacts, values and norms, and basic assumptions (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2019). In contrast, Cameron and Quinn believe that organizational culture can be divided into four elements, expressed words, artefacts, conscious contracts and norms, and implicit assumptions (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). The figure below shows this interpretation, and the theory is further based on the theory from Cameron and Quinn as the theory in the book "Diagnosing and changing organizational culture" can be seen as particularly relevant for further comparison in this thesis.




Figure 2 - Elements of Organizational Culture(Cameron & Quinn, 2013, p. 20)

At the most basic level, culture is the implicit assumptions that define the human condition and its relation to the environment. This element of culture is only recognized if it is challenged by non-comparable or contradictory assumptions. An example of this is that we do not make a conscious choice about which language to speak when we get up in the morning unless we are confronted with another language (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

From assumptions come contracts and norms. These are rules and procedures that run human interaction. This element originates from assumptions about how things should be, for example in an organization, and then become rules for the entire organization. An example may be how the organization should reward employees. A well-known norm may be that rewards should be given in the form of money, and the contract in the organization then becomes that rewards are given as a bonus at the end of the year (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

The artefacts can be observed to a greater extent. These are elements of culture that are represented in the building we work in and the clothes we wear. It is also expressed through logos, themes, mission statements, formal goals, and the type of identification that the organization usually uses. Thus, this element of culture is even more noticeable (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

The most obvious element of culture is the explicit expressed behavior by the members of the group. In an organization, this is about how people interact, how much they care about the organization and how much they contribute to it with their effort and energy. It is also about how open the organization is to innovation and activities, and whether how much it is encouraged. Cameron & Quinn further state that if the culture is to change, each of these levels must be addressed (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, 2013).

2.2 Competing Values Framework

The Competing Values Framework (CVF) was developed based on studies aimed at identifying the characteristics of effective organizations. In 1974, Campbell, Brownas, Peterson, and Dunnette created a comprehensive list of 39 indicators that measured organizational effectiveness. Quinn and Rohrbaugh further analyzed this list in 1983 with the objective of reducing its complexity. Their analysis led to the identification of two dimensions within organizational culture, resulting in the formation of four quadrants. These quadrants represent distinct sets of indicators that measure organizational core values that underlie how organizations are addressed and their effectiveness, collectively referred to as the CVF (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983).

Firstly, it is worth noting that these four core values represent contradictory or competing assumptions. Each cohesive unit highlights a core value in two different dimensions - flexibility versus stability, and internal versus external. The first dimension of the Competing Values Framework distinguishes between effectiveness criteria that prioritize flexibility, dynamism, and discretion, versus criteria that prioritize stability, order, and control. This dimension highlights that certain organizations are considered effective when they actively embrace change, adapt to new circumstances, and exhibit an organic nature. Such organizations, exemplified by Google and Nike, continuously evolve their product offerings and organizational structures over time. In contrast, other organizations are perceived as effective when they demonstrate stability, predictability, and a mechanistic approach. This tendency is often observed in universities, public agencies, and conglomerates like Boeing, where longevity and sustained leadership in design and performance are key attributes. The

continuum within this dimension spans from organizational versatility and agility at one end to organizational stability and endurance at the other (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

The second dimension of the framework distinguishes between effectiveness criteria that emphasize internal orientation, integration, and coherence, and criteria that prioritize external orientation, differentiation, and rivalry. Some organizations are regarded as effective when they exhibit specific internal characteristics. For instance, IBM and Hewlett-Packard have historically been recognized as consistent organizations, each with its distinct "IBM way" or "H-P way." On the other hand, effectiveness may also be associated with organizations that prioritize interaction and competition beyond their own boundaries. Toyota and Honda, for instance, are renowned for their approach of "thinking globally but acting locally." In this context, departments within these organizations adapt their characteristics to the local environment, rather than strictly adhering to a centrally controlled approach. The continuum within this dimension extends from organizational cohesiveness and alignment on one end to organizational differentiation and independence on the other (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). Together, these two dimensions form four distinct quadrants, as illustrated in Figure 3, capturing the relationship between them.




Figure 3 - Competing Values Framework (Cameron & Quinn, 2013, p. 40).

Furthermore, the sets of indicators that represent organizational effectiveness within the four quadrants will be presented. In Figure 3, the horizontal and vertical arrows illustrate

conflicting assumptions associated with the two dimensions. Similarly, the diagonal lines connecting the corners reflect opposing perspectives. This implies that an organizational culture scoring high in adhocracy is likely to score lower in hierarchy. It is important to note that there is no right or wrong culture; rather, different cultures exhibit distinct indicators of effectiveness.

2.2.1 The four cultures in the framework

Hierarchy – Control

The hierarchical culture emerged from Max Weber's extensive research on state organizations, aiming to meet the increasing demands of a diverse and expanding society. This culture is characterized by seven fundamental attributes: rules, specialization, power elite, hierarchy, tenure, lack of personality, and accountability. Prior to the 1960s, hierarchical structures gained popularity due to their perceived ability to provide stability and enhance efficiency by integrating tasks, ensuring uniformity, and exerting control over personnel and job functions. Success in this culture relied on clearly defined lines of authority, standardized rules, and accountability mechanisms, highlighting the importance of formalized structures, standardized processes, and effective control mechanisms within organizations. Large corporations, such as McDonald's or The United States Department of Justice, exemplify this hierarchical culture through their adoption of top-down decision-making, well-defined roles and responsibilities, standardized procedures, and the use of performance metrics for accountability. In such organizational culture, known as hierarchy, employee behavior is guided by established procedures, while effective leaders play a crucial role as skilled coordinators, ensuring seamless operations. The primary long-term objectives of this culture are stability, predictability, and efficiency, with formal rules serving as the foundation that unifies and sustains the organization. Despite being perceived as controlling, this culture fosters a sense of dependability by ensuring accurate execution of planning processes while minimizing costs (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

Market – Competition

In the late 1960s, organizations faced new competitive challenges, prompting scholars like Oliver Williamson and Bill Ouchi to propose alternative approaches to organizational culture. One key concept that emerged was transaction costs, leading to the development of the market form of organizing. This organizational structure functions like a market, focusing on external interactions with suppliers, contractors, unions, and regulatory bodies. Unlike hierarchical structures, the market form relies on market-based mechanisms, competition, and monetary exchanges rather than internal control mechanisms. Market-oriented organizations prioritize economic profitability, desired outcomes, market niche strength, strategic expansions, and customer base security. Competitiveness and productivity are core values within these organizations. A market culture emphasizes external positioning and control, assuming competitive external environments and value-oriented customers. Management's role is to enhance the organization's competitive position and productivity. Market-oriented organizations pursue clear purposes and employ aggressive strategies for high productivity and returns. In the words of General George Patton, market-oriented organizations are "not interested in holding their position. Let the enemy do that. They keep moving forward all the time, winning over opposition, and constantly marching towards their goals" (Cameron & Quinn, 2013, p. 45). Thus, a market culture, as assessed through the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI), represents a result-oriented workplace where leaders play dual roles as driven producers and competitors, maintaining a tough and demanding approach. The cohesive force that binds the organization together is the shared commitment to achieving victory. Long-term interests are propelled by competitive actions and the pursuit of ambitious goals and objectives. Success is gauged through metrics such as market share and market penetration, with the aim of surpassing competitors and attaining a leadership position in the market (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

Clan – Cooperation

Clan culture, akin to a family-based structure, distinguishes organizations. Compared to market-based and hierarchical counterparts, clan-based firms prioritize shared values, strong cohesiveness, active employee participation, individualism, and a collective identity resembling extended families. Unlike rule-based hierarchies or profit-driven organizations, clan-like organizations emphasize collaborative teamwork, employee involvement in

decision-making, and well-being. They establish autonomous work groups, rewarding collective achievements over individual performance, and implement quality circles for improvements. Clan culture assumes effective management through teamwork, employee development, perceiving customers as partners, and prioritizing a humane work environment. These ideas, advocated by the human relations movement, gained recognition among Western organizations due to the success of Japanese companies implementing them post-World War II (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

In situations where turbulent and rapidly changing environments make long-term planning difficult and decision-making is uncertain, an effective way to coordinate organizational activities is to ensure that all employees share the same values, beliefs, and goals. Japanese organizations recognized this long before their Western counterparts. Dean Randy Nelson of Pixar University, recognized for its strong clan culture, expressed the heart of their model:

“Providing people with opportunities to fail together and recover from those failures together. You can spend a lot of money trying to outcompete others, or you can try to create a better culture than them. Create a place that makes employees feel special, that makes them feel they are part of something bigger, a place where they can continuously learn and develop, and a place where everyone genuinely likes each other. If you create such a culture, who will want to leave? Plus, you'll attract the best people out there, knocking on your door to join” (Cameron & Quinn, 2013, p. 48-49).

This explains why the coat of arms of Pixar University bears the Latin inscription "Alienus Non Diutius" - No longer alone. Clan culture, as assessed in the OCAI, is a typical example of a workplace where people share a significant part of themselves. It is like an extended family, where leaders are viewed as mentors and perhaps even parental figures. Loyalty and tradition hold the organization together, and commitment is high. The organization places emphasis on the long-term benefits of individual development, with a strong focus on cohesion and morality. Success is defined by the internal climate and the genuine interest in people. The organization highly values teamwork, participation, and consensus (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

Adhocracy – Create

The transition from the industrial era to the information age gave rise to a new organizational form called adhocracy. These types of organizations are well-suited to the fast-paced and turbulent conditions of the twenty-first century. Adhocracy differs from other organizational forms by assuming that success stems from innovative initiatives, a focus on developing new products and services, and fostering entrepreneurship, creativity, and pioneering activities. Adhocracies adapt quickly to changing circumstances, as they are characterized by temporary and specialized structures. They are often found in industries such as aerospace, software development, and film. Adhocratic organizations face the challenge of producing innovative goods and services while rapidly seizing new opportunities (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). Rephrased to suit the military context, adhocracy culture involves learning to anticipate change in established patterns based on expectations of future change in the environment (Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 2015).

Unlike hierarchical structures, adhocracies lack centralized power. Decision-making and power dynamics flow between individuals or workgroups, depending on the specific issue at hand. Individualism, risk-taking, and forward-thinking are valued within this model. Members are involved in various aspects of the organization, including production, customer engagement, and research and development. For example, in a consulting firm, a new client requirement is treated as an independent project, necessitating the creation of a temporary organizational structure. Once the project is completed, the structure dissolves (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

In summary, adhocratic cultures are characterized by a dynamic and innovative workplace, where individuals are willing to take risks. Effective leadership embraces a visionary and innovative approach. These organizations prioritize experimentation and being at the forefront of knowledge, products, and services. Adhocracies aim for rapid growth, acquiring new resources, and producing unique offerings (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

2.2.2 Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument

Cameron and Quinn have developed the tool Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI), which measures the culture in an organization at the present time, and the desired culture around five years into the future, based on the CVF. This model was the dominant model worldwide for assessing organizational culture in 2011 (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). In their book, "Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture: Based on the Competing Values Framework," Cameron and Quinn explains that "OCAI is not necessarily the only way to map and change organizational cultures. However, it offers several advantages to managers who wants to identify and change the culture in their organization" (Cameron & Quinn, 2013, p. 23). It has been used in a range of industrial sectors, including healthcare, education, national and local government authorities, colleges and universities, former Master's degree programs (Master of Business Administration), as well as in military organizations (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Gerras et al., 2008). Another pertinent actor to mention is the Danish researcher Morten Aaby, who operates a consultancy service engaged in cultural assessment based on OCAI (Aaby, 2023).

OCAI evaluates six key dimensions of organizational culture: *Dominant Characteristics*, *Organizational Leadership*, *Management of Employees*, *Organizational Glue*, *Strategic Emphases*, and *Criteria of Success*. *Dominant Characteristics* embraces typical features of the department or how it is referred to externally. *Organizational Leadership* holds the perceptions of the prevailing management style within the organization. *Management of Employees* is the perception of management's orientation towards its personnel. *Organizational Glue* underscores the emphasis on achievement and goal realization. *Strategic Emphases* are the primary areas or behaviors the organization focuses on to achieve its goals. And lastly, *Criteria of Success* represents the cultures that defines success in the organization, meaning which criteria are used to determine how successful the organization is. These six dimensions represent specific aspects within the organization and provide an indication of areas where the organization may need to focus on cultural change efforts. In the survey each of the six dimensions demonstrates a question, with four different options/statements for to each. A total score of 100 points is allocated among the four options based on which statement best describes the organization. This is done for all six key dimensions twice, for the current situation and the desired situation, resulting in a total of 48 statements (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

Figure 4 - *OCAI based on CVF (Aaby, 2023)* illustrates how OCAI is based on the four distinct culture types from the CVF. The figure shows the establishment of an x-axis and y-axis that differentiate the culture types from each other using the two "dimensions" within the CVF:

Internal focus and integration vs. External focus and differentiation

Stability and control vs. Flexibility and discretion

Each of the six key dimensions will have its own diagram based on the results of the survey. This allows for the representation of a square figure illustrating the current and desired culture within each dimension. After completing the data analysis, an overall figure (the overall culture profile) can also be generated based on the six individual figures (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).




Figure 4 - OCAI based on CVF (Aaby, 2023)

2.2.3 OCAI's relevance to the Norwegian Armed Forces

The OCAI model is particularly useful in analyzing the culture in the Royal Norwegian Navy in two ways. Firstly, the model addresses the challenges in the Navy by balancing contrasting

needs. It looks at the traditional military emphasis on hierarchy and clear command, essential for a military ship crew, against the need for creativity and flexibility, especially during naval combat. This investigation may therefore help to understand how the Navy manage these opposite requirements. Secondly, Cameron and Quinn developed the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) to measure an organization's culture in a structured, quantitative way. While some experts might be skeptical about quantifying something as complex as culture, the OCAI offers a way to investigate culture even among novices (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). Therefore, this may be particularly relevant for the Navy, and the 1. Frigate Squadron as a large part of the crew onboard are conscripts, meaning the ones with only one year of compulsory service (*Forsvaret*, 2023). However, it's important to note that while an organization might primarily fit into one quadrant of the model, it often exhibits traits from the others as well. Within larger organizations like the 1. Frigate Squadron, different groups or units might display distinct cultural characteristics (Gerras et al., 2008). To address this issue, one approach has been to separate the different crews. This is explained in more detail in the following chapters.

2.3 Is yours a learning organization – David A. Garvin

The master's thesis about organizational learning in the Navy by Røsland and Nilsen was based on the theory by David A. Garvin. The results from this master's thesis will be linked to the findings in the thesis by Røsland and Nilsen, therefore some of the same theory is also relevant to present (Nilsen & Røsland, 2021). The review, "Is yours a learning organization" by David A. Garvin, Amy C. Edmondson and Francesca Gino introduces a survey instrument for measuring an organization's ability to learn. The tool's conceptual base is what the authors call the three building blocks of a learning organization. It is specified in the review that organizations do not perform equally well across the three building blocks due to each one requires a distinct support activity to provide an effect. It must address the specific organization's strengths and weaknesses over a long period to be able to map the development. Furthermore, it will establish a profile based on their ability to learn and further measure this against benchmarking (Garvin et al., 2008). The three building blocks, a supportive learning environment, concrete learning processes and practices, and management that reinforces learning will further be reviewed in more detail.

2.3.1 Supportive learning environment

A supportive learning environment includes the components: *psychological safety*, *appreciation of differences*, *openness to new ideas*, and *time for reflection*.

Psychological safety concerns employees not feeling neglected or fear when they disagree with the management, authorities, or other team members in the organization. The same applies if they make a mistake (Garvin et al., 2008). Psychological safety is an expectation that employees will not be embarrassed, rejected, or punished for sharing ideas, taking risks, or giving and receiving feedback. The importance of all voices being heard is essential in a supportive learning environment.

Appreciation of differences concerns making people aware and open to different ideas and point of views. Recognizing the value of competing functional outlooks and alternative point of view may increase motivation, energy and the power of innovation (Garvin et al., 2008).

Openness to new ideas is about crafting novel approaches. Learning is not just about correcting mistakes and solving problems. Employees should be encouraged to risk-taking and exploring the unknown (Garvin et al., 2008).

Time for reflection is when a supportive learning environment allows time for a pause in action and encourages review of the organization's processes. Garvin describes the consequence of stress and tough deadlines as compromising the ability to think analytically and creatively. In an environment where employees and managers are measured based on their ability to deliver a product or service based on hours, a performance culture is often created which can then come at the expense of time for reflection (Garvin et al., 2008).

2.3.2 Concrete learning processes and practices

The second, concrete learning processes and practices, includes the components: *experimentation*, *information collection and analysis*, *sharing of information*, and *education and training*.

Experimentation involves the active exploration of innovative approaches to create and assess new products and services. For this purpose, organizations should establish a structured process that ensures a systematic review of experiments, allowing sufficient time for evaluating and implementing novel ideas (Garvin et al., 2008). A notable advantage of this element is that it cultivates a culture of testing and adjustment within the organization, thereby enhancing its capacity to effectively navigate permanent changes in the future. The fundamental essence of this sub-component lies in fostering adaptability and the ability to respond to evolving circumstances, which are indispensable qualities for keeping pace with the rapid developments today.

The combination of *collecting*, *analyzing*, and *sharing information* can be partially merged. *Collecting information* involves collecting data to stay updated on changing trends in technology, society, and the economy among competitors and customers. *Analysis* and interpretation help identify and address challenges, while *sharing* can occur among individuals, groups, or the entire organization. During analysis, researchers emphasize the importance of identifying and discussing underlying assumptions that affect decision-making. They stress the significance of considering all observations and viewpoints, avoiding excessive focus on established perspectives, as it can be time-consuming and uninteresting. Knowledge can be transferred vertically, horizontally, within the organization, or between external organizations. Internal knowledge transfer involves sharing knowledge between different departments or projects. External knowledge transfer includes learning from other companies about specific events or problem-solving methods. Another option is to seek information from experts or researchers who specialize in areas the organization wants to implement. The essential aspect of information sharing is ensuring prompt and accurate distribution of important information to those who need it. This ultimately enhances organizational efficiency and productivity (Garvin et al., 2008).

Education and training play a pivotal role in cultivating and enriching the skills of employees. Frequently, organizations and businesses have predetermined curricula and training programs designed for new hires to ensure their proficiency in job performance. However, long-serving employees, those transitioning to new roles, or those taking initiative in ongoing projects may also benefit from additional training and education. Researchers

underscore the significance of affording everyone the opportunity for personal development and advancement, as it ultimately contributes to the organizational well-being. Consequently, it becomes the organization's responsibility to allocate resources and facilitate the provision of training and educational opportunities (Garvin et al., 2008).

2.3.3 Leadership that reinforces learning

Supportive learning environment and concrete learning processes and practices are fortified by the final building block: Leadership that reinforces learning. This component does not have any sub-components. Organizational learning is greatly influenced by the behavior of leaders within the organization. When leaders effectively involve and engage their employees in discussions about relevant issues and challenges, the employees will also feel encouraged to learn. If leaders signal the importance of investing time in problem identification, information exchange, and sharing experiences, this mindset will spread throughout the organization. Furthermore, researchers emphasize that when individuals in positions of authority demonstrate a desire and commitment to considering alternative viewpoints through their own behavior, employees will feel motivated to contribute new ideas and suggestions (Garvin et al., 2008).

2.3.4 The four principles

David A. Gravin, Amy C. Edmondson and Francesca Gino explains that the online organizational tool they have created is designed to answer two questions: “To what extent is your unit functioning as a learning organization?” and “What are the relationships among the factors that affect learning in your unit?”. Furthermore, experience from the development and testing of this tool has given the researchers four principles that managers who want a more learning organization should focus on.

Firstly, the researchers believe that openness, inclusive behavior, and patterns of behavior are essential for the employees to follow what the manager wants to implement. The cultural and processual dimensions of learning require explicit and targeted interventions. Results from the study by Gravin, Edmondson and Gino suggest that installing formal learning processes and

cultivating a supportive learning climate requires steps beyond simply modifying leadership behavior. Leadership alone is not effective (Garvin et al., 2008).

Secondly, organizations are not monolithic. Managers should recognize that organizations allocate varying durations to the learning process. Within each organization, diverse groups and individuals exist, characterized by differential rates of learning and personal development. Consequently, the establishment of a learning culture within an organization is contingent upon the pace of individual growth. Therefore, it is essential for each organization to devise a distinct learning strategy tailored to its specific needs (Garvin et al., 2008).

The third principle is that comparative performance is the critical scorecard. The purpose of assessing performance in an organization is not to level the various sub-components in the survey, but rather to compare with competitors or benchmarking. Performance must be seen in the context of units operating in the same environment (Garvin et al., 2008).

The last principle is about learning being multidimensional. Organizations often adopt a targeted approach to improvement by focusing on specific sub-components. However, researchers contend that each of these building blocks is inherently multidimensional, with distinct responses to various influences. Consequently, the pursuit of organizational learning can be approached in diverse ways, depending on the specific building block targeted for intervention. This places greater responsibility on managers to carefully consider the selection of focus areas or sub-components to effectively bring about change within a given building block (Garvin et al., 2008).

The article concludes that the purpose of the tool is not merely to assess the company's learning capability through a numerical score, but rather to encourage self-reflection and analysis within the company. By promoting internal discussions, the tool aims to facilitate a heightened emphasis on learning within the organization (Garvin et al., 2008).

2.4 Organizational culture and organizational learning

This paper aims to establish a connection between organizational learning and organizational culture. Consequently, the endeavor is to link Garvin's three building blocks for learning to Cameron & Quinn's four types of organizational culture, by using other sources to possible find relations between organizational culture and organizational learning.

As described earlier in the chapter, learning involves a lasting transformation in both experience and behavior resulting from past encounters. Organizational learning, therefore, refers to the enduring change in an organization's experience and behavior due to accumulated experiences. To facilitate learning, an organization must be willing to adapt and undergo transformation (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2019). Peter Senge introduced a fundamental theory known as systems thinking in the context of organizational learning. According to Senge, developing a learning strategy encompassing the entire organization is essential at the leadership level, with systems thinking serving as its foundation (Senge, 1990, 1999). In this regard, Jacobsen & Thorsvik explain the concept of systems thinking as follows:

"The challenge lies in channeling individual learning in such a way that everyone contributes to safeguarding and promoting the overall interests of the organization" (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2019, p. 356).

Furthermore, they elaborate on systems thinking culture by stating that it involves perceiving the connection and interdependencies within one's own organization and the surrounding environment. Through systems thinking, each employee gains an understanding of the holistic view and interrelationships among all organizational activities. This comprehension allows individuals to align their work and learning with other organizational endeavors. Thus, learning is seen as a transformative process. It has been repeatedly emphasized that successful organizational changes require a corresponding shift in organizational culture. The authors concluded that reengineering was not enough to achieve desirable change. It had to be integrated with an overall approach to changing an organization's culture. In other words, the failure of reengineering occurred in most cases because the culture of the organization remained the same. The procedure was treated as a technique or program of change, not as a

fundamental shift in the organization's direction, values, and culture (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2019).

Resultingly, Jacobsen and Thorsvik asserts that organizational culture can significantly impact a company's success (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2019). Modern studies establish a notable correlation between organizational culture and effectiveness (Hartnell et al., 2011; Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2019). These findings align with the research conducted by Cameron & Quinn (2013). While an organization may achieve short-term effectiveness, the dynamic nature of the world and society necessitates continuous adaptation. Additionally, competing organizations continually emerge. To maintain long-term effectiveness, an organization must align itself with the changing societal and environmental conditions, thereby fostering a culture of learning. Organizational culture that values continuous learning is a prerequisite for becoming a learning organization (Wadel, 2008).

Garvin's three building blocks, 1) supportive learning environment, 2) concrete learning processes and practices and 3) management that reinforces learning have different characteristics that can be linked directly to the different organizational cultures, especially clan and adhocracy culture. Each type of culture possesses a distinct organizational profile, as previous elaborated in this chapter and summed up in the accompanying figure below. Subsequently, the three building blocks is linked to the culture profile.

<p style="text-align: center;">The clan culture</p> <p>A friendly workplace where people share a lot of themselves. It's like an extended family. The leaders are considered mentors, and perhaps even parental figures. The organization is held together by loyalty or tradition. The commitment is high. The organization emphasizes the long-term benefits of staff development and emphasizes compliance and morale. Success is defined through sensitivity towards customers and being concerned with people. The organization greatly values teamwork, participation and consensus.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">The adhocracy culture</p> <p>A dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative workplace. People dare to take chances. The managers are considered innovators and risk takers. The glue that holds the organization together is a commitment to experimentation and innovation. Being at the forefront is emphasized. The organization's long-term emphasis is on growth and acquiring new resources. Success means acquiring unique and new products or services. The organization encourages individual initiative and individual freedom.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">The hierarchical culture</p> <p>A highly formalized and structured workplace. Procedures govern what people do. The managers take pride in being good coordinators and organizers who are very efficient. Maintaining an organization where everything runs smoothly is very important. Formal rules and guidelines hold the organization together. The main long-term emphasis is on stability and an efficient and painless performance of the organization. Success is defined through reliable deliveries, that planning goes well, and that there are low costs. In the management of employees, emphasis is placed on secure employment conditions and predictability.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">The market culture</p> <p>A results-oriented organization. The most important thing is to get the job done. The employees are competitive and goal-oriented. The leaders are promoters, producers and competitors. The glue that holds the organization together is an emphasis on winning. Reputation and success are common interests. The organization's long-term goals are competitive deals and achieving measurable objectives. Success is defined through market share and market penetration. Competitive prices and being a market leader are important. The organizational style is a driver of competitiveness.</p>

Figure 5 - Organizational Culture Profile (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

Supportive learning environment

A supportive learning environment, with its subcomponents of psychological safety, appreciation of differences, openness to new ideas, and time for reflection, can be associated with the adhocracy and clan culture. Openness to new ideas and time for reflection may foster innovation, consequently these segments within building block 1 may be connected to the adhocracy culture. A supportive learning environment, psychological security, and appreciation of differences involves establishing a sense of safety, and sharing with other people, which are characteristics that can be recognized in the clan culture. In contrast, the hierarchical culture is perceived as highly efficient. Consequently, time for reflection may be deprioritized in such a culture, which also indicates that a supportive learning environment tends towards the opposite diagonal, namely adhocracy (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991; Smollan & Sayers, 2009).

Concrete learning processes and practices

Concrete learning processes and practices encompass several key components, including experimentation, information gathering, information analysis, education and training, and information sharing. Experimentation entails allocating sufficient time for evaluating and implementing new ideas, thereby facilitating the exploration of novel approaches. It's essential for organizations to avoid fixating on well-established perspectives during discussions, as this can prove time-consuming and unstimulating (Garvin et al., 2008). In contrast, hierarchical cultures prioritize adherence to formal rules and guidelines, striving for maximum efficiency. This emphasis may appear incongruent with the nature of experimentation, which aligns more closely with an adhocracy culture characterized by flexibility and innovation. Additionally, the education and training subcomponent underscores the researchers' emphasis on employees' need for ongoing learning and development opportunities. Consequently, providing individuals with avenues for personal growth becomes imperative. Within a clan culture-oriented organization, for instance, the organization should emphasize the long-term benefits derived from fostering individual growth. Hence, building block 2 can be associated with both clan culture and adhocracy culture (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, 2013; Garvin, 1993; Garvin et al., 2008; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991).

Leadership that reinforces learning

Leadership that reinforces learning points out that leaders must signal the importance of spending time and encourage problem identification, information exchange and experience sharing. In addition, people in authority must show a desire and commitment so that employees feel encouraged to come up with new ideas and suggestions. Organizations that have an adhocracy culture encourage individual initiative and individual freedom. Therefore, building block 3 can also be linked to the adhocratic cultural profile of Cameron & Quinn (2013). In summary, Garvin's three building blocks for learning can be linked to Cameron and Quinn's indicators for the adhocratic and clan culture (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991; Schein, 1984).

3 Methods

The purpose of this chapter is to describe what has been investigated and how the investigation is conducted. The methodological approach for this study will be presented. This includes the following: the selection of research design, population, sample, an overview of the survey itself, as well as data collations, data processing, ethical considerations, and limitations to the thesis. Finally, this chapter will discuss the study's validity and reliability, which are crucial factors for the overall research, and will allow the reader to evaluate the reliability and validity of the research.

3.1 Research design and choice of methodology

The purpose of this study is to determine how organizational culture may play a role in whether the 1. Frigate Squadron differs in its status as a learning organization compared to the 1. Corvette Squadron with a deductive approach. Additionally, this study will contribute to enhance the understanding of the extent to which organizational culture influences organizational learning within the entire Navy. Prior research has already delved into these aspects within the Corvette Squadron, Coastal Ranger Command, and Naval Special Operations Command by Karl Martin Aarsrud and Jørgen Gulland (2022). Extending this inquiry to the Frigate Squadron offers an opportunity to enhance comprehension through a more extensive dataset. In accordance with the suggestions arising from Aarsrud and Gulland's research, future studies could consider expanding their focus to include other units within the Navy as this remains a somewhat unexplored area of research (Aarsrud & Gulland, 2022). This would allow for an examination of possible common trends and insights. Thus, the research will examine a selected squadron within the Navy, with the possibility of generalizing the findings to the entire population, i.e., the entire Navy. Therefore, an extensive design has been chosen, based on a desired breadth. This design facilitates statistical generalization. Jacobsen defines statistical generalization as the phenomenon where the findings we have uncovered apply not only to the subjects we have examined but also to those we have not studied. In essence, we extrapolate from a sample of units to the entire population. As the research design allows for extensiveness, the design of the research question should narrow the scope down. Consequently, the selection led to the formulation of a descriptive research question, temporally delimited, with the objective of explaining the condition at a specific interval (Jacobsen, 2015).

The selected method is also constrained in terms of time, employing a cross-sectional design with quantitative data collection. In a cross-sectional study, the examination of reality occurs at a specific point in time. It is important to note that this research design offers a dual advantage. It provides a precise description of a condition at a given moment and the capability to identify phenomena that co-vary at that interval (Jacobsen, 2015). The research question considers the integration of data collection from the master's theses: “Does the Navy's culture facilitate learning?” (2022) and “The Navy - a Learning Organization?” (2021), with the data collection conducted in this research. The research on culture in the Corvette Squadron, Coastal Ranger Command and Naval Special Operations Command by Karl Martin Aarsrud and Jørgen Gulland (2022) was done approximately one year ago. Furthermore, the research on the Navy as a learning organization by Nilsen and Røsland was conducted around two and a half years ago (2021). On the one hand, this makes the comparisons of data limited in time over a two-year period, which may pose certain challenges as it is considered a long time. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that a substantial cultural change within the Navy has not necessarily occurred within this time, especially considering that most personnel in these squadrons are still in active service. Furthermore, it is an established premise that significant cultural shifts require an extended period to occur (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

3.2 Population and sample

This study examines the sailing personnel in the 1. Frigate Squadron who belongs to a crew. The 1. Frigate Squadron in the Navy is a large squadron and the whole squadron got the option to answer the survey, as the culture can be defined by everyone, whether you have worked there for a long time or a short time. This includes conscripts, sailors, non-commissioned officers, and officers. At the same time, it can provide greater engagement than excluding some of the employees, for example all the conscripts.

To understand the impact of culture on organizational learning in the 1. Frigate Squadron, a basis for comparison is required. The 1. Corvette Squadron, the Coastal Ranger Command, and the Naval Special Operations Command have already been surveyed by Aarsrud and Gulland (2022). Out of these three departments the 1. Corvette Squadron is the one most like

the 1. Frigate Squadron. However, the 1. Corvette Squadron and the 1. Frigate Squadron are not entirely alike, as they have somewhat different operation patterns, but are considered good enough comparison grounds in this research, as they manage similar tasks internally. Furthermore, previous research on the 1. Corvette Squadron, the Coastal Ranger Command, and the Naval Special Operations Command has an extensive design, which means that the entire sample can provide an indication of the entire Navy. Thus, the Navy as a population will also serve as a statistical generalization in this research to build upon what Aarsrud and Gulland have found (2022). Therefore the 1. Frigate Squadron can be described as the actual population being studied (compared to the 1. Corvette Squadron), and the entire Navy may be described as the theoretical population (Jacobsen, 2015).

At the time of the survey, the population consisted of 580 employees in the 1. Frigate Squadron, resulting in a sample of 65 respondents, yielding a response rate of 11.2%. There are varying claims about what constitutes an adequate response rate, but for a web-based survey like this, a response rate between 10-20% might be expected (Saunders et al., 2019). While this may not be considered high, it can still be deemed acceptable (Baruch, 1999; Richardson, 2005). The collected data is deemed sufficient to conduct the discussion. For comparison, on September 1, 2022, the 1. Corvette Squadron had a total of 103 employees. The survey conducted by Aarsrud and Gulland garnered responses from 39 individuals, resulting in a response rate of 38%. It is essential to emphasize the researchers' relationship with the 1. Corvette Squadron, as both researchers were part of the squadron's daily operations. This differs from the research approach for the 1. Frigate Squadron. Therefore, the close relationship of the researchers with the 1. Corvette Squadron may have influenced a higher level of participation.

3.3 The Survey

Initially, it was relevant to use the same cultural assessment that was applied for the 1st Corvette Squadron to establish a basis for comparison. The survey that was used is The Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) (Aaby, 2023). This is a pre-designed survey based on the Competing Values Framework (CVF) theory (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). The developers of this survey refer to it as likely being the most widely used tool for assessing organizational culture in the world. Originally the survey was made in English, and

the company behind ocai.dk. is Danish. However, the survey was translated into Norwegian, in the book "Identification and change of organizational culture" (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). The survey in this investigation was conducted in Norwegian as it is the native language for the respondents in the 1. Frigate Squadron. It is not considered that understanding might have been compromised due to language barrier. The thesis includes both the survey in Norwegian and its original English version as appendices.

OCAI incorporates two distinct scales, namely the Likert scale and the ipsative scale. Each of these scales exhibits its own set of strengths and weaknesses, however an argument for not using the Likert scale is presented by (Cameron & Quinn, 2013) as follows: By employing a Likert scale, where statements are rated from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree," it may seem easier for respondents to provide answers. However, the responses given are not interdependent. When using the Likert scale, the tendency is for all culture types to be rated either high or low, resulting in less differentiation. Conversely, the ipsative scale necessitates respondents to allocate 100 points across four statements associated with the four distinct culture types. Cameron and Quinn underscore the principal advantage of the ipsative scale, emphasizing that the responses accentuate and differentiate the distinctive nature of organizational culture. They elaborate that the respondent is forced to identify compromises that genuinely transpire within the organization.

Since the ipsative scale was the format used for the 1st Corvette Squadron's responses, it was considered important to apply the same scale for the 1st Frigate Squadron. Additionally, alongside the standardized survey, three additional questions were incorporated: the respondent's assigned crew, the duration of the respondent's employment in the military, and the respondent's highest level of education. This information might show trends that are relevant to discuss and might be valuable information for the different crews.

There are numerous programs available for creating surveys, but to adhere to privacy regulations and ensure an anonymous survey, it was decided to use nettskjema.no. The survey has demonstrated ease of production as well as straightforward data processing. However, there are some feedback from the respondents that indicate some difficulties. Firstly, Nettskjema.no did not have a function in the anonymous survey with Ipsative scale that would

allow to make a maximum and minimum limit of 100. Therefore, the respondent had to count and calculate to make the summation of the given 100 points. One measure was therefore to write under each question that you should remember that the sum should be 100. However, this led to several miscalculations (find the number) and caused less accurate data. Nonetheless, this could have potentially incentivized a higher survey completion rate, as errors occurring whenever the allocated points did not sum up to 100 might have led to respondent frustration and a subsequent abandonment of the survey. However, to compensate for not having a maximum or minimum function, and to make it easier for the respondent the method to choose the scoring was a dropdown-method instead of writing the number yourself. However, with this, it was only possible to choose a whole number, meaning: 0, 10, 20, 30, and so on, up to 100, as shown in Figure 6 - Sample question using ipsative scale (Aaby, 2023) - Illustration by the author. This made it easy to distribute numbers.

1. Dominant characteristics - Current situation

The organization is very personal. It is like an extended family. The employees give a lot of themselves. *

The organization is very dynamic and proactive. Here, employees like to put their heads forward and dare to take risks. *

The organization is very results-oriented. It is all about getting things done. The employees are very competitive and result-oriented *

- ✓ Choose...
- 0
- 10
- 20
- 30
- 40
- 50
- 60
- 70
- 80
- 90
- 100

ed and structured. Employees generally follow formal procedures. *

Figure 6 - Sample question using ipsative scale (Aaby, 2023) - Illustration by the author.

However, a disadvantage of this would be that the respondent would not be able to choose the exact number themselves. Still, looking at the numbers of the respondents in the data from the 1. Corvette Squadron by Aarsrud and Gulland (2022), there was only around one half that didn't write whole numbers, 0, 10, 20, 30, and so on. And the once using more accurate

numbers for distribution would only use the scale with five in between, like 0, 5, 10, 15, and so on. This difference in scoring method is therefore not considered a distinct disadvantage to the research. It is also worth mentioning that each question was set as mandatory to answer to secure data to all the statements. The downside of this could be that the dropout was greater because all the questions had to be answered.

3.4 Data Collection

This subsection explains how responses were collected from the respondents and reasoning related to the choices made during this process.

Data collection in the Royal Norwegian Navy and in the military in general distinctively diverges from conventional practices, mainly owing to the military's extensive sensitive information. A notable proportion of the daily undertakings of the staff within the 1. Frigate Squadron operates within classified, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) frameworks. Access to non-classified communication platforms, the internet, and mobile connectivity remains restricted for many whiles sailing. This means that the survey was not as accessible to respondents as it would be in general in today's technologically advanced society. Therefore, this factor required extra consideration when choosing the research method.

The survey was disseminated via email using the Royal Norwegian Navy's classified platform. Employees across the different crews were easily identifiable since they are already grouped into email categories. Initially, it was considered distributing the survey via a link. However, due to the classified nature of their system, coupled with the fact that the survey link directed to an unclassified network, would have led to a lot of work for the respondents. Instead, a QR code was included in the email, enabling employees to scan it with their phones. However, this approach had its drawbacks: employees often experience weak mobile reception on board, they don't always carry their phones due to ship safety protocols, and there are times when the captain orders all phones to be turned off and cutting off the network. Despite these challenges, this method was deemed more efficient than sending a direct link, especially since many of the vessels were docked during the survey distribution period.

When the survey received an extremely low response rate in the initial five days, it was considered necessary to create an alternative method to distribute it. Through acquaintances onboard, posters containing information about the survey and the QR code were printed and displayed in all the messes and common areas onboard. This may have contributed to the rapid increased response rate. Furthermore, this approach proved efficacious and adeptly ensured the preservation of respondent anonymity.

3.5 Data Processing

This sub-chapter explains how the collected data was handled and analyzed. The assignment consists of both primary data that was obtained via the questionnaire sent out to the 1. Frigate Squadron, in addition to secondary data obtained from the master's theses, in English, “Does the Navy's culture facilitate learning?” (Aarsrud & Gulland, 2022) and “The Navy - a Learning Organization?” (Nilsen & Røsland, 2021). The secondary data used can be seen in Appendix A – The Culture in the 1. Corvette Squadron and Appendix B – Organizational Learning in the Royal Norwegian Navy.

3.5.1 Primary Data

The primary data was collected and stored in *Nettskjema* and subsequently exported to Excel. Each respondent's answer was given in numerical form, metric data, thus preventing the need for data coding. Since *Nettskjema* didn't ensure that each respondent's allocation summed up to 100 points across four statements, this had to be verified in Excel post-collection. Upon data analysis, it was evident that several respondents did not distribute their points accurately, leading to forced responses and errors. Out of 72 responses, 7 seemed to have misinterpreted the survey, allocating far more than the intended 100 points across the four statements. Consequently, these entries were excluded, resulting in a final respondent count of 65. Aside from these removed entries, 21 responses did not add up to a 100. Each respondent was required to respond to twelve statements - six regarding the current situation and six regarding the desired situation. This equates to 12 sums per individual, totaling 780 unique sums for 65 responses. With 21 incorrect sums, the error rate was approximately 2.7%. Adjustments were made to these sums to ensure a total of 100 points, by proportionately adding or subtracting

from each of the four statements. Such error adjustments were important to maintain a decent response rate for the 1. Frigate Squadron. Additionally, a more proportional distribution of points could have been considered. However, this idea emerged after the finalization of the results and the discussion chapter, leaving little opportunity for adjustments at that stage. Overall, this might have influenced the results, but probably to a minimal extent since the error was small. An example of how the points was distributed is shown in *Table 1*.

Table 1 - Example of error adjustments in the survey

Not adjusted				
Desired				
a)2	b)2	c)2	d)2	Sum Ø1
10	30	40	10	90,00
Adjusted				
Desired				
a)2	b)2	c)2	d)2	Sum Ø1
12,5	32,5	42,5	12,5	100,00

Following the error adjustments, the responses were organized by crew, and subsequently by dimension within each cultural category in the overall squadron. Given that the total for each question is 100, both the absolute and percentage distributions for each question are equivalent, which further simplified the data analysis. Once all responses were organized, a graphical representation was constructed to illustrate the current and desired cultural profiles.

3.5.2 Secondary Data

This study has chosen to extract secondary data from the master's thesis, in English, "Does the Navy's Culture Facilitate Learning?" (Aarsrud & Gulland, 2022), and "The Navy - A Learning Organization" (Nilsen & Røsland, 2021). The secondary data consists of quantitative data collected through surveys presented via the online form, Nettskjema. Aarsrud and Gulland used the OCAI survey like in this study, and the inspiration and methodology for this paper were originated from their thesis. They investigated the culture in the Naval Special Operations Command, Coastal Ranger Command, and the 1. Corvette Squadron (Aarsrud & Gulland, 2022). Since the results on the 1. Corvette Squadron was to be compared to the 1. Frigate Squadron, only this squadron is presented in the secondary data, shown in Appendix A – The Culture in the 1. Corvette Squadron. The researchers Nilsen and Røsland chose a Likert scale to provide answer options in the survey. The data was analyzed

using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences tool (SPSS), where the responses were coded to values ranging from 1 to 7 and 1 to 5, then multiplied by 100 and divided by 7 or 5, depending on the number of response options. This was done with the intention of comparing the collected data against a benchmark. The benchmark they used was developed in, the Learning Organizations Survey, LOS, by David A. Garvin, Amy Edmondson and Francesca Gino, which is based on collected empirical data from various organizations, private and public (Garvin et al., 2008). The researchers chose to present the data for each of the three building blocks by first examining them in isolation. This made it easier to analyze each sub-component and highlight differences between the departments or units (Nilsen & Røsland, 2021). This thesis only needed to extract information and results on the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron. Therefore, only these departments are presented in this thesis, and is shown in Appendix B – Organizational Learning in the Royal Norwegian Navy.

Overall, this master's thesis uses primary data on the culture profile in the 1. Frigate Squadron and compare it with secondary data on the culture profile in the 1. Corvette squadron, to further compare to secondary data on the organizational learning in both squadrons. Resultingly, being able to say how culture may influence organizational learning in the 1. Frigate Squadron.

3.6 Ethical Considerations

3.6.1 Anonymity

The focus on anonymity in the Armed Forces is considered significant so it was important that the respondents should experience the survey as anonymous. The anonymous survey made in Nettskjema was therefore sent for approval by NSD, the Chief of the Navy, the Commander of the 1. Frigate Squadron and the Norwegian Defense University College, which approved the study in the Royal Norwegian Navy.

3.7 Limitations to the thesis

3.7.1 Limitations to the design and method

The selection of the research design was essential for comparing data and introducing a more comprehensive perspective into previous research. However, it is important to note that within this design, there may be underlying factors that remain unexplored and unmentioned in the context of a cross-sectional study. The quantitative data collected is based on standardized choices. Respondents are somewhat constrained in their responses, primarily because of the predefined response options in the survey, with limited room for adding alternative perspectives. As articulated by Jacobsen, our ability to influence outcomes is limited to the factors we have knowledge of, as opposed to those that outside our knowledge (Garvin et al., 2008). Nevertheless, to accommodate unforeseen insights, the survey concludes with an open-ended question inviting participants to provide additional comments freely. A comprehensive mixed-methods study was initially considered to further reduce this limitation; however, due to time constraints, this option had to be excluded. A mixed-methods approach, potentially incorporating in-depth interviews, had the potential to significantly enhance the depth of the research. This aspect could have been beneficial to address in the discussion section, as it could have provided stronger support for the findings in the survey. The absence of individual interviews may potentially impose limits on the extent to which conclusions might be drawn in the research, thereby impacting the overall validity of the arguments presented.

3.7.2 Limitations to the population and sample

Table 2 - Overview of size of crew and number of respondents, provides an overview of each crew and the number of respondents, indicating the ratio of respondents to the crew size. Notably, the response rate for Crew 4 and Crew 5 is significantly lower, posing a limitation to the research. Although the overall response rate surpasses 10%—deeming it sufficient for analysis—the notably low response rates of 3.8% for Crew 4 and 6.6% for Crew 5 restrict the study's robustness for these crews. Hence, considerations must be made regarding the validity of these responses and whether they can be said to represent the entire crew.

Table 2 - Overview of size of crew and number of respondents

Crew	Size of crew	Number of respondents	Percentage
Crew 1	130	22	16,9
Crew 2	130	18	13,8
Crew 3	130	16	12,3
Crew 4	130	5	3,8
Crew 5	60	4	6,7

3.7.3 Limitations to the reliability

The study's reliability might be influenced by the author's association with the squadron, given that a previous position was held on one of the crews of the 1st Frigate squadron. The author's perceptions of the culture could potentially influence the discussion, though efforts have been made to mitigate biases. Employing a standardized survey might have yielded a more objective perspective. Resultingly, this proximity has its set of advantages and disadvantages that must be consider when evaluating the findings of this study. Nevertheless, the research's reliability is deemed satisfactory in addressing the various research questions.

3.8 Validity and reliability of the survey

The analysis of the data and conclusions presented in Chapters 5 and 6 necessitate careful evaluation of the validity of the collected data. Reliable research offers trustworthy results, and the study's foundation rests on its validity. Validity bifurcates into internal and external classifications. Internal validity addresses whether a quantitative survey indeed measures its intended variables—termed conceptual validity—and whether established correlations signify causal relationships, known as causal validity. External validity delineates the extent to which findings from a chosen sample can be generalized (Jacobsen, 2015).

3.8.1 Validity

The survey utilized in this research stands as a standardized instrument for measuring culture. It is widely recognized as a tool in the field of cultural assessment. Cameron and Quinn have compiled a comprehensive database from various studies, producing substantial evidence concerning both the reliability and validity of the OCAI. There have been no known instances of opposing or disproving evidence (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). Originally tailored for the

private sector, some of the survey's questions may appear less relevant for a military organization like the Royal Norwegian Navy. Nevertheless, only two statements seem slightly incongruous. Hence, no modifications were done to the survey. Its validity was further bolstered through a face-validity technique, where six external individuals answered the survey and offered feedback. A key suggestion centered on adopting a Likert scale over an Ipsative scale. However, the imperative of aligning the responses from the 1. Frigate and 1. Corvette Squadron rendered this suggestion unimplemented.

The five different crews within the 1. Frigate Squadron led to the incorporation of the survey pinpointing the respondent's specific crew. Yet, it's possible that some respondents might have reflected more on the holistic culture of the entire frigate squadron rather than their crew. Such a discrepancy could somewhat affect the study's internal validity. Nevertheless, the primary objective remains the measurement of culture, and the conceptual validity is deemed satisfactory for this study.

Lastly, the external validity connected to this study describes whether the obtained results hold relevance not only for the specific department under examination but also to what extent these findings can be generalized to the entire Navy. While the primary motivation of this research isn't to achieve comprehensive generalization across the entire Navy, the results can indeed complement the findings of Aarsrud and Gulland, who aimed for such extensive generalization.

3.8.2 Reliability

The reliability of the OCAI survey is described as strong by Cameron & Quinn. It also surpasses several of the most frequently used tools in social and organizational sciences (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). Nonetheless, this endorsement does not automatically guarantee the reliability of this specific survey. It is imperative to determine whether the methodology adopted in the survey's execution might have influenced the outcomes (Jacobsen, 2015). Several factors may impact reliability, for example including the truthfulness of respondents' assertions, if the right people were asked to take the survey, any unintentional bias in the survey questions, and whether the researcher was imprecise. Since the survey asked people to

think about both their current and desired culture, it's unlikely they had reasons to give false answers. There isn't a right or wrong culture, so this reduces the chance of them being influenced to answer a certain way. Additionally, several officers from different crews have encouraged participation in the survey, promoting the idea that the crew could potentially learn and evolve from the insights gathered. Since many often hold respect for the officers in the crew, this could have helped to enhance the reliability of the survey.

Furthermore, it can be pointed out that some of the claims in the survey were very much aimed at civil organizations, not the defense sector. Dimension 6, "Criteria of Success" showed some unexpected findings that will be explored further. These irregularities suggest that the reliability of the findings in this dimension might not be ideal.

Forced responses can introduce a source of reduced reliability, as units are compelled to answer all questions, forming opinions on both the current and desired culture across a total of 6 dimensions two times. Answers provided hastily "just to finish" represent a potential inaccuracy in this study. This was evident from responses that had to be discarded, as it became clear that some participants either did not read or comprehend the guidelines for point allocation, hence providing random answers, with distribution of points way beyond 100. Since the instructions could seem complicated, it's likely that those who read them carefully understood them well. They probably also gave honest answers, as there doesn't seem to be any benefit to giving false information.

Checking the distribution of who answered the survey is possible to some extent, since the question of how long the respondent had worked in the military, and education level was included. It showed a mix of respondents. However, it's hard to say whether this distribution is proportional to the distribution in the 1. Frigate Squadron overall since there's no way of finding the distribution of the overall "education level" and the "years of working in the military" in total. In Table 3 - Distribution of education level for respondents and Table 4 - Distribution of years of work in the military of the respondents, the distribution of education level and years of working in the military of the respondents is shown. Table 3 - Distribution of education level for respondents show an uneven distribution of education level. However, it's probably a balanced distribution as most of the people on board are either conscripts, and

come straight from Secondary school, or have just finished a bachelor's thesis from the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy. It is not possible to assess this further. Table 4 - Distribution of years of work in the military of the respondents shows a somewhat even distribution of how long the respondents have worked in the defense force. In general, it's inferred that the gathered responses reflect the current and desired culture fairly accurate.

Table 3 - Distribution of education level for respondents

Eduaction level	Number aswered	Percentage
Primary School	2	3,1
Secondary School	30	46,2
College Graduate	2	3,1
Bachelor's Degree	31	47,7
Master's Degree	0	0,0
PHD	0	0,0

Table 4 - Distribution of years of work in the military of the respondents

Years of working in the military	Number aswered	Percentage
0-1 year	12	18,5
2-5 years	25	38,5
6-10 years	17	26,2
More than 10 years	8	12,3

Furthermore, it is relevant to mention that the data from Aarsrud and Gulland is approximately one year old, and the data from Røsland and Nilsen is about two and a half years old. Consequently, there's a possibility that there are different respondents or new relations in these studies that will be compared. Nevertheless, it is emphasized that organizational culture is constantly evolving. A major shift takes time and is unlikely to have occurred within this timeframe. Yet, even if deliberate efforts are made towards cultural change, it's emphasized that alterations take time. Some shifts might be evident, but the primary characteristics of the culture at the time of the surveys are presumed to be comparable.

The potential for inaccuracies, whether during the survey's creation, distribution, data collection, processing, interpretation, or analysis, cannot be entirely discounted. Despite these

considerations, the reliability of this survey is assessed to be sufficiently to inform conclusions and address the research objectives.

4 Results

In this chapter, a detailed exposition of primary data is presented. Initially, the focus will be on the different crews. To preserve anonymity the different crews will be named a number from 1 to 5. A graph of their culture profile will be presented. The blue color in all the graphs represents the current culture situation and the orange color in all the graphs represent the desired culture situation. Secondly, the overall culture profile of the 1. Frigate Squadron will be presented. Lastly, an in-depth and structured description of the Frigate Squadron's cultural profile is provided, mirroring the format used to describe each of the six learning dimensions, facilitating comparative analysis with the 1. Corvette Squadron.

The thesis includes secondary data that profiles the 1. Corvette Squadron's culture. This analysis uses a similar detailed approach, following the structural framework applied to the six learning dimensions by Aarsrud and Gulland. While this chapter doesn't showcase the 1. Corvette Squadron's secondary data, this can be found in Appendix A – The Culture in the 1. Corvette Squadron. Additionally, the data that cover organizational learning within the 1. Frigate Squadron, the 1. Corvette Squadron, and the Royal Norwegian Navy by Nilsen and Røsland, can be found in Appendix B – Organizational Learning in the Royal Norwegian Navy.

4.1 Culture profile of the crews in 1. Frigate Squadron

4.1.1 Culture profile of Crew 1 in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 7 - Culture profile of Crew 1 in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Figure 7 - Culture profile of Crew 1 in the 1. Frigate Squadron showcase the cultural tendencies within Crew 1 of the 1st Frigate Squadron. Predominantly, the market culture emerges as the foremost cultural type at 28.2, marginally surpassing the hierarchy culture, which stands at 28.1. The clan culture, too, holds a notable presence, registering at 27.7.

A detailed examination of the figure reveals a considerable disparity between the current and desired states, particularly for the clan culture; there's an expressed preference for a 5-point increase. Meanwhile, the market culture displays a sizable divergence of 4.6 points between the current and aspirational states, with a tilt towards a reduction. Changes in the adhocracy and hierarchy cultures, in comparison, are more restrained in the desired shifts.

4.1.2 Cultural profile of Crew 2 in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 8 - Culture profile of Crew 2 in the Frigate Squadron

Figure 8 - Culture profile of Crew 2 in the Frigate Squadron depicts the cultural landscape of Crew 2 within the 1st Frigate Squadron. Within Crew 2, the clan culture, registering at 27.3, emerges as the most prevalent. Following closely is the market culture at 25.7, which slightly surpasses both the hierarchy (24.0) and adhocracy cultures (23.0). An examination of **Feil! Fant ikke referansebildet.** reveals a noticeable shift in preference, with the orange 'desired' square leaning further left compared to the blue 'current' square. Most prominently, there's a marked inclination to reduce the market culture's influence, with a desired decrease spanning 4.1 points, from 25.7 to 21.6.

4.1.3 Cultural profile of Crew 3 in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 9 - Culture profile of Crew 3 in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Figure 9 - Culture profile of Crew 3 in the 1. Frigate Squadron showcases the cultural tendencies within Crew 3 of the 1st Frigate Squadron. Predominantly, the clan culture emerges as the leading trait with a score of 28.2, and interestingly, there's no inclination to alter this, as evidenced by identical current and desired scores. On the other end, the adhocracy culture, with its 20.6 score, shows a preference for a slight decrease to 19.0. While there's a notable trend to reduce the market culture from 23.2 to 21.6, the most significant desired shift is observed in the hierarchy culture, aiming to increase from 27.9 to 31.1. A discernible trend in **Feil! Fant ikke referansebildet.** is the leftward inclination of the desired orange square in comparison to the current blue square.

4.1.4 Cultural profile of Crew 4 in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 10 - Culture profile of Crew 4 in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Figure 10 - Culture profile of Crew 4 in the 1. Frigate Squadron shows the cultural tendencies within Crew 4 in the 1. Frigate Squadron. The most dominant culture is the market culture (30,3), and the crew shows a small desire to decrease it. Next is the hierarchy culture (24,3), then the clan culture (23,3), and lastly the adhocracy culture (22,0). The desired square is more to the left on the graph than the current square, and the biggest desire for a change is the hierarchy culture. This culture is desired to change from 24,3 to 27,1, making the difference of 2,8 in scoring between current and desired.

4.1.5 Cultural profile of Crew 5 in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 11 - Culture profile of Crew 5 in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Figure 11 - Culture profile of Crew 5 in the 1. Frigate Squadron depicts the cultural tendencies of Crew 5 in the 1st Frigate Squadron. The prevailing culture within this crew is the adhocracy culture, registering at 28.3, with a slight inclination towards a decrease. Following closely is the market culture at 25.4, then the clan culture at 23.3, and lastly, the hierarchy culture at 22.9. The desired cultural profile slightly leans towards the left on the graph when compared to the current profile. However, it's noteworthy that the market culture is more towards the right. The most significant desired shift is seen in the adhocracy culture. Still, the current and desired profiles are closely aligned on the graph.

4.2 Overall Culture Profile in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Figure 12 - Overall culture profile of the 1. Frigate Squadron presents the comprehensive cultural profile, aggregating all the dimensions to provide a general overview of the culture within the 1st Frigate Squadron.




Figure 12 - Overall culture profile of the 1. Frigate Squadron

Figure 12 shows that the most dominant culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron is currently clan culture, with the score 27,1, and a desire to increase it by 2,7 to 29,8. Following the clan culture is the market culture, scoring 25,4, with the largest desire to decrease it by 3,1 to 22,3. The hierarchy culture and the adhocracy culture are desired to change less. The current hierarchy culture is set to 25,7, with a desire to increase is by 1,4 to 27,1. The least prominent culture is the adhocracy culture at 21,8, with a desire to increase it by 1,0 to 20,8.

4.3 The six different dimensions in the 1. Frigate Squadron

In this part of the results the six dimensions in the framework on the overall 1. Frigate Squadron will be elaborated. To specify, there is six questions in the survey about the current culture situation, and the same six questions about the desired culture situation. The six dimensions are representing one of the six questions each. Analyzing the various dimensions is crucial, as this information will be comparable to the secondary data, organizational learning. These individual dimensions also offer a much more precise indicator of the desired changes. A general overview alone cannot highlight the specific elements that are sought to be discussed, only the overarching culture.

4.3.1 Dimension 1: Dominant Characteristics in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 13 - Dominant Characteristics in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Dominant characteristics, includes typical features of the department or how it is referred to externally (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). In this dimension, a notable discrepancy between the current and desired organizational characteristics is evident.

The clan culture is the highest scored culture, 28,7. The hierarchy culture trails closely with a score of 28,2. While the current and desired situation for clan culture remains relatively the same, there's a pronounced shift in the desired level for the hierarchy culture in total of 9,4, from 28,2 to 18,8. There's also a markable desire to increase the adhocracy culture from 20,0 to 26,8. Furthermore, there's a desire to increase the market culture, resulting in the orange desired square being distinctly more to the right than the blue current square.

4.3.2 Dimension 2: Organizational Leadership in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 14 - Organizational Leadership in the 1. Frigate Squadron

In the dimension of Organizational Leadership, the survey evaluates respondents' perceptions of the prevailing management style within the entity (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). Currently, the market culture emerges as the predominant trait, evidenced by a score of 30.2. However, there's an expressed preference to moderate this to 24.5. On the opposite spectrum, the adhocracy culture, currently at 15.4, is indicated to have the most significant intended increase, targeting a score of 24.0. The clan culture presents a near-stable preference, indicating only a minor inclination to ascend from 25.9 to 26.3. In contrast, there's a discernible trend favoring a decline in the hierarchy culture from 28.5 to 25.2. Visually, the desired position, represented by the orange square, is positioned higher in the graph compared to the current state, denoted by the blue square. Remarkably, the orange square showcases nearly consistent scores across all cultures, yielding an almost perfect rectangular shape.

4.3.3 Dimension 3: Management of Employees in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 15 - Management of Employees in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Figure 15 - Management of Employees in the 1. Frigate Squadron highlights the unit's perception of management's orientation towards its personnel. Notably, the desired state represented by the orange square exhibits only slight deviations from the current state shown by the blue square. The most pronounced preference is an elevation of the clan culture by 3.1 points, moving from 25.5 to 28.6. Conversely, there's an inclination to reduce the hierarchy culture by 2.8 points, shifting from 28.2 to 25.4. Minor adjustments are sought in the adhocracy culture with an increase and in the market culture with a decrease, causing the orange desired square to be positioned slightly higher than the blue current square in the chart.

4.3.4 Dimension 4: Organizational Glue in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 16 - Organizational Glue in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Figure 16 - Organizational Glue in the 1. Frigate Squadron, underscores the emphasis on achievement and goal realization. The clan culture emerges prominently with a score of 28.5, followed by the market culture at 25.8, the hierarchy culture at 25.6 and the adhocracy culture

at 20,1. There is minimal inclination to modify the existing scores of the clan and market cultures. However, a significant decrease of 6.1 points is desired for the hierarchy culture, bringing it down from 25.6 to 19.5. Conversely, there's an aspiration to elevate the adhocracy culture by 5.1 points, rising from 20.1 to 25.2. As a result, the position of the desired orange square is higher on the graph compared to the current blue square.

4.3.5 Dimension 5: Strategic Emphases in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 17 - Strategic Emphases in the 1. Frigate Squadron

In essence, the strategic emphases of an organization are the primary areas or behaviors it focuses on to achieve its goals. Within the 1st Frigate Squadron, the hierarchy culture stands out in this dimension, registering a current score of 29.0. However, there's an aspiration to reduce it by 5.4 points, bringing it to 23.6. The clan culture also asserts its significance with a score of 27.9, with an inclination to elevate it by 2.3 to 30.2. It's also desired to enhance the adhocracy culture, raising it from 20.2 by 5.2 points to 25.4. In contrast, the market culture,

presently scored at 23.0, exhibits a preference to be decreased to 20.8. Consequently, on the visual representation, the desired orange square occupies a higher position on the graph than the current blue square.

4.3.6 Dimension 6: Criteria of Success in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 18 - Criteria of Success in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Lastly, the criteria of success. This dimension represents the cultures that defines success in the organization, meaning which criteria are used to determine how successful the organization is. The graphic representation in Figure 18 - Criteria of Success in the 1. Frigate Squadron shows that the most dominant current culture is hierarchy at 38,4, and this culture is also the one most desired to decrease, by 11,7. This is the highest varied number between desired and current all over. Furthermore, it's a desire to increase the market culture with 6,5, from 16,0 to 22,5, and to increase the adhocracy culture with 3,7, from 15,0 to 18,7. Lastly

the clan culture is desired to increase some, by 1,6, from 30,6 to 32,2. The orange desired square is in total more to the left on the graph than the blue current square.

5 Discussion

The aim of this study is to assess how the organizational culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron might influence the squadron as a learning organization. To effectively address this, the first section in this chapter will discuss the results of the culture within the 1. Frigate Squadron and elaborate on what characterizes organizational culture in the squadron by linking theory to the presented results. Secondly, this chapter will discuss and link the results with the secondary data of the 1. Corvette Squadron by Aarsrud and Gulland (2022) presented in Appendix A – The Culture in the 1. Corvette Squadron. Thirdly, these two culture profiles will be linked to the secondary data that reflect the broader spectrum of organizational learning within the 1. Frigate Squadron, the 1. Corvette Squadron and the Royal Norwegian Navy by Nilsen and Røsland (2021) presented in Appendix B – Organizational Learning in the Royal Norwegian Navy. This comparison will enable the possibility to see how the culture may relate to the organizational learning within the 1. Frigate Squadron. This is articulated through two distinct models. The first model presents a consolidated overview of all three building blocks that forms organizational learning, wherein the Navy's average is juxtaposed against the developed benchmark. The second model emerges from an in-depth dialogue with the researchers, extracting and highlighting specific data relevant to the two squadrons selected for this study. Resultingly, the research question, “How may organizational culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron influence the organizational learning?”, will be answered.

5.1 What characterizes organizational culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron?

This section will answer the subsidiary research objective: “What characterizes organizational culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron?”. The culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron will be presented mostly the same way in the discussion as in the results. Firstly, the different crews will be discussed. Then the different cultures in the six dimension and the overall culture profile will be discussed together.

5.1.1 The culture in the different crews of the 1. Frigate Squadron

All the crews will be discussed. However, due to the low response rate for Crew 4 and Crew 5 conclusions will not be drawn for these crews and poses a constrain to the outcome of the study.

5.1.1.1 The culture in Crew 1 in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 19 - Small illustration of culture profile in Crew 1 in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Figure 19 illustrates that within Crew 1 of the 1st Frigate Squadron, there's currently a prevailing inclination towards hierarchy and market culture. This suggests that the crew's culture is primarily anchored in the lower section of the graph, emphasizing stability and control. The market culture distinguishes by its outward orientation, competitiveness, and swift decision-making ethos. Hierarchy culture embodies a controlled environment and emphasizes order and stability (Cameron & Quinn,

2013). Nonetheless, there appears to be an aspiration among the crew for a shift towards greater flexibility and discretion as the orange desired square is higher on the graph. Especially the clan culture is desired to increase. The Clan Culture is characterized by a familial atmosphere, underlined by internal focus, flexibility, mutual respect, and a sensitivity to members' needs and aspirations. There's a noticeable the biggest inclination towards further strengthening this cultural aspect, as seen from the difference between the current and desired score (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

When comparing the current cultural tendencies against the desired ones for Crew 1, it becomes evident that there's an aspiration to bolster internal cohesion, solidarity, and order. The crew seems to lean towards strengthening its clan culture while slightly tapering down the influences of market, adhocracy, and hierarchy cultures. This suggests an intent to cultivate a more harmonious and integrated internal environment, with reduced emphasis on external competitive dynamics and rapid adaptability, as well as a wish for more flexibility and discretion, in contrast to stability and control (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 2015).

5.1.1.2 The culture in Crew 2 in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 20 - Small illustration of the culture profile in Crew 2 in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Figure 20 indicates that Crew 2 in the 1. Frigate Squadron highly values internal relationships and collaboration, as the clan culture is the most dominant culture. The crew wants to strengthen this bond even more, suggesting a desire to create an environment where members view themselves as part of a big family, sharing a sense of loyalty and tradition (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). Furthermore, Crew 2 seems to be inclined towards reducing the

emphasis on competitiveness and external achievements. This shift might suggest a move away from a results-driven approach to one that prioritizes internal cohesion and structured processes. Another consideration is that the clan and market cultures represent contrasting cultural profiles, which can potentially conflict with each other. A culture centered on loyalty and close relationships may inevitably clash with a culture that prioritizes results at any cost (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Wig, 2014). This applies to both crew 1 and crew 2.

While Crew 2 seems to appreciate the importance of flexibility and innovation, they might be aiming for a more stable and predictable environment, hence the subtle desire to slightly decrease the influence of the adhocracy culture. Lastly, like the overall culture for the 1. Frigate Squadron, the data suggests that Crew 2 is looking to instill more order, control, and formalized procedures within their operations. The increase in desired score for hierarchy culture may point to a need for clearer roles, responsibilities, and more predictable outcomes (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

Overall, Crew 2 of the 1. Frigate Squadron appears to be prioritizing internal collaboration and structured processes. The data reveals a conscious move towards creating a more stable and predictable environment. While they still value adaptability and competitiveness, there's a

noticeable trend towards enhancing internal harmony and ensuring a more organized workflow. This can potentially lead to improved alignment among crew members and may serve as a bedrock for sustained operational efficiency (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). On the other hand, this can also be negative, and it will be discussed further in the overall culture profile for the 1. Frigate Squadron.

5.1.1.3 The culture in Crew 3 in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 21 - Small illustration of the culture profile of Crew 3 in the 1. Frigate Squadron

As for Crew 3 in the 1. Frigate Squadron, Figure 21 implies that the crew highly values internal relationships and collaboration, as the clan culture is the most dominant culture for this crew as well. Furthermore, it looks like the crew is content with the internal relationships, and with their current cultural dynamics in this aspect. As there isn't a desire to alter this, it might indicate that they might already have established

a cohesive and supportive environment they're comfortable with (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). Adhocracy culture is the least prominent culture in this crew. Adhocracy culture emphasizes innovation, risk-taking, and adaptability. Crew 3 also desires to scale it down further, as most of the crews wishes. This decrease in the desired score suggests they may want to pivot slightly away from risk-taking and focus more on predictability and stability (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 2015). Additionally, Crew 3 desires to decrease market culture, meaning a desire for less emphasis on competition and external results. The crew might be leaning towards fostering a more internally environment rather than focusing heavily on external competition and achievements. However, out of all the crews the market culture is the lowest in this crew. Furthermore, the hierarchy culture in Crew 3 indicates a desire towards further streamlining their processes and enhancing the formalized structure which is the same for most of the crews. The desire for a stronger hierarchy culture points to a potential need for clearer roles, more control, and predicable outcomes (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

Overall, there's a clear trajectory towards establishing a more organized and predictable environment in Crew 3 in the 1. Frigate Squadron. The data suggests they are content with their current clan culture, indicating they have established a supportive and trusting environment. There's a subtle shift from risk-taking and external competitiveness towards reinforcing internal structure and processes. This suggests that Crew 3 values stability and is making conscious efforts to ensure streamlined operations onboard the ship (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

5.1.1.4 The culture in Crew 4 in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 22 - Small illustration of the culture profile of Crew 4 in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Figure 22 illustrates the cultural tendencies of Crew 4 in the 1. Frigate Squadron. Given that only 3.8% of the crew responded to the survey, it's important to approach the results with caution, as they may not fully represent the entire crew. It will be difficult to draw conclusions in this crew.

The most dominant culture, the market culture, suggests that the crew is competitive. However, this crew also seems to want to shift their external focus and differentiation towards internal focus and integration, even though the adhocracy culture is the least prominent. The desire for change in the market culture suggests that the crew may place excessive emphasis on performance and outcomes, to which the employees may not be receptive. Furthermore, there's a desire to increase the hierarchy culture, which indicated that the crew wants more structure, clearer rules, and more stability (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

5.1.1.5 The culture profile in Crew 5 in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 23 - Small illustration of the culture profile of Crew 5 in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Figure 23 represents the cultural tendencies of Crew 5 in the 1. Frigate Squadron. While a mere 6.7% of the crew participated in the survey, it's essential to interpret the results judiciously for this crew as well, as they might not offer a comprehensive representation of the entire crew. Drawing definitive conclusions for this crew poses challenges.

The dominant culture within this crew is the adhocracy culture, distinctively different from the other crews where it is the least prevailing. This crew appears to be the sole unit that mostly encourages risk-taking and nurtures creativity at work. Furthermore, this crew seems to be the only crew that leans towards both being, and wanting to have an external focus and differentiation, as both the desired and the current square is further to the right on the graph. In a military setting, it's understandable to prioritize cultivating a competitive advantage, especially as there's only one winner in war. This context also underscores the value of encouraging calculated risk-taking (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). Although there's a slight tendency to reduce the adhocracy culture in Crew 5 in favor of other cultures, the crew appears generally content with the prevailing cultural landscape, as the near alignment of current and desired profiles on the graph indicates.

5.1.2 The dimensions and the overall culture profile in the 1. Frigate Squadron

In this section the results of the culture within the 1. Frigate Squadron overall will be discussed by elaborating and discussing the six dimensions. Congruence on the six culture aspects means that Dominant Characteristics, Organizational Leadership, Management of Employees, Organizational Glue, Strategic Emphases and Criteria of Success are based on the same value sets and are alike. Studies on successful organizations show that they often possess a congruent culture, leading to fewer conflicts and contradictions (Cameron & Quinn,

2013; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991; Smollan & Sayers, 2009). When a culture is incongruent, it typically underscores the need for change. Such misalignment can result in varying values, perspectives, goals, and strategies, necessitating time and effort to address and comprehend. Resultingly it's relevant to discuss how the different dimensions in the 1. Frigate Squadron might be congruent or not.




Figure 24 - Small illustration of dimension 1 in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 25 - Small illustration of dimension 2 in the 1. Frigate Squadron

In the dimension, Dominant Characteristics, a notable discrepancy between the current and desired organizational characteristics is evident. The hierarchy culture is desired to decrease with 9,4 points. This is an invitation that might suggest action, as the difference between current and desired is almost 10 points. Cameron and Quinn believe that this alone results in a concrete need for a culture change (2013). On the one hand, no action is immediately required since the difference doesn't exceed 10. On the other hand, in all the six dimensions the 1. Frigate Squadron experiences a stronger hierarchy culture than desired, proving a consensus towards reducing this culture overall. Furthermore, there are only three cases where the differences between the current and desired scores are about 10 points. However, it is also important to analyze the smaller shifts, those less than 10 points, between the current and desired culture. This helps in understanding the overall culture profile more comprehensively (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991).

In the dimension of Organizational Leadership, which evaluates the respondents' perception of typical management styles within the organization, the findings are intriguing. There appears to be a desire for a more balanced distribution among the various cultures. The current market culture is particularly dominant, suggesting that the squadron views leadership as primarily result-oriented, striving to outperform competitors. Over time, such an unrelenting emphasis on results could become exhausting, possibly explaining the crew's desire to decrease it (Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 2015; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991). As Cameron and Quinn have highlighted, a disparity across diagonals can introduce more inconsistency than a disparity between adjacent cultures (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). In a broader context, looking at all the dimensions, the clan culture emerges as the prevailing culture. There's a noticeable tension between the clan and market cultures, and they could be seen as competing forces. A culture grounded in loyalty and close ties can be undermined by a management style that's single-mindedly fixated on results (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991). One possible explanation for this tension might be the result of the managers having been in their positions for a long time. Over time, this can lead to the "old way" of conducting management lingering to this day. Such a scenario could foster dissatisfaction within the squadron. Lastly, it appears that the 1. Frigate Squadron wishes for the organization's management to foster an environment where taking risks, showing initiative, and enjoying individual freedom are encouraged (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). The conventional wisdom asserts that a culture that is congruent, and supports the structure and strategies of the organization is more efficient than an incongruent, or disconnected culture (Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991; Schein, 1984, 2004). Resultingly, incongruent in dimension 2, may indicate that the crew feels their concerns are not being acknowledged by management. If this issue becomes too significant, it could lead to negative dynamics on board. What this means for the learning environment will be elaborated in the next section.

1. Frigate Squadron - 4. Organizational Glue




Figure 26 - Small illustration of dimension 4 in the 1. Frigate Squadron

1. Frigate Squadron - 5. Strategic Emphases




Figure 27 - Small illustration of dimension 5 in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Moreover, it is worth noting the low score for the adhocracy culture in all the dimensions. There's a common trend, especially in dimensions 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 that there's a desire to increase this culture. Given such a restrained cultural profile, it indicates that the squadron may fall short in demonstrating flexibility and promoting individuality. Ideally, fostering an open and dynamic environment could pave the way for a creative workspace where employees feel empowered to take calculated risks (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). Consequently, as the organization's leadership being results-driven, the prevailing culture in several domains may not foster creativity or innovation within the squadron (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Schein, 1984, 2004). Additionally, there seems to be a potential undervaluing of change and openness. Although the 1. Frigate Squadron is a relatively large unit in the Royal Norwegian Navy, it is known that it has a flat structure like the 1. Corvette Squadron. Thus, authoritarian leaders will be able to largely influence. This can further be argued for both through the low score for adhocracy at the current time, but also because of the markable desire for an increase.

1. Frigate Squadron - 3. Management of Employees




Figure 28 - Small illustration of dimension 3 in the 1. Frigate Squadron

1. Frigate Squadron - 6. Criteria of Success




Figure 29 - Small illustration of dimension 6 in the 1. Frigate Squadron

The current and desired adhocracy culture is congruent in the Management of Employees relative to the other dimensions. This suggests that the organization prioritizes its staff, providing a dynamic environment. This may manifest through attractive benefits and terms, such as offering commuting facilities for personnel residing in different cities, which is known that many employees benefit from. Overall, the management of employees seems flexible. In other words, the management appears to engage with the staff in a unified manner. This suggests that the management is approaching interactions and communications with their employees in a cohesive and consistent way, indicating a sense of unity and agreement (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 2015; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991; Schein, 2004).

Moreover, the hierarchy culture is desired to be reduced in all dimensions. This suggests that the organization operates with a large degree of formal guidelines and rules that possibly set limitations for innovation and development (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). Especially in dimension 6, the large divergence between current and desired culture is at 10,8. Additionally, the graphic representation in Figure 29 - Small illustration of dimension 6 in the 1. Frigate Squadron, is very different from the other dimensions and the overall culture. According to the researchers, Cameron, and Quinn, this can stimulate an awareness of a need for change, because the employees highlight specific aspects of the organization that are uncomfortable or unclear (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991). However, as

mentioned in the methodology chapter regarding reliability and validity, the unexpected results in Dimension 6 could be irregularities. It suggests that the reliability and validity of findings in this dimension may not be optimal, given that the questions and statements associated with it were tailored for civilian organizations, not the armed forces. Consequently, this factor is considered in further discussions.

There appears to be a link between Dimension 6, Dimension 2, and Dimension 1 — Criteria of Success, Dominant Characteristics and Organizational Leadership respectively. The prevailing cultures seems to emphasize significant control in these dimensions, with leadership perhaps imposing high demands, to comply with formal framework. This correlation can be inferred from the hierarchy desired decrease in Criteria of Success, in both the hierarchy culture for Dominant Characteristics and the market culture for Organizational Management. Multiple indicators suggest that a potential leader's need for control could manifest as a dominant hierarchy culture in this context (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, 2013; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991). Conversely, it's possible that respondents may have misinterpreted some of the answer choices in the survey. Adjusting the phrasing of certain options to better align with the defense sector's context might have been a contributing factor. The hierarchy culture can be interpreted as being about solving a task in a safe and reliable way. In contrast, market culture aims to be the best in a market and therefore may not sound suitable. In the Navy context, an equivalent would be more aimed at solving missions, whatever the cost, and winning the war. Similarly, adhocracy culture in the answer for dimension 6 in the survey might be better described as achieving tasks creatively and uniquely, rather than being an industry innovator (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, 2013). Consequently, this suggests that dimension 6, Criteria of Success, might not be as representative as the other dimensions to describe the culture.




Figure 30 - Small illustration of the overall culture profile in the 1. Frigate Squadron

The currently most dominant culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron overall is the clan culture. This culture is characterized by focus on internal maintenance with flexibility, interest in people and sensitivity towards others. The second most dominant culture is hierarchy, which is considered a controlling culture. Furthermore, a department with a mercantile market culture, which the frigate squadron tends to have, may focus on external positioning with the main emphasis on competition and rapid decision-making

(Cameron & Quinn, 2013). Adhocracy culture seems to be the least prominent culture of the four. As Crew 1, 2, 3 and 4 all have the adhocracy culture as the least dominant one, this may indicate an agreed desire for more predictability among the various crews.

Concurrently, there is a notable drive to diminish the market culture, highlighting it as the primary target for change within the organization. This clearly underscores a strong wish to reduce this aspect of the culture. The desired shift in market culture may suggest that the department places an excessive emphasis on performance and outcomes, with which the employees are not content (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 2015). Moreover, the inclination to reduce the adhocracy culture could signify a desire for greater predictability among the various crews (Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

Overall, the culture profile reveals that the squadron seeks a decrease in market and adhocracy cultures, while favoring an increase in clan and hierarchy cultures. This suggests that the organization aims to redirect its focus inward towards internal cohesion and integration. Notably, both desired and current culture is more towards internal focus and integration than external focus and differentiation. This shift could significantly influence efficiency, centering on internal orientation, integration, and coherence (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983). The suitability and profitability of such a culture for warship crews merit a deeper discussion. Is it wise to desire an inward focus when potential threats are present

externally? Such an approach could potentially heighten the risk of overlooking external dangers. Consequently, this could cause the squadron to be reactive rather than proactive, diminish its adaptability, and subsequently impact the organization's capacity to learn (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983; Smollan & Sayers, 2009; Wig, 2014). This will be further elaborated upon.

5.2 How does organizational culture relate to organizational learning in the 1. Frigate Squadron compared to the 1. Corvette Squadron?

To be able to answer the research question: “How may organizational culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron in the Royal Norwegian Navy influence the organizational learning?”, the next subsidiary research objective will be answered: “How does organizational culture relate to organizational learning in the 1. Frigate Squadron compared to the 1. Corvette Squadron?”. The culture in the 1. Corvette Squadron is presented in Appendix A – The Culture in the 1. Corvette Squadron and the organizational learning in the two squadrons is presented in Appendix B – Organizational Learning in the Royal Norwegian Navy. Firstly, the overall culture in the two squadrons will be linked, and secondly, compared to the data on organizational learning. As discussed in the theoretical framework, parallels exist between certain sub-elements of the building blocks and the characteristics of adhocracy and clan cultures. It is intriguing to examine whether the profiling of the current organizational culture aligns with the assessment of organizational learning. This part of the discussion will focus on how adhocracy and clan cultures contribute to the foundational elements of learning organizations, drawing from the collected data, as these culture types seems to be the most relatable to learning organizations (Aarsrud & Gulland, 2022; Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 2015; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991; Schein, 1984). The selected cultural dimensions that were chosen to be compared to the building blocks is selected by the author based on what dimensions that would merit a discussion.

5.2.1 The 1. Frigate Squadron vs. the 1. Corvette Squadron




Figure 30 - Small illustration of the overall culture profile in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 37 - Small illustration of the overall culture profile in the 1. Corvette Squadron

Notable parallels emerge between the two squadrons, particularly in the predominance of clan culture within both. Each department also exhibits a distinct and similar market culture that they desire to diminish. The cultural similarities between the 1. Corvette Squadron and the 1. Frigate Squadron warrant discussion. A notable number of onboard personnel, particularly officers, noncommissioned officer, and those in managerial roles, share a common educational background, having attended the same military academy or military school (Forsvaret, 2023). This suggests that their foundational military cultural perspectives might be shaped in the same environment before branching out into their respective squadrons. Consequently, the distinctive cultural traits that each squadron has developed are particularly noteworthy given that many of their members originate from the same place.

The most distinguished difference in their overall cultural profiles is the 1. Corvette Squadron's greater tendency towards a desired adhocracy culture, a focus that is not as prominent in the 1. Frigate Squadron. Conversely, the 1. Frigate Squadron demonstrates a higher preference for hierarchy culture, current and desired, compared to the 1. Corvette Squadron. At first glance, the culture in the two squadrons looks similar; however, they show a different desire for differences. Furthermore, a more detailed comparison will be presented, and the various dimensions will be highlighted and compared with their organizational learning.

5.2.2 Supportive learning environment

This section is based on and connecting the following parts: The discussion in section 5.1.2, Appendix A – The Culture in the 1. Corvette Squadron, Appendix B – Organizational Learning in the Royal Norwegian Navy and theory from chapter 2. All the tables are developed by the author; however, they are based on their references.

Table 5 - Culture profile for the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron (Aarsrud & Gulland, 2022).

Culture	Current 1. Frigate Squadron	Current 1. Corvette Squadron	Difference	Desired 1. Frigate Squadron	Desired 1. Corvette Squadron	Difference
Clan	27,1	28,5	1,4	29,8	30,8	1
Adhocracy	21,8	21,3	0,5	20,8	24,8	4
Market	25,4	25,9	0,5	22,3	21,2	1,1
Hierarchy	25,7	24,2	1,5	27,1	22,4	4,7

Table 6 - Results from building block 1 in the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron (Nilsen & Røsland, 2021)

Building block 1, Supportive learning environment					
Squadron	Psychological security	Valuing differences	Open to new ideas	Time to reflect	Average
1. Frigate Squadron	70,1	61,2	67,0	53,8	63,0
1. Corvette Squadron	77,6	70,0	76,8	53,4	69,5
Difference	7,5	8,9	9,8	0,4	6,4

Table 5 shows the culture profile for the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron. The 1. Corvette squadron scores higher on the current clan culture with 1,4 more than the 1. Frigate Squadron. The 1. Frigate squadron scores somewhat higher than the 1. Corvette Squadron on the current adhocracy culture with 0,5. However, the 1. Corvette Squadron seems to have bigger desire for a more dominant clan and adhocracy culture than the 1. Frigate squadron with the difference of 1 point more for clan and 4 points more for adhocracy. In total the 1. Corvette Squadron seems to be more flexible. Furthermore, when combining the sub-components in building block 1, the average value for the 1. Corvette Squadron is 69,5 and the 1. Frigate Squadron 63,0, a difference of 6.4. Thus, the difference between the first building block and the adhocracy culture isn't the same for the two squadrons.

Looking at the adhocracy culture and the component, *time to reflect* in building block 1, the 1. Frigate Squadron scores higher than the 1. Corvette Squadron on both. As the hierarchy culture is symbolizing effectiveness, which might indicate less time for low-priority tasks that are not considered important, the adhocracy culture on the other diagonal might indicate *time to reflect* (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Garvin, 1993; Garvin et al., 2008; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991). Resultingly this link might coincide with that the 1. Frigate Squadron have a more overall dominant adhocracy culture and is considered better at *time to reflect* than the 1. Corvette Squadron. This will further be commented regarding building block 2 in the next section.

Controversy, the 1. Corvette Squadron scores 9,8 higher on *openness to new ideas* than the 1. Frigate squadron, which doesn't align with the adhocracy culture. The adhocracy culture symbolizing innovation and risk taking, might be linked to the component in the building block 1, *openness to new ideas*, as innovation requires openness (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991; Schein, 2004). On the one hand, since the 1. Frigate Squadron scores higher than the 1. Corvette Squadron this link may potentially be self-contradictory. On the other hand, this indication is inconsistent by the result in the current hierarchy culture as this is a diagonal culture to adhocracy, with great contradictions, and the 1. Frigate Squadron scores 1,5 point more than the 1. Corvette Squadron on hierarchy culture (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). Moreover, it is relevant to point out that although 1. Frigate Squadron scores higher than 1. Corvette Squadron at the present time, the 1. Corvette Squadron has a much higher desire to strengthen the adhocracy culture than 1. Frigate Squadron has. The 1. Frigate Squadron desires to decrease the adhocracy culture with 1 point, and the 1. Corvette Squadron desires to increase the adhocracy culture with 3,5 points. Resultingly, this may indicate that the 1. Corvette Squadron is more *open to new ideas*, as they desire to strive to be more innovative and willing to take risks than the 1. Frigate Squadron, and since the current situation for both is similar. As Cameron and Quinn said, the failure of reengineering occurs in most cases because the culture of the organization remains the same (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). This may be translated into that; the failure of learning occurs when there is no desire to change. Thus, this may indicate why the 1. Corvette Squadron is considered overall better at being a supportive learning environment than the 1. Frigate Squadron.

Furthermore, in Table 6 the 1. Corvette Squadron shows a more pronounced score for the aspects of *psychological security* and *valuing differences*, with a 7,5- and 8,9-point difference, respectively, over the 1. Frigate Squadron. *Psychological security* and *valuing differences* can be associated with the clan culture as it may involve establishing a sense of security and sharing with other people (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 2015; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991; Schein, 1984). In an organization that feels like an extended family you will most likely feel safe and valued, though you are different. Resultingly, a consistent pattern suggesting a link between clan culture and these two elements of a supportive learning environment is observed. This is particularly intriguing because the current difference in clan culture and these two building blocks are dominant in the 1. Corvette Squadron. This pattern suggests that there may be a correlation between clan culture and the building blocks of *psychological security* and *valuing differences*. Notably, the disparities between the squadrons are more significant in these areas than in the areas of time to reflect and openness to new ideas which further emphasizes this.




Figure 24 - Small illustration of dimension 1 in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 31 - Small illustration of dimension 1 in the 1. Corvette Squadron

When considering the first cultural dimension, that of Dominant Characteristics, typical features of the department or how it is referred to externally, a further correlation presents itself (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). The 1. Corvette Squadron demonstrates distinctly higher levels of adhocracy and clan cultures relative to the 1. Frigate Squadron. These results support the higher scores the 1. Corvette Squadron got for having a *supportive learning environment*.

One important detail to note is that this is just an example. The 1. Frigate Squadron scores higher than 1. Corvette Squadron on clan culture in dimensions 5 and 6, and higher on adhocracy culture in dimension 4. However, in all other cases, the 1. Corvette Squadron scores higher than 1. Frigate Squadron on clan and adhocracy culture.

According to Nilsen and Røsland (2021), the Royal Norwegian Navy exhibits a stronger presence in a supportive learning environment, than the two other building blocks. This suggests a link between organizational culture and learning, as two sub-components of this building block appear to align with clan culture, which is the predominant culture in both squadrons. Additionally, this may explain why the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron register higher scores in the supportive learning environment compared to the other two building blocks.

5.2.3 Concrete learning processes and practices

Table 7 - Current culture profile for the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron (Aarsrud & Gulland, 2022)

Culture	Current 1. Frigate Squadron	Current 1. Corvette Squadron	Difference
Clan	27,1	28,5	1,4
Adhocracy	21,8	21,3	0,5
Market	25,4	25,9	0,5
Hierarchy	25,7	24,2	1,5

Table 8 - Results from Building Block 2 in the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron (Nilsen & Røsland, 2021)

Building block 2, Concrete learning processes and practices						
Squadron	Experimentation	Collection of information	Analysis	Education and training	Sharing of information	Average
1. Frigate Squadron	55,5	58,1	60,1	58,9	61,9	58,9
1. Corvette Squadron	67,7	59,5	67,9	63,8	65,7	64,9
Difference	12,2	1,4	7,8	4,9	3,8	6,0

1. Frigate Squadron - 4. Organizational Glue




Figure 26 - Small illustration of dimension 4 in the 1. Frigate Squadron

1. Corvette Squadron - 4. Organizational Glue




Figure 33 - Small illustration of dimension 4 in the 1. Corvette Squadron

Within the framework of the second building block, significant differences emerge between the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron. Notably, in Table 8 the 1. Corvette Squadron surpasses the 1. Frigate Squadron by 12,2 points in terms of *experimentation*, an aspect highly regarded within an adhocracy culture. Comparing the overall culture profile for the two squadrons the 1. Frigate Squadron scores 0,5 points higher than the 1. Corvette Squadron in adhocracy culture. Consequently, a negative correlation appears to exist between adhocracy culture and the learning component *experimentation*. However, referring to all various cultural dimensions, it's only in dimension 4, which concerns the organizational glue, that the 1. Frigate Squadron slightly outpaces the 1. Corvette Squadron in adhocracy culture, with scores of 20.1 to 19.3, respectively. Across all other dimensions, the 1. Corvette Squadron exhibits higher levels of adhocracy culture. Thus, this may a reason why the 1. Corvette Squadron scores much higher on *experimentation* than the 1. Frigate Squadron.




Figure 30 - Small illustration of the overall culture profile in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 37 - Small illustration of the overall culture profile in the 1. Corvette Squadron

Garvin emphasize that organizations must establish formal processes related to experimentation, highlighting the significance of allocating time for evaluation and implementation (Garvin et al., 2008). While the 1. Corvette Squadron demonstrates a higher score in *experimentation*, looking at Table 8 - Results from Building Block 2 in the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron (Nilsen & Røsland, 2021), an examination of the first building block—specifically, the sub-component *time for reflection*—reveals that the 1. Frigate Squadron slightly exceeds the score of the 1. Corvette Squadron. This could offer a stronger partial explanation for why the 1. Frigate Squadron's overall score slightly surpasses that of the 1. Corvette Squadron in the overall adhocracy culture.




Figure 27 - Small illustration of dimension 5 in the 1. Frigate Squadron




Figure 35 - Small illustration of dimension 5 in the 1. Corvette Squadron

Furthermore, there's a small difference in the components; *collection of information*, *education and training* and *sharing of information*, where the 1. Corvette Squadron scores 1.4, 4.9, and 3.8 more than the 1. Frigate Squadron. These components in building block 2 might be linked to the adhocracy culture as this culture emphasizes growth and new resources (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991). Moreover, dimension 5, "Strategic Emphases," can be posited to have a correlation with *collection of information*, *education and training* and *sharing of information* as the strategic emphases of an organization are the primary areas or behaviors it focuses on to achieve its goals (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). This dimension may therefore be associated with the organization's commitment to training initiatives. Figure 27 - Small illustration of dimension 5 in the 1. Frigate Squadron and Figure 35 - Small illustration of dimension 5 in the 1. Corvette Squadron indicates that the 1. Corvette Squadron manifests a marginally higher inclination towards adhocracy culture in strategic emphases. This is mirrored in the outcomes of the components *collection of information*, *education and training* and *sharing of information*, where the 1. Frigate Squadron registers slightly lower metrics in comparison to the 1. Corvette Squadron.

5.2.4 Leadership that reinforces learning

Table 9 - Results from Building Block 3 in the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron (Nilsen & Røsland, 2021)

Building block 3, Leadership that reinforces learning	
Squadron	Management
1. Frigate Squadron	65,8
1. Corvette Squadron	72,3
Difference	6,6




Figure 25 - Small illustration of dimension 2 in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Figure 32 - Small illustration of dimension 2 in the 1. Corvette Squadron

Leadership that reinforces learning points out that leaders must signal the importance of spending time and encourage problem identification, information exchange and sharing of experiences (Garvin, 1993). Organizational leadership that has a dominant adhocracy culture encourage individual initiative and individual freedom (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). Therefore, this building block and the dimension 2, organizational leadership can be linked. Table 9 - Results from Building Block 3 in the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron shows the 1. Corvette Squadron is better at leadership that reinforces learning than the 1. Frigate Squadron. Consequently, this might also be interpreted as why they show a higher adhocracy culture in the dimension 2, organizational leadership (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, 2013; Garvin et al., 2008). The dominant culture is the market culture for the 1. Corvette Squadron and the 1. Frigate Squadron with a large margin and adhocracy at its lowest. The leadership style in the organization from a cultural perspective facilitates learning to a lesser extent as adhocracy is very low. According to Senge's theory on systems thinking, a learning strategy must be developed by the leaders for the entire organization (Senge, 1999). It can be argued that for an organization to truly embrace systems thinking, its management culture must embody elements of adhocracy, which values innovation, and flexibility. In the case of the 1. Corvette Squadron, the prevailing leadership style is one that nurtures adhocracy more than the 1. Frigate Squadron. Consequently, this suggests that there might be a more pronounced culture of systems thinking within the 1. Corvette Squadron.

To sum up, the overall remarks of the three building blocks shows an indication that the organizational culture in the two squadrons might relate to the organizational learning. In building block 1, supportive learning environment, there seems to be several connections. The component, *time to reflect*, seems to reflect upon the adhocracy culture, whereas the 1. Frigate Squadron scores slightly higher than the 1. Corvette Squadron in both. However, the 1. Corvette Squadron seems to score higher in adhocracy culture in five out of six of the dimensions. This may strengthen the argument why the different score between the squadrons in *time to reflect* is so small, and why the 1. Corvette Squadron also scores a lot more than the 1. Frigate Squadron in *openness to new ideas*. However, this doesn't necessarily imply a connection and could indicate that culture and learning are not always closely related. Nevertheless, the indication of relation between the clan culture and the components *psychological security* and *valuing differences*, as the 1. Corvette Squadron scores higher than the 1. Frigate Squadron in both, which strengthens the relation. In building block 2, dimension 5, "Strategic Emphases," can be posited to have a correlation with *collection of information, education and training* and *sharing of information* as the strategic emphases of an organization are the primary areas or behaviors it focuses on to achieve its goals (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). This indicates further relation between organizational culture and its relation to organizational learning in the 1. Frigate Squadron compared to the 1. Corvette Squadron, as the 1. Corvette squadron surpasses the 1. Frigate Squadron in both. Lastly, the building block 3, leadership that reinforces learning, also indicates a relation. The 1. Corvette Squadron scores higher in adhocracy culture in dimension 2, organizational leadership, which is congruent to their higher score in building block 3. This suggests that organizational culture relate to organizational learning in the 1. Frigate Squadron compared to the 1. Corvette Squadron, and that the 1. Corvette Squadron might have a culture that is more conducive to facilitating organizational learning overall. Thus, this is also possible to apply to other departments in the Navy (Aarsrud & Gulland, 2022).

5.3 How may organizational culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron in the Royal Norwegian Navy influence the organizational learning?

After discussing how culture can affect learning in the 1. Frigate Squadron by comparing it with the 1. Corvette Squadron, the research question, "How may organizational culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron in the Royal Norwegian Navy influence the organizational learning?", has essentially been answered. However, this section will summarize and highlight the

specific points relevant to the 1. Frigate Squadron to provide a more concrete answer to this research question.

The organizational culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron in the Royal Norwegian Navy seems to influence the organizational learning in several ways. Figure 39 in Appendix B – Organizational Learning in the Royal Norwegian Navy indicates that the 1. Frigate Squadron scores below the developed benchmark, below the average in the Navy and below the 1. Corvette Squadron in all building blocks, except in one component, *time to reflect*. As reflected upon, in building block 1, *time to reflect* and *openness to new ideas* can be compared to adhocracy culture. In all dimensions, the 1. Frigate Squadron shows a desire to increase the adhocracy culture. The differences in current and desired culture indicates that the culture is incongruent, and changes might be implemented to increase the 1. Frigate Squadron as a learning organization (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991; Schein, 1984, 2004).

Furthermore, in building block 1, the 1. Frigate Squadron scores low on *valuing differences* and *psychological security*. As these components can be linked to the clan culture, the following can be said about the context. The clan culture is the most dominant culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron, however, compared to the 1. Corvette Squadron, they score lower. This means that the 1. Frigate Squadron might benefit from increasing the clan culture further to facilitate for *valuing differences* and *psychological security*. On the one hand, this culture is the most dominant culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron, which may suggest that a change in this culture might not significantly affect organizational learning. On the other hand, the 1. Frigate Squadron has a notably strong hierarchy and market culture. This prominence could overshadow the clan and adhocracy cultures, thereby limiting their ability to enhance organizational learning (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991; Schein, 2004; Wadel, 2008).

Moreover, in building block 2, concrete learning processes and practices, in figure 39 in appendix B, the 1. Frigate Squadron scores low on all the components, *experimentation*, *collection of information*, *analysis*, *education*, and *training*, and *sharing of information*. This building block can especially be linked to the dimension 5, “strategic emphasis”, as it’s the

organizations primary areas or behaviors it focuses on to achieve its goals (Cameron & Quinn, 2013). Figure 27 further strengthens the argument that the 1. Frigate Squadron desire to increase the clan and the adhocracy culture, resultingly it might increase their ability to enhance organizational learning (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991; Schein, 2004; Wadel, 2008).

Lastly, the building block 3. Figure 39 in Appendix B – Organizational Learning in the Royal Norwegian Navy shows that the 1. Frigate Squadron scores low in leadership that reinforces learning. Furthermore, the dimension 2 in the culture profile of the 1. Frigate Squadron shows that the squadron emphasizes hierarchy and market culture, symbolizing control, and competition. These cultures may not be considered an ideal culture for facilitating organizational learning (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991; Schein, 2004; Wadel, 2008). Furthermore, a potential conflict within the organization is highlighted, where the most significant disparity between the current and desired culture is notably evident in the adhocracy culture, in Figure 14 - Organizational Leadership in the 1. Frigate Squadron A learning strategy must be developed by the leaders for the entire organization (Senge, 1999), and a culture that is incongruent, and where the employees doesn't support the structure and strategies of the organization is less efficient (Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991; Schein, 1984, 2004; Smollan & Sayers, 2009). On the one hand, it may appear that the leadership perspective is what influences the organizational culture and the organizational learning, to a large extent. On the other hand, this does not mean that management alone can change the culture and facilitate learning (Garvin et al., 2008).

Overall, it must be noted that the adhocracy culture within the overall cultural profile of the 1. Frigate Squadron suggests a desire for its reduction. This may indicate that the 1. Frigate Squadron considers other cultures to be more significant. It also implies that there are other challenges that should be addressed before prioritizing a culture that fosters learning. In general, the organizational culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron in the Royal Norwegian Navy seems to emphasize stability and control, as well as internal focus and integration. The discussion indicates that a culture emphasizing flexibility, discretion, and a slightly more external focus and differentiation than what the 1. Frigate Squadron currently practices, could

potentially enhance organizational learning within the squadron (Cameron & Quinn, 2013; Richard W. Woodman & Pasmore, 1991; Schein, 2004; Wadel, 2008).

6 Conclusion

This master's thesis has analyzed the culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron to explore potential links between organizational culture and organizational learning. This was done by comparing the results from the 1. Frigate Squadron to prior research from the master's theses of Aarsrud and Gulland (2022), and Nilsen and Røsland (2021). The research question of the thesis was: “How may organizational culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron in the Royal Norwegian Navy influence the organizational learning?”. To address the research question, two subsidiary research objectives were formulated. “What characterizes organizational culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron?” and “How does organizational culture relate to organizational learning in the 1. Frigate Squadron compared to the 1. Corvette Squadron?”. These questions had to be answered before the research question could be answered.

In summary, the culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron, both as it currently exists and as desired by the crew, is characterized more by an emphasis on internal focus and integration, rather than on external focus and differentiation. Additionally, while the present culture tends more towards stability and control, the desired culture shifts towards favoring flexibility and discretion. It is difficult to conclude how the organizational culture is linked to organizational learning, but there are several indications that there is a connection. Combining the results, the theory, and the data from the master's theses of Aarsrud and Gulland (2022), and Nilsen and Røsland (2021), the organizational culture seems to relate to organizational learning in the 1. Frigate Squadron compared to the 1. Corvette Squadron to some extent. The 1. Corvette Squadron might have a culture that is more conducive to facilitating organizational learning overall. Thus, this is also possible to apply to other departments in the Navy and reinforces the conclusion reached by Aarsrud and Gulland (2022). Learning is essential for improvement in our endeavors. A cooperative and creative work environment can be supportive and encouraging and seems crucial for enhancing organizational learning. The discussion indicates that a culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron that would emphasize flexibility, discretion, and a slightly more external focus and differentiation than what the 1. Frigate Squadron currently practices, could potentially enhance organizational learning within the squadron.

6.1 Further research

This thesis has explored how organizational cultures facilitate learning. However, an intriguing area for future research would be to examine which specific culture is most effective for a crew on a military ship. Should it emerge that either an adhocracy or clan culture is most suitable, this finding would underscore the significance of a cultural shift within the 1. Frigate Squadrons operational framework.

Further research could beneficially investigate the correlation between the cultural context and the extent of learning within the 1. Frigate Squadron or the overall Royal Norwegian Navy, and how these variables interact with and impact operational performance. An additional approach could involve conducting in-depth investigations thorough research within different departments to support the characterization of the organizational culture and to explore its links to organizational learning.

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8 Appendices

8.1 Appendix A – The Culture in the 1. Corvette Squadron

The data shown in this appendix is the data collected by Karl Martin Aarsrud and Jørgen Gulland and extends to cover the cultural profile of the 1. Corvette Squadron. This data is presented the same way as for the 1. Frigate Squadron to make the comparison more effortless. However, Aarsrud and Gulland did not investigate the different crews.




Figure 31 - Small illustration of dimension 1 in the 1. Corvette Squadron




Figure 32 - Small illustration of dimension 2 in the 1. Corvette Squadron

In dimension 1, the data shows that there's only a small gap between current culture and desired culture in the 1. Corvette Squadron. Clan culture is notably predominant, achieving the highest score of 30.9. Equally apparent is the minimal emphasis on hierarchy culture, as reflected by its low score. Both adhocracy and market cultures present similar scores in the current assessment, yet there is a clear preference within the units for diminishing the market culture while bolstering the adhocracy culture. Another notable observation is the preferred decrease in market culture concerning the Organizational Leadership. This inclination towards altering market culture suggests that the squadron may be excessively focused on performance and outcomes, leading to employee dissatisfaction. The squadron also exhibits a significant desired shift of over 10 points, underscoring a definitive call for cultural transformation. This implies that the emphasis on achieving results may not predominantly stem from individual contributors within the department but rather from the leadership style of the managers, who are motivated

by success and outperforming competitors. This is reflected in the fact that the market culture does not have a dominant presence in the overall cultural profile of the corvette squadron. Furthermore, it is noticeable that the 1. Corvette Squadron is also torn between the diagonals, market, and clan culture (Aarsrud & Gulland, 2022).




Figure 34 - Small illustration of dimension 3 in the 1. Corvette Squadron




Figure 33 - Small illustration of dimension 4 in the 1. Corvette Squadron

Moreover, the 1. Corvette Squadron registers a consistently low emphasis on adhocracy culture across various dimensions. However, dimensions 3, Management of Employees, stands out, as the adhocracy culture is more valued here, and the overall cultures are more balanced. The desired and the current culture in this dimension is more equal, which may indicate a satisfaction towards how the employees experience the management (Aarsrud & Gulland, 2022; Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

1. Corvette Squadron - 5. Strategic Emphases




Figure 35 - Small illustration of dimension 5 in the 1. Corvette Squadron

1. Corvette Squadron - 6. Criteria of Success




Figure 36 - Small illustration of dimension 6 in the 1. Corvette Squadron

It is evident from dimension 5, Strategic Emphases, that there is a preference for a shift in the cultural dynamics. There is a noticeable desire for a reduction in market culture and an increase in clan culture. This suggests a move away from a priority on "stability and control" and "external focus and differentiation," towards a greater emphasis on "flexibility and discretion" as well as "internal focus and integration." This is also the case in dimension 6, Criteria of Success, however, this dimension also shows a remarkable high current hierarchy culture that's desired to decrease with almost 10 points (Aarsrud & Gulland, 2022; Cameron & Quinn, 2013).

1. Corvette Squadron




Figure 37 - Small illustration of the overall culture profile in the 1. Corvette Squadron

According to Aarsrud and Gulland (2022), the 1. Corvette Squadron exhibits a relatively balanced cultural profile with a pronounced clan culture, a substantial market culture, and a somewhat less pronounced adhocracy culture. In the corvette squadrons, crew members work closely in small teams. They share a great deal about themselves, demonstrating loyalty to each other and to their department, which is characteristic of the prevalent clan culture. Additionally, the

significant presence of market culture indicates an organization that is driven by results and has a continuous ambition to excel. The market culture suggests that the squadron confronts tasks and challenges directly. When considering these two cultural types together, it may suggest some level of uncertainty within the units regarding which culture is dominant or perhaps even a debate over which culture should be considered most prominent (Aarsrud & Gulland, 2022).

Interestingly, the data suggests a desire within the organization to reduce the emphasis on both market and hierarchy cultures. Instead, there's a leaning towards enhancing the prominence of clan and adhocracy cultures. This shift underscores the organization's aspiration for less stability and control and more flexibility and discretion. It's also noteworthy that despite the market culture currently ranking second with a score of 25.9 points, there's a consensus within the organization for it to be the least dominant among the four cultural paradigms. Overall, the current and the desired scores do not markable incongruent (Aarsrud & Gulland, 2022).

8.2 Appendix B – Organizational Learning in the Royal Norwegian Navy

This appendix presents data from the master’s thesis “The Navy - a Learning Organization?” by Sindre Gangså Røsland and Eirik Vatne Nilsen (2021). The data will reflect upon the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron as learning organizations, and to what extent these organizations are learning organizations compared to the Royal Norwegian Navy overall. This is articulated through two distinct models made after corresponding with Røsland. The first model presents a consolidated overview of all three building blocks that forms organizational learning, wherein the Navy's average is juxtaposed against the developed benchmark. The benchmark used was developed in, the Learning Organizations Survey, LOS, by David A. Garvin, Amy Edmondson and Francesca Gino, which is based on collected empirical data from various organizations, private and public (Garvin et al., 2008).




Figure 38 - The average learning outcomes in the Royal Norwegian Navy compared with the median in benchmark (Nilsen & Røsland, 2021).

Nilsen and Røsland (2021) commented on the graph in figure 38 suggestion that the Navy has potential for improvement, particularly regarding concrete learning processes and practices

(building block 2), and leadership that reinforces learning (building block 3). Conversely, the Navy's strength lies in having a supportive learning environment (building block 1). Indications from Building Block 2 aligns with previous research in the Navy, which has identified, among other issues, challenges related to learning between departments (Erstad & Folkestad, 2016; Forsvaret, 2019; Statens Havarikommisjon, 2021). In other words, it is practiced differently. The study reveals a distinct relationship between the various building blocks, yet it provides limited insight into the causality and the direction of influence under these conditions. Findings in the study also support the theory that departments that perform well within one building block do not necessarily do so within another. Consequently, to raise the collective learning level in the Navy, measures should be taken within all three building blocks. Looking at the overall results for the Navy, the research suggests the organization somewhat lags as a learning organization when compared to the benchmark set by LOS (Nilsen & Røsland, 2021).

The second model emerges from a dialogue with the researcher Sindre Gangså Røsland, extracting and highlighting specific data relevant to the two squadrons selected for this study. In Nilsen and Røsland's study (2021), data from the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron were not directly presented. This required reaching out to the researchers to obtain additional data.

Figure 39 presents the results from the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron. Additionally, the average overall response from the Navy and the selected benchmark are included for comparison. It should be emphasized that several other departments performed better than the 1. Frigate Squadron and the 1. Corvette Squadron. However, as the selected departments have been previously mentioned as suitable for comparison, no further departments were incorporated. The other departments have been omitted from this overview.




Figure 39 - The average learning outcomes in the 1. Frigate Squadron, 1. Corvette Squadron and the Royal Norwegian Navy overall with the median in the benchmark (Nilsen & Røsland, 2021)

Nilsen and Røsland (2021) have noted that the 1. Corvette Squadron performs better than the 1. Frigate Squadron in many areas, especially in “experimentation” in building block 2, and in “Psychological Security”, “Valuing Differences”, and “Open to new ideas” in building block 1. However, the 1. Frigate Squadron seems to be better at “time to reflect” than the 1. Corvette Squadron. They conclude that significant disparities among the Navy’s departments suggest a fragmented approach to organizational learning (Nilsen & Røsland, 2021). An indication that is largely supported by previous research (Erstad & Folkestad, 2016; Forsvaret, 2019; Statens Havarikommisjon, 2021). These differences should be studied, to increase the collective level of learning in the organization. Moreover, this aligns with the Norwegian Navy's ambition to be a learning organization (Forsvaret, 2019, 2020; Nilsen & Røsland, 2021).

8.3 Appendix C – The Survey in English

The survey in Norwegian can be sent upon request.

Organizational culture in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Page 1

Mandatory fields are marked with a star *

An investigation into culture related to organizational learning in the 1. Frigate Squadron

Compared to the 1. Corvette Squadron



Foto: Vegard Oen Hatten/Forsvaret

Norwegian media paints a black-and-white picture of the Norwegian armed forces, giving the impression that the culture lacks contentment, cohesion, and security, and that the leadership lets things slide. But how would you, as an employee, describe the current culture, and what do you desire?

My name is Veronica Holm-Eriksen, and I currently serve as an Operations Officer in the Maritime Combat Service Support in the Royal Norwegian Navy. I previously worked as a navigator in the 1. Frigate Squadron and am now studying Maritime Management at the University of South-Eastern Norway. This survey is part of my master's thesis aimed at delving into how the organizational culture within the 1. Frigate Squadron affects the organization's ability to learn.

This paragraph is for those with a special interest:

Organizational culture can be characterized as performance-oriented and may constitute the very foundation of how an organization handles challenges and makes decisions. The master's thesis by Eirik Vatne Nilsen and Sindre Gangså Røsland from 2021 investigated whether the Navy is a learning organization. Their findings suggest that the Navy is somewhat less aligned with the benchmarks of a learning organization. Notably, the 1. Corvette Squadron demonstrated a greater propensity for learning compared to the 1. Frigate Squadron. Furthermore, Karl Martin Aarsrud and Jørgen Gulland explored in their master's thesis whether the organizational culture in the 1. Corvette Squadron and the Coastal and Marine Ranger Command could be a factor in the organization's ability to learn. It turns out that there may be some correlation between organizational culture and the organization's ability to learn. Therefore, a further investigation of organizational culture in another squadron in the Navy could provide a clearer answer based on more data.

I aim to examine whether the organizational culture of the 1. Frigate Squadron, compared to the already mapped organizational culture of the 1. Corvette Squadron, could be a contributing factor to the organization's slightly reduced ability to learn compared to the 1. Corvette Squadron.

The survey is designed to ensure complete anonymity; individual responses cannot be traced back to respondents. Participation is entirely voluntary, and respondents may withdraw from the survey at any stage if they choose

The survey takes between 10-15 minutes to answer.

I would be happy to share the results with you once completed the thesis. If you wish to receive the results, or have any other questions related to the survey or the project in general, please contact the following:

Veronica Holm-Eriksen: vholmeriksen@mil.no

Supervisor at USN: Veronica.Jaramillo.Jimenez@usn.no

Thank you for contributing to the survey!

Mandatory fields are marked with a star *

Guidance for completion

The survey consists of 6 questions regarding the current culture and 6 questions regarding the desired culture. Each question is divided into four statements/options, each of which you will assign a score to.

For each question, you should distribute 100 points based on how much you agree with the statement in relation to the four options. You should allocate the most points to the option that you feel best describes the situation accurately and the fewest points to the option that you feel describes the situation in the organization least accurately.

In the same way, you will weigh your choices when answering about the desired culture, giving the most points to the statements that describe the situation as you would like it to be.

Remember that you must distribute 100 points per question/area of assessment.

Below, you can see an example before the survey begins.

Mandatory fields are marked with a star *

1. Dominant characteristics - Current Situation

The organization is very personal. It is like an extended family. The employees give a lot of themselves. *

The organization is very dynamic and proactive. Here, employees like to put their heads forward and dare to take risks. *

The organization is very results-oriented. It is all about getting things done. The employees are very competitive and result-oriented *

The organization is very controlled and structured. Employees generally follow formal procedures. *

Remember that the sum of the four statements above must add up to 100

Mandatory fields are marked with a star *

Prior to commencing the survey, please take a moment to respond to three preliminary questions.

What is your highest level of education achieved? *

- Primary School
- Secondary education (vocational qualification or study qualification)
- College Graduate
- Bachelor's Degree
- Master's Degree
- PhD

Which crew do you belong to? *

- Team Bøhn
- Team Lervik
- Team Schnelle
- Team Høknes
- The maintenance crew

How many years have you worked or served in the Armed Forces (including education)? *

Choose the nearest number of years you have worked/served. For example, if you have worked in the defense for 1 year and 4 months, choose 0-1 years.

- 0-1 year
- 2-5 years
- 6-10 years
- More than 10 years

The survey starts on the next page

Mandatory fields are marked with a star *

1. Dominant characteristics - Current Situation

The organization is very personal. It is like an extended family. The employees give a lot of themselves. *

The organization is very dynamic and proactive. Here, employees like to put their heads forward and dare to take risks. *

The organization is very results-oriented. It is all about getting things done. The employees are very competitive and result-oriented *

The organization is very controlled and structured. Employees generally follow formal procedures. *

Remember that the sum of the four statements above must add up to 100

2. Organizational Leadership - Current Situation

The management in the organization focuses on guidance, facilitation and care. *

The management in the organization focuses on entrepreneurship, innovation and willingness to take risks. *

The management in the organization has a very direct, offensive and results-oriented focus. *

The management of the organization focuses on coordination, organization and efficiency. *

Remember that the sum of the four statements above must add up to 100

3. Management of Employees - Current Situation

The management style in the organization is characterized by teamwork, agreement and participation. *

The management style in the organization is characterized by individual willingness to take risks, innovation, freedom and originality. *

The management style in the organization is characterized by tough competition, high demands and a focus on results. *

The management style in the organization is characterized by security in employment relations, conformity, predictability and long-lasting relationships. *

Remember that the sum of the four statements above must add up to 100

4. Organizational Glue - Current Situation

The glue that holds the organization together is loyalty and mutual trust. The commitment to the organization is high. *

The glue that holds the organization together is a common desire for development and innovation. The focus is placed on proactive advancement and foresight. *

The glue that holds the organization together is a focus on results and goal achievement. *

The glue that holds the organization together is formal rules and guidelines. Maintaining a well-functioning organization is important. *

Remember that the sum of the four statements above must add up to 100

5. Strategic Emphases - Current Situation

The organization emphasizes employee development. There is a high degree of trust, openness and involvement. *

The organization emphasizes growth and new challenges. Trying new things and seeing new possibilities is highly valued. *

The organization emphasizes competition and achieving results. Achieving even higher goals and being a market leader is crucial. *

The organization emphasizes permanence and stability. Efficiency, control and a "well-oiled machine" are important. *

Remember that the sum of the four statements above must add up to 100

6. Criteria of Success - Current Situation

The organization defines success based on the development of employees, teamwork, employee commitment and general care for the individual. *

The organization defines success as having the newest and most unique products. We are innovative and product leaders. *

The organization defines success as controlling the market and outperforming other players. The key to success is being a market leader. *

The organization defines success based on how efficient the organization is. Reliable deliveries, coordinated planning and cost-effective production are key factors in achieving success. *

Remember that the sum of the four statements above must add up to 100

Mandatory fields are marked with a star *

You have now completed the first part of surveying current culture.

The last part involves mapping the **desired culture**.

Take some time to focus on your desired situation. What do you want the organization to look like? What does it take to achieve success? What trends, challenges and opportunities are coming?

Mandatory fields are marked with a star *

1. Dominant characteristics - Desired Situation

The organization is very personal. It is like an extended family. The employees give a lot of themselves. *

The organization is very dynamic and proactive. Here, employees like to put their heads forward and dare to take risks. *

The organization is very results-oriented. It is all about getting things done. The employees are very competitive and result-oriented *

The organization is very controlled and structured. Employees generally follow formal procedures. *

Remember that the sum of the four statements above must add up to 100

2. Organizational Leadership - Desired Situation

The management in the organization focuses on guidance, facilitation and care. *

The management in the organization focuses on entrepreneurship, innovation and willingness to take risks. *

The management in the organization has a very direct, offensive and results-oriented focus. *

The management of the organization focuses on coordination, organization and efficiency. *

Remember that the sum of the four statements above must add up to 100

3. Management of Employees - Desired Situation

The management style in the organization is characterized by teamwork, agreement and participation. *

The management style in the organization is characterized by individual willingness to take risks, innovation, freedom and originality. *

The management style in the organization is characterized by tough competition, high demands and a focus on results. *

The management style in the organization is characterized by security in employment relations, conformity, predictability and long-lasting relationships. *

Remember that the sum of the four statements above must add up to 100

4. Organizational Glue - Desired Situation

The glue that holds the organization together is loyalty and mutual trust. The commitment to the organization is high. *

The glue that holds the organization together is a common desire for development and innovation. The focus is placed on proactive advancement and foresight. *

The glue that holds the organization together is a focus on results and goal achievement. *

The glue that holds the organization together is formal rules and guidelines. Maintaining a well-functioning organization is important. *

Remember that the sum of the four statements above must add up to 100

5. Strategic Emphases - Desired Situation

The organization emphasizes employee development. There is a high degree of trust, openness and involvement. *

The organization emphasizes growth and new challenges. Trying new things and seeing new possibilities is highly valued. *

The organization emphasizes competition and achieving results. Achieving even higher goals and being a market leader is crucial. *

The organization emphasizes permanence and stability. Efficiency, control and a "well-oiled machine" are important. *

Remember that the sum of the four statements above must add up to 100

6. Criteria of Success - Desired Situation

The organization defines success based on the development of employees, teamwork, employee commitment and general care for the individual. *

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The organization defines success as controlling the market and outperforming other players. The key to success is being a market leader. *

The organization defines success based on how efficient the organization is. Reliable deliveries, coordinated planning and cost-effective production are key factors in achieving success. *

Remember that the sum of the four statements above must add up to 100

Page 7

Mandatory fields are marked with a star *

Do you have any comments on the survey?

Thank you for taking the time to answer the survey.

8.4 Appendix D - Permission from NSD



Melding fra Lasse Andre Raa (Rådgiver)

27.09.2023 16:28

Det fremgår av meldeskjema den 27.9.2023 med vedlegg at det ikke skal behandles opplysninger i prosjektet som kan identifisere enkeltpersoner hverken direkte eller indirekte.

Prosjektet trenger derfor ikke en vurdering fra Personverntjenester.

Vi legger til grunn at det ikke registreres indirekte identifiserende kombinasjoner av bakgrunnsopplysninger, samt at spørreskjemaleverandøren ikke registrerer IP-adresser knyttet til den enkelte besvarelse.

Vi forutsetter at henvisninger til Sikt personverntjenester fjernes fra informasjonsskrivet, eventuelt omformuleres, ettersom vi ikke har vurdert noen behandling av personopplysninger i prosjektet.

HVA MÅ DU GJØRE DERSOM DU LIKEVEL SKAL BEHANDLE PERSONOPPLYSNINGER?

Dersom prosjektopplegget endres og det likevel blir aktuelt å behandle personopplysninger må du melde dette til Personverntjenester ved å oppdatere meldeskjemaet. Vent på svar før du setter i gang med behandlingen av personopplysninger.

VI AVSLUTTER OPPFØLGING AV PROSJEKTET

Siden prosjektet ikke behandler personopplysninger avslutter vi all videre oppfølging.

Lykke til med prosjektet!