Radicalization and violent extremism

A discourse analysis of Norwegian governmental discourse on radicalization and violent extrem i st

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Title and subtitle:

Radicalization and violent extremism, a discourse analysis of Norwegian governmental discourse on radicalization and violent extremism.

Abstract:

This thesis is a analysis of the discourse of radicalization and violent extremism from a governmental perspective. Norman Faircloughs threedimensional model is applied to the two Action Plans on radicalization and violent extremism that has been published by governments in Norway. It seeks to see what discourses are found in the plans, and what social consequences it might have. As radicalization and violent extremism has been put on the agenda, governments' in Europe has simultaneously formulated their response to this challenge, in forms of strategy. Academics and organizations has reacted to many of these policies as they legitimize the use of surveillance and other means in their quest for combating terrorism, that might affect people's right to privacy, and curtailing of human rights. I have taken on the Norwegian strategy for preventing radicalization and violent extremism, and explored what images of reality the government is giving.

Key words:

Radicalization, Violent extremism, Government, discourse analysis, Human Rights

Number of words:

25874

DECLARATION

I certify that this is all my own work. Any material quoted or paraphrased from reference books, journals, www. etc. has been identified as such and duly acknowledged in the text or foot/end notes. Such sources are also listed in the bibliography. I have read the College's policy on plagiarism and am aware of the penalties for plagiarism.

I have retained a copy of my work.

Signed: .... Name: ....

Preface

It is with great joy (and an oz. of fear) that I am handing in this dissertation. It has been a journey of blood, sweat and tears (literally).

I would like to thank my supervisor, Christian Stokke, for his patience with me, and his calming advice and guidance, when I was panicking.

To my fellow students, thank you for two years of great companionship and collaboration.

Mads, thank you for bearing with me, I know you are as happy as I am, to be handing in this thesis – this has been a lot on you too. And also a great thank you to my parents for continuously supporting and pushing me, when I could not find the silver lining. Lastly to my former colleagues at the National Criminal Investigation Service, and my current colleagues at National Police Directorate, thank you for supporting me through these two years, you all made it somehow a little bit better.

Kripos Hustrykkeri

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Content

1.

Introduction

1.

The topic of radicalization and violent extremism has had a growing influence on the public and political debate. September 11th 2001 in many ways mark a new era for terrorism and radicalization, and governments increasingly turning their heads towards extreme Islamic terrorism. This is much a result of the narrative *chosen* by the G.W. Bush administration following the attacks – the 'war on terror' (Fairclough: 2006: p.141). In the wake of the last decades terrorist attacks, happening in all parts of the world and also the emergence of groups like IS and extreme right-wing groups, governments are increasingly strengthening their efforts to combat such forces in society. Many have, often as a part of counter-terrorism strategies, formed new laws, and forged new, preventative measures. An increase in radicalized and extreme nationals has more prominently figured the debate. Young people, which of different reasons, are being recruited to IS, and travels to Syria as "foreign fighters", or so-called "home-growns" which perform acts of terror on their own countries soil, like in Paris, or 22nd of July 2011 in Oslo and Utøya. As a result, many states, and also the EU have developed strategies and action plans to deal with these issues.

2.

What several scholars have questioned about these counter-terrorism/counter-radicalization strategies is the effect it might have on the core values of democracy, such as civil liberties, fundamental human rights and rule of law? Are we eroding our own modern democracies? As a consequence of these strategies, many have identified an increase in surveillance from intelligence services, and there is a fear of increasing arbitrary arrests etc. (Lund in Johannessen & Glomseth: 2015: p.130). Also Amnesty, in their latest annual report, expresses a concern in relation to the increasing trend of European governments to enforce measures they understand as a threat to human rights. " *These included measures targeting those travelling or intending to travel abroad to commit or otherwise pursue illdefined terrorism-related acts; sweeping new surveillance powers; extended powers of arrest with reduced procedural guarantees; and "counter-radicalization" measures that would potentially repress freedom of expression and discriminate against certain groups" (Amnesty: 2016: p. 46).* Governments on the other hand tend to claim that these counter-radicalization measures are to protect human rights – they are a necessity. This poses many questions. One, is the question of what is most important – individuals rights or national security? This is an important concern; to weigh the importance of national security to the possible consequences and effects it might have on the individual.

3.

This study is about how Norwegian governments depict the discourse of radicalization and violent extremism. There has been a rapid rise in the discourse on radicalization since 2004, having this affect that one might feel this as an 'era of radicalization'. Still, this term is not new. Cristopher Beaker-Beall et al. says that; *after a brief analysis of the etymology of the term reveals that it has been used in varying political contexts throughout history* (2015: p. 4). What they suggest is new is the weight put on radicalization as a factor in political discourse, as the dominant way of comprehending militant violence (C.Beaker-Beall et.al: 2015: p. 4).

In Norway, there has been developed two action plans to encounter radicalization and violent extremism. The first one was published in 2010, by the Social democratic government, and the second was published in 2014, by the Conservative government. These are detailed plans that contain the current attitude and strategy of the governments.

5.

It is a paradox that the protection of national security, which also entails that what need to be protected are the nation's society and the people, is at risk of diminishing the same rights as it is trying to protect. Therefore I find it highly interesting to look at the national situation, and how the Norwegian government paints a picture of the topic and situation of radicalization and violent extremism. What discourses are present in the Action plans of 2010 and 2014? Have they changed?

6.

I will look at this through the theory of constructivism which holds that the world is socially and historically constructed. This means that current structurers, change as the ideas change. Also, historical events and occurrences change structures. Actions inform actors, and they will act on their subjective comprehending of these actions. The assumption is that since 2010, events have caused a change in structures, and we now see a different, socially constructed world.

7.

On the abovementioned grounds I understand this to be a very current part of the societal debate and I wish to pursue this further in my study.

8.

9.

1.1 Research question and purpose

10.

Challenges posed by extreme and violent forces both within and outside the Norwegian society have led to a felt need for a strategy to cope with and tackle the issue of radicalization and violent extremism. A strategy tells us something about in what way and what actions have to be made, in order to correct a given problem. The Action plans form the government's strategic approach to tackle radicalization and violent extremism. It also tells us a lot about the nature of the government (Kundnani: 2012: p. 1). Many countries in and outside Europe have developed strategies on how they best believe this is done. This trend has caused reactions from different groups in society, but also organizations which are worried about the effects of these strategies. Limitations on fundamental human rights, such as freedom of speech, and freedom of religion, and an increase in surveillance, and discrimination of certain groups are of concern. What is interesting about this is that there seems to be a conflict, between the government efforts to protect national security and individual rights. This balance between national security and individual rights needs to be taken into consideration when developing such public policy.

11.

Public policy, will usually always be influenced by a political standpoint, and is also a result of compromises, between political views. Sometimes, interest groups or lobbyist might be involved in the process of policymaking. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that policies hold a range of assumptions, ideas and thoughts of those who created it. A text does not only depend on what is explicitly said, but also what is implicitly said and assumed (Fairclough: 2003: p.11). Isabela and Norman Fairclough both suggest in their book *Political Discourse Analysis,* that politics has a fundamental character. They suggest that it is basically about choices and actions, and choices about how to act on different circumstances and goals (2012: p.1). This raises some questions. How does this influence the policy and in what way? What happens when the policy is implemented in society? Also, what are possible consequences of the strategy?

12.

I am interested in, and have formulated my main research questions as follows; *what discourses figures in the government's Action plans of 2010 and 2014, concerning radicalization and violent extremism? What images of reality does the government want to, or unconsciously create with the text and what actions are they causing? How are the discourses influencing the wider social practice?*

13.

Therefore, I am assessing the discourse of radicalization and violent extremism in Norway. The Action plans kind of serves as examples in the analysis, and illustrate the strategy of the Norwegian government and the (governmental) discourse of radicalization and violent extremism. I want to see what the discourse does, what actions and consequences it causes.

14.

An analysis of the Norwegian Action Plans can have societal significance to uncover what images of the government efforts, attitudes and conceptions of radicalization and violent extremism that are presented to us, how it is presented, but also to what

is *not* presented to us, which again creates the foundation of our knowledge on this problem. Through the analysis of information, decision makers create the environment they are also responding to. Meaning we can also say that it is they who are socially constructing the environment as realities and orchestrating what *they* perceive as the objective world (Hatch: 2011: p. 58).

15.

16.

1.2 My role as a researcher

17.

I am writing this thesis from a political science perspective, which is reflected in my choice of topic, theories and methods. Critical Discourse analysis is in fact often used when analyzing political language (Eppler, Henriksen et.al:2011: p.67). I suggest that this is also a great way to approach the subject of Human Rights and multiculturalism, because these are subjects highly relevant and debated in the political sphere. Applying the knowledge from previous education and the possibilities this can provide, equips me with not only the contextual and societal knowledge needed for this project, but also with the analytical skill. I consider myself being critical towards the governmental current efforts to combat radicalization and violent extremism, but I believe my work to be constructive criticism, and of eager character to evolve the efforts, so that violence of this character is limited, but without harm to fundamental individual and democratic rights.

18.

19.

1.3 Structure

20.

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 holds the introduction, specifies the research question and the purpose of this research, and also a short introduction to my role as a researcher. The 2 nd chapter is a literature review of preexisting literature and research done on the field of radicalization and violent extremism, both in Norway and abroad. It provides an overview of what has been looked into, but also, and possibly more importantly, what has not. In the 3 rd chapter I have outlined the theoretical framework for this thesis. It provides a detailed explanation of the theories of Social Constructivism, and the constructivist inspired Securitization theory, and how these theories fit this project. Chapter 4 is the 'Methods chapter' where I explain Critical Discourse analysis, first from a theoretical perspective, and then in practice which details how I have operationalized my research, concerning tools for analysis, identification of discourses, data collection, sampling and methodological challenges. Chapter 5 contains the analysis. It begins with describing the "order of discourse", before I proceed with the analysis. I have analyzed AP2010 and AP2014 separately with the help of a discourse analytical model to textually analyze the two documents and to identify discourses that figure in the in the government treatment of the phenomenon of radicalization and violent extremism. Chapter 6 I discuss my findings, and contextualize them in the Norwegian society. The 7 th chapter is the conclusion, with a summary of my research and some final thoughts and considerations.

21.

2.

Literature review

1.

Curiosity about why someone is being radicalized, why someone would go to the extreme, and who they are has sparked academia to research the topic of radicalization and violent extremism. www.radicalisationresearch.org is a UK public funded website, which contain easy-accessed, academic research, from all over the world. Directing attention to research on policy, which is relevant to this project, one will find research concerned with how governments respond to so-called radicals, jihadists and other types of extreme forces. Also, a great deal of the attention has been placed on education, and how to tackle extremism in schools. Researchers have criticized government's counter-radicalization strategies, on several grounds. Paul Thomas in his book ' *Responding to the Threat of Violent Extremism: Failing to Prevent'* (2012) is an extensive piece of research on the British strategy towards radicalization and violent extremism. He suggest that Prevent and the larger CONTEST strategy, is creating a deeper divide in society, especially alienating the Muslim communities. He criticizes the strategy for being ' *ineffective'* and *'misguided'* . Thomas also provides a suggestion for how to better tackle this controversial subject – through integration and cohesion across different communities. His critique of the British strategy is one of many. Media, and academics has been all over the Prevent strategy, and critiqued it for leading a path to a police-state (Mohammed & Siddiqui: 2013), creating a 'suspect-community' (BBC/Casciani: 26.08.2014) and repressing free speech and open debate and other forms of critique (The Guardian/ Bennett: 20.9.2015).

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
Radicalization and the meaning of the word, has also been contested in research. In the introduction to ' *Counter-radicalisation: Critical perspectives'* (2014) it is suggested that radicalization has become the explanatory factor of all terrorist attacks happening, and that the state, media and academia has created a dominant discourse that believes a process of radicalization always precedes this type of violence (p.1). The authors is also critical to the way the term radicalization is used now, which is the belief that radicalization is supposed to cover and explain all that goes on in the process of turning violent (p. 3-4). Turning a moment to the Norwegian context, Lars Gule, professor at Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences and researcher on the field, has also criticized the Norwegian government and the latest Action Plan for the definition and content of the term radicalization. He calls the term inadequate to explain extremism, because the terms (radicalization and extremism) has two different meanings and cannot be coupled together and explain an extremist through a process of radicalization (Gule/Dagbladet: 2015, March 25 [th]).

3.

Articles mentioning radicalization between 1990 – 2011 (Kundnani: 2012: p. 7)

Further, in the same book, in the article ' *Radicalisation: the journey of a concept'* by Arun Kundnani (2012), he discusses the defining and popularity of the term radicalization. He demonstrates through an analysis of the use of the term, an increase in its popularity in academia since 2004. Beneath is a figure that demonstrates the use of the word 'radicalization' and its increase in use in journals from 1990 to 2011.

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What would have been interesting is to see the further development from 2011 till' today, and whether the use of 'radicalization' has increased or declined. From my point of view, the term does not seem to have lost its popularity in the media or in the public and political debate. Unfortunately, I was not able to obtain such statistics.

14.

Radicalization has become the central signifier for counter-terrorism policy. Kundnani suggest that this has led to a creation of a 'suspect communities' of the Muslim population, and that they are being discriminated in several ways. He further suggests a shift in the focus of explaining acts of terrorism, where explanatory reasons for *why* was curtailed in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, whereas to after 2004, radicalization emerged as a response to the need of exploring the process which creates a terrorist, so governments could develop analytically based preventative strategies. He believes policy-makers looked for a new discourse, and not objectively trying to study the origins of terrorism. As a result, the discourses of radicalization are inherently suspicious, and contain discriminatory assumptions. These assumptions are grounded in a belief Kundnani describes as such: " *that those perpetrating terrorist violence are drawn from a larger pool of extremist sympathisers who share an Islamic theology that inspires their actions; that entry into this wider pool of extremists can be predicted by individual or group psychological or theological factors; and that knowledge of these factors could allow government policies that reduce the risk of terrorism"* (2012: p. 5). Further, he identifies a distinguishing between 'old' and 'new' terrorism, where 'old terrorism' originates from nationalist or leftist political violence, whilst new terrorism refers to Islamic theology. He asserts that the 'old terrorism' is less confronted with the question of radicalization. He concludes his essay by saying that radicalization literature has failed in proving a causal effect theology and violence, and that terrorism and radicalization cannot be explained merely with religion, but has to be coupled with several factors of dissent, such as political (Kundnani: 2012: p. 21).

15.

A discourse analysis has been conducted on the British strategy "Prevent", by Martin Thomas (in C. Beaker-Beall et al.: 2015). He identifies a plan that constructs an image of British-value primacy, vulnerability among radicalized people, assigned identities, and a belief in prediction. 'Prevent' is criticized for that, exposing good British values on vulnerable people, and also by influencing communities that feel disassociated with what he calls Britishness with those values, seems to be the solution of the problem. Furthermore, he sees the plan having an inherent assumption that disassociation from the Britishness is perceived as a threat, and that those people are characterized as 'the vulnerable' (2015: p. 190-191). The vulnerability is caused by the individual's economic, social and psychological grievances, and that they therefore are more

vulnerable to the extremist message. Martin calls this a *distancing,* which means that the plan assigns the 'vulnerable' an identity outside of the British normal, because they don't feel connected to the society (2015: p. 194). He then goes on to criticize how the measures in the plan therefore is built upon the assumption that when these vulnerabilities are identified, professionals can operate, locate and intervene towards these individuals considered 'at risk' (2015: p.195). He identifies the British mission as a one that leans on its power to predict, and accurately identify the vulnerable threat (2015: p. 190).

16.

The abovementioned reveals a lot of research on the topic, especially on the British 'Prevent'. What seems to be lacking is research on the policy in a Norwegian context, or at least as I was able to find. I was not able to find any current assessment or evaluation of the Action plan of 2010, or any critical research on the current strategy of 2014. Still, there is a project funded by the Research Council of Norway, in working progress called RADISKAN, where the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI), FAFO and the Department of Anthropology in Aarhus are collaborating. The focus of the project is on what discourses are substantiating the preventative work. Their main source of discourses is the Nordic countries Action Plans against radicalization and violent extremism. Already there has been discovered a link between the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian plans, and that is the notion of civil society's responsibility to detect and prevent radicalization, but also a resting official understanding of radicalization as a product of social exclusion, and social exclusion as a marked 'course' towards extremism. The study is expected to be published in 2018 (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik: 2015: p. 174-175). Aside from this, Norwegian research has been more occupied with different groups of extremists such as right- and left – wing extremism, militant Islamism etc., who they are, and how they operate and on how individuals are radicalized. Some research has been conducted on the preventative efforts, and included a range of societal to individual causes for radicalization and recruitment, and looked at measures, preventative, controlling and repressive, from a critical point of view. But still several of these fields have limited existing research (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik: 2015: p. 234-235).

17.

An overview of knowledge and research in Norway on the subject of radicalization and violent extremism has been assessed. "Research on Prevention of Radicalization and violent Extremism: The Status of Knowledge" (2015) is linked to the publishing of the Action Plan of 2014, and is a result of measure 1; *research strategy* . This measure calls for a systematization of what is existing research on this field (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik: 2015: p. 7). It's developed by the Norwegian Police University Colleges Tore Bjørgo, and Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik. They seek to identify what kind of research there is a lack of, but also what exist in Norway and in the Nordic countries. It is said that there is solid research facilities on the field (Nupi: 2015) Still Bjørgo, and Gjelsvik was able to identify several holes in Norwegian academic research, such as lack of research on women in extreme Islamic milieus, hate crime, the relationship between the violent extreme and the not so extreme. Relevant to this project is how they identified a lack of research on the balance between what they call " *prevention and freedom* " (Bjørgo& Gjelsvik: 2015: p. 256). They assert a need for an examination of the balance between prevention and a society and state that upholds the population's rights, such as rule of law and personal integrity, and that although this is a field that already has extensive research, it is stressed that this cannot be challenged enough (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik: 2015: p. 257).

18.

3.

Theories

1.

A theory is of significance because it is a way of explaining, comprehending and interpreting "reality" (Stoker in Marsh & Stoker: 1995: p. 16). Theory is helpful to determine what factors that are important to be able to explain a phenomenon, event or other occurrences, and what weight to put on each factor influencing the observation (Stoker in Marsh & Stoker: 1995: p. 17).

2.

For this project I chose to include two theories, one building off on the other. This is in order to better grasp the complexity of the subject of radicalization and violent extremism. By using branching theories, they will not differ in such a way that is contradicting and makes deciding what is important or not, difficult and create two different "realities", but rather complement each other and provide deeper insights and perspective to the project, as one of the theories is more specific than the other. I have chosen (social) constructivism as the executive theory, which is present throughout and structures the overall thesis. For the analysis I have included the theory of *securitization.* It is a leg of constructivism and is more focused on the subject of security. Using this approach to theory will provide a more detailed and accurate analysis.

3.

4.

3.1 Constructivism

5.

To start off, constructivism holds three basic ontological positions. First, ideas, thoughts and beliefs matter. This is also called *ideational* structures. In constructivism, the ideational structures matter more, than the material. This is opposed to neo-liberalism and neo-realism, where state interests are also defined by the material (Aguis in Collins: 2010: p.50). The world is given form by processes of social practice and action. Further, the world is constructed by a set of ideas and system of norms, " *which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time and place* " (Jackson & Sørensen: 2013: p. 209), entailing not only social construction, but also historical.

6.

Second, identities of actors are important in constructivism. The identity of actor's guide how they will act and their identity explain the actors' action. Alexander Wendt has been a major contributor to constructivism, and also to the notion of identity. He provides a great example of the constructivist view, and how the world is constructed by beliefs and ideas; " *500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons' because 'the British are friends and the North Koreans are not* " (Wendt: 1995: p. 73). Wendt argues that 'friendship' and 'enemies' is a socially constructed thing, and is a part of how a state identify and place themselves in the international realm. Also, as Martha Finnemore argues; what we want is, to some extent, influenced by norms, rules, and beliefs and by the relationships we have with others (Finnemore: 1996: p. 128).

7.

Third, " *agents and structures are mutually constituted"* . This means that actors create the 'reality', norms and structures, but it influences the actors as well (Arguis in Collins: 2010: p. 51). *Structuration* , as a concept and way of analyzing the connection between structures and actors, was proposed in 1984, by sociologist Anthony Giddens. Structures and rules of social action constrain actors, but because of subjective ideas and thoughts, actors have the ability to change these structures. Structuration theory is much dualistic (Jackson & Sørensen: 2013: p. 210). Important is also the notion that structures and identities are never fixed, and that they can change. An example from Dyrberg, Hansen and Torfing of how identities change, is the increased military interventions by the UN to protect Human Rights. They say this is due to new conditions caused by a number of events and situations that have happened in the world, which again has led to a new priority of Human Rights. They conclude the example by claiming that a new game plan for the UN arose, but also a new identity which seeks to protect Human Rights to a larger degree, rather than respecting sovereignty solely (Dyrberg et. al: 2001: p.8-9). The example is transferable to this context, arguing that using the constructivist approach would be adequate for exploring how governments change identity, ideas and beliefs, and give higher priority to other subjects, due to a change in historical, international and national conditions.

8.

Constructivism, and the origins of the theory, has been influenced by both Immanuel Kant and Max Weber. Kant argued that knowledge of the world is filtered through human consciousness, and because of that; obtained knowledge will always, to some extent, be subjective to that person. It is filtered through our subjective understanding (Agius in Collins: 2010: p. 51). Weber believed that " *human beings rely on understanding of each other's actions and assigning meaning to them* " (Jackson& Sørensen: 2013: p. 211). This means that we assign certain behavior and actions a specific meaning, retrieved from our own subjective knowledge. This concept is often referred to as ' *Verstehen'* . Verstehen refers to people's efforts to try to understand what is being expressed (Aguis in Collins: 2010: p. 51).

9.

When doing constructivist research, identity is central, because we might be interested in looking at actor's interests and actions. Knowing about the identity of the actors can help the researcher locate present preferences and ideas. Considering Wendt's example of US relationship with the UK and North Korea again, knowing about the US preferences and identity goes a far way in explaining their action. Wendt argues the reason for the perceived 'friendship' between the US and UK, comes from a shared understanding (Agius in Collins: 2010: p. 53).

10.

Constructivism emphasizes the social construction of reality. The world can therefore not be an entity of objective research, because everything that the world is constituted of is made by man as such (Jackson & Sørensen: 2013: p. 212). This brings us to the next leg of the theory – theory of securitization.

11.

12.

3.2 Securitization theory

13.

Securitization theory branches from constructivism in that it sees the notion of security as a socially constructed one. Also, whether or not something is perceived as a threat to the security of an object, or to how big extent the threat is, is a subjective matter (Emmers in Collins: 2010: p. 140). The theory of Securitization was largely developed by Ole Wæver in the 90's. There were already preexisting theories of security in security studies, but he contributed with an analytical framework, that would explain how a subject becomes securitized (Mutimer in Collins: 2010: p. 91). This is now called *Securitization Theory.* Another major contributor is Barry Buzan. Both represent the Copenhagen School. This school has developed concepts for rethinking security, in an effort to reconceptualize and redefine the notion and agenda of security studies (Emmers in Collins: 2010: p. 137). The starting point of the theory is that security is about survival. The school has identified five categories of security that the notion of survival is crucial to; military, environmental, economic, societal and political security (Emmers in Collins: 2010: p.137)

14.

The main assumption of securitization theory is that, actors, often politicians, lobbyists, governments and other people usually having power or is occupied with politics; securitize issues, usually within the five categories of security, in existential threat to survival. These are by Buzan and Wæver called *securitizing actors* . The issue is referred to as *referent object* . This object, when securitized, has a ' *legitimate claim to survival'* (Emmers in Collins: 2010: p. 137).

15.

Further, The Copenhagen School has developed a model for analyzing security, in a two-stage process. An issue, or object, can either be non-politicized, politicized and securitized. I will concentrate on explaining the stages politicized and securitized. A politicized issue is a matter of concern that is dealt with in the political and bureaucratic system. It is usually a part of public policy, and is dealt with in a "normal" political procedural way, such as hearings, deliberation etc. Or it is redistributed to decentralized governing offices. A politicized issue becomes a securitized one, when actors frames the issue as under existential threat, and creates a sense of urgency, that needs instant and extraordinary efforts beyond the 'normal' political system (Emmers in Collins: 2010: p. 138-139). Thus, securitization is the act performed by actors that leads to a securitized issue. This indicates that it is something in the way that it is talked about or treated, that creates the outcome. The speech act, in securitization theory, is therefore of importance. The Copenhagen School believes the speech act to be the starting point of a process of securitization. As explained by Emmers; *A securitizing actor uses language to articulate a problem in security terms and to persuade a relevant audience of its immediate danger"* (in Collins: 2010: p. 139). So the actor articulates a discourse of security and it is the audience that then provides the grounds for legitimate, and beyond the normal political system, acts on the issue. Also, the how "well" something is securitized seems to depend on the power of the actor, therefore, the actor tends to be the state (Emmers in Collins: 2010: p. 139).

16.

Though, what is important to mention is that the securitized issue, does not necessarily have to be in total existential threat, in reality as such. But it is in the interest of the actor, to create an image of existential threat. Also, when the audience legitimizes the securitization of an issue, it becomes the reality. An example of how a subject is securitized is how people are more likely to die in a car crash, than a terror attack, but efforts to combat terror are provided with far more financial resources than a project to improve roads and road safety (De Goede: 2008: p. 161). Further, the theory therefore asserts that once a subject is securitized, it will also cause measures that are disproportionate to the actual threat. Emmers also brings out the issue of securitization and how it can be abused in well-established democracies, by legitimizing the curtailing of civil liberties, detaining suspected terrorist without trial, restriction of political institutions and increase in military budgets. He sees this in the context of post-9/11 (Emmers in Collins: 2010: p. 142).

17.

What is securitization theory interested in knowing about? I am presenting Emmers' five questions that demonstrate the securitization theory model. First, the theory is occupied with *who* the actors are. Who is securitizing? Who is the speech act of securitization coming from? This could be ranging from individual level, to group and institutional level and international level. Secondly, it seeks to know *who* or *what* needs to be protected according to the actors. Thirdly, *what* is the 'who' or 'what ' to be protected from? Naturally, there must be something causing the threat, whether its climate change, migration, globalization or something else. Fourth, *who decides* what is seen as a security issue? In order for something to be fully and successfully securitized, one needs an audience that is convinced there is a security threat present that needs to be dealt with. That audience, if its society, a specific group or elite, decides whether it is a security threat. But in order to have an impact on government decision, it has to be an audience with sufficient power. Fifth and lastly; *what means* should be deployed to handle the threat? These means should be extraordinary and can go beyond the normal political procedure. As mentioned above, they can also have unfortunate implications (Emmers in Collins: 2010: p. 149-150).

18.

I chose to ad on the securitization theory, because I believe that although constructivism is a good theory for the overall thesis, that can explain the ideas and beliefs, and interests behind the governments image of reality, and how that is portrayed in the action plans, securitization theory can provide adequate explanation for incidences of securitization, and what security

can do. It can help with a deeper understanding of causes and implications of a securitized issue can have in terms of Human Rights, democracy and rule of law (Taureck: 2006: p. 4).

19.

4.

Methods

1.

The method I have chosen for this study is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA is one out of many versions of discourse analysis. The version of CDA I intend to use is that of Norman Fairclough. This is due the models well developed and concrete analytical tools, which makes it easier to apply when doing an empirical analysis (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 72).

2.

There has been a growth in the interest of discourse analysis in social sciences as a qualitative method. This is due to a newfound realization of the importance of language, behavior, ideas and concepts, and how this is loaded with assumptions about 'reality' (Burnham et al.: 2004: p. 242). Often discourse analysis literature evolves around the reproduction of discourses, and those who have the ability to reproduce them, such as politicians, lobbyists, and journalists. Action is therefore constrained, and the public is guided in how to respond to particular occurrences. *"It is the function of discourse analysis to reveal the bases of these common assumptions and to show how they relate to different interests in society"* (Burnham et al: 2004: p. 242). Due to the abovementioned I found constructivism as theory to fit well with a Critical Discourse analytical method. Further, many agrees to, when using this approach, that it is not desirable to follow a traditional scientific guide, not to emphasize a testable hypotheses or to have a rigid research design, but rather to do in-depth and careful qualitative research. Though, this does not mean that a discourse analytic approach is less reliable or striving to conduct accurate research (Burnham et al: 2004: p. 246).

3.

With this as an outset, I will now outline the premises of the Fairclough model, with emphasis on the three-dimensional model, which I have used as a design for my research. Then, in this chapter I explain how I have conducted the analysis, and with what 'tools', and also outline the data collection process, methodological challenges and demarcations. The chapter is somewhat two folded, where the first part of the chapter describes the theoretical part of Critical Discourse Analysis, while the second part describes the methodological and practical tools that I have applied to my analysis.

4.

4.1 Critical Discourse Analysis: In Theory

5.

Critical Discourse Analysis is a qualitative research method, occupied with language used as a power resource, and to examine the relationship between discourses and socio-cultural change (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p.72). The idea is that language is constructed in patterns, which our statements are bound by, depending on different social settings, and a discourse analysis aims to analyze those patterns that constitute a social "world" (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 9). Critical Discourse Analysis is one of several discourse analysis approaches. Michel Foucault was a major contributor to the developing of theories and terminology in discourse analysis (Bryman: 2012: p.536), for example, "he was interested in the rules for what statements was accepted as meaningful and true in a specific historical timeframe" (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 21). He believed that truth was constructed by discourse, and therefore bound by some "rules" – today, most types of discourse analysis' share this view (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p.22).

6.

There are also several approaches within CDA, but they all share some common ground, these are outlined by Jørgensen and Phillips as follows;

•

" Social and cultural processes and structures partially have a linguistic-discursive character.

•

Discourse is both constituting and constituted, meaning it is an important part of creating the social world *and* is constituted by other social practices.

•

Language should be analyzed empirical in its social context.

•

Discourse is ideological, meaning that its practice contributes to create and reproduce power between different groups.

•

Critical research, meaning that the approach is not politically independent or neutral, but is engaged in social change" (1999: p.73-76).

1.

2.

For my research I chose Norman Fairclough's model of CDA. I chose this because it is said to be useful when examining discourse as a part of social practice. This is of importance already at the developing of a research question, where the question should be in relation to fields occupied with social practice, like political science (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 76 & 89). It also, unlike poststructuralist discourse analysis, assumes that discourse is also constituted, not only constituting, meaning that not only discourses create knowledge and power relations, also other social practices is important, such as institutions, identity and economic systems (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 77 and Fairclough: 2006: p. 9). Therefore, Fairclough's model is highly *relational* – it is not only concerned with discourse itself, but the relations between discourse and other social elements of life, with a focus on process and change (Fairclough: 2006: p. 10). His model for analysis is often based on an ontological critical realism, approaching discourse not only as a discourse, but also in relationship to non-discursive elements (Bryman: 2012: p.537). Fairclough emphasizes that a social constructivist theory, and the recognition of a socially constructed reality, is consistent with realism (Sayer (2000) in Fairclough: 2006: p.18).

3.

Fairclough's model for CDA is three dimensional – three 'levels of analysis'. So when analyzing a text, one should pay attention to (1) the text itself and the language, (2) text production- and consuming, meaning how the writers of the text draws on former discourses, and the readers interpret the text using former discourses, and (3) the wider context and social practice the text is a part of (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 80).

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
Faircloughs three-dimensional model

14.

15.

I believe this to benefit my research in such a way that it enables me to not only examine the Action Plans itself, but also in what context, and will allow me to answer for example the question of how the politics of the current government have influenced the plan at hand, or if, and how it has been inspired by other documents.

16.

The model suggests how to analyze the text in three different levels, and these can be analyzed separately. When analyzing the discursive practice (second square in the model), one is interested in how the text is produced (writers) and consumed (audience), and how discourses and genres are articulated in the text (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 81 & 93). In relation to my work, this might mean looking at if the people that developed the plans was appointed, and appointed by whom. Or if there was any organizations or other groups involved in deciding the content.

17.

When analyzing the text itself, one is looking to find out how the discourse appears textually. For this Fairclough suggest several tools like ethos, metaphors, choice of words and grammar (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 95). These are just suggestion, so other methods for analyzing text are also available. The intention of this kind of analysis will be to look for how choice of words for example creates a sentence, and the implications that sentence can have on how we perceive a term or phenomenon, e.g. radicalization.

18.

After having analyzed the text and discursive practice, it is time to put it in context – the outer box in the model above. Jørgensen and Phillips points out two important aspects with this part of the analysis; (1) the effort in trying to identify the non-discursive practices, and relations that is a part of the framework for the discursive practice, and (2) drawing lines between the discursive practice, and the bigger order of discourse it is a part of (1999: p. 98). The third 'level of analysis' is much a discussion about the discursive practice, and how it produces, reproduces, or restructures the order of discourse, and what consequences it might have for the social practice (and context) (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 82). It should be said that it is not the intention to get 'behind' the discourse. This is an embedded premise for doing a discourse analysis, especially with a social constructivist positioning, that reality can never fully be reached and always will be somewhat subjective. The analysts' intention should be directed towards the actual discourse, what is being said, and how a certain way of presenting a discourse might have social consequences (Jørgensen &Phillips: 1999: p. 31).

19.

20.

4.2 Critical Discourse Analysis: In Practice

21.

In this part of the chapter I intend to outline and describe what tools and methods I have applied in my analysis of the texts, and how. Fairclough has written several books and articles on how to do a Critical Discourse Analysis. In this study I have mainly used his " *Analysing discourse; Textual analysis for social research*" from 2003, and " *Language and Globalization*" from 2006. In these works he provides detailed suggestions on how to empirically analyze a text, applying his model, with thoroughly outlined examples and explanations of different tools. I chose these because they are more detailed and contain step-by-step guidelines. Other works of Fairclough I understand as more abstract and general in its explanation and ways of applying the model, and only scratching the surface of what a CDA can contain.

22.

Norman Fairclough has developed an approach to conducting the analysis in his *Analyzing discourse: Textual analysis for social research* from 2003. I have extracted six steps from Fairclough that make up a rough framework for the analysis (2003: 128-129)

1.

Uncovering the main topic in the text

2.

Identify the position/perspective/ of the writers.

3.

Examine the linguistics.

4.

Identify discourses, through looking at main 'themes' from the "world" (also areas of social life).

5.

Place the text into a context. What is the text a response to?

1.

4.2.1 How to identify discourses?

2.

Fairclough proposes two ways of looking at discourses. First, it is discourses as representing some particular part of the 'world'. Second, that discourses is representing the 'world' from a particular point of view. If we choose to understand discourses in this way, he further suggest that, when identifying discourses one can look for the *main parts of the world* or what he also calls *main themes* in the text, and also identify from what perspective they are represented (Fairclough: 2003: p. 129). I will explain themes below.

3.

Themes can hold a range of different perspectives and representations, and clusters of arguments. Main themes can characterize a larger subject, such as radicalization and violent extremism (Fairclough: 2006: 144 & 160). 'Themes' is therefore not only one way of identifying discourses, but can also be used as a tool for the analysis. As an example, Fairclough applies themes as a tool in his short CDA of the 'war on terror' in his book " *Language and Globalization* " (2006). He does this to exemplify to the reader how to identify discourses and to illustrate how arguments, narratives and discourses are associated with those central themes (Fairclough: 2006: p. 144). I have applied this tool to my analysis in order to discover the discourses present in the Action Plans.

4.

Discourses may also contain different vocabularies, though they might overlap to a high degree. This means that different discourses may use the same word, but in different ways, and assign different meaning to the words. To uncover this pattern, one should focus on the semantic relations. It is suggested that the researcher looks for frequently used words, and the word that either precedes it immediately, or some (two, three, four) words away. For example, is the word preceded by a word with negative or positive connotation (Fairclough: 2003: p. 131)? The findings may say something about the perspective of the writer.

5.

Assumptions, either value, existential or propositional assumptions, can be linked to certain discourses. It can function as a distinction, or variable, between discourses. This link is potentially there due to the fact that some assumptions are, to some degree, universally held by society at large. Arguments in discourses often rest upon assumptions related specific to it (Fairclough: 2003: p. 132). Like 'themes', 'assumptions' can also be used as a tool for analysis of the documents, and not only for identifying discourses. Assumptions, more specifically value assumptions, have been applied to my analysis – I will later come back to outlining and discussing assumptions as a tool for analysis.

6.

Other ways of delineating discourses is by seeing discourse as an analytical term, as suggested by Jørgensen & Phillips. This would allow the researcher to demarcate the world into a size and so create a frame for the study, making it possible to determine a discourse strategically related to the research question and purpose. Meaning, that it would be the material of the researchers choosing that will demarcate the "distance" between each discourse (1999: p. 149). Using this type of approach the researcher is assigned the task of constructing discourses, rather than just discovering them. In this study I have therefore decided to treat discourse as an analytical term, to better be able to discover and analyze discourses, because I set the 'size', making myself able to decide how big the frame for including and excluding discourses should be, with a focus on relevance.

7.

4.2.2 Actors

8.

The 'actors' related to a text are of great importance in a Critical Discourse Analysis. The actors are usually the writers of the text. These can also be called "social agents". They have the power to influence the content and texturing of the text. Still, there are usually existing constrains on language, due to i.e. the genre. Fairclough uses the example of an interview, where there are certain conventions on how to talk during an interview. In this study, the genre of the text is typically a governmental text, which often has constraints in forms of language, such as formal tone, a set layout for governmental documents, and also limitations on a theme, i.e. radicalization and violent extremism. Therefore, actors are socially constrained by the *social structures* , but there is still a lot of room for constructing 'a world' (Fairclough: 2003: p. 22). In this text, the writers represent the current government. The implications this has for the text is that the discourses are representations of how they are positioned towards a specific social practice, i.e. radicalization and violent extremism.

9.

Related to the actor is the audience, the readers, of the text. The Action Plans are both of a 'preventionist' character, and they contain lists of actors related to this type of work. This is actors they are trying to reach with the documents. It is therefore natural to believe that the receivers of these texts are first-line workers, such as the police, child protection/welfare services, schools etc., but also organizations, the local communities, friends, workplaces and others. Also, the measures outlined in both plans, have assigned responsibility to different ministries. We can therefore assume that they also are intended receivers. Perhaps it is useful to divide them into primary and secondary receivers. The primary receivers will then be the ministries, which would have the overall responsibility for the measures, and also the responsibility of reaching the executers of the measures, as mentioned would be the schools, police, local communities and so forth. Therefore, the secondary receivers would be the latter mentioned.

10.

Although the plans have targeted audience, it is reasonable to expect the plans to reach a wider audience. At least it possesses the potential to do so. This is due to two factors; both plans are accessible electronically, but also in Norwegian and English. The information, and the discourses, therefore has a heightened possibility of reaching both intended, but also unintended audience, with the information in the text.

11.

4.2.3 Tools

12.

For the selection of tools to use to analyze the texts, it makes sense to only apply those that fit both the research question and the chosen data material – those of relevance. Still, there may be many tools that are of relevance, so it is up to the researcher to decide which ones that is to be applied. I have applied those that are of relevance, *and* , that are reoccurring. For instance,

there is no need to apply a tool and look for, for example, metaphors, if this only occurs once, and is not of significance to the research objective or question. I stress doing a textual analysis, to incorporate and take advantage of all stages from the model I apply.

13.

4.2.3.1 Argumentation

14.

The book "Political Discourse Analysis" suggests looking at argumentation in discourses as a way of representing reality and 'the world' (Fairclough & Fairclough: 2012: p 1). "Ways of representing the world enter as premises into reasoning about what we should do (Fairclough & Fairclough: 2012: p. 86-87)". So how we represent the world, are bound by our understanding and interpretation of it, and again control our reasoning about what we should do about it. Isabela and Norman Fairclough suggest a model for how to analyze arguments, and evaluate practical reasoning in arguments, by setting up a figure for practical reasoning. By reconstructing an argument like in the suggested model, it is easier to identify how an actor represents the world, and also *why* (the reasons for the claim) it is argued that way, by identifying the goals and values of the actor. Often, as the authors stress, the context (*circumstances* in the model) is the problem, at least according to the actors' values, and the claim for action is the solution to that problem (Fairclough & Fairclough: 2012: p. 44).

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24.

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                    ┌─────────────────────────────┐
                    │ Claim for action:           │
                    │ Agent (presumably) ought to  │
                    │ do A.                        │
                    └─────────────────────────────┘
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┌──────────────────────┐  ┌──────────────────────┐  ┌──────────────────────┐
│ Goal (G): Agent's     │  │ Circumstances (C):    │  │ Means - Goal (M-G): If│
│ goal, i.e. eradicate  │  │ Agent's context of    │  │ the agent does A, he  │
│ radicalization and    │  │ action: natural,      │  │ will (presumably)     │
│ extremist forces in   │  │ social, institutional │  │ achieve G.            │
│ society. Prevent      │  │ facts                 │  │                       │
│ terror.               │  │                       │  │                       │
└──────────────────────┘  └──────────────────────┘  └──────────────────────┘
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┌──────────────────────┐
│ Values (V): What the  │
│ Agent is actually     │
│ concerned with or     │
│ ought to be concerned │
│ with                  │
└──────────────────────┘
```

Structure of practical argument (Fairclough & Fairclough: 2012: p. 45)

25.

26.

Practical reasoning is defined by them as " *argumentation for or against a particular way of acting that can ground decision* " (2012: p. 1). To exemplify this, I use the example from securitization theory, where an actor securitize something by arguing for the existential threat of, let's say, the nation. The actor may argue in favor of a particular way of acting, in order to secure the nation. If he successfully convinces the audience with his argument, this can lead to a decision to act the way purposed by the actor.

27.

Evaluating the argumentation in a text can be beneficial as to uncover claims to action, and the goals, circumstances and values that support the action, and ask critical questions about the argumentation (Fairclough & Fairclough: 2012: p. 120).

28.

4.2.3.2 Narrative and explanation

29.

Narratives and explanations are closely linked to argumentation. The narrative and/or explanation usually precede the argument, to provide context, and cause for action. Because CDA says analysis should focus on discourses, as a way of representing reality, because it provides reasons for action, non-argumentative tools, such as narratives and explanations can provide useful insights. This is due to narratives and explanations function in argumentation, as they are embedded as explanations is to, and provide reasons as to why one should act (Fairclough & Fairclough: 2012: p.1). "It is pointless unless we see them as feeding into and influencing processes of decision-making, or premises in arguments for action" (Fairclough & Fairclough: 2012: p. 3).

30.

In times of crisis, the narrative that 'wins' the dominant position in society, might also have effect on what policies is chosen. We can assume that politicians and others concerned with politics want people to accept a particular narrative of a crisis or

special event, because it provides reason to accept a certain type of policy (Fairclough & Fairclough: 2012: p. 4). A narrative fills an event with meaning, and narratives are subjective, and can therefore differ from actor to actor (Fairclough: 2006: p. 116). Narratives can for example be condensed, and the explanation can lack agency, in terms of lack people responsible for an action.

31.

Evaluating and analyzing narratives and explanations can give insight to what an actor 'blames' or account the crisis, and the argument that determines the course of action. It is suggested to divide explanations and narratives into whether the blame is attributed a systemic origin (of the crisis) or a non-systemic. The systemic origin attributes the cause of 'the crisis' to the system, for example; the economy is the reason for high real estate prices. Here, the crisis in the real estate market is caused by the economy, and the system which the economy is a part of. Non-systemic origin of a crisis can for example be *people* , and a moral or intellectual failure of the people (Fairclough & Fairclough: 2012: p. 6-7). How a context is represented, and a crisis accounted, is usually in accordance with the actors goal, and preferred way of acting, and can therefore be valuable to assess in an analysis.

32.

4.2.3.3 Assumption & Presuppositions

33.

Assumptions are often what are taken for granted, and the implicit meaning of texts (Fairclough: 2003: p. 212). We assume that things are a certain way. There is usually an underlying belief that meanings are shared, and can be taken as a fact or a given, and that there exists some form of common ground. Fairclough distinguishes between three different types of assumptions, these are:

-

Existential assumption; assumptions about what exists. Examples are globalization, democracy, which is often personified as 'it'.

-

Propositional assumption; Assumptions about what is or can be or will be the case.

-

Value assumptions; assumption about what is good or desirable. Because we have different values, we have different opinions of what is good or desired (Fairclough: 2003: p. 55).

1.

When texts have assumption, there is an implicitly believed shared value system between the writer, and the audience, or the receiver of the text. The values do not necessarily have to be accepted by either party. Uncovering assumptions in a text can therefore be valuable to my study, in uncovering where the authors identifies themselves, and for example what values they are committed to.

2.

4.2.3.4 Legitimation

3.

Commonly, political activity in democratic societies seeks legitimation. It needs to be acknowledged, usually on a widespread basis, what is done, and why it is done. Legitimation in text can vary in the degree they are implicitly or explicitly forwarded. Legitimation of an action can be referred to through for example narratives or explanation of a context, like legitimation of action, due to some kind of risk or danger. And analysis can therefore uncover the strategies of legitimation (Fairclough: 2003: p. 219). Mass media, both nationally and internationally, was an important factor in the legitimation of the 'war on terror', because it appealed to what Fairclough called 'distant suffering', giving the US a worldwide (at least Western) sympathy, and approval to go to war, on terror (Fairclough: 2006: p. 142). Assessing the legitimation gives an analysis awareness to which instruments is applied in a text. Legitimation can for example be used as a way to legitimize policies, that ultimately can curtail democratic principles and values in times of (what might be portrayed as) 'crisis'.

4.

4.2.3.5 Modality

5.

Modality , 'measures' the level of commitment the authors make to the different statements, demands, offers or question they put forth in the text. It can signal whether to author is vague, in doubt or certain about a something written (or said). Fairclough distinguishes four 'speech functions'; statements, questions, demands and offers. The two former he refers to as knowledge exchange (i.e. statements; 'I am a girl', questions; 'are you a girl?'), and the two latter as activity exchange (i.e. demands; 'Open the door', offers; 'let me open the door') (Fairclough: 2003: p. 165). These speech functions can all have

levels of modality, and mark how an author is either committed to the 'truth' (statements & questions), to obligation or necessity (demands), or to act (offers) (Fairclough: 2003: p. 167-168).

6.

How to identify modality in a text? Usually, modality has markers. Some of these Fairclough refers to as "archetypical markers of modality", such as 'can', 'will', 'may', 'must', 'should' etc. – modal verbs (Fairclough: 2003: p. 168). Also adverbs, such as 'possibly', 'always' etc., and participial adjectives, such as 'allowed', can help determine the level of commitment (Fairclough: 2003: p. 170).

7.

By establishing the level of modality and the modal choices in a text, it is possible to see how the author identifies themselves. It is as such of importance to the texturing of identity. "(…) what you commit yourself to is a significant part of what you are" (Fairclough: 2003: p. 166). For example, are strong commitments to truth, such as predictions of what *will* happen, common from politicians and governments. This is, as Fairclough assert, due to their socially ratified power of prediction. Predictions of the future can be part of a legitimizing move about what we should/should not do (Fairclough: 2003: 167).

8.

9.

10.

4.3 Sampling

11.

" *The selection of cases who are relevant to the research question* " (Bryman: 2012: p. 14). In my study I am doing a *purposive sampling* , meaning the selection of documents are not based on a random selection, but rather chosen strategically in relevance to my research question (Bryman: 2012: p. 418). The research question should function as a guide to what needs to be collected.

12.

Radicalization and violent extremism is a hot debated social phenomenon, and I found it interesting to look at it from a governmental view. Looking at the Action plan can say something of how the government interpret the problem, how they interpret what an extremist is, and what other social issues that might be involved in the problem (interdiscursivity). But also how they, based on how they interpret the problem, seek to solve it. The Action plan can be seen as an official expression of a problem, and the national strategy. When putting this in context with a Critical Discourse Analytic model, we can identify possible consequences of the discourse, and change, and a dominant way of understanding this issue.

13.

I have chosen to use the English version of the Action plans. Because a discourse analysis pays close attention to language, I considered it appropriate and with attention to accuracy, to analyze the English version, when I am writing in English. I do not wish to affect the analysis with my translation of the documents. Because my translations might hold my interpretation of different words, and also that I might ascribe different value to some words, the analysis might be affected in a way that I will not be able to grasp what the government is actually saying. Therefore, to be more accurate and to get more reliable answers from my analysis, I find it best to use the English version. Still, there can be a downside to this. Because the English version already is a translated one, some of the original meaning might have gotten lost in translation, and both the governments understanding and my own interpretation of the English word, can have affected the original meaning of the document. I have also checked, and compared the Norwegian versions to the English ones, in order to be sure that they are accurately and directly translated, and that no parts have been left out, added or altered.

14.

The delimitation down to these two Action Plans is based on the simple fact that there are only those two that exist. Prior to the publishing of the Action Plans, efforts and strategies towards radicalization and extremism, has been more generalized in the general prevention of crime and terror as such. Examples of these efforts are "The Government's Prevention Strategy. Fellowship – security – equality", and "Forces for good – Crime Prevention Action Plan. 35 measures to improve security", both of 2009 (AP: 2010: p. 8). Neither of these documents even contains the terms "radicalization" or "extremism". It would have been interesting to include documents of such kind in the analysis, but that would probably affect the study's ability to be focused and narrow, and evolve in to a too wide project.

15.

There are other ways of researching the government's discourses on radicalization and violent extremism, for example through newspaper articles, or through published material on the government website. I did not choose this, on the grounds that most of this is usually written by one person, often representing the government, but is still in fact *one* person. As I

wanted to grasp the official, and unified agreed positioning towards radicalization and violent extremism, I saw it expedient to go forth with an analysis of the Action Plans, because it represents the government as whole, and therefore fitting my research questions.

16.

17.

4.4 Data Collection

18.

When it comes to data collection, Wodak and Meyer proposes that there is no specific way of gathering data when doing a Critical Discourse Analysis, simply because it is, by many not considered a specific phase. " *Some authors do not even mention sampling, while other scholars strongly rely on traditions based outside the sociolinguistic field"* (2009: p. 23). Further, they also emphasize how data collection in CDA is not a step that needs to be finished before the analysis can take place, but can be a continuous process (Wodak & Meyer: 2009: p.27). The collected data is usually depending on what type of discourse one wants to research and what objectives are at the researchers mind (Alba-Juez: 2009: p. 26). The process of data collection is therefore closely linked to the social problem, rather than a precise research question. This also accords with the 'critical' in discourse analysis, in terms of wanting change ((Wetherell et.al (2001) in Alba-Juez: 2009: p. 251).

19.

After a first collection has been made, researchers should focus on carrying out the first analyses. Looking for indicators for concepts, and putting concepts in categories, might spark the need for more information and further data collection (Wodak & Meyer: 2009: p. 24). I experienced this first hand, as I intentionally wanted to explore only the Action Plan of 2014, when I later discovered there was one preceding this, namely the Action Plan of 2010.

20.

When doing a discourse analysis, it is possible to supplement the study with other sources of data, such as conducting interviews and transcribing them, reception study on how the audience or target groups perceive the text, observation etc. I have chosen to exclude this from my research, because an analysis of the Action Plans is already highly time consuming.

21.

The data collected, is concerned with a relatively small time period, from 2010 to 2014, which makes the analysis demarcated and focused concerning both the timeframe and space, but also with regard to accuracy in an attempt to answer the research question. Because the texts I have chosen has a time span, it is *diachronic* . Oxford dictionaries define diachronic especially relating to language (Oxford Dictionaries; *diachronic)* . It can be defined as something moving over time. The Action Plans has been available in print, and on the government website.

22.

23.

4.5 Methodological challenges

24.

Jørgensen and Phillips emphasizes the rarity in CDA for researchers to reveal what means have been used to identify their discourses, and also the discourse content. According to them, it is especially rare with those using larger quantities of data (1999: p. 153). As a remedy, they suggest looking at other people's work to get an idea of how this is done, but this proved to be more difficult in reality. In my struggle for a method to identify discourses, I looked at other Master Theses' and different works from Fairclough, Van Djik and Wodak to mention some. It struck me as odd that few gave a detailed outlining of their approach to discourses, because it is demanded of research, in order to create reliability, that the researcher provides transparency (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 152). I have dealt with this is such a way, that I have explained how a discourse can be demarcated, and suggested several approaches, and created awareness around the subjectivity of the researcher when 'choosing' a discourse.

25.

I found Critical Discourse Analysis to be highly challenging, because this was a method unfamiliar to me when I started this project. To achieve a full understanding of the method, and how to properly employ it, was difficult and resulted in a extensive reading of different books on method. This was very time consuming work. Still, this is also much of the reason for my choice in approach to CDA ended up with Fairclough's three-dimensional model, because this is a detailed and well developed model.

26.

Another methodological concern might be the relative low number in tools for the textual analysis I have selected, compared to the great 'universe' of possible tools for analysis. How do you know if you chose the right ones, and what is *right* ? I found

this to be subjective to the researcher, and what he/she considers relevant to the chosen data material, to answer the research question, and which could give interesting answers.

27.

According to Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, there are little focus in CDA on criteria for quality, such as objectivity, reliability and validity. Further, full objectivity is nearly impossible in Critical Discourse Analysis, because we must assume that the researcher has embedded beliefs, thoughts and preconceptions that will affect the analysis (Meyer & Wodak: 2009: p.32). It is suggested that it should at least be accessible to the groups under study (Meyer & Wodak: 2009: p. 31).

28.

5.

Analysis

1.

The first part of the empirical analysis is textually and discursively oriented, whilst the next chapter focuses on the social practice, and possible consequences of the discourses and the Action plans.

2.

As mentioned above, Fairclough's three-dimensional model for doing analysis, has allowed this study to analyze the text, discursive practice, and social practice separately. Below I will go forth with presenting my findings from the analysis. A discourse theoretical opening to an analysis is usually an examination of a phenomenon, such as a text, speech, article etc., and why it came to exist, and also a theoretical hypothesis about a dislocation which the phenomenon is being seen as the answer to (Dyrberg et al.: 2001: p.134). Although I am not applying a concrete discourse theoretical framework, I consider this argument relevant for my project. If we consider the Action Plans as the phenomenon, which has been examined, and that the dislocation the plans are an answer to is the problem of radicalization and violent extremism in the Norwegian society. Further, the argument suggests that, there is nothing in the problem itself that would naturally advocate for an Action plan as the solution, hence it is contingent. Still, it is also clear that the Action plans was an apparent choice, because several other European governments had issued similar plans prior to the Norwegian ones, and it was therefore already in the discursive terrain (Dyrberg et al.: 2001: p. 144). I find the argument interesting, because it places the documents in a setting of discursive practice already from the outset and as a part of constructed, political norm and as a "taken for granted- ness" in the discourse of radicalization and violent extremism.

3.

I will go forth with the analysis of the documents, starting with setting the *order of discourse* .

4.

5.

5.1 Order of discourse

6.

Jørgensen& Phillips suggest setting the order of discourse, as a framework for the analysis. Determining what the order of discourse is can be a natural way of demarcating groups of discourses for analysis. It also might make the work of analyzing and detecting where there might be struggle or conflict between discourses, or where there is continuity or change, easier. Also, it is a help to see what is *not* being said, and taken for granted. (1999: p.147-148)

7.

The order of discourse is a set of discourses in the same field (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 70). Fairclough defines an order of discourse as a social space, where discourses overlap partially in the same terrain, or field. Simultaneously, they 'compete' over filling this terrain with meaning in their own way. The order of discourse is the space of potential discursive conflict (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 69 & 147).

8.

Further, the order of discourse is the designation of the discourses that are used in a social institution or social domain, for example the order of discourse in schools. Meaning that within that order, there exist a number of discursive practices (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 80). Fairclough calls the order of discourse the discursive or, semiotic moment of social practices (Fairclough: 2006: p. 31). It is the linguistic element of (networks of) social practices (Fairclough: 2003: p. 24). The order contains different aspects, a *relationship* , that is socially ordered between the different ways of 'talking'. Continuing with the examples of schools, there can be a dominant way of teaching, and conducting teacher-class relationship, but there can be alternative ways of teaching, in the same school (Fairclough: 2001: p. 233).

9.

Operationalized, the text is to be analyzed as a part of the order of discourse, and ask where this event fits in with the bigger picture, and where the discursive practices might contribute to change or reproduction (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p.82). Fairclough explains it as two dimensions, that both needs attention; text, and the order of discourse. He stresses that one has to compare the concrete practice, i.e. the social event (text), with the order it fits in to (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 145).

10.

But how to identify and set the 'order of discourse'? Discourse theory operates with the term 'floating signifiers'. These are terms that different actors try to impact with, and assign different meaning to. Words like democracy, globalization, and radicalization can be floating signifiers. Discourses fight over filling terms like the abovementioned with a dominant meaning. Jørgensen and Phillips therefore suggest that 'floating signifiers' is a good tool for delineating the order of discourse. They use the example of democracy, which can point to an order of several political discourses, that all tries to define democracy in their preferred way (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 154).

11.

Fairclough himself has a tendency in his studies when identifying the order of discourse, to link it to the institution under examination, for example, the school, hospital, government etc. (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 147). I, however, have chosen to link it to the domain, or phenomenon. I have identified the order of discourse to be "preventing radicalization and violent extremism". This is due to how all the discourses that I have identified, are surrounded along the phenomenon on how to prevent "radicalization and violent extremism". Naturally, this is because of the nature and the purpose of the documents.

12.

The order has a descriptive, and a normative level. Preventing radicalization and violent extremism on a descriptive level says something about the concrete measures in the text, on how to prevent it, what that process and work should consist of, and who is responsible for doing it. The normative aspect of the order is directed towards a notion of values, such as human rights, democracy and security, and the ideal of an inclusive, integrated, tolerating and 'extremist free' society.

13.

14.

5.2 "Collective security – shared responsibility"

15.

" Collective security – shared responsibility" is the official name of the first action plan for prevention of radicalization and violent extremism that was issued by a Norwegian government. It was published December 1 st, 2010 (The Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police (from now referred to as Ministry of Justice): 30.11.2010). At this time the threat level towards Norway was considered low. However, the Government was informed that, due to the international situation, where other countries had experienced greater terrorist attacks, and also 'signs' in the Norwegian society, that this might change in the nearest future (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 5). The plan was published by the second Stoltenberg government, a social democratic government. The primary goal was to make sure extreme views and beliefs were not turned into action. The intention was a broad approach, with four prioritized areas; more knowledge and information, strengthen the authorities' interaction, strengthen dialog and involvement, and support for vulnerable people (The Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police: 01.12.2010).

16.

The government said they had worked on this plan continuously since 2008, and called it ' *a groundbreaking work* ' (ibid).

17.

5.2.1 Actors

18.

The most visible actor is the government itself – the writers. The writers were a coalition government, consisting of the Labour party, the Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party, leading a Social-Democratic political line. The plan was issued by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police, led by Minister Knut Storberget, and are available online, at www.regjeringen.no . The minister is the only person, mentioned by name, that 'speaks' in the plan, through the introduction. The rest of the plan has a governmental 'voice'.

19.

The process of creating the plan is explained in the second annex (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p.36) in the plan. There was held seminars to exchange information, with relevant ministries, and agencies such as The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Police Directorate, The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), and drafts was later sent to scientist at the Norwegian Police University College (PHS), Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI) and The Norwegian Correctional Services' Education Centre, to mention some. Further, the government gathered international inspiration, and visited the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands – countries which all have Action Plans on radicalization and violent extremism. Religious and minority

establishments and councils where also involved in the dialogue, and given the opportunity to come forth with opinions, in meetings with the Ministry of Justice and the Police. Participants have been the Islamic Council of Norway, The Muslim Student Association, The Norwegian Organization for Asylum seekers, Mira Centre, and The Contact Committee for Immigrants and the Authorities (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 36).

20.

Seemingly, there has been many hands put to work in the developing of this plan, and the process seems quite transparent with an outlining of who has participated. But it is not clear, however, who contributed with what, how much, and what has been excluded in the deliberating process. Therefore, it is difficult to establish each contributors influence on the plan.

21.

5.2.2 Tools

22.

I will now go forth with presenting the findings from the textual analysis of "Collective security – Shared responsibility" of 2010. This part of the analysis represents the inner box of Fairclough's three dimensional model concerning *text* . Overall, the Action Plan contains various phrases of political character, and I perceive it to promote the current governments own political agenda at the time. There is a considerable awareness to the notion of inclusion, collective responsibility and efforts, and social equity – all features of the social democratic agenda. It's preoccupied with areas of politics commonly heatedly debated in Norway, such as immigration policy, and promotes a responsibility of the welfare state to offer public services, such as housing. It is a social and political prevention strategy.

23.

I found it logic to separate my findings, in sub-chapters for each tool, for the sake of structure. Although, I have separated them here, many of the phrases in the text contain several elements from different tools. Many of the instances of argumentation, narratives, assumptions and so forth, are highly intertwined. Still, in order to maintain structure and logic to my arguments, the findings from my textual analysis of the Action Plan of 2010 are written under several sub-chapters, the same will be for the Action Plan of 2014, in chapter 5.3.

24.

The analysis shows several instances of all the tools I have applied. The text contains argumentation, narratives, assumptions etc. I will highlight some with direct quotations from the text, and explain how it is an instance of modality, legitimation, assumption, argumentation or a narrative/explanation. As mentioned above, a phrase can contain, for example, both an assumption and an argument. I intend to demonstrate an example of this from the text as well.

25.

5.2.2.1 Argumentation

26.

There are several arguments in the text, many of which that argues and establishes, the risk of radicalization, the worst possible consequence, what needs to be done, and why. I have extracted an argument from the foreword:

27.

" *Norway is one of the safest countries in the world, and creating a safe and secure society is a fundamental aim of every government. Those who choose to use violence and terror cause anxiety and fear and must be fought against and prosecuted. We have a responsibility to take a precautionary approach. Providing protection is also about prevention, both here in Norway and internationally* " (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 5).

28.

Then applied in Fairclough & Fairclough's model for argumentation, which deconstructs the argument;

29.

Claim for action : Fight and prosecute those who are terrorists.

30.

Circumstances : Terrorists causing fear and anxiety in the safest country in the world. Radicalization is happening in society.

31.

Means-Goal : If we adopt a precautionary approach, we will reach the goal, which is to secure and protect Norway.

32.

Goal : Secure and protect the Norwegian society and democracy.

33.

Value : Democratic set of values, which opposes those who use violence to accomplish their goals.

34.

This argument highlights the Government as acting on the basis of moral and democratic values. They will use legal methods to pursue terrorists, and protect the society which is not founded on a regime of fear and anxiety, but rather on principles they believe democracy is built on . Argumentation is about setting a premise for, and arguing for or against something, so that the action taken is the one of the 'arguer'. In this text, the Government is concerned with dialogue as means to cope with the risk of radicalization and 'worst case scenario';

35.

" *We must do more to prevent undesirable behavior before it is too late and we must do so in a broad perspective. We must resolve conflicts, rather than aggravate and create new ones and we must choose dialogue rather than creating a divide between individual and groups. It is through increased democratic participation that we can drive back those who which to use violence to achieve their political goals. The strength of open democracy is that the majority is always in majority, that extreme views are in the minority and that even fewer will translate extreme views into actions* " (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 5)

36.

" *We must ensure that Norwegian counter-terror measures continue to be targeted, restrictive and responsible. Violent, extreme views have the opposite intention – their targets are deliberately chosen on the basis of race, religion, gender or sexual orientation. We will combat such views with words. (...) This is our joint responsibility* " (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 6) .

37.

In both examples, there is a moral high road. Democratic principles, and participation, through dialogue is the 'sword' against the 'dragon' of radicalization and terror that target a society arbitrarily. There is clearly a line being drawn up between the 'us', and the 'them', which leaves little room for the 'grey-area'. Needless to say, there are in fact people, who wants to perform acts of terror, or other types of violence, towards civil society, or parts of it, but, as Fairclough neatly puts it, there needs to be a discourse, not divided into simple binary oppositions, but with a third and fourth category, that does not necessarily support terrorist activity (Fairclough: 2006: p. 151). What is interesting is how the arguments is constructed, painting the picture of risk as relatively severe, with horrifying consequences such as terrorism, but which is met with a 'soft power' means, as dialogue, and at a time where the terror threat level is considered low.

38.

Argumentation is a good way of exposing the goals and the values of the writers. Through a close reading of the arguments in Action Plan 2010, I find that the Governments is portraying a highly democratic society and government, based on morals, and good values, fighting the violent and "evil", which targets the innocent, and the Norwegian democracy. It is argued *for* a preventionist, dialogue oriented, human rights focused (and democratic) 'fight' against those who use violence to accomplish their goals. It is portrayed as a fight, but with soft means, and that democratic values is enough to protect society. The world is presented as threatened from an enemy outside of the Norwegian democratic norm. This image enters as the premise of what we *should* do.

39.

5.2.2.2 Narratives & Explanations:

40.

Important to an argument is the narrative which will either precede or follow an argument, to provide context to the reader and create a foundation and provide legitimacy for reasons to act. Continuing with the first example, used to demonstrate how to deconstruct argumentation, using Isabela and Norman Fairclough's method, I will present the narrative following the deconstructed argument;

41.

" *Giving pupils a tour of the Storting's Eidsvold Gallery clearly demonstrates the fundamental values on which Norwegian democracy has been based: popular sovereignty, division of powers and human rights. I usually stress that we must understand and defend the value of having a critical and free press and a broad political and voluntary sector. We must defend these foundation stones of democracy: the rule of law and freedom of expression and speech* " (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 5).

42.

The reason why this is a narrative is that it narrates the Norwegian democratic history, and the democratization process as a fair, and peaceful process, and provides the foundation to act through the call for a defense of " *the foundation stones of democracy* " . But the narrative could have been different, seen from another perspective. For example, a democratization

process is often slow and complex, i.e. voting rights were implemented gradually, and restrictions to vote where lifted fully in 1913 when all women were granted the right to vote (Bjørklund: 2005: p.120).

43.

In the text there is also a greater narrative of the experiences with violent extremism in Norway and in Europe. This historic narrative elaborates on different extremist groups in Europe, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and Red Brigades in Italy, and how radicalization can occur as a part of any ideological, political or religious orientation. Then it shifts to the concern of extreme Islamists, and European concern for "home-grown" terrorism, such as the London bombings in 2005. The narrative functions as a contextualization of the problem the European world was, and is faced with today. This narrative feeds into the argumentation that *"it is especially extreme Islamists persons who have grown up in Norway that represent a new challenge that must be dealt with* (The Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 9)", and legitimizes that these are the threat. As I mentioned in the methods chapter, analyzing narratives can give insight to what or whom the actor 'blames' for the crisis, and this is often in accordance with the actors goal , and the argument that determines the course of action. The quotation above would be a non-systemic blame, because it ascribes the main issue to nationals (i.e home-grown) with an extreme (and violent) version of Islam.

44.

Furthermore, the Action Plans provides explanations of what characterizes a person who is at risk for, or already is radicalized. As mentioned a narrative and explanation is commonly subjective to actors, depending on what information the actor prefers, and have access to, to inform them. A narrative makes sense of an event, and incorporates the actor's particular point of view (Fairclough: 2003: p. 85). The characteristics in Action Plan of 2010 are based on European studies, gathered from experiences of radicalization in Europe. There is a general belief that most radicalized persons are men, in the age range from 15 to 30. Political and religious motives, commonly coupled together, are prominent. Their explanation for parts of the political motives of radicalized people is amongst other the military presence of the US and Western allies in Iraq and Afghanistan (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p.10). An important part of this narrative is the word "presence". It implies that the military forces are merely present and no more or less, painting a picture of a relatively peaceful force present. However, a narrative from a local afghan man, woman or child living with these forces present, or more generally a sympathizer with the afghan people, might have a different narrative of that military presence, as the action plan points out as a political motive for attacking in Europe. The narrative takes a complex issue, and tones it down to a mere 'presence'.

45.

5.2.2.3 Assumption
46.

An assumption in a text is common where the writer believes he has a common ground, or understanding, with the reader, i.e. they share views and beliefs, norm system, or cultural values. For example by saying "we must fight for democracy", the writer assumes that the reader shares the same assumption that democracy *is* worth fighting for, because it is believed to be a good thing. In "Collective security – a shared responsibility"(Ministry of Justice: 2010) there are assumptions about the transparency of the Norwegian system(welfare state), democracy, and a common Norwegian moral, based in what is closely related to human rights, such as freedom of expression. Following the definition of the strength of the Norwegian community is how we should oppose those with opinions and views " *we do not like to hear* " (Ministry of Justice: 2010:p. 5). This is to be done through the use of " *democratic methods and intellectual weapons* " (ibid). This sentence defines what values are inside the normal, and what Norwegian moral is, and what is not. It is an assumption of value, that all Norwegians share the same values of democracy and Human Rights, and it defines who is not a member of this "inside the normal" value box. Thomas Martin points this out in his discourse analysis of the British "Prevent", where he calls this *distancing* (Martin in Baker-Beall et. al.:2014: p. 194). A person is placed, and seen by the government and others, as someone outside, in his case, the British norm and sense of belonging, and therefore also vulnerable to extremism.

47.

The plan further assumes that the causes for radicalization are mainly tied to social challenges, such as lack of employment, lack of relations and friends and/or mental health issues, and that prevention largely needs to happen at government and local authority level. It is a assumed profile of what a perpetrator might be like, based on European experiences. This can be labeled a propositional assumption, because it assumes *what will be the case* . It further assumes dialogue, explicitly stated with different groups such as minority, religious, and voluntary organizations, is a fundamental element in prevention of radicalization and violent extremism. It says that " *In Europe, the focus is on finding links between weaknesses in integration policy and minority groups' experiences of being on the outside of society* " (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 10). This statement, and other utterances in the text, clearly vocalizes how there is an assumption that the problem lies mainly with immigrants, but also the link between how they, due to a failure in integration policy, have fallen on the outside of the Norwegian norm and community, placing the responsibility both on the individual and the societies failure to correctly integrate people. I find there to be a common trend throughout the text that it assumes immigrants, Islamism, and the failure of the social institutions as the main cause of radicalization and extremism. This assumption is based on what on what they identify as a trend; young individuals, "outsiders", with little or no attachment to the European (Norwegian) society, nor their minority community, and

perceiving violent radical groups as an easy solution (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p.10). Still it acknowledges that many of the 'home-grown' Islamist extremist had *seemed* well integrated.

48.

As mentioned in the introduction, where I outlined the example, of US friendship with UK and perceived enemies of North Korea regarding nuclear weapons, states also assumes friendships. These friendship 'exists' due a belief in shared values, and interests. Such friendship also occur in the Action Plan, where the text expresses how, in the process of making the plan, saw to Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK, due to factors; one being, the fact that those countries have previous, thorough experience with action plans regarding radicalization and violent extremism, and second, due to them being " *our closest neighbors"* (2010: p.11). This entails that the experiences those countries have had will apply to the Norwegian society, and that the research conducted and evidence collected, will have value in terms of implementing them in the Norwegian context, due to an assumption that geographically closeness, and also friendship based on values, interests and cooperation, creates similar challenges (and enemies).

49.

It is also assumed the plan has an ability to predict radicalization. The modality of the text also supports this, as I will come back to in subchapter 5.2.2.5.

50.

" *Those who know the local community **will be*** (modal expression) *able to detect a negative trend and see whether anyone is at risk of becoming radicalized by potentially violent groups* " (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p.15).

51.

Because the plan has earlier defined some key causes to why, and who becomes radicalized, it also assumes the ability to predict who are "the vulnerable", which identifies the problem, and should therefore be subject to the plans outlined measures. This is a case of *distancing* , where the government identifies someone as more 'vulnerable', due a dislocation, i.e. negative trend. What is 'negative' is here assumed as common ground, because what is considered negative is not defined, and " *thus positioned, it becomes those who (are seen to) exist outside of a framework of (...) norms, and behaviors who may potentially threaten the (...) state* (Martin in Baker-Beall et. al.:2014: p. 194) .

52.

5.2.2.4 Legitimation

53.

It can be understood as a *legitimizing move* to provide reasons for why we should act on an issue, before describing how. When for example portraying society in danger, and creating a fear (existential or not), the measures to deal with the threat can seem more legitimate, than it would without that image of a threatened society. As mentioned earlier, in a text, legitimation can be expressed either implicitly or explicitly through a narrative or an explanation of context. I have already provided some examples of legitimation above, such as the legitimation of home-grown Islamists as the biggest threat through a narrative and argument. This intertwining between different tools is hard to avoid because many of them interact and inform each other in order to create a discourse. There are still more examples of legitimation, and how this provides support to the Action Plan of 2010's policy towards radicalization and violent extremism.

54.

An example of legitimation occurs in the second paragraph in the foreword; " *The Government has informed the Storting that there are aspects in the situation inside and outside Norway today that collectively represent a transition to a terror threat picture more like the one we see in countries where terror attacks have been or have been attempted to be carried out. We have no guarantee that no serious situations will arise(...)* " (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 5). This statement is a part of seeking legitimization as to why there is a need for an Action Plan, and why the situation needs to be dealt with – it provides cause to act, through the construction of a fear of personal (and society's) safety being at risk. This type of statements occurs repeatedly; "However, this does not mean that radicalization and violent extremism, and in an extreme consequence terrorism, cannot also affect us" (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 7). The writers appeal to, what we can only assume is considered important for most people in a society, being safe and with the absence of threats and terror.

55.

5.2.2.5 Modality

56.

Modality concern how committed a writer is to their statement. A writer can modify their certainty or the necessity of a subject, through use of words such as "if", "can", "will", "have" etc. In an overall examination of the text, the modal expressions that can be categorized as statements are often oriented towards what will be the case; "Norway *is* threatened", "the Norwegian system *has* been based human rights", "it *is* our joint responsibility" – it is presented as certainties. Some *statements* also have a predictive character such as " *This will not be effective enough in an increasingly complex world and*

will be a weak policy (...) " (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 6). They address the need for a complex enemy image, if not, and expressed with certainty, the Norwegian society will not be able to cope with future challenges.

57.

Those modal expressions in the text that can be categorized as *demands* commonly concern something we 'must' do, and addresses a responsibility either the state, institutions, the people, or society as a whole have. It ranges from a responsibility for the society to take " *a precautionary approach* (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 5), *"tolerate views and opinions we don't like"* (ibid: p. 5), *"be prepared that the terror situation (...) can change quickly "*(ibid: p.7), to state authority responsibilities such as " *in schools teaching democracy and citizenship will be strengthened "*(ibid: p.12), " *they* (the police) *have a responsibility to intervene and implement suitable measures"* (ibid: p.15).

58.

However, there seems to be more uncertainty when the authors discuss the methods of how to prevent radicalization and violent extremism, who is at risk, and motives. This entail a weaker commitment.

59.

" *The common denominator is vulnerability and therefore good preventative measures will usually be general measures"* (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 8)

60.

" *By virtue of their role as mentors, they can play a key role in the radicalization of others"* (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p.10).

61.

" *Political and religious motives may involve a nationalistic or separatist focus or an International fight against the external enemies of Islam "* (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 10).

62.

63.

5.3 "Action Plan against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism"
64.

In 2014, the second action plan was published, replacing the old one. This plan was issued by a conservative government, the first Solberg-government. It was issued June 10 [th] , 2014 by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security (The Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security (from now referred to as: Ministry of Justice: 10.06.2014). The circumstances under which this plan was published were quite different from the first. As I mentioned, at the time when the first plan was published, the terror threat level was considered low, and the Norwegian society had no experience with large-scale terrorism, and much of the plan was built on experiences from other countries, especially concerning violent Islamism, and 'home-grown' terrorists. In 2014 Norway was for the first time encountered with large-scale terrorism, executed by a Norwegian national and right-wing extremist. Also, the international circumstances had changed, due to the civil war in Syria, large numbers of migrants fleeing war and conflict in the Middle East and parts of Africa to Europe, the emergence of the Islamic State, accompanied by the many so called "foreign fighters" which travelled from all over the world to join the group to fight. I believe it would be fair to say that this plan, compared to the one of 2010, has been given a lot more attention from the media, and academics, possibly due to all the international and national media attention the subject of war, terror, radicalization and violent extremism was dedicated, causing a very public debate.

65.

This change in political leadership, and both national and international context, is important to take into consideration when examining plans of this character, because it may affect the language, and display a change in the actor's agenda, values, and interests.

66.

The foreword establishes the goals for the plan. Primarily, the plan seeks to improve efforts in order to combat radicalization and extremism. They identify a need for more information, knowledge and education in this field, and a better cooperation and coordination between those involved. The overall goal is to intervene as early as possible with those who are 'at risk'. They define their approach as targeted, strategic and action-oriented, and argue for a close follow-up of the measures by the responsible ministry assigned (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 5).

67.

5.3.1 Actors
68.

The writers of the plan represent the current government – the Solberg government. There is no person 'speaking' in the plan, but the voice present is that of the Government as a unit. The plan is signed by all of the ministries that are in some way involved in the plan, either in the production process, or as a responsible ministry for the follow-up of a measure (there a 30 measures). The plan is available at www.regjeringen.no , or at www.radikalisering.no . The latter webpage was established as a part of a measure, in order to spread knowledge, and improve accessibility to the plan, and general information about radicalization and violent extremism, for organizations, institutions, and civil persons. Due to the plans dynamic character, I will emphasize that I am using the first version of the plan that was issued, and that information may have been added in the electronic version since then.

69.

The production process is not described, and it appears unclear who has contributed with what, and who has been involved, apart from those ministries mentioned in the plan. It is hard to determine if there have been any organizations, other institutions or academics involved in the developing process. Neither have I been successful in finding such information elsewhere. Therefore, I can only assume who have been "natural" points of contact for information, knowledge and cooperation in the designing process, such as the National Police Security Service (PST), which is mentioned as a part of the strategy.

70.

5.3.2 Tools
71.

This is the continuing part of the textual analysis, also referred to as the 'inner box' of Fairclough's model. I will present my findings from the analysis of the 2014 Action Plan, in the same manner as with the previous plan, using the same analytic tools. My intentions was to analyze them separately in order to see differences or similarities in the actors interests and possible agenda and how this might have changed, more clear from one plan to another when they are dismantled and compared.

72.

I want to mention some overall features of the plan, as I did with the last one. On a first glance, the plan seems preoccupied with evaluating itself, and the former efforts done in the field of radicalization and violent extremism. In this way it is political, and wants to show where the previous government failed, and how the new government wants to improve these efforts – it is a negative *evaluative statement* of the former governments efforts, due to the word 'improve', which insinuates that their efforts were not good enough (Fairclough: 2003: p. 172). The Action plan of 2014 is value-oriented, with emphasis on democracy, human rights and security. An interesting comparison is how the former plan was explicitly focused on the collective society, inclusion and fairness – all soft power values, the plan of 2014 is more subtle and implicit in its regards to values, and has an explicit emphasis on security in its detailing of key fundamental values – hard power values. It also strikes as more clear-cut, due to its length/format, and amount of text, and in comparison to the plan of 2010, it leaves out prolonged details of social political areas, such as work and social inclusion, foreign policy and healthcare.

73.

5.3.2.1 Argumentation
74.

Also this plan contains argumentation. An argument is constructed by our interpretation of the world, and practical reasoning about *what* we should do, and *why* . I have followed the same model for this analysis, as with the former one, applying Fairclough & Fairclough's model for analyzing practical reasoning in argumentation.

75.

" *With this plan, the Norwegian government wants to improve the efforts to combat radicalisation and violent extremism. Terrorism is the most extreme consequence of radicalisation and violent extremism. Thus, preventative efforts are a key element for ensuring fundamental values such as democracy, human rights and security. Being able to live our lives without fear of being exposed to hate and violence is a fundamental value of a secure society* (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 5).

76.

Below I have put the quotation in the model for analyzing practical reasoning in an argument:

77.

Claim for action : Improve efforts towards radicalization and violent extremism, and provide preventative efforts

78.

Circumstances : Radicalization and violent extremism is a current threat in society, with terrorism as the extreme consequence.

79.

Means-Goal : If we improve our efforts, we will reach our goal.

80.

Goal : The goals are to (1) eradicate radicalization and extremism, and prevent terrorism, (2) ensure fundamental values, such as human rights, democracy, and security, and (3) live 'our' lives without fear of violence.

81.

Value : Democracy, national security, and provide security for the population.

82.

The premise for action here is *threatened* . Society, people, values, the state is presumed to be threatened, and so this is the premise that feds the argument, and claim for action.

83.

I will also provide another example of argumentation, extracted from the plan. And again I want to stress the difficulty of fully separating the linguistic tools from each other, as they often are connected to each other. In the following quote it is possible to identify several linguistic tools at work such as argumentation, legitimation and modality.

84.

" *In December 2010, "Collective security – a shared responsibility (...) was issued. This plan was the first of its kind in this field in Norway. Through the work of following up the action plan, knowledge and experience were developed, which are now being further developed in this plan. At the same time, the perceived threat has changed and become more aggravated since 2010. Therefore, there is a need for a greater effort and more dynamic approach to this work* (The Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 13).

85.

The government argues for, and establishes how the context have changed, acknowledging the previous work, but also a need for new action, due to the changed situation, and that in order to cope with this we need a greater effort and more dynamic approach to the subject. It is also an act of legitimation, because it explains the need for further, and more concentrated work, it is legitimizing the new action plan through the notion of an aggravated threat situation. The quote contains modal expressions such as ' *the perceived threat has changed'* , emphasizing the immediate need for action. Paired with ' *there is a need for a greater effort (...),* the situations urgency is a fact.

86.

5.3.2.2 Narrative & explanation

87.

What I have found to be interesting regarding narratives in my analysis is how the plan of 2010 and 2014 both opens with a narrative of Norwegian history and experience with both peace and conflict. In many ways, it is a linguistic way in order to foster support and unify the people that relate to this history, to the politics presented in the plans. More specifically related to the action plan of 2014, the narrative concerns 22 [nd] July 2011, which is to many a very painful part of Norwegian history (the Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 7). Because so many in the Norwegian population remember this day with horror, and due to the fact that this was the greatest attack in Norway since the Second World War, this creates a very strong image in the plan. For many Norwegians this narrative, coupled with an explanation of the current threat situation would create what would seem to be a very just reason to act, and can in function as a premise in arguments for action. Narrative is in this way a powerful mean, when it is subjectively shared.

88.

Related to how Fairclough theorizes that narratives and explanations usually will precede an argument, I found prominent evidence of this in page 9 and partially page 10 in the action plan. Page 9 & 10 is the section where 'relevant challenges' are outlined. What can be considered as the narrative is the historic tale from the 1990's until today's time, presenting what challenges have been, and what the Norwegian society is currently faced with. Then the writers continue with an explanation of what, in detail, the challenge consist of (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 9-10).

89.

As suggested by Fairclough I have extracted an example of the explanations into 'systemic' and 'non-systemic' attribution of blame (Fairclough & Fairclough: 2012: p. 6-7). To some degree there is a combination of both systemic and non-systemic 'blame'. The writers emphasize the psychological and social factors that might cause a radicalization process, which is non-systemic, and the social factors, such as lack of employment, low social status etc., which is a systemic attribution of blame. Psychological factors are personal features concerning the individual, while the systemic 'failure', such as distortion is employment causing immigrants as a group to be disadvantaged in the labor market, is a societal feature. The writers identify three challenges that cause problems to preventative efforts. All of these challenges are systemic;

Internet and social media as an arena for interaction, and exchange of (like-minded) opinions,

●

International circumstances, such as war and conflict, either directly or not directly experiences with it,

●

and; increased polarization between groups, particularly right-wing extremists and Islamic extremists (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 9-10).

1.

However, the systemic reasons for radicalization and violent extremism, holds elements of non-systemic attributions of blame in the text. Internet and social media has become an arena for radicalization and violent extremism according to the text. The internet makes it easier for people to find others that share the same opinion. The blame is attributed to the person due to vulnerability: *"Extremist messages can also easily reach persons who are physically or virtually in the fringe zone of extremist groups and who are vulnerable to be influenced in a negative direction"* (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 9). Moreover, this explanation also lacks agency, because there seems to be no 'senders' of the extremist message.

2.

5.3.2.3 Assumptions

3.

As with the action plan of 2010, also the plan of 2014 holds some assumptions. The first assumption that appeared as I conducted the analysis was a propositional assumption.

4.

" There is a need for more information, more cooperation and better coordination of the efforts in this area" (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 5).

5.

The statement establishes that there is a need, and that it is something 'we' have common, and that the need exist, not just from the government's perspective, but also the reader. It assumes that society feels the same need for action. The writers are trying to establish some common ground with the reader of what "we", as the society, need – a need the reader may not feel. Propositional assumptions often establish what *will be the case* , i.e. the case is that the society has a need.

6.

What I have not mentioned, but which applies to both action plans is the notion of "radicalization" as a possible existential assumption. As discussed in the methods chapter, an existential assumption often personifies large phenomenon as 'it', and as a thing that really exists (but intangible), like globalization. Radicalization is a word that has been given meaning, but is much a 'floating signifier'. The word is empty until actors give it content, and the content can change. There can say to be a struggle to fill the signifier of radicalization, because both governments that apply radicalization (and extremism) to this complex situation, agrees to the fact that it cannot be put into a framework, but at the same time it is defined in small terms. Oxford Reference Dictionary offers a good explanation of the process of giving meaning to such signifiers: " *It is a signifier that absorbs rather than emits meaning. (...) because it is susceptible to multiple and even contradictory interpretations, suggesting that it does not have a specific meaning itself, but functions primarily as a vehicle for absorbing meanings that viewers want to impose upon it* " ('floating signifier': n.d.). Moreover, this signifier has got a negative connotation, when talking about the term relating it to terrorism. This relationship, and the existence of 'radicalization', can seem to be existential assumed, due to its constructed nature.

7.

5.3.2.4 Legitimation

8.

" *In the coming years, the polarization among Norwegian extremist threat perpetrators will probably increase. Polarisation can result in recruitment to and radicalisation of various groups, some of which may be new. (...). It is crucial that we prevent further radicalisation and new recruitment among precisely these persons* (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 10)".

9.

The above quotation is a legitimizing move. It is combined with a 'explanation', as a background, which legitimizes why we should act. The quote details a picture of a possible future that it is necessary to act on now. This will again legitimize to policy following it, as long as the prediction for the future is agreed upon. It is further argued, that not only will the situation be more polarized, but it is also necessary to act, in order to prevent further recruitment to such groupings.

10.

Why do the governments need to legitimize their policy in the text? Because there is a need for legitimation of the actual social practice. The measures that are presented in the action plans, and how prevention is executed is the social practice. The social practice needs to be 'approved' by civil society in order for the government act legitimate. Also, the international community can play an important role here. By example, many of counter-terror and radicalization plans are not legitimate in the eyes of Amnesty International, because the practice is, according to them, discriminating and may undermine human rights. The legitimacy can say to be constructed, because the governments constructs an image of reality, which would legitimize the actions, i.e. if the nation-state and democracy is believed to be threatened, it would seem legitimate to take action in order to defend it.

11.

Moral legitimation, defending the actors' action through the use of moral values, is a 'sub-category' of legitimation (Fairclough: 2006: p. 147). I have extracted a example:

12.

" *The measures in this plan come in addition to the more general efforts to promote participation, social inclusion, and equality. Prevention in a broad perspective involves ensuring good formative conditions for children and youth, fighting poverty and working to ensure that everyone regardless of their background, shall have a sense of belonging and be protected against discrimination* "(Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 7).

13.

The government is attempting to legitimize the efforts by how extending the claim that it is not only about eradicating radicalization and violent extremism in society, but a extended effort of the governments already sorted out plan to promote other values as well. It paints a picture of a government working hard to not only fight terrorism, but also more day-to-day problems such as discrimination, and unequal access to public goods. It is providing moral legitimacy to their plan (Fairclough: 2006: p. 148).

14.

5.3.2.5 Modality

15.

The modal expressions in the text figures prominently with common modal "markers" such as 'it is', 'are', 'shall', 'wants' and 'will'. What is common is that those statements that holds a high degree of certainty, are those perceived as facts, such as " *terrorism is the most extreme consequence of radicalization* (…)" and " *It is important to ensure public security* " (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 7). Modal expressions do not only imply the certainty of the expression, but also the necessity. Statements with lower sense of necessity and certainty usually contain the marker 'wants'. This signifies that it is something the government wants and would like to do, but it is not necessarily something they must do, i.e. " *the Norwegian government wants to improve the efforts* (…)" and " *The government wants to prevent recruitment (…)* " (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 5). This is also true for how the measures will work, for example; " *General preventative efforts in many different fields can also help prevent people from choosing violence* (…)" (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 7).

16.

As with the plan of 2010, also this plan uses modal expressions that entail uncertainty concerning reasons as to *how* people become radicalized and what the gateways are; " *Extremist messages can also easily reach persons who are physically and virtually in the fringe zone* (…)", " *Persons can go through a process of radicalisation as a result of their internet activity* " and " *Provocative images from conflicts, humanitarian crises and attacks on civilians can have a strong influence on some individuals* (…)"(Ministry of Justice: 2014: p.9). On the other hand, there seems to be more certainty as to *why* , due to the use of 'is' when it is talked about the emergence of internet, international conflicts and polarization, meaning they know the effects of the causes, but not how they influence different individuals.

17.

The statements can also be divided into the categories of *demands* and *statements.* Similar to "Collective security – a shared responsibility" (Ministry of Justice: 2010), the demands is often linked to the responsibility of the various ministries or other institutions have related to the measures; "(…) *only one ministry shall be responsible for each individual measure* ", and an example is; " *The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) shall inform and advise the police districts* (…)" (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 5 & 20).

18.

The statements that have a predictive character is often mentioned when concerning the threat towards Norway, specifically, how this threat will develop; *"Globalisation entail that circumstances in another part of the world may have consequences for Norway* ", and " *In the coming years, the polarization among Norwegian extremist threat perpetrators will probably increase* "(Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 25 & 10). Still, the statements hold markers of low certainty of those predictions, due to the use of 'may' and 'probably'.

5.4 Discursive practice

20.

In this part of the analysis, I will describe the discourses I have identified in the Action plans. Discourses are a specific way of representing something (Fairclough: 2003: p. 17). By using a constructivist theory, this means that the discourses identified represents a certain way the government portrays their image of reality. Representations in the discourses can be said to form images of reality. A constructivist position would argue that reality is somewhat constructed by its actors, and their identity and beliefs help form this reality. I have identified discourses that are relevant to the order of discourse 'preventing radicalization and violent extremism'. According to Phillips and Jørgensen it is the discursive practice and its role in the wider social context that should be in focus, and how this either produces or reproduces the discourses in the social practice (1999: p. 82). The researcher is therefore examining how, in this case the government, draws on already existing discourses about a social phenomenon, and uses this in the text, and how the consumers understand and interprets the text (1999: p. 81). Consumers might for example be firstline workers, such as teachers, police, correctional employees, or the media. Further, Phillips and Jørgensen states that the main purpose of a critical discourse analysis, is to study the relations between the discursive practice and wider social context and structures. With this statement, a premise also follows. The premise, or underlying assumption, is that the discursive practice reflects and contributes to social and cultural change. Meaning the discourses figuring in the Action Plans says something about how society perceives the discourse of radicalization and violent extremism, but also that the Action Plans contributes to how society *should* perceive this discourse.

21.

It has, due to the abovementioned, been natural in this study to put greater emphasis on this part of the analysis in order to see the relations between the discourses and social practice (context). Beneath I present the identified discourses, and explanation of these, according to my interpretation of them. I will discontinue the separation of the analysis of the plans, and present the discourses as a whole, as several appear in both.

22.

The discourses have been identified by using 'themes' as tool. As discussed in the methods chapter, according to Fairclough, there are two ways of looking at discourses; either as representing some particular *part* of the 'world', or as representing the 'world' *from* a particular viewpoint. If the latter is chosen, then discourses can be identified through themes. To exemplify; the Government represent 'Norwegian values' (democracy, rule of law, Human Rights based) as the world, and as a constituted fact, not as a particular part, where their (subjective) particular part of the world is presented.

23.

24.

5.4.1 The discourse of threat

25.

The discourse of threat concerns several aspects of threat. First, it is about the threat level and what the future might look like. Second, it concerns who poses a threat, historically and present day. And third, what are possible warning signs.

26.

This discourse is present in both plans, and makes the core of the plans, because if there weren't any threat, there wouldn't be any plan.

27.

The first aspect of threat is presented as a threat-assessment. It's presented as a narrative where the governments give the historic detail of Norwegian experiences with terror attacks. In the action plan of 2010, the discourse is concerned with how Norway has been spared of any large scaled attacks, without ignoring the past experiences with right-wing extremism (neo-Nazism) in the 90's. The focus is, several times, moved to the fact that the current threat level might change. It is especially stressed that we must not underestimate or simplify "enemy images" (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 6). The orientation of the discourse of threat changes somewhat in character in 2014. This is due to change in social context, referring to 22 [nd] of July, 2011. Still, the discourse is historically oriented, and presents the same image of the threat from right-wing extremists in the 1990's. It also continues the complexity of the threat, and a terrain that is hard to move in.

28.

In the action plan of 2010 there is a detailed description of the experiences with extremism in Norway and Europe, resulting in an assessment of the current threat, especially from extreme Islamists: *"it is especially extreme Islamist persons who have grown up in Norway that represent a new challenge that must be dealt with "*(Ministry of Justice: 2010: p.9). In 2014, the threat is more focused on challenges at a society level, than individual level, where internet, international circumstances and polarization are more prominent.

Both plans are preoccupied with presenting who may pose a threat, and to what extent. Persons at-risk are mentioned several times, and are describes as persons falling outside of the society and not affiliated to Norwegian values and norms. They struggle either at a physiological or social level, or both. This takes shape in different forms in the plans. The 2010 plan elaborates more on social features, such as integration policy, housing, education and the notion of a good childhood, social inclusion and work. As mentioned earlier, the social democratic ideology is very visible. Theory says that social democratic thinking is to a large extent preoccupied with the individuals' dependency on social relations and fellowship with others. Further, it believes that society, through political work and reform, can be more open and inclusive, and social and economic human rights, such as education and work are premises for leading the 'good life' (Malnes & Midgaard: 2009: p. 254-255) . This is explicit in "Collective security": " *Participation in voluntary organizations provides a purpose and fellowship, learning and democratic competence. The Norwegian Government regards the voluntary sector as a cornerstone of our democracy and welfare state* "(Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 23). This plan also makes a 'profile' based on persons who have performed terrorist attacks. They are identified to be young (between 15 and 30 years of age), and male.

30.

The action plan of 2014 seems more focused in this area, and presents the threat from more of a group perspective. The governments present two groups as the biggest threat, which is 'Al-Qaeda inspired extremists' and 'right-wing extremist'. The notion of physiological and social factors are still a part of the concern, but not a significantly elaborated on. Internet as a factor to radicalization of people is identified to a higher degree in this plan, than in the action plan of 2010.

31.

Warnings signs are first introduced and identified as a part of the discourse in the action plan of 2014. This is concerned with how persons may change their behavior when going through a process of radicalization. It provides a list of 'possible signs of concern'. The behavorial changes to be watch out for concerns statements, such as intolerance for others points of view, changes in appearances, such as use of symbols linked to extreme organizations, hate crime and change in social networks.

32.

5.4.2 The discourse of value

33.

There are several expressions in the texts that create the foundation for what I have called 'the value discourse'. It contains several important terms such as 'democracy', 'equality and social inclusion', 'solidarity' and 'co-determination'. The value discourse is concerned with presenting Norwegian values and what the Norwegian framework of values. The discourse is present in both plans, but it figures more explicitly and prominently in the action plan from 2010. Collective security emphasizes Norwegian values, rights of the people, and values and rights that people *should* have. It describes the Norwegian society with transparency, good democratic participation, popular sovereignty, and as human-rights based. Further, it is preoccupied with values that I understand to be their interpretation of what constitutes Norwegian culture, such as solidarity, good community solutions, the welfare state and democratic understanding and participation. To a larger extent the analysis show that "Collective security" has a greater emphasis on values, many of them in social democratic nature, throughout. The value discourse also figures in the action plan of 2014, but to a lesser extent. Many of the same values are emphasized, such as democracy, human right, social inclusion and participation, but are in general mentioned and their importance accentuated, less. The focus of social responsibility, open democracy, fellowship and voluntary work, have faded. The notion of hate speech and possible damage is on the other hand, is first introduced in the plan of 2014.

34.

The general arguments of the value discourse are:

- Ensuring and protecting democracy, public safety/security, human rights such as free press, freedom of speech and expression, and rule of law, which constitutes the foundation of the Norwegian society, from attacks.

- Values and teaching values to, especially, children, immigrants (newly arrived and others), and people at-risk is an important factor to prevent radicalization and violent extremism.

- Ensure that people are not discriminated, marginalized or fall out of society, in terms of school, work and in other social arenas, and have a sense of affiliation is at heart of not only the action plans for preventing radicalization, but in general a strategy.

Providing good conditions for children, and fighting child poverty, securing their education is a key to preventing marginalization, and in long terms, radicalization and crime.

•

Providing immigrants the tools for good integration, and securing social inclusion, work, absence of racism and discrimination. "Insight into Norwegian society is a condition for the ability to participate in democratic processes" (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 23).

1.

Considering the value-discourse in a security policy perspective for a moment, defining the objectives of security policy can provide interesting insights. A positive definition of security policy, concern *what* the policy is protecting. Therefore, a positive definition of security policy is usually occupied with promoting its protection of the core values of the state. These values are presented as significant for the survival and sovereignty. Peace, sovereignty, and territorial integrity are examples. What is problematized in theory is how the protection of values can be too vague when it's not limited, and protection measures can come to be too wide, and fall outside of what is usually defined in terms of security policy (Hovi & Malnes: 2011: p. 104).

2.

The value discourse also has some links to the European/International discourse. The text (2010) is also preoccupied with the values of their collaborating countries, suggesting a bond, let's call it a fellowship, with neighboring countries, which the Government identifies with. For example it is elaborated on Denmark as a " *democratic society, with freedom, responsibility, equality and opportunity for all*" (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 11). Also, the discourse ties itself to the threat discourse, as the notion of values is a part of how Norwegian values needs to be (1) secured from the threat, and (2) influence the population in such a degree that people will not be a threat to Norway. This is also in line with the general belief that Norwegian values, when shared as a community, in itself is a measure for preventing radicalization and violent extremism.

3.

5.4.3 The 'soft power' war on terror discourse
4.

After analyzing the documents I believe to have identified what I chose to call a mild form of reproduction of the war on terror discourse. It figures more in the action plan of 2010, than in 2014, but present in both. The 'War on Terror' discourse, explained in short introductory terms, is based on former US president George W. Bush administrations claim of a war against terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, 2001. It constructed enemy images of us & them, where Islam and Islamic culture as inferior, and the West as a enlightened, democratic society (Hatem: 2003: p. 77). The discourse also disregards any other economic or political factors as to why 9/11 happened (ibid). The 'war' has two battlefronts, at home; securing the nation, and fighting terrorism abroad; specifically in the Middle East (Hatem: 2003: 78).

5.

To explain how I have identified the war on terror discourse in the action plan, I will provide context. The Norwegian academic Torbjørn Knutsen have written about the war on terror, and four strategies to combat terror (Knutsen in Hovi & Malnes: 2011: p. 234-239), whereas two are hard power strategies, and two are soft power. First, its hard measures 'at home' enforced by the police and intelligence agencies, where they gather intelligence about extremist networks, their behavior etc. Many western countries have broadens their laws and mandate of their police and intelligence services (Knutsen in Hovi & Malnes: 2011: p. 234). The second, national oriented strategy is through social reform and other measures to remove conditions for growth of terrorism in society. Most significantly this has been expressed through a focus in integration policy (ibid: p 235). This national strategy also have an international dimension, where spreading democracy and prosperity to Muslim countries is the main objective, and is therefore the second soft power measure, and third strategy for combating terrorism. Fourth, and what is possibly the most common association with the war on terror, is the hard power of military operations and invasions abroad (Knutsen in Hovi & Malnes: 2011: p. 236).

6.

It is the second strategy of the above mentioned that is most relevant for the identification of this discourse in the documents. Integration policy is a theme mentioned on several occasions in the action plan of 2010. The discourse focuses on ensuring a controlled immigration policy, that is ensures a fair, humane and human rights oriented treatment, and shifts focus to integration policy. The integration policy concerns fighting discrimination and promoting equality. The main objective is to secure employment, education and language, equality and participation; "a strong democratic culture is a goal in itself for the whole Norwegian society. "Insight into Norwegian society is a condition for the ability to participate in democratic processes"(Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 23). Also, other social areas are emphasized as part of removing conditions for radicalization and violent extremism, such as employment, mental and physical health, social inclusion, developing respect and tolerance for cultural and ethnic diversity in society and equal opportunities (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 21-25). Dialogue as a means, is mentioned on several occasions and strikes as a possible core of the strategy. Dialogue with religious and other interfaith groups is undertaken as something the authorities shall facilitate, and grants was given in order to

promote this. Dialogue is not part of the war on terror discourse, and might exist as a separate discourse. It stands in contrast to the closed of "War on Terror", where democracy should be imposed and the world is divided into black-white nuances, but rather invites to an open and tolerant dialogue with other world views. Still, dialogue is something the government aims to spread in the world and understands a tool for foreign policy; "Inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue is one of several means of promoting tolerance between ethnic and religious groups in a number of countries where terrorism is rife". It is common for Norwegian authorities to present itself as a peacemaker in international affairs, and is engaged in both military peace operations (such as the war in Afghanistan), and participants of peace negotiations, this belief seems to also be present in the text: "Extensive development aid and a commitment to peace and dispute resolution will be continued, as will the work on defending international law and human rights" (2010: p. 24). But there is also an awareness to the critic of the West's efforts; "The are those who believe that the "West" is operating with a double standard, which has been seen as an important driving force behind radicalization and support to international terrorism" (2010: p.25). Again, there is a possible to see the ties to the "war on terror" discourse, where the government positions itself with the "West" as an 'us', while the 'them' is represented as "those".

7.

The same discourse presents itself in the action plan of 2014. As the plan is not as detailed, and elaborates to a lesser extent on social areas (it is much more comprised in length in general), the discourse is not as visible and prominent. Also here, the notion of 'enemy images' figures; "Norway's foreign policy and security policy profile has resulted in changes in our potential enemies" (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 9). This is combined with a recognition that the change in threat is due to international circumstances and conflicts outside of Norway. Again the discourse seems conflicted, enemies is an important part of the war on terror discourse, but what is not in line with it, is the recognition of the state's own contribution and engagement (military) in other states might evoke terrorism (Hatem: 2003: p.77).

8.

Going back to the second strategy of combating terrorism, which is performed at 'home' using social reform, action plan of 2014, continues this part of the discourse from 2010 on an explicit basis, by referring to the plan, and emphasizing the need for even greater efforts. The government highlights knowledge and cooperation between various social sectors as a key to good preventative work (2014: p. 13). Further, the writers stress improvement in the health, educational, and the correctional sectors. As I mentioned earlier, hate speech is a new element in the work against radicalization, introduced in the action plan of 2014. As part of the social reform strategy, the objective is to prevent hate rhetoric/expression and limit the experiences that might lead to radicalization, from the internet. 5 measures out of 30 are devoted to this work. This is introduced as media, and social media has spread, and manifested itself in society. It is possible to trace the growing belief with the government, that radicalization through social networks on the internet, and 'self-radicalization' by reading and watching certain kinds of material, happens more frequently.

9.

The general rhetoric of both plans can somewhat be understood to be in line with the war on terror discourse, in the way it's presented using terms as "fight", "combat" "the West" and so on, but the measures, and their execution, in the plan is much more on a soft power level with emphasis on social reform.

10.

5.4.4 The European/International discourse

11.

This discourse concern to a large extent how the Norwegian strategy has been developed through inspiration and collaboration with other European countries and the EU, but it is also concerned with how the Norwegian government views itself in the wider international context, examples are Norwegian interests (Ministry of justice: 2010: p.9 & 2014: p. 14), foreign policy (ibid: 2010 p. 24-25 & 2014: p. 9), contribution in war, and enemies of the west, where the Norwegian government identifies itself with the culture of the Western world(ibid: 2010: p.10). It merges somewhat with the war on terror discourse in this manner . Both plans also compare themselves to other European countries.

12.

Both action plans are oriented towards the European and International sphere. There is a evident close connection to the Nordic countries in the discourse. The self-identification with these countries and related challenges posed by radicalization and violent extremism are strong, and initiatives to establish closer cooperation are taken. These are neighboring countries of Norway which the government collaborates with on other fields, such as the Nordic Passport union which allows citizens of the Nordic countries to travel and reside within this region without documentation or permits. Collaboration of prevention of radicalization and extremism might therefore be perceived as natural and in the discursive terrain. "Friendship" and "enemies" are socially constructed relationships, and norms and beliefs is to some degree determined by these relations (Finnemore: 1996: p. 128). There is also a explicit 'want' for a collaboration with Nordic countries and EU: "The is much to be learned through the exchange of information about measures in other countries and adaption of such measures to our national context" (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 25). In fact, the plan of 2010 goes as far as to acknowledging the relations to

the British strategy "prevent": "The "prevent" part of the British strategy is equivalent to this Norwegian action plan and the British regard this as a long-term solution to the problem"(Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 12).

13.

Further, the action plan of 2010 is preoccupied with the threat in Europe, and European context. This is done in such a way, that it does not differ between what is the Norwegian threat and the European one, presenting it as universal for Europe *and* Norway. Same goes for the knowledge the government assumes to have on radicalization, implying a unified agreement as to who become radicalized and why (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 9-10).

14.

In this discourse, Norway as a peace promoter is visible. It focuses on how Norway, as a part of the United Nations commits to monetary and medical aid, as well as conflict resolution. Explicitly the Action plan of 2010, mentions cooperation with UN in the UN Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), which seeks to promote exchange in knowledge on national programs for de-radicalization, and the possibility of openly discussions about de-radicalization programs. Muslim countries are the primary target group (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 25).

15.

This discourse implies that the Norwegian governments has close ties to international, European and Nordic fora's in their quest for eradicating radicalization and violent extremism. These relationships are built on a belief in shared value systems, and in some cases the promotion of democratic values, the Western way of handling the subject. The identification with the 'West' and friendships Alexander Wendt argues is due to a shared understanding (Aguis in Collins: 2010: p. 53).

16.

5.4.5 The discourse of prevention

17.

The discourse on prevention places its focus on prevention of radicalization and violent extremism, as a part of a larger initiative to crime prevention. In both Action plans, radicalization is presented mainly as a crime, and part of the judicial system, and crimes related to radicalization and violent extremism, is to be dealt with in the same manner as ordinary crimes, both from a preventative and penal perspective. There is an agreement on the idea of prevention of radicalization has to be based in general crime prevention. On this note the texts 'talks' to other action plans developed relating to crime, such as the 'Forces for good – Crime Prevention Action plan (2009)' and 'Action plan for the prevention of crime (2013-2016)'. The prevention discourse is also preoccupied with prevention on a societal level.

18.

The discourse of Prevention further on is concerned with responsibility. I have identified 'responsibility' as divided between two actors, public sector institutions and the public. Institutions, including the government, are in the discourse responsible for the societal factors that may lead to radicalization, i.e. lack of affiliation in society, and is assigned through the 30 measures a responsibility for developing their respective political fields, that will even differences and remove causes for radicalization. The other actors that are assigned responsibility are the society and public at large. This is evident in both plans. Action Plan of 2010 is built on this, and the social orientation works as the foundation of the strategy, this is evident already through the name "Collective security – a shared responsibility". This notion of a shared social responsibility is mentioned on several occasions. The 2014 plan takes a different approach. The current government provided a list with possible warning signs to look out for, and urge people to take action if they are concerned. They have also made a table of parties involved in preventative efforts, where friends and family is identified as closest to the individual (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 28-29). In this way, and also explicitly mentioned (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 6 & 2014: p. 7), the governments present a need for a broad prevention strategy that involves the society as a whole.

19.

Because both Governments demarcated the plans to concern prevention, investigative and intelligence measures are left outside the scope of the plans. By doing this, the government leaves out a large part of the preventative discourse that would have been interesting to investigate. Still, it is interesting to identify what is *not* presented in the discourse, and reasons as to why.

20.

5.4.6 The discourse of 'home-grown' *vs.* 'foreign fighter'

21.

" In a democratic society, violent extremism concerns trends, which in an extreme consequence can threaten democracy (…)" (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 7). This statement from the action plan of 2010 neatly summarizes the gist of the discourse on home-grown terrorism and the issue of foreign fighters. This discourse is present in both plans, but is presented

differently. It implies a contextual connection, which is a result of being a trending subject at present time. What the discourse concerns primarily is extreme nationals committing crimes of terror either nationally or internationally.

22.

The reason why this discourse changes character is due to changing circumstances in society. At the time the Action plan of 2010 was drafted, Europe had have several instances where persons born and raised in a European country, had been radicalized and committed terrorist attacks in their own country (European) (Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 9). The threat had somewhat turned away from terrorism executed by 'outsiders', to an increasing trend towards what is named as 'home-grown' terrorism. It is interesting how this issue in the discourse is presented as only a problem within the Islamic tradition (ibid). The discourse is further concerned with integration policy and how many countries in Europe, have been focused on links between a weak integration policy and the emergence of 'home-grown' terrorists, and minorities feeling of disassociation with society. It is offered an explanation that due to low sense of belonging, in neither the minority community nor the community at large, they turn to radical groups. What poses as a challenge in the discourse is how many seems to be well-integrated. Again, the presentation of the discourse seems to be overly concerned with the idea that this problem only stems from immigrants, and minorities with radical interpretation of Islam.

23.

In the Action plan of 2014, the discourse has changed. A new 'trend' in extremism has emerged. Still the problem is the same, where a country's citizens are committing crimes of terror. The issue with foreign fighters is split in to two, where one part of the problem is Norwegian (ethnic or not), travels to conflict zones to fight, and the second part is the concern that these people, after having combat training, return home and perform terrorist attacks. Explicitly, the discourse when presented in the 2014 plan is first occupied with assessing the threat foreign fighters may pose, especially at home. It is concerned with how participating in violent conduct abroad may lower the threshold at home, in combination with Norway as the enemy seems to be the governments most pressing concern (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 9). Also this part of the discourse needs to be viewed in its context. Foreign fighters is the name given to those who travel abroad to engage in combat for various reasons. This grew as a problem in society in 2012 when many Norwegians traveled to Syria to join the so-called Islamic State (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik: 2015: p.116).

24.

4 out of 30 concrete measures in the plan are devoted to foreign fighters. Gathering research on them, notices when they return, follow-up on returned fighters are what these measures concern. (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 18 & 22-23) In addition, one measure also calls for a regulation of the penal code on private persons who have participated in armed conflict (Ministry of Justice: 2014: p. 22). The discourse has developed from being almost exclusively concentrated on the violent Islamic threat, posed by people with immigrant background. In the action plan of 2014 the discourse seems to have more awareness about 'ethnic' Norwegians also being radicalized.

25.

6.

Social Practice

1.

Fairclough argues that texts, as the social element they are, have causal effects. The effects may not be obvious, and they can occur immediately or on a long-term basis. A text does not necessarily follow the regular pattern of cause-effect, and automatically and consciously bring about a causal effect in people's behavior, beliefs or action. This does not mean they are non-existent (2003: p. 8). He explains this due to the social context. What texts and the factors in the social context, decide whether and how a text might influence and effect. It also depends on the receiver of the text. Lastly, he asserts that it is not the texts itself, that causes the social effect, but the meaning in the texts that might have social impact (Fairclough: 2003:.p. 11-12). Therefore, the meaning of the discourses identified, coupled with the social practice can be adequate to say something about possible social consequences.

2.

The social practice represents the outer and last square of Fairclough's model. The primary objective with this part of the analysis is to look at the wider context, or practice, the text is a part of. It is described as "social conditions for interpretation" (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 80). This level of analysis can be considered as a discussion on the discursive practice, and how this might influence the social practice by how a subject is presented, and if it produces or reproduces the discourse (ibid: p. 82). I would again like to stress that the aim of the researcher should not be to get behind the discourse, but rather pay attention to the discourses, what is being said, and how this way of portraying the discourse can have social consequence (Jørgensen & Phillips: 1999: p. 31). The questions I asked in the introduction where what images of reality does the government want to, or do unconsciously create with the text and what actions are they causing? How are the discourses influencing the wider social practice?

3.

The intention with the plans is to create an inter-sectoral and broad approach to the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism. Further, the government wants to teach society how to notice and respond to possible radicalization, and better social conditions. The picture that is painted is one of overhanging, constant threat in society from forces that wants to hurt and create fear in the Norwegian society, and society is collectively responsible for contributing to the prevention of such forces. Looking out, Europe is also affected by this 'crisis' and is taking affair, and the government look to Europe and the Nordic countries for advice for prevention. It is presented as a battle *we* must fight, not with military means, but with "intellectual methods" and the judicial system, democracy, dialogue, and human rights.

4.

Values, and especially what is considered to be Norwegian values, are widely emphasized, and create the image of a joint society against radicalization and violent extremism. It also separates those who not identify with these values. The government is eager in the attempt to identify who these people are, and how radicalization can be prevented. In that lies a inherent belief, that by knowing who and why, society and public institutions can predict those 'at-risk' and intervene. The Norwegian governmental discourses are interpreted as highly influenced by International and European experience, and their discourses on radicalization. They have adopted many of the same beliefs and implemented them in the Action Plans.

5.

6.1 The 'multiculturalist scapegoat'

6.

The first Action plan of 2010 shows clear signs of the belief that violent Islamic terrorism, and Islamist radicalization is the biggest threat. This is much a adopted idea. History taught us, that this was not the case in Norwegian context. 22/7 was what constructivism would say is a historical happening that changed the agenda (Jackson & Sørensen: 2013: p. 209).

7.

Academics, like the Norwegian HIOA professor states in her essay "The terror in Norway and the multiculturalist scapegoat" (2012), that it became apparent that there had been too much focus on the extreme Islamist threat. This may well be due to learnt experiences from Europe that was not efficiently and accustomed to the Norwegian context. Norwegian history has been more 'plagued' by right-wing extreme acts of violence (assassins etc.)(Ministry of Justice: 2014: 9).

8.

This focus shows signs of a misinformed and wrongly influenced Norwegian discourse. Research on Nordic media coverage of immigrants, and Muslims also support this (Horsti: 2008). This does not eliminate that the threat might be real, or that this is possible for the future. But shows how thoughts, beliefs and experiences are influenced and constructs an image. Media to a large extent has since the 1990's focused on immigration from a negative point of view (Eide in Horsti: 2008: p. 281). If we continue the assumption that actors are informed, the media plays an important role in informing the government as well.

9.

Going back to the four strategies for preventing terrorism, prevention in Norway, through the use of soft power means such as social reform is important. It is a long term strategy, and often is good integration policy a part of this. Erna Solberg, before she became prime minister emphasized the importance of integration policy: "If second-generation immigrants do not feel affiliation with the Norwegian society, the consequences will be big. The aggression towards the Norwegian society will increase, with increased danger of crime, and/or sympathy with terrorist groups (Aftenposten: 12 [th] october, 2005)(My translation)". It is a fact that many Muslim immigrants are struggling and facing obstacles for a good integration in society, and is exposed to prejudice, but studies also show that immigrants, and second and third generations are more and more incorporated in society (Castles, Haas & Miller: 2014: p. 204-205).

10.

A critical question can be raised: if basing the strategy on the assumption of failed integration, which rests on a premise of xenophobia, will the strategic efforts ever work, and be implemented with the openness in society this type of strategy needs? (Knutsen in Hovi &Malnes: 2011: p. 236)

11.

Does the discourse produce an image of a situation worse than it is in reality? After 9/11, security became high on agenda, and some would say that the exaggerated threat posed by Muslim immigrants in Western society has become common. Radicals have been devoted to much room in the media, which affects the general discourse (Castles, Haas & Miller: 2014: p. 205). Another actor that also informs the governmental discourse is the Police Security Service (PST), which promotes Islamism as the biggest and most continues terror threat. This is informs the politics in such a way that it will be given additional focus, that again will provide a disproportionate image. Ketil Lund, a writer in the book "Police leadership"(2015)

(Politiledelse) says; "If I was a Muslim, I would be uneased, somewhat felt subjected to suspicion, just by being a Muslim", due to PST's focus on radical Islam.

12.

Tore Bjørgo, also emphasizes how recent years have focused on Islamic terror, which lead to a massive critique of how the government and police handled terror after 22 [nd] of July. Compared to the plan of 2010, the 2014 plan has a greater focus on control and surveillance, than on integration and education (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik: 2015: p. 68).

13.

6.2 Securitization?
14.

The governmental discourse is much oriented towards values, and the protection of Norwegian values. As I mentioned in chapter 5.4.2, on values, security policy that concern *what* the policy is protecting is often about values, and as significant for the states survival, and measures can come to be too wide (Hovi & Malnes: 2011: p. 104). When fundamental values are presented as in danger, it can lead to securitization, and given reason to curb other rights.

15.

Freedom of expression has been contested on what is acceptable and not acceptable to say in the public sphere. Freedom of expression has enjoyed good public support as a principle, but attitudes in defending the right for all opinions vary (Rønning in Carlsson: 2013: p. 14). Helge Rønning has conducted research on Norwegian public opinion on the importance of the freedom of expression. He found that "a majority would reject the right of religious extremists to hold public demonstrations (...). On the other hand, 74 % thought it was important to defend freedom of expression even if utterances were experienced as being offensive"(2013: p. 14). He concludes that there seems to be ambivalence with the Norwegian people about general tolerance, and freedom of expression. Are we eroding our own democracy?

16.

Extensive surveillance, no fly-lists, and curtailing of civil liberties is much a discussion that concerns the US. Still, the aftermath of 9/11 has affected the Norwegian society, new laws have been introduced, and Ketil Lund goes as far as to say that we have moved towards an increase in the level of surveillance in an accelerated speed (2015: p. 130). This increase is not mentioned in the action plans, which I find to be highly interesting. Portraying fundamental values of society as in danger may open for a wider definition of security policy, which may lead to disproportionate measures. Lund says that politicians has lost what should be the primary objective of the liberal state, namely to secure freedom for self-expression and life. Safety for the population should only be a means for this (Lund in Johannessen &Glomseth: 2015: p. 131).

17.

Even though dialogue is emphasized as an important measure in the plans, and as a part of the strategy, the social practice seem to entail that surveillance and other hard measures have increased, such as the permanent armament of the police (Lund in Johannessen &Glomseth: 2015: p. 134), and the discourse avoids the subject. Is the governments discourse used a securitization means, to legitimize other methods of prevention? "From this perspective, the notion of radicalisation has provided the basis for new political agendas based upon 'how best to counter what are interpreted, or indeed socially constructed, as problematic challenges to existing orders of states and societies'(Githens-Mazer:2012: 556)" (C. Beaker-Beall et al.: 2015: p. 6).

18.

19.

6.3 Dialogue as a strategy
20.

21.

Facilitating dialogue with intercultural and interfaith organizations and communities is highly emphasized in the governmental discourse of radicalization and violent extremism, in order to create tolerance, and understanding for each other's point of view. But the discourse is also conflicted, as it is emphasized that opinions we don't like to hear are to be opposed with "using democratic methods and intellectual weapons"(Ministry of Justice: 2010: p. 5). This perception creates an understanding of their political orientation as dysfunctional (Castles, Haas & Miller: 2014: p. 205).

22.

Media is increasingly focusing on ethnicity in their representation of minorities. This ethnification can lead to a divide in 'us' and 'them'. In a study on how a selected group of immigrants perceived their representation in media, one of the respondents answered that he was rarely (one time in ten years), invited to public debates unless it concerned immigration or integration

(Eide: 2010: p. 67) A social consequence is that other voices are shut out of the debate on other subjects, if they are only allowed a say in subjects that are assumed to interest them.

23.

As I discussed above, soft power means, as the social reform, which emphasizes the integration aspect, can face challenges if it is not implemented with the openness needed for this kind of cooperation. This would also have to apply for dialogue. But will such a strategy actually be able to detect those who have the potential to go violent, and reach these types of environments (Knutsen in Hovi & Malnes: 2011: p. 236)? If the radical communities are reached, and the possibility of dialogue is there, there is still a need to recognize the fact that having a radical opinions does not necessarily lead to a change in attitudes towards violence, and to violent activities (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik: 2015: p. 15). Being radical has, in the course of history, lead to many great developments all around the world.

24.

As a final remark it is important to notice how the discourse on terrorism has changed. Terrorism, constructed as a war, was commonplace after 9/11. From 2004, this image has changed, and the discourse on terrorism is now concerned with terrorism as an act of crime, and judicial matter (Hülsse & Spencer (2008) in Jackson & Sørsensen: 2014: p. 283). Pursuing the combat of radicalization and violent extremism, may have led to a discourse more in line with the democratic principles of rule of law and human rights, if we consider war always as unjust, and the universal right to fair trial.

25.

7.

Conclusions

1.

In this thesis I have looked at the governmental discourse on radicalization and violent extremism. The aim has been to identify how the government creates an image of reality on this subject, and to look at what discourses that figures prominently. I have identified 6 main discourses. The discourses concern a threat-assessment, which is highly influenced by a European identity, where violent Islamism is the common denominator. Media focus also contributes to exaggeration. It is theorized that due to globalization, many countries are facing similar challenges, which they often responded with similar policy solutions to (Marsh & Stoker: 1995. P. 184). Further, European countries due to the influence from the EU, is no longer "truly independent of one another" (ibid: p. 186). This is also what identified in the European/International discourse. The Norwegian government discourse is preoccupied with protecting Norwegian values, and democracy from attacks, and securing its survival, which has shown to be common in security policy.

2.

Both plans are interpreted as highly influenced by the context at the time, and is understood to be trending, due to the focus on 'home-grown' extremists, and 'foreign fighters'. In this way the plans is much a product of being in the discursive terrain in Europe. The discourses show a state under pressure to deal with this matter, and in fear of the state's existence and for public safety. Measures of a soft power character have been implemented, but also measures concerning surveillance and intelligence.

3.

It is important in the creation of policy that the rights of the individual, is carefully weighed with public security, so some groups are not marginalized as a result of eager work against radicalization. Organizations like Amnesty International have expressed their concern, and must be taken into consideration. There seems to be a utilitarian approach, where public safety is in favor of the individuals rights. Radicalization, on the contrary, happens in the individual. It is important that the government presents a nuanced, informed and unbiased representation of the situation, without prejudice, and in a Norwegian context. I address the importance of remembering this fine line, when issuing new policies and strategies.

4.

5.

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- Kommentar...

[Lagre] [Avbryt]